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The Interkit Story: A Window into the Final Decades of the Sino-Soviet Relationship

By James Hershberg, Sergey Radchenko, Péter Vámos, and David Wolff, February 2011



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**The Interkit Story:
A Window into the Final Decades of the Sino-Soviet Relationship**

James Hershberg, Sergey Radchenko, Péter Vámos, and David Wolff

The tumultuous relationship between the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China—from alliance to bitter falling out to violent border clashes to frigid standoff to wary warming—was one of the main plotlines of the Cold War narrative; and the central drama in the evolution of the communist world from mighty ideological and geopolitical monolith (at least on the surface) and rival to the American-led “free world” to nasty schism to ultimate fragmentation and collapse. Thanks to the progressive opening of both Chinese and Soviet (and Soviet-bloc) sources and archives, the years since the Cold War's conclusion have seen an outpouring of new scholarly accounts of the creation, short life, and dissolution of the alliance forged by Joseph Stalin and Mao Zedong in Moscow in February 1950.¹ Most recently, detailed studies by Lorenz

¹ For examples of important publications of new evidence on the Sino-Soviet relationship beginning in the early 1990s—not including broader studies of Chinese and Soviet foreign policy and history by such figures as Chen Jian and Vladislav Zubok that, inter alia, deal with this subject—see, e.g., Odd Arne Westad, *Cold War and Revolution: Soviet-American Rivalry and the Origins of the Chinese Civil War, 1944-1946* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993); Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao, and the Korean War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993); Michael Sheng, *Battling Western Imperialism: Mao, Stalin, and the United States* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997); Odd Arne Westad, ed., *Brothers in Arms: The Rise and Fall of the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1945-1963* (Washington, DC: Wilson Center Press/Stanford University Press, 1998); Wu Lengxi, *Shinian Lunzhan, 1956-1966: Zhong Su Guanxi Huiyilu* [Ten years of polemics: a memoir on Sino-Soviet relations, 1956-1966], 2 vols. (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian chubanshe, 1999); Yang Kuisong, *Mao Zedong yu Mosike de Enenyuanyuan* [Mao Zedong and Moscow: gratitude and resentment] (Hong Kong: Sanlian chubanshe, 2000); Dieter Henzig, *The Soviet Union and Communist China, 1945-1950: The Arduous Road to the Alliance* (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2003); Andrei Ledovskii, Raisa Mirovitska'ia, and Vladimir Miasnikov, eds., *Russo-Kitaiskie Otnosheni'ia v XX veke*, vol. 5 (1946-1950) (Moscow: Pamiatniki Istoricheskoi Mysli, 2005); Shu Guang Zhang, “The Sino-Soviet alliance and the Cold War in Asia, 1954-1962,” in Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., *The Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. I (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 353-375, and Sergey Radchenko, “The Sino-Soviet Split,” in Leffler and Westad, eds., *Cambridge History of the Cold War*, Vol. II, pp. 349-372; see also various articles in the *Journal of Cold War Studies* (JCWS) and *Cold War History* (CWH) and in various publications of the Cold War International History Project, including the *CWIHP Bulletin* (CWIHPB), esp. nos. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 3-29, 94-119, and 148-207; nos. 8-9 (Winter 1996/97), pp. 220-279; issue 10 (March 1998), pp. 149-182; nos. 12-13 (fall/winter 2001), pp. 243-262, 335-336; and no. 16 (fall 2007/winter 2008), pp. 105-398, and working papers such as no. 30, David Wolff, *One Finger's Worth of Historical Events: New Russian and Chinese Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Alliance and Split, 1948-1959* (2002), no. 36, Paul Wingrove, *Mao's Conversations with the Soviet Ambassador, 1953-1955* (2002); no. 42, Sergey Radchenko, *The Soviets' Best Friend in Asia: The Mongolian Dimension of the Sino-Soviet Split* (2003); no. 49, Wang Dong, *The Quarreling Brothers: New Chinese Archives and a Reappraisal of the Sino-Soviet Split, 1959-1962* (2006); and no. 54, Péter Vámos, *Sino-Hungarian Relations and the 1956 Revolution* (2006). Among the important journal articles to appear in recent years are Sergey Radchenko, “Mongolian Politics in the Shadow of the Cold War: The 1964 Coup Attempt and the Sino-Soviet Split,” *JCWS* 8:1 (Winter 2006); Chen Jian, “The Tibetan Rebellion of

M. Lüthi and Sergey Radchenko, building on Chinese, Russian, and other records, have tracked the story through the mid-1960s, bringing the tale beyond Khrushchev's ouster and up to the early stages of the Cultural Revolution's chaos and concurrent sharpening of the Sino-Soviet conflict and competition.²

However, comparatively little fresh scholarship or published new evidence from communist sources has emerged on Sino-Soviet relations during the second half of the post-World War II superpower confrontation—from the shrill rhetoric and frenzied rallies of the Cultural Revolution and the military buildups and bloody fighting along the remote, disputed Ussuri River frontier in the late 1960s, to the rapprochement two decades later, epitomized by the chaotic May 1989 summit in Beijing between Deng Xiaoping and Mikhail Gorbachev as protesters thronged Tiananmen Square, shortly before the Cold War and then the USSR itself winked out of existence.³ Much of that story remains murky or confusing, not only the decision-making at the highest levels but details of mutual exchanges and perceptions between Beijing and Moscow (and its allies), and the evolution of policies and actions by the two rivals' military, political, ideological, and intelligence arms. Lingering secrecy has impeded or precluded investigation into some topics, but much has remained inaccessible to interested scholars simply

