

What the MAOISTS are concealing

Notes on the Tenth
Congress of the
Communist Party
of China

by MIKHAIL ALTAISKY

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The Tenth Congress of the Communist Party of China was held in China in an atmosphere of deep secrecy. Everything was kept secret: preparations for the congress, the very fact it was held and the contents of the speeches. The congress documents were published only when it was over.

Why this secrecy? What are the Maoists trying to hide from the Chinese people and from the whole world? This article by Mikhail Altaisky, published in the Soviet paper *Literary Gazette*, provides answers to these questions.

The "September events" of 1971, which led to the disappearance from the political arena of Lin Piao, the "closest comrade-in-arms and successor of Chairman Mao", as well as of a large group of other prominent political figures, came as a profound shock in Peking and to a considerable extent paralysed the activity of the Maoists' military-bureaucratic group.

To put the Peking hierarchy in order became one of the most urgent tasks, and precisely for this reason the need arose to hold the Tenth Congress of the Party ahead of time. But the Mao group could not hold this congress without a thorough preliminary purge of the army and of various sections of the political apparatus. The scale of this purge may be judged from the foreign press reports, according to which more than 30,000 servicemen of different ranks were tried in connection with the "Lin Piao case".

The middle of 1973 saw signs of active preparations for the Tenth Congress. But the Maoists surrounded all the preparatory work and the very fact of the convening of the congress with such a veil of secrecy it seemed to be a question not of a congress of the ruling party, claimed to have 28 million members, but of a rally of representatives of secret societies.

The meagre documents of the Tenth Congress—Chou En-lai's political report, the report by Wang Hung-wen on changes in the Rules of the Communist Party of China, a formal communique on the Tenth Congress, the Rules of the Communist Party of China and the concluding report on the first plenary meeting of the central committee of the Communist Party of China of the tenth convocation—were all published after the congress had ended.

The clandestine atmosphere in which the congress took place shows the Maoists' fear of the Chinese people and of world public opinion; it shows their uncertainty about the future.

Mao Tse-tung and his group fear the light, they fear publicity and therefore resort to the favourite method of past Chinese rulers—political and ideological seclusion.

The congress once again demonstrated the anti-socialist essence of the Maoists' policy within the country and confirmed the anti-Soviet line of the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China in international affairs.

How then did Mao Tse-tung's group, whose dictatorship was spoken of at the Moscow meeting of Communist and Workers' Parties in 1969, manage to preserve its military-bureaucratic machinery of power?

Camouflage of a Serious Crisis

The final communique of the congress says it was "a congress of solidarity, a congress of victories and a congress full of vital strength and energy". But is not this flowery style only a camouflage of the grave crisis Maoism is experiencing? For in reality, despite statements about the numerical growth of the Communist Party of China, the party organisations are not in fact functioning as viable and genuine guiding bodies. This, in particular, is borne out also by the fact that preparations for the congress did not include preliminary conferences of provincial party organisations which, according to the Rules, should have elected the congress delegates. There were no provincial conferences, just as there was no election of delegates. Indeed, in violation of the Rules of the Communist Party of China, adopted by the Ninth Congress, the delegates were actually appointed or, as the communique states, "elected" by means of a "multiple exchange of opinions and consultations on the candidatures", though not a word was said about who actually "elected" these delegates and whom they represented.

Moreover, as the communique actually admits, the congress only rubber-stamped the agreement reached in the course of the keen struggle within the Maoist group and in fact merely recorded officially the results of complicated haggling.

The documents of the congress claim that "the experience of the last four years or so have fully confirmed the correctness of both the political and organisational line of the Party Congress". In every possible way the Chinese leaders at the Tenth Congress emphasised the continuity of the policy of the Ninth Congress. Chou En-lai and Wang Hung-wen laid particular stress on the fact that the political report to the Ninth Congress, which is known to have been made by Lin Piao, "had been drafted with the personal guidance of Chairman Mao Tse-tung". But the facts and the documents of the Tenth Congress themselves, and the admissions made in the reports by Chou En-lai and Wang Hung-wen point not to the correctness of Maoism but to yet another fiasco, to the continuation of the profound crisis the Peking ruling clique is experiencing.