1959 and China's Changing Relations with India and the Soviet Union," *JCWS* 8:3 (Summer 2006); Lorenz Lüthi, *The People's Republic of China and the Warsaw Pact Organization*, *CWH* 7:4 (Nov. 2007), pp. 479-494; Shen Zhihua and Xia Yafeng, "Hidden Currents during the Honeymoon: Mao, Khrushchev, and the 1957 Moscow Conference," *JCWS*, vol. 11:4 (Fall 2009), pp. 74-117; and idem, "The Whirlwind of China: Zhou Enlai's Shuttle Diplomacy in 1957 and Its Effects," *CWH* 10:4 (Nov. 2010), pp. 513-535.

² Lorenz M. Lüthi, *The Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2008); Sergey Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens: The Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962-1967* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press/Stanford University Press, 2009). On *The Sino-Soviet Split*, see also the roundtable on H-DIPLO (15 December 2008) and symposium in *JCWS*. 12:1 (winter 2010), pp. 120-165.

³ Perhaps the only book-length treatment of Sino-Soviet relations in the last decades of the Cold War is Elizabeth Wishnick, *Mending Fences: The Evolution of Moscow's China Policy from Brezhnev to Yeltsin* (University of Washington Press, 2001). For journal articles presenting fresh communist evidence on Sino-Soviet relations since the mid-1960s, see, e.g., Christian Ostermann, "East German Documents on the Sino-Soviet Border Conflict, 1969," *CWIHPB* 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), pp. 186-93; Chen Jian and D. Wilson, "'All under Heaven is Great Chaos': Beijing, the Sino-Soviet Border Clashes, and the Turn toward Sino-American Rapprochement, 1968-1969," *CWIHPB* 11 (Winter 1998), 155-175; Yang Kuisong, "The Sino-Soviet Border Clash of 1969: From Zhenbao Island to Sino-American Rapprochement," *CWH* 1:1 (Aug. 2000), 21-52; Lorenz M. Lüthi, "Beyond Betrayal: Beijing, Moscow, and the Paris Negotiations, 1971-1973," *JCWS* 11:1 (winter 2009), pp. 57-107; Mircea Munteanu, "Communication Breakdown? Romania and the Sino-American Rapprochement, 1969-1971," *Diplomatic History* 33:4 (September 2009), pp. 615-631; Nicholas Khoo, "Breaking the Ring of Encirclement: The Sino-Soviet Rift and Chinese Policy Toward Vietnam, 1964-1968," *JCWS* 12:1 (winter 2010), pp. 3-42; Mircea Munteanu, "When the Levee Breaks: The Impact of the Sino-Soviet Split and the Invasion of Czechoslovakia on Romanian-Soviet Relations, 1967-1970," *JCWS* 12:1 (winter 2010), pp. 43-61; Lorenz M. Lüthi, "Restoring Chaos to History: Sino-Soviet-American Relations in 1969," *The China Quarterly* (forthcoming).

because of the financial and linguistic challenges inherent in scouring relevant archives in various countries of the former communist realm, even if they have already been opened.

To stimulate and support scholarly inquiry into the largely untold story of the Sino-Soviet rivalry and relationship during the latter decades of the Cold War, we have launched a project to collect and assess archival sources from the now partially-open Russian archives and generally-open archives of the Warsaw Pact nations of East-Central Europe (ECE) on an organization set up by the Kremlin to coordinate Soviet-bloc analysis of and policy toward China from 1967 until the mid-1980s. That institution, known as “Interkit” (derived from the Russian word for China, “*Kitai*”), periodically gathered China experts from the USSR, its Warsaw Pact allies, and a shifting mix of other nations aligned with the Kremlin (e.g., Mongolia, Vietnam, Laos, and Cuba). The participants—primarily communist party functionaries but also, in some cases, diplomatic and/or academic China “hands”—considered the political, economic, ideological, cultural, and other dimensions of dealing with their problematic former ally. Interkit’s unannounced meetings, mostly in Eastern Europe but occasionally in more far-flung locales such as Ulaanbaatar and Havana, spanned Mao Zedong’s last years to the transitional period after his death in September 1976, from the brief yet intense succession struggle to the reign of Deng Xiaoping and his policies of modernization and economic reform and opening. By the mid-1980s, as recounted below, as Mikhail Gorbachev took power and began a concerted effort to repair Soviet ties with Beijing, the ECE allies were starting to go their own way and were less willing to take direction from Moscow, and Interkit had outlived its usefulness.