As a matter of fact, Mao Tse-tung's political line, approved by the Ninth Congress, led to sharp differences within the Chinese leadership, for this course not only failed to indicate a way to solve the problems facing the country, it also contradicted the main trends in the development of the international situation. The Maoists had therefore to manoeuvre, to change their tactics in order to adapt themselves to the new situation.

It is indeed difficult to speak of the correctness of the organisational

line when the leading bodies of the Communist Party of China had been created at the Ninth Congress "under the personal leadership" of Mao Tse-tung and Mao Tse-tung had personally called Lin Piao his "most loyal comrade-in-arms, closest assistant and successor", but afterwards many members of the political bureau and many local leaders were victimised. Approximately one half of the membership of the political bureau, including the "successor" himself, later turned out to be "bourgeois careerists, intriguers, counter-revolutionaries, double-dealers, apostates and traitors to the homeland, Kuomintang agents, Trotskyites, special agents and revisionists". How can one speak of the "correctness of Mao Tse-tung's organisational line" if the congress had to be convened ahead of time and the Rules of the Party changed in order somehow or other to gloss over the organisational confusion in the structure of power after the "Lin Piao case"?

Covering Up the Traces of Crimes

Although a "political report by the central committee of the Communist Party of China" was on the congress agenda, no such report was actually delivered. The congress did not answer a single important question concerning the development of China and the party itself. Indeed, it did not even raise such questions.

As can be seen from the communique, the attention of the congress was mainly devoted to problems of the division of power within the Maoist military-bureaucratic group. Precisely for this reason the "Lin Piao case" became the central question.

The Chinese leaders faced an exceptionally complicated problem: how to speak about the "Lin Piao case" in such a way as actually to say nothing. Chou En-lai's report asserted that the "anti-party group of Lin Piao consisted of a mere handful of people, it was extremely isolated from the whole of the party, the whole of the army and the people and from the whole of the country and could not influence the situation as a whole". But, if this is so, how absurd is the bombastic argument that the elimination of Lin Piao "is one of the greatest victories of our party since the Ninth Congress, it is a severe blow at internal and external enemies", the argument that as a result of Lin Piao's removal not only, according to Chou En-lai, "is the line of the Ninth Congress penetrating ever more deeply into the consciousness of the people" but also "serious natural calamities have been overcome". Truly, when people try to prove too much, they prove nothing at all!

In order to divert attention from the failures of Mao Tse-tung's policy within China, the Chinese leaders seek to portray the "September events" of 1971 as a result of the machinations of external forces. At one time Chinese propaganda even attempted to present Lin Piao as an "agent of Moscow", but this fabrication proved to be so obviously bankrupt that in Peking they thought it better to limit themselves at the Tenth Congress to an attempt to depict Mao Tse-tung's closest associate as a wretched conspirator and impotent politician who, they allege, after the failure of the third and last "attempt on the life of the great leader" "unlawfully boarded a plane and took off in it in order to fly to the Soviet revisionists but crashed on the territory of the Mongolian People's Republic". It is interesting to note that the "top secret" materials of the "Lin Piao case"

(which for some reason or other were soon available in the editorial offices of all the biggest bourgeois newspapers and information agencies) show that Lin Piao's repeated attempts on the life of Mao were known to Mao's associates, and that Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai even knew of Lin Piao's intention to fly to a foreign country but for some reason or other did nothing to prevent it.

Who can believe such cock-and-bull stories like cheap thrillers, obviously cooked up in the offices of Kang Sheng's secret political police department? One cannot accuse the staff of these departments of being over-imaginative or exceptionally original—they simply chew the cud of the hackneyed clichés, dating back to the time of the Kuomintang, about the "hand of Moscow" and "Soviet red imperialism".

But if one ignores the numerous and sometimes self-contradictory descriptions of the "Lin Piao case" and seriously considers the meaning of even those political accusations which Chou En-lai levels at Lin Piao, one cannot help asking: Was there in fact any political conspiracy? Is not all the talk about Lin Piao as a conspirator an attempt to conceal the unprincipled struggle for power among Mao's closest associates and, also, to hide the traces of the physical extermination of Lin Piao and his immediate followers, to camouflage it as a plane crash? Seeking to compromise Lin Piao in every way, the Chinese leaders do not apparently realise how they are discrediting themselves, like the widow of the non-commissioned officer in Gogol's story, who "flogged herself". In the summer of 1972 the Japanese and Hong Kong press published a "top secret" letter of the central committee of the Communist Party of China, dated January 13, 1972, on the subject of "Lin Piao's counter-revolutionary conspiracy".