The Interkit story, we believe, with its ongoing dialogue between the Kremlin and its allies on the gamut of China-related subjects, paralleled and therefore offers insight into the evolution of Sino-Soviet relations—both Moscow’s views of and policies toward China and the impact, or lack thereof, of Beijing’s efforts to “differentiate” in its relations among the USSR’s allies, the better to promote discord within the Soviet bloc. Until now, Interkit has received scant scholarly attention—we believe only one serious study has significantly alluded to the organization, Claudie Gardet’s examination of Sino-East German relations (published in 2000), and only in that limited context using primarily German sources.⁴

⁴ Claudie Gardet, *Les Relations de la République populaire de Chine et de la République démocratique allemande (1949-1989)* (Bern: Peter Lang, 2000), based on her French dissertation. Typically, a special issue of *The China*

Building on that study, we are taking a far broader approach. We aim to illuminate relations between the entire Soviet bloc and China over more than a two-decade period rather than focusing on one particular Warsaw Pact ally. Besides seeking records related to the Interkit process itself, we recognize that it is also crucial to collect and disseminate evidence on higher-level debates and exchanges such as records of summits and politburo meetings, cable traffic between Soviet-bloc foreign ministries and their embassies in Beijing, and bilateral inter-party exchanges. For at least the initial phase of this project, we are focusing on Russian and ECE archives, since post-1965 Chinese archival records remain extremely difficult to access (the Foreign Ministry Archives in Beijing has only processed and opened files until that date); for that matter, the extent of Chinese awareness of “Interkit” remains uncertain, although the outlines of its “differentiation” strategy are well known.

The project grew out of an initial exploration of Interkit by Prof. David Wolff in 2003 when (not yet aware of Gardet’s work) he assembled Russian and East German archival records (in particular a stenogram of the group’s second meeting, in Berlin in 1969, from SAPMO, a depository for the SED records) for a presentation at a conference in Budapest devoted to using Central and East European archives on the Cold War in Asia; Wolff subsequently published his early findings in *Russian History*.⁵ Our efforts to look into this topic have benefitted, over the years, from parallel endeavors by CWIHP and the Parallel History Project, including an oral history conference on Sino-East European relations in Beijing in March 2004 and the posting of pertinent materials on the PHP website.⁶

This new effort to collect a wider range of sources—not only documents from various Warsaw Pact countries but also oral history evidence from participants—is overseen by Prof. Wolff at the Slavic Research Center (SRC) of Hokkaido University in Sapporo, Japan, in collaboration with the Cold War International History Project and other academic institutions. In February 2010, the SRC, along with the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and CWIHP, organized

Quarterly on China and Europe Since 1978: A European Perspective (Cambridge University Press, 2002), did not even substantially address Sino-East-Central European relations.

⁵ Wolff, “Warsaw Pact Sinology and the Sino-Soviet Split,” presentation to international conference, “New Central and East European Evidence on the Cold War in Asia,” organized by George Washington University and hosted by Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest, 31 October-1 November 2003; Wolff, “Interkit: Soviet Sinology and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1967-1986,” *Russian History* 30:4 (2003), pp. 433-456.

⁶ See Xiaoyuan Liu and Vojtech Mastny, eds., *China and Eastern Europe, 1960s-1980s* (Zurich: Zürcher Beiträge Nr. 72, 2004). The project has benefitted in particular from East German materials, originally collected for PHP, by Bernd Schaefer.

a second Budapest workshop, hosted by Dr. Péter Vámos and focused on Interkit and Sino-Soviet relations, to gather international perspectives from archives in the region and beyond, collect oral history testimony from Hungarian participants in the Interkit process, and brainstorm future activities (See Appendix III for program). Hungarian, Polish, Czech and Mongolian documents were added to the German and Russian materials available earlier. A second workshop is now scheduled to take place in Freiburg, Germany—also hosted by Dr. Vámos—in May 2011; there are also plans in the works for further documentary and oral history workshops.

In this working paper, we present an initial sampling of translated documents to outline Interkit’s shadowy existence, together with a contextual introduction that outlines our current knowledge of the group’s existence and raises some key questions about its function and activities. Did it actually influence or even shape Kremlin policy toward China and perceptions of what was happening there? Or was it primarily a transmission belt to spread propaganda, coordinate policy, and enforce orthodoxy among Moscow’s allies? Was it an accurate barometer of the shifting Sino-Soviet relationship, or did a particular faction—most likely the hard-line Soviet China experts led by party stalwart Oleg Rakhmanin—sometimes dominate or distort Interkit’s proceedings to advocate its own policies or maneuver in bureaucratic struggles over how to deal with the PRC? To what extent, if at all, did non-Soviet China experts use the regular gatherings to develop their own approaches, if not in the plenary sessions (where disagreements tended to be smoothed over) then in more private bilateral talks? Were the effects of China’s “differentiation” strategy evident in the Interkit proceedings? Did Beijing closely track the organization, or try to influence its activities or outcomes, either directly (through contacts with participants) or indirectly?

These are among the questions we will be exploring in our Interkit project, along with others that will emerge as more evidence is assembled and assessed. As suggested by the title of Wolff’s journal article—“Interkit: Soviet Sinology and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1967-1986”—one major aim of our inquiry, aside from enhancing our knowledge and analysis of the trajectory of Sino-Soviet relations, is to better understand the evolution of Soviet/Russian (and East-Central European) scholarship on China. Inevitably, the academic discipline of Chinese studies in the USSR and other communist nations during this period was influenced, indeed warped, by ideological and policy imperatives, and the same China experts who populate the Interkit

narrative also tended to dominate, or at least heavily influence, both policy toward and academic studies of China in their own countries.

Mikhail S. Kapitsa,⁷ Oleg B. Rakhmanin,⁸ Mikhail I. Sladkovskii,⁹ and Sergei L. Tikhvinskii were the Big Four and maintained a firm hold on all studies of China, from the commanding heights of four interlocking institutions. In addition, the last three names were among a small group of “counselor-experts” selected to participate in various party analyses “of the Chinese problem.”¹⁰ By the early 1980s, Kapitsa had become the deputy foreign minister (after a long tenure as director of the Foreign Ministry’s Far Eastern Department), Rakhmanin worked as first deputy director of the Department for Relations with Fraternal Countries (known simply as THE Department), Sladkovskii oversaw several hundred specialists as director of the Institute of the Far East, while Tikhvinskii trained diplomats as the head of the Soviet Union’s Diplomatic Academy. During the final six years of the Brezhnev era, this quartet produced over 200 articles and books, providing unerring semi-official guidance to Soviet China experts, academics and journalists regarding the party line.¹¹ Two of the Sinological “gang of four,” Rakhmanin and Sladkovskii, were also Interkit leaders. As the directors of China-policy in the Central Committee and of the Institute of the Far East, these two individuals represented the two streams of policy-oriented China-watching that would be merged into Interkit, shaping elite and popular perceptions of the Middle Kingdom throughout the Warsaw pact.¹² Gilbert Rozman, the

⁷ Mikhail Kapitsa (1921-1995). In 1970-82, head of the First Far Eastern Department (Socialist countries) of the Soviet Foreign Ministry; in 1982-87, Deputy Foreign Minister.

⁸ Oleg Rakhmanin (1924-2010) served as First Deputy Director of the International Department for Relations with Fraternal Parties from 1968 to 1985.

⁹ Mikhail I. Sladkovskii (1906-1985) After graduation from Far Eastern State University in Vladivostok, he worked in the Ministry of Foreign Trade from 1930 until 1965. Director of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies from 1966 until 1985.

¹⁰ “About the Group of Expert-Advisors on the China Issue,” 20 October 1972, f. 4, op. 22, d. 1004, l. 2, Russian State Archive of Contemporary History (RGANI), Moscow.

¹¹ Gilbert Rozman, *A Mirror for Socialism: Soviet Criticisms of China* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), pp. 44, 50-51.

¹² Actually, the Warsaw Pact plus Mongolia, Cuba and Vietnam, but minus Romania. Further guidance was provided by the Scientific Coordination Council on the Problems of Chinese Studies (*Koordinatsionnyi nauchnyi sovet po problemam kitaevdeniia*) under the direction of Mikhail Sladkovskii, director of the Institute of the Far East, in March 1974 in Moscow. Seven fraternal countries were also represented in the International Commission on the Contemporary Problems of the Far East (*Mezhdunarodnaya komissiya po aktual'nyim problemam dal'nego vostoka*) established in April 1976 in Moscow. See report by Barna Tálas (Hungarian Institute for Foreign Affairs) and Károly Lipkovics (Party School of the CC HSWP): The founding meeting of the Scientific Coordination Council of coordinating socialist countries’ China research centers. Moscow, March 20-22, 1974. Budapest, 25 March 1974, Hungarian National Archives (HNA), M-KS 288. f., 32/b/1974, 76. ő. e., Budapest; Report by Otto

closest student of Soviet Sinology in the 1960s-1980s, has observed that: “Only after 1967 was a concerted effort made to explain what had happened and was happening in the PRC...At the end of the 1960s Soviet Chinese studies reached their maturity. From this time to 1982 they would be marked by voluminous output, stable organization, and a consistent prevailing outlook on Chinese society. This outlook was an amplification of emerging views from the mid 1960s; so there was no fundamental change in thinking for about two decades under Brezhnev’s and Suslov’s leadership...”¹³ Such was the fate of Soviet Sinology during the later years of the Cold War.

In sum, despite considerable mystery as to its inner politics and relationship to high-level decision-making, Interkit undoubtedly comprised a key part of Sino-Soviet relations and Moscow’s policy toward Beijing in the second half of the Cold War. We look forward to exploring these issues in the years to come, and invite inquiries and suggestions from colleagues interested in collaborating in this effort.

I. Interkit’s Origins and Early Years

The Soviet Union had always been more than a state, an empire or a superpower. It was also the Third Rome, the holy land, the keeper of the communist faith, the authoritative interpreter of Truth within the socialist bloc and the international communist movement. The Soviet Foreign Ministry had only a limited remit in these ideological matters, which nevertheless were at the very core of state policy, and so required the involvement of the Communist Party, and even the creation of specialized institutions to promote conformity and advance Soviet interests, draped in appropriate ideological formulations, within the ranks of foreign communist parties and, after 1945, within the communist bloc. The most famous of these institutions was the Comintern (1919-1943), a formidable weapon in Stalin’s hands, used both to enforce obedience in the international communist movement, and, when needed, to channel funds and weapons to suit the Kremlin’s aims. Dismantled during the Second World War in an effort to please

Juhász CC HSWP International Department) on the establishment of the International Commission on the Contemporary Problems of the Far East. Budapest, 22 June 1976 HNA, M-KS 288. f., 32/b/1976..