In the so-called "571 engineering scheme" (mentioned at the Tenth Congress), which is alleged to be a coded plan for "armed uprising", "the murder of Mao Tse-tung" and "the formation of a new central committee of the Communist Party of China", the following statement is made about Mao Tse-tung:

"Each time he dragged out one force to rout another, today he drags out this one to rout that one, tomorrow he will drag out that one to rout this one; today he sings the praises of certain people and tomorrow he labels them as traitors and destroys them; today he shares his throne with them and tomorrow they are his prisoners. The history of several decades shows that those whom he begins to promote invariably meet their political death later. What political forces could lastingly co-operate with him? His former secretary—an assassin among assassins, a jailer among jailers, one of his closest comrades-in-arms and associates—was himself put behind bars. He did not even spare his own son and drove him to insanity, he is an inveterate intriguer and a monster of cruelty; he will bury anyone alive and accuse him of all things bad. It is absolutely clear that all who had been his associates and were later overthrown were in reality scapegoats."

If this is a genuine document, it indicates that even persistent Maoists, if they retain any sense of political responsibility and of duty to their country, will sooner or later realise the pernicious nature of Maoism. This is precisely what the "case of Liu Shao-chi" and the "Lin Piao case" reveal.

On the other hand, if the "571 engineering scheme" is a falsification

(and this is the conclusion drawn by many specialists and even by Taiwan propagandists) the Maoists have copied it, as it were, from nature, perhaps even too naturalistically for such material.

Chou En-lai paints in the blackest hues the political ethics prevailing within the Peking ruling group when he asserts that Lin Piao was forced to deliver a report with which he did not agree and "against which he had secretly plotted", when he says about many of his colleagues of yesterday that they "do not show themselves without 'Chairman Mao's quotation book' in their hands, do not make a speech without 'Long live Chairman Mao!' on their lips, whom they eulogise in public and stab in the back."

If that is so then Chairman Mao leads a hard life and faces a still more joyless future! He is surrounded by "special agents", potential renegades and traitors, "time bombs" and "public figures" who fight against Mao Tse-tung under the banner of Mao Tse-tung's ideas.

In these circumstances Mao Tse-tung's call, eloquently formulated as "three musts and three must nots", addressed to his supporters, rings literally like a cry from the heart! "It is necessary to fulfil Marxism [read "the ideas of Mao Tse-tung"] and not revisionism [in the Maoist cant "revisionism" can be anything you like, including genuine Marxism-Leninism, so far as it does not correspond to Maoism]; it is necessary to unite and not to split; it is necessary to be honest and open, not to engage in intrigues."

Beautifully said! It is only a pity that neither the author of this tirade nor his supporters dare sort out their own words and deeds under the headings of the "three musts and three must nots". In that case, for self-analysis and self-appraisal, they could make good use of the eloquent collection of epithets used in connection with the "case of Liu Shao-chi" and the "Lin Piao case".

As stated in the "Political Report" (and this is one of the chief accusations!), Lin Piao and Chan Po-ta considered that "the main task after the Tenth Congress must be the development of production". But do Chairman Mao and his Prime Minister Chou En-lai think otherwise? Is not the development of production truly the main task for China, which the Chinese leaders themselves call a "backward, developing country"? Even the documents of the Tenth Congress mention among other tasks the need "to carry out a revolution and stimulate the development of production". Apparently Chou En-lai's words in his report to the Tenth Congress—"as always we lag behind the demands of the objective situation"—really and accurately characterise the policy of the Chinese leaders.

Cult of Terror under the Slogan of "Class Struggle" and "Continuation of the Revolution"

One of the main political arguments by which the Chinese leaders seek in the documents of the Tenth Congress to justify their arbitrary and adventurist policy, including the notorious "cultural revolution", countless purges and persecution of honest people suspected of opposing the policy of the Maoists, as well as Peking's slander of the socialist system in the Soviet Union and other fraternal states, are the theses of "the sharpening of the class struggle between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie", "the continuation of the revolution in conditions of dictatorship of the pro-

letariat", "the struggle of the two roads—capitalist and socialist"—until the triumph of communism. It would be difficult to say what predominates in this reasoning—political demagoguery or ignorance of the theory of scientific socialism. One might think that Mao Tse-tung and his followers, having never seriously studied the theory of Marxism-Leninism, had lost their way among three trees, had confused the social situation in the country in the period immediately following the victory of the socialist revolution with the period of building a mature socialist society and the transition to communism, as is now happening in the USSR. But something else is perfectly obvious—the way the theory of the "class struggle" is being artificially used to justify anti-socialist actions, the group struggle for power within the Peking leading clique and the slanderous attacks on the USSR and other socialist countries, where, as Mao claims, "capitalism has been restored".