¹³ Rozman, *A Mirror for Socialism*, pp. 42-3. Rozman’s analysis tracks Soviet views of various Chinese classes/groups to document Aesopian commentary regarding the possibility of reform within socialist systems. His introduction contains the best overview of the Soviet China-watchers in the 1960s-1980s. This group has been surprisingly long-lived, perpetuating the views to be presented below.

Moscow's wartime Western allies, the Comintern was reinvented in 1947 in the form of the Cominform—an "information bureau" of the nascent communist bloc, employed by Stalin effectively to bring the East Europeans into line with Soviet policies and punish transgressors (i.e. Yugoslavia).

Most people who know something of Soviet history—or history of communism in general—will have heard about these two institutions. Few have heard of the third—and last—Soviet effort to institutionalize conformity through party channels. This introduction recounts the rise and fall of the little known Interkit—the China International—a series of meetings held interchangeably in the different capitals of the socialist bloc since 1967. The purpose of these meetings was to force Soviet views of the Chinese threat on Moscow's allies—the East Europeans and the Mongols at first, but later the Cubans, the Laotians and the Vietnamese—and to keep these allies in line with the confrontational Soviet policy in the face of tireless Chinese efforts to split up the ranks of Soviet followers. Through the party channels the conclusions of a small group of Soviet functionaries were brought to bear on the press and academia not only in the USSR but also across the bloc and, for a generation, defined what, when, and how something could be said about China.

Where had this initiative to coordinate China-related research and propaganda sprung from? The origins of the Interkit process go back to the Sino-Soviet split, which had divided the international communist movement. The Sino-Soviet rivalry was a defining factor in the relations between the Soviet bloc and China during the second half of the Cold War. From the late 1950s, the Chinese leadership made it increasingly clear that it was unwilling to remain a subordinated member of an alliance led by the Soviet Union. At first, China's pursuit of an independent posture was disguised in ideological garb—Mao Zedong accused the Soviet leadership of restoring capitalism and attempting to subvert the revolution through peaceful cooperation with the United States. In the 1960s, however, some of this ideological phraseology wore off, and the Sino-Soviet conflict deteriorated into a vitriolic power struggle that nearly boiled over into a full-blown war over a border dispute in 1969.

Questioning "revisionist" Nikita Khrushchev's ability and right to lead the communist movement and the socialist camp, Mao Zedong offered an alternative pole of leadership, selling his revolutionary creed as the only true faith to Soviet satellites and undecided onlookers in the

communist bloc and in the third world. Beijing of course aspired to win over Moscow's closest allies as well, courting in particular the GDR, Hungary, and Poland (Albania had already defected from the Soviet-bloc to side with China in 1960-61, and a few years later Romania began to stake out a more equidistant position, though Bucharest did not go so far as Tirana in its warmth toward Mao's regime).

Starting from the early 1960s, Beijing identified states as friendly, unfriendly, or hostile, based on their relations with the PRC and their attitudes toward its enemies—in the case of East-Central Europe and the Soviet Union. China distinguished among the socialist states based on their degree of autonomy from the USSR, a policy referred to as a “differentiated” approach toward the socialist community. In 1964, Liu Shaoqi compared Beijing's treatment of socialist countries to how peasants planted rice: “each plant has to be treated separately.”¹⁴ Using this method, Beijing wanted to test the firmness of these countries' alliance with the Soviet Union and the Soviet capacity to control its satellites. The policy of differentiation played on the various nuances and changes in the domestic political and economic situation of socialist countries, and was characterized by Chinese attempts to penetrate into domestic life, to undermine and shake the unity of the Soviet bloc, and to spread China's influence in various strata of the population, including the intellectuals and the young people.

To be sure, China focused its struggle on the Soviet Union. Chinese foreign policy considered relations with individual states and with the whole socialist camp as a derivative of Sino-Soviet relations, and subordinated its bloc-policy to its policy toward the Soviet Union. The relationship between China and the Soviet satellites was probably best described by Hungarian leader János Kádár in April 1970: “as to the essence of the issue, the crucial question is what the Chinese intend to do in relation to the Soviet Union. In their eyes, we are only puppets.”¹⁵ Of course, the Chinese would have felt justified in doubting ECE independence had they read a 1972 internal Polish party report [**Document 12**] flatly declaring: “The fundamental principle of our policy toward China is to fully cooperate with the Soviet Union—our main ally.”

The Soviet attitude toward the development of relations between its satellites and China was first reactive and later preemptive. During the first phase of ideological debates, Moscow

¹⁴ Hungarian MFA, 4th Territorial Department, China Desk, György Újlaki's report: Foreign Policy of the PRC and Sino-Hungarian relations during the past year. Budapest, 7 July 1964 HNA, XIX-J-1-j-Kína- 26-00153/1964,.