All the arguments of the Chinese leaders on the class struggle are absolutely contrary to logic and the facts. They assert that China is a socialist country, that the dictatorship of the proletariat was allegedly strengthened in China in the course of the "cultural revolution" and that, as they say, the "cultural revolution" itself "is a great political revolution of the proletariat against the bourgeoisie and all other exploiter classes, taking place in the conditions of socialism".

If we are to take these assertions of the Chinese leaders seriously, the conclusion is inevitable: either there has been no socialist revolution whatever in China, no co-operation of agriculture, no transformation of capitalist industry and trade, no abolition of the exploiter classes and, hence, there is no socialism in China, or we are witnessing an attempt to use socialist phraseology to pursue a great power chauvinist anti-popular policy contrary to the principles of socialism and to suppress the sound socialist forces of society for the purpose of struggle against communists who are resisting Maoist policy.

As we know, remnants of the exploiter classes still exist in China. Yet the Maoists, while declaring war to the death against all "persons following the capitalist road" and "persons seeking to restore capitalism" (which means members of the Communist Party of China, old revolutionaries and workers), do not in any way touch the remnants of the exploiter classes. These purposely vague phrases about "persons" is only a convenient way of dealing with political opponents. For this purpose it is only necessary to label them "class enemies".

The Maoists' intensive exploitation of the thesis of the sharpening of the class struggle in conditions of socialism is nothing but an admission of the fact that their policy does not meet the interests and demands of the masses of the people, demands for the development of socialism in China, that it arouses sharp conflicts in society and the opposition of the masses of the people and that this policy can be pursued only in conditions of a desperate and continuous struggle of coercion, constant purges, terror and intimidation. This is evidently the meaning of statements made by Chou En-lai and Wang Hung-wen to the effect that campaigns like the "cultural revolution" will be repeated dozens of times at intervals of several years. It is interesting that Maoists link these campaigns with the "struggle of the two lines [Maoist and anti-Maoist—author's note] within the party"

and, according to Chou En-lai, "this struggle will repeat itself another 10, 20 or 30 times".

Moreover, with a view to making a greater show and for the "theoretical intensification" of this thesis, Wang Hung-wen's report even refers to a certain "objective law of the class struggle" which Mao Tse-tung has discovered. This "law" reads:

"Complete disorder in the Celestial Empire leads to universal order. This repeats itself every seven or eight years. All the scum rises to the surface by itself. It cannot but emerge. . . ."

Unstable Equilibrium

The materials of the Tenth Congress and the results of elections to the central committee and the leading organs of the party indicate that various hostile clans within the Maoist group succeeded in reaching a certain compromise on both organisational and political questions. This is borne out by the internal contradictions in the documents of the Tenth Congress, the attempt to combine in them incompatible trends. An undisputed success of the most extremist Maoist wing is the fact that the Tenth Congress approved the chief slogan of the "cultural revolution"—"to conduct a struggle, criticism and transformation in the sphere of the superstructure" and stressed the intensification of the class struggle and the thesis of "continuation of the revolution".

The fact that the documents of the congress did not reflect certain realistic economic measures carried into effect in the provinces and even mentioned in the press on the eve of the congress also shows the influence of the Maoist extremist wing on the drafting of the political line.

At the same time it is obvious that the organisers of the congress could not make up their minds wholly to ignore the imperative needs of the specific situation and the current demands of the development of the country. Linked with this, apparently, is the rehabilitation of a group of experienced veteran party and government workers, including such persons as former general secretary of the Communist Party of China Teng Hsiao-ping (in the years of the "cultural revolution" he was invariably spoken of as "person No. 2, holding power and following the capitalist road"), former members and alternate members of the political bureau and secretaries of the central committee of the Communist Party of China Tan Chen-lin, Wulanfu, Wang Chia-hsiang, Li Fu-chun and Li Chin-chuan, and a number of first secretaries of provincial committees of the party. They became members of the central committee of the Communist Party of China but were assigned the role of "specialists" and kept under careful control.