¹⁵ Minutes of the HSWP Politburo Meeting on 7 April 1970 HNA, p. 12, M-KS-288f-5.a-515. ő.e.,.

showed great sensitivity toward each Chinese move and reacted immediately. By the second half of the sixties, however, the Soviet leadership, convinced that the radicalism of the Chinese Cultural Revolution effectively scared off most would-be adherents of Maoism on the international stage, merely felt the need to take prophylactic measures in order to avoid unexpected situations. One of the most effective preventive methods was the close coordination of China policies with allies in the socialist camp.

The Soviets intended to control all spheres of cooperation between their satellites and the PRC, from economic and cultural relations to more sensitive scientific and technological cooperation, not to mention military or party-to-party contacts. Even the annual bilateral trade agreements with the detailed list of export and import goods were subject to Soviet approval. The close coordination of China policies was implemented on different levels, including meetings of the top leaders, ministers and deputy ministers in Moscow or in other capitals, meetings of “friendly” ambassadors in Beijing, regular meetings of Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Party Central Committee International Department officials, meetings of China specialists from government organizations and research institutes, and consultations of Soviet diplomats with government officials and party workers. ECE diplomats were summoned to Moscow for consultations, and one of the main tasks of the satellites’ diplomats in Beijing was to coordinate their countries’ steps with their allies, primarily with the Soviet Union. The Soviets stressed the importance of mutual exchange of information, and of the united resistance to China’s differentiation strategy.

When all hell (later to be known as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution) broke loose in China in the summer of 1966, the Soviets, like the rest of the world, were stupefied by the pointlessness of the violence and the overwrought adulation of Mao’s image, but they were also horrified and outraged by the vitriolic anti-Soviet (and anti-Russian) fervor that accompanied the chaos.¹⁶ By that winter, the venomous insults and accusations hurled at Soviet leaders, along with frenzied round-the-clock protests around the Soviet embassy in Beijing and harassment of Soviet diplomats, generated serious concern in Moscow (where Chinese students passing through the capital even protested in Red Square in front of the Holy of Holies, Lenin’s

¹⁶ On the Cultural Revolution, see in particular Roderick MacFarquhar, *Origins of the Cultural Revolution, vol. 3: The Coming of the Cataclysm* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997); and MacFarquhar and Michael Schoenhals, *Mao’s Last Revolution* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).

Tomb). Was China's tumult simply a domestic crisis? Or did Mao's actions imply a serious military threat in addition to the now open competition for leadership of the communist (and post-colonial Third) world? Amid rising fears of war, facing a new and evidently more serious challenge from their erstwhile ally, the Kremlin leaders took a series of steps. After a period of restraint following Khrushchev's ouster two years earlier, they returned to open criticism of Mao and his policies—in December 1966 party boss Leonid Brezhnev took off the gloves and resumed polemics in a major speech to a CPSU CC plenum, and two months later, when he met in London with British leader Harold Wilson, Prime Minister Aleksei Kosygin—as he was being hung and burned in effigy by protesters in Beijing—seemed “obsessed” by the Chinese (their “bacilla of hatred”) and spoke of them “the way Pakistanis talk about Indians.” Rallying communists around the world to try to isolate the CCP virus, the Soviet leaders stepped up efforts to organize a collective of like-minded fraternal parties that could collectively denounce Beijing. Amid eased relations with the West with the settlement of the Berlin and Cuban crises (despite intensified tensions over Vietnam), they quietly built up Soviet military forces along the Sino-Soviet border and, after 1967, in Mongolia.¹⁷

And, puzzled and alarmed by Beijing's enmity and its ferocity, they decided to found a closed institute (*zakrytyi institut*) to study the Far East, mainly China. Its importance was such that a number of *nomenklatura* appointments were involved, *valiuta* (hard currency) was allotted to purchase Western literature on China, and a new building was constructed, standing to this day in somewhat dilapidated state near the Profsoiuznaia Metro station. The Institute of the Far East was set up in 1966—partly to help the Soviet leadership understand what was happening in China, and partly as a place of employment for numerous China experts who had become redundant now that Sino-Soviet relations had been downsized to the long-distance barrage of hostile propaganda. Within a few months of the Institute's founding, a second China-related move was undertaken. The leading China specialist, Oleg Rakhmanin hosted a delegation of heads and deputy heads of party CC International Departments from ECE socialist countries and Mongolia in Moscow in December 1967 to coordinate China policy.

¹⁷ On these steps, see esp. Radchenko, *Two Suns in the Heavens*, chap. 4; Kosygin's attitude was recounted by British officials to U.S. officials in U.S. embassy (London) telegram no. 6315 (Bruce), 6 February 1967, SUNFLOWER folder, box 255, National Security Files, Country Files, Vietnam, Lyndon B. Johnson Presidential Library, Austin, TX.

The initiative for what was later institutionalized as Interkit may have actually come from Poland. Although the Polish leader Wladislaw Gomulka had earlier opposed tough Soviet policies on China (for example, he resisted Khrushchev's efforts to bring Mongolia into the Warsaw Pact in 1963, which would have been a slap in the face for the Chinese),¹⁸ by 1967 he was in no mood to defend Beijing. "There are absurd things happening" in China, the Polish leader told Brezhnev as the Cultural Revolution intensified; the disturbed Soviet leader agreed that the "Chinese problem must be investigated," as there was no telling where the chaotic events might lead [**Document 1**]. The growing tumult in China, and the insults suffered by the Poles at the hands of the "revolutionary" Chinese diplomats, contributed to a sense of solidarity with the Soviet cause. In any case, the invitation to participate in talks in Moscow "aimed at harmonizing positions on the policy of the Communist Party of China, China's internal and international situation and development" was issued in the name of Poland's communist party [**Document 4**].

Central Committee representatives of Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, and the USSR took part in that first meeting in December 1967. High-ranking CPSU officials Mikhail Suslov and Boris Ponomarev both met and exhorted the delegates, while the USSR delegation was led by Oleg Rakhmanin, the Deputy Director of the International Department for Relations with Fraternal Countries; Aleksei Rumiantsev, CC CPSU member and the Vice-President of the USSR Academy of Sciences; and Mikhail Sladkovskii, the Director of the newly-founded Institute of the Far East. The Kremlin's minions showed no reluctance to lead, or if necessary pressure, the other delegations. The German report states blandly that "before the beginning of the meeting, it was visible that the Soviet comrades were treating the meeting as extremely significant." They immediately put forth an agenda.

1. Working out a joint written evaluation on the situation in the PRC and on the politics of the group around Mao Zedong.
2. Verbal information exchange on these matters.
3. Exchange of opinions regarding further counteractions to the Mao-group policy as well as over the coordination of research efforts and information exchange in this field.

¹⁸ Polish Foreign Ministry memorandum regarding possible Mongolian accession to the Warsaw Treaty, 20 July 1963. See Vojtech Mastny and Malcolm Byrne, eds., *A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact, 1955-1991* (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2005), doc. 25, pp. 154-156.

The Germans and Mongolians came out strongly for this agenda for forging a common front to contain Chinese influence, a major new front in the Cold War.

The Soviets also detailed the Chinese threat. First on the list was Chinese aggression along the joint border with the USSR. Second was Chinese propaganda, especially radio programs targeting Soviet populations, often of non-Russian ethnicities, just across the frontier. Finally, Mao himself was characterized as someone who had reached the top through intrigues and violence. The Soviet representatives even admitted that many of Mao's "anti-Marxist, non-scientific, and anti-Leninist positions" had been edited out by Pavel Iudin, the former ambassador to the PRC, who had also been tasked (at Mao's request to Stalin)¹⁹ with compiling and editing the Russian edition of Mao's collected works [**Document 6**].

According to the East German report, the Poles argued that the meeting should be a non-binding exchange of opinions. "They demanded the meeting to become a non-committal exchange of information ... By all means there must be no jointly agreed document, as it could be interpreted as forming a faction [**Document 6**]." This echoes Warsaw's earlier resistance to unified action. But in the course of a week in Moscow, doubters were overcome and a common statement was issued. Reports at the second Interkit meeting in January 1969 make clear that several measures adopted at the 1967 meeting had been partially implemented and that the coordination process was firmly established.

II. Interkit's Expanding Responsibilities, 1968-1975

1968 marked a turning point in China's foreign policy. Following the intervention that August of Warsaw Pact military forces in Czechoslovakia, Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated to their lowest point yet. The Chinese compared the intervention to Hitler's invasion in Poland, to the US aggression in Vietnam, and to Japanese imperialism in China thirty years earlier. On August 23rd, at the National Day reception of the Romanian Embassy in Beijing, Zhou Enlai in his speech castigated the Soviet Union as a social-imperialist [**Document 7**].²⁰ The Chinese

¹⁹ See record of Mao's first talk with Stalin in Moscow, 16 December 1949, *CWHIP Bulletin* no. 6-7 (Winter 1995/1996), p. 7.

²⁰ Cable from Aurel Duma, Romania's ambassador to Beijing, to Petru Burlacu, deputy minister of Foreign Affairs, regarding the speech given by Zhou Enlai, premier of the State Council, during the cocktail organized at Romania's Embassy on the national holiday, 23 August 1968, Beijing, in Romulus Ioan Budura, ed., *Relatiile Romano-Chineze*,

leadership feared that the Soviet leadership might apply the Brezhnev doctrine to China as well, and began to consider an attack from the North as the greatest threat to its national security.²¹

After the invasion, East Central Europe appeared in Chinese propaganda in two contexts. On the one hand, Beijing virulently attacked those countries which participated in the action, terming them collaborators of Soviet revisionists—even though Mao had little sympathy for the goals of the Prague Spring (which in essence represented the very opposite of Mao’s continuous revolution). But at the same time, the Chinese press described the Warsaw Pact and Comecon member states as victims of the exploitative and oppressive policies of Soviet imperialism. In early 1969, China launched renewed propaganda attacks against Soviet neocolonialism in Southeast Asia and Eastern Europe, drawing a parallel between Tsarist imperialism and “Soviet social-imperialism,” and stressing that Soviet revisionists made Mongolia into their colony, robbed Eastern Europe, and occupied Czechoslovakia. All Soviet allies (excepting Romania) expressed their clear support for the Soviet Union and roundly condemned the “disruptive” Chinese policy, Chinese provocations along the Sino-Soviet border and the ensuing anti-Soviet campaign.