The inclusion in the leading party bodies of two representatives of the national minorities of China (Wei Kuo-ching of the Chuang, and Saifuddin of the Uigur), apparently reflects the effort to ease the tension in relations between the nationalities in the People's Republic of China, caused by Mao Tse-tung's chauvinist policy of assimilating the national minorities in China.

The fact that Chan Po-ta, who had been a prominent figure in the group of Chiang Ching-Kang Sheng and a leading ideologist of Maoism, was implicated in the "Lin Piao case" undoubtedly casts aspersions on

Mao Tse-tung himself, as well as on the group of "leftists", including Chiang Ching, Yao Wen-yuan and others.

Many foreign observers emphasise that the "times of trouble" in China are not over, that the struggle for power will continue and fresh outbursts are inevitable. Facts prove that the leading figures in Mao's group are preparing for this impending struggle and are energetically promoting their supporters to leading bodies of the party and the state. Probably at the session of the National People's Congress which, according to Chou En-lai, is to be held in the near future, the struggle for the appointment to government posts of representatives of the different groups will flare up anew.

In this connection it is also instructive that certain prominent Chinese public figures are reserving their positions with regard to Mao Tse-tung's line. The most odious and darkest aspects of the activities of the present Chinese leadership within the country (the "cultural revolution", persecution of party workers under the pretext of a purge, "May 7" schools, militarisation of the country) as well as in the field of foreign policy (open and unprincipled advances to imperialism on the basis of anti-Sovietism, solidarity with the most aggressive Nato circles and with revenge-seeking and other reactionary forces)—all this is presented as steps taken on the *personal initiative* and under the *personal leadership* of Mao Tse-tung. Nor is it accidental in this connection that Lin Piao's report to the Ninth Congress of the Communist Party of China was said to have been "drawn up under the personal guidance of Chairman Mao Tse-tung". These prominent public figures evidently strive to appear before public opinion and the court of history merely in the role of obedient executors of the will and instructions of Mao Tse-tung.

Although the Tenth Congress of the Communist Party of China to some extent "let off steam" from the over-heated boiler, it could not abolish the grim rivalry between the different clans of the Maoist group. Before a month had passed after the Tenth Congress, the notorious tatsupao (big character posters) again appeared on the walls of Peking and Shanghai with calls to "tear off the heads of new rogues of the type of Lin Piao". The word "rogues" implies certain high-ranking figures of the Peking ruling clique.

And so the question, natural to the internal mechanism of the Maoist régime, again arises: Who is next?

The Army and the Party

Both Chou En-lai's report and the report on changes in the Rules contained the following statement: "The party must guide everything", including the army and the Hungweiping organisations.

The calls to strengthen the role of the party are an indirect result of the "Lin Piao case" and, at the same time, an admission of the insolvency and dangerous nature of Mao's thesis that "power is born of the rifle", which led logically to the formulation "the rifle rules everything".

The Maoists are now trying to preserve the first thesis and reject the second. In practice this is being done by intensifying control of the army. But although the role of the army is not being emphasised at present, its exceptionally important position in the political life of the country remains.

This is proved by the fact that professional soldiers make up about 40 per cent of the membership of the new central committee of the Communist Party of China. In the political bureau of the central committee of the Communist Party of China regular officers and persons holding military posts form the absolute majority: 18 out of 25 members and alternate members of the political bureau; six out of nine in the permanent committee of the political bureau, and three out of the five vice-chairmen of the central committee of the Communist Party of China. Military men also hold strong positions in the provinces where in 22 out of the 29 local party and revolutionary committees they occupy all the key positions. Peking cannot but reckon with this.

Maoism—the Road to Nowhere?

In the field of home policy the congress did not in general advance any positive programme of social-economic construction in the country. The documents of the congress do not give a concrete analysis of the development of the country's economy and its prospects. The economic plan is mentioned only casually. Nevertheless, when giving a cursory enumeration of the country's tasks in the field of home policy, Chou En-lai, in addition to mentioning the insolvent Maoist dogmas, was forced, although also in an equally cursory manner, to call for the "strengthening of planning and co-ordination". He demanded that the party organisations "devote proper attention to questions of economic policy, show care for the life of the masses and investigate and study well how the state plans for national economic development should be fulfilled and overfulfilled". But if the Chinese leaders continue to follow the Maoist line all these calls will remain poised in mid-air, for the interests of the people are alien to Maoism: the real policy of Mao Tse-tung is directed at preserving the low living standards of the working people, at concentrating the country's entire resources on developing the war industry and missile and nuclear weapons.

They Fear the Detente

The chapters on foreign policy in the documents of the Tenth Congress do not contain a serious and realistic analysis of the international situation.

Between the lines of the congress documents it can be seen that the Peking leaders are obviously confused and annoyed by the detente in international relations connected primarily with the active peace offensive of the Soviet Union and the countries of the socialist community and which is the result of the growth in the might and international prestige of the forces of socialism, the socialist community in the first place, and also of the intensification of realistic trends in the policies of a number of big Western countries.

The Maoists, once again donning the toga of revolutionaries, maintain: "We are still living in the epoch of imperialism and proletarian revolution." Under cover of distorted interpretations of quotations from Lenin's works on imperialism, the Chinese leaders are in fact once again returning to the thesis of the inevitability of a world war. Fearing to come out in the role of open apologists of war, the Chinese leaders replace the word "war" by the abstract term "colossal upheavals in the world". Describing the

international situation they say: "A storm is brewing in the mountains and the wind is blowing through the rafters."

These flowery phrases are meant to conceal the Maoist line of sharpening international tension. Precisely in the "Political Report" the international detente is described as a "temporary and superficial phenomenon" and the "colossal upheavals" are declared to be "a good and not a bad thing". This shows unequivocally Peking's intention to oppose its policy to the general agreed line of the countries of the socialist community for a detente and consolidation of peace, a line which was approved by the congresses of the Communist Parties of the socialist countries and was again clearly outlined in the communique of the Crimean Meeting of leaders of the fraternal parties of the socialist countries in July 1973.

When considering the international situation Peking pretends that there is no socialist system, no socialist community.

The documents of the congress repeat the former adventurist slogan about setting up an "immensely wide united anti-American and anti-Soviet front", this being complemented by a call to all countries and, in particular, to the countries of the Third World to fight "against the hegemony of the two superpowers—the USA and the Soviet Union".

At the same time it is obvious from the general content of the congress documents that the criticism of American imperialism is considerably milder. The present Peking leaders direct the main blow at the Soviet Union, slandering in every way possible the home and foreign policy of our party and of the Soviet state.

The Chinese leaders put special stress on the mythical danger of a "surprise attack by social-imperialism", which, as we know, implies in Peking the Soviet Union. The danger of a world war is also being linked with this in the first place. "Social-imperialism" is presented as more aggressive than American imperialism. In this connection, the Chinese leaders have started a pseudo-scientific discussion on the possibility of compromises with imperialism in order to oppose "social-imperialism". An attempt is thus being made to justify the line of an unprincipled rapprochement with the biggest Western powers on an anti-Soviet basis.

At times certain public figures in the West hasten to acquire an ally in Peking so as to achieve certain political aims in the international arena. But let them make no mistake about the genuine intentions and possibilities of the present Chinese leaders! A new Far East Munich is not destined to take place! In this connection it would be fitting to recall the Chinese proverb: "He who lifts a stone will crush his own feet!"

In connection with the rabid anti-Soviet policy pursued by Mao and his supporters it is worth recalling certain conclusions drawn by the Communist Party of China from the lessons of Chiang Kai-shek's counter-revolutionary coup in 1927 and the treachery of certain former "leftist" Kuomintang members who went over to the enemy after Japan's attack on China.

It is noteworthy that these conclusions were outlined by Mao Tse-tung in 1940 in his work *On the New Democracy*.

Here is what he said at that time:

"If China wants to become independent, it cannot do without the

assistance of the socialist state and the international proletariat. . . . To reject the aid of the Soviet Union means to doom the revolution to defeat."

There then follow words which sound like an admonition in present-day conditions:

"At present the situation is absolutely clear: If not a policy of alliance with Russia, if not an alliance with the socialist state, then there must be a policy of alliance with the imperialists, there must be an alliance with imperialism. . . . But if you form an alliance with them [imperialists—author's note] they will demand that you 'march North with war' and nothing will be left of your revolution."