The January 1969 Berlin meeting showed that Interkit was still gathering steam [Document 8]. Rumiantsev, heading an even bigger Soviet delegation than in December 1967, reported on the distance covered since the previous meeting. First of all, the CC CPSU had approved the documents generated by the Moscow meeting for “practical work” in the Soviet Union. The documents were then circulated to the Central Committee, members of the Central Control Committee, Soviet diplomats, and First Secretaries of the union republics, regional and local party committees. A concrete propaganda plan was drawn up resulting in a series of articles in *Kommunist*, printed in 200,000 copies. These, in turn, had been consolidated into a brochure and republished in English, French, German and Spanish by Novosti Press Agency. Ten articles were also published in *Pravda* and *Izvestiia*.

Rumiantsev then listed the suggestions of various parties to the Moscow meeting, later implemented by the Soviets. The value of non-Russian input suggests both the Soviet

1880–1974. Documente. (Bucuresti: Ministerul Afacerilor Externe – Archivele Nationale, 2005). Document 315, pp. 903–904.

²¹ For a good overview see Chen Jian and David L. Wilson, “All Under the Heaven is Great Chaos: Beijing, the Sino-Soviet Border Clashes, and the Turn Toward Sino-American Rapprochement, 1968-69,” *CWIHP Bulletin* 11 (Winter 1998), pp. 155-175.

delegation's desire to please, and possibly an understanding that Sinology in the Warsaw Pact was often strongest beyond the borders of the USSR. "We are of the opinion," stated Rumiantsev, "that the publication of documents and articles provided by the fraternal parties about the Chinese question was and is extremely significant. We consider this form of coordination and mutual aid in our shared affairs to be most important and promising."²²

Eager to avoid the tensions regarding the appropriate approach to China that marked discussion among the Warsaw Pact allies throughout the early 1960s, the Soviets listened attentively to reports from the other countries' delegates. But numerous details make clear the Soviet initiative and continued enthusiasm for this project. For example, when the head of the East German International Department within the Central Committee, Paul Markovski, welcomed the heads of the guest delegations punctually at 10 AM on January 28, he addressed them in alphabetical order in German, starting with Bulgaria (Bulgarien in German) and ending with Hungary (Ungarn in German). Tellingly, when three days later, a protocol was adopted unanimously by all present, the list of signers, while still beginning with Bulgaria, continued with Hungary and Germany, for in Russian "Vengerskaia Narodnaia Respublika" and "Germanskaia Demokraticheskaiia Respublika" come before Mongolia. Clearly a translation from the Russian, the meeting's conclusions had been drafted by the Russians for approval by their allies.

Rumiantsev suggested the removal of the word "Secret" from the first page of the joint protocol. In a show of trust, he insisted that each party should make its own decisions on the document's use, not limited by the strict rules on the circulation of classified documents.²³ Rumiantsev may also have assumed that Beijing would get the document anyway. It is impossible to say if the broader writ and tighter coordination of Interkit helped provoke the Chinese attack at Zhenbao Island, but it could only have contributed to the spirit of combative retaliation in the spring of 1969. The Chinese dubbed the Interkit "fanhua guoji"—"The anti-China International."

The bloody border clashes in March 1969 marked the nadir of relations between the two countries. At the 9th CCP Congress in April 1969, convened after a thirteen-year interval, the Chinese party denied the existence of the socialist camp and made anti-Sovietism part of its

²² RGANI F.4, op.19, d. 525, l. 29, 107-110.

²³ German stenogram of January 1969 Interkit meeting, Berlin, pp. 323-326, SAPMO.

official policy which remained the key elements of Chinese foreign policy throughout the seventies. But the Party Congress also set in motion processes that had positive effects on relations between China and the Soviet bloc. Mao's aim was to strengthen moderate forces within the leadership, to break out from self-imposed isolation and to implement a more rational foreign policy. During the next few months, most Chinese ambassadors returned to their posts (which they had vacated during the Cultural Revolution) and the PRC established diplomatic relations with countries such as Italy, Turkey, Austria and Canada. One of the results of the Chinese opening was the Kosygin—Zhou Enlai meeting at the Beijing Airport on 11 September 1969. The most positive aspect of the meeting between the two prime ministers was that they met at all. Relations returned from the battlefield to the conference table. Both sides set forth their own positions, but could not reach an agreement on any disputed issues.

* * *

In the seventies, the orientation of anti-Soviet Chinese foreign policy shifted to a united front strategy – or what Mao called a “horizontal line” – which was to include any country opposing the Soviet Union, irrespective of ideological position. Even the United States, the once number-one enemy, had a role to play in the united front along with Western European capitalist countries and the Third World.

The basic Chinese attitude toward East-Central Europe was cautious openness. Beijing attempted to establish semi-official channels of informal exchange first, primarily in scientific and technological cooperation, gradually increased the amount of bilateral trade and initiated small steps in other areas. The PRC denied the existence of the socialist community; the Soviet Union and its closest allies were not considered socialist, but instead condemned as opportunist and revisionist. China excluded the possibility of re-establishing inter-Party relations, but showed willingness to improve state-to-state relations on the basis of Panch Shila, the five principles of peaceful coexistence agreed to by China and India (i.e., Zhou Enlai and Nehru) in 1954.²⁴ Only Albania