Mao Tse-tung repeated this conclusion from the lessons of history in 1957 when he declared: "After the October revolution, the government of any country refusing to live in friendship with the Soviet Union will only harm the genuine interests of its own people."

It follows that at present Mao Tse-tung (like Lin Piao at the Ninth Congress, according to Chao En-lai) is intriguing against his own words, and more so, even against the lessons of history. It appears that the present-day policy of Mao—even from the viewpoint of his former principled positions—is anti-Chinese! And this is really so.

The Chinese leaders' line for rapprochement with the West is known to be widely commented upon in the world press. Serious-minded observers emphasise that the Peking leaders would like to use their rapprochement with the West to interfere both with the general detente and the Western countries' normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries. To implement its anti-Soviet policy Peking wants to obtain from the West both political support for its chauvinist ambitions and economic assistance.

In pursuing this line, however, the Maoists are forced to reckon with the fact that their policy of rapprochement with the West has its limits and is fraught with dangerous consequences for themselves. The still existing socialist elements of the basis and superstructure in China, the Chinese people's deep-rooted hatred for imperialism, imperialism which in its time brought China tremendous misfortunes—all this raises obstacles to the policy of unprincipled rapprochement with Western imperialist states. The Maoists, seeking to lessen the people's dissatisfaction with such a policy, are therefore trying to present it as an attempt to find a new ally in the face of "aggression from the North", i.e. the Soviet Union, fanning anti-Sovietism in China in every possible way.

Another obstacle to China's open rapprochement with the imperialist countries and the formation of blocs with them is, strange as it may seem, Peking's hegemonistic foreign policy itself and also its hopes of achieving leadership of the Third World and using the alliance with the countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America to strengthen its positions in the world arena as a "superpower". The fear of undermining its authority still more in the Third World forces the Peking leaders to retain the anti-imperialist slogans.

Moreover, the policy of forming blocs with imperialist and frankly reactionary revenge-seeking forces in the West arouses criticism even from those friends of the Maoists who sincerely believed in their anti-imperialist slogans and accepted Peking's revolutionary phrases in all good faith.

A Synthetic Scarecrow

Chou En-lai's report and the formal communique of the congress touch upon Soviet-Chinese relations. One might welcome Chou En-lai's statement to the effect that the disputes between China and the Soviet Union "should not interfere with the normalisation of relations between the two countries on the basis of the five principles of peaceful co-existence, border issues between China and the Soviet Union should be peacefully settled by means of negotiations in conditions excluding any threat". But these wise words, first spoken in October 1969, have not been confirmed since then by practical deeds but have been accompanied by irresponsible talk about a mythical "threat from the North" and abuse showered upon the Soviet Union and its policy.

We see that the Chinese leaders' words thus differ from their deeds and the fine words contained in the "Political Report" that the Chinese leaders "are true to their word" are refuted by their treacherous actions and pharisaical policy.

For it was precisely the Chinese leaders who at the beginning of the 'sixties began to concentrate troops along the entire Soviet-Chinese frontier to evict local inhabitants and build military settlements and various military installations. It was precisely on the orders of Mao that one provocation after another began to be organised on the Soviet-Chinese border, going as far as big bloody skirmishes.

From the material published by the Hungweipings during the "cultural revolution" we know that at one of the working conferences in the central committee of the Communist Party of China in 1963, Lo Jui-ching, then Chief of the General Staff of the Chinese People's Army of Liberation and secretary of the central committee of the Communist Party of China, warned Mao Tse-tung and Lin Piao that the "preparations in case of war" actively being made along the Soviet-Chinese border may force the USSR to retaliate. According to the same source, Mao replied that it was profitable for China to draw the Soviet Union's attention to the border with China and that this border "must be transformed for the USSR into one bleeding wound".

However, when the Soviet Union was forced, in defence of its borders, to take the necessary measures to reinforce its frontier fortifications, the Peking leaders raised an incredible hue-and-cry about "the threat from the North", the "concentration of Soviet troops on the border", etc. etc. At the same time, the Soviet Union's numerous proposals for normalising the situation on the frontier and Soviet-Chinese relations were either ignored or rejected. At their congress the Maoists did not even mention this initiative of the USSR.

As Leonid Brezhnev, general secretary of the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, stated in his speech in September 1973 at Tashkent, the Chinese leaders did not even deign to reply to the proposal of the central committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the USSR Council of Ministers for the conclusion of a non-aggression treaty between the USSR and the People's Republic of China, advanced in the middle of June 1973. This proposal convincingly shows the Soviet Union's good will

and constructive approach to the question of the development of relations with the People's Republic of China.

Formerly, the Maoists had rejected or failed to reply to our proposals for a summit meeting, for confirmation of the validity of the Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance (1950), for signing an agreement on the non-use of force, including conventional and missile and nuclear weapons, and to a whole series of constructive proposals for the normalisation of relations between states. Seeking to avoid a serious discussion of these proposals and to conceal the insolvency of their policy towards the Soviet Union and the absence of a realistic constructive approach to it, the authors of the "Political Report" of the central committee of the Communist Party of China resorted to a feeble trick. Apparently counting on people's complete lack of knowledge, they ask with affected naivete: "Must it [China—author's note] really give up to the Soviet revisionists the whole of its territory to the north of the Great Wall in order to demonstrate its approval of the international detente and readiness to improve Chinese-Soviet relations?" The authors of this rhetorical question well understood that the Soviet Union has no territorial claims on the People's Republic of China. One may ask: Why are the Chinese leaders playing such an unscrupulous game? How can one believe these political leaders who, knowing the true facts, spread such villainous confusion?

What has caused such violent bitterness towards the Soviet Union by the Chinese leaders? There are a number of causes—mainly internal, and also, of course, due to the fact that the Chinese people, despite a frantic anti-Soviet campaign over many years, continue to cherish friendly feelings for the Soviet Union, the genuine friend of the Chinese people.

The constructive steps to normalise Soviet-Chinese relations taken by our country in recent years have placed the Chinese leaders in a difficult position.

The bitter anti-Soviet attacks and inventions contained in Chou En-lai's report and in other documents of the congress pursue the ultimate aim of justifying their hostile policy towards the Soviet Union and intimidating those who think otherwise.

As far as the Soviet Union and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union are concerned, they are pursuing a consistent principled internationalist line towards China, a line approved by the 24th Congress of the CPSU. We threaten no one, China included. We have no political or territorial claims on any one, China included, and do not intend interfering in its internal affairs. A policy of threats and blackmail radically contradicts the principles of the Soviet state and of our party. We stand for friendship, co-operation and good-neighbourly relations with all nations, the great Chinese people included. Our party has repeatedly declared this.

Speaking in Alma-Ata in the summer of 1973, Leonid Brezhnev said: "Our principled course, which combines a resolute struggle against the theory and practice of Maoism, as a trend inimical to Leninism, with readiness to normalise inter-state relations with the People's Republic of China, the course of the 24th Congress, remains invariable." In his speech in Tashkent on September 24, 1973, Leonid Brezhnev stressed once more that our party and the Soviet state are pursuing a line not only for normalising relations with the People's Republic of China but, more than that,

for restoring Soviet-Chinese friendship, which would accord with the vital interests of the peoples of our countries and all peaceloving forces.

The statements of the Soviet leaders on these questions are backed by deeds, are expressed in the language of specific and constructive proposals.

The entire Soviet people and all Soviet communists wholly and fully support this realistic policy of our party towards China. The policy of our party proceeds from the cardinal fact that the vital interests of the Soviet and Chinese peoples, far from conflicting, coincide. And our party therefore exposes as dangerous and injurious for China itself the attempts of the Peking leaders to justify their anti-Sovietism by claiming that there is a clash of interests between China and the Soviet Union, by alleging that there is still an outstanding territorial question, by farfetched territorial claims on the USSR and hackneyed fabrications about the "threat from the North". Sooner or later it must and will be understood in China that the policy of enmity pursued by the Chinese leadership will not benefit China and that it only harms, in the first place, the Chinese people and the cause of building socialism in China.

An analysis of the documents of the Tenth Congress of the Communist Party of China shows that this congress made no contribution to the solution of complicated and urgent problems of the development of China along the road of socialism—rather on the contrary. The Maoists used this congress to ease the internal discord and to strengthen the dictatorial régime of the military-bureaucratic group, whose policy not only threatens the socialist achievements of the Chinese working people but also does serious harm to the cause of socialism, democracy and peace in the whole world. Furthermore, the Maoist adventurist foreign policy creates a new source of tension in the world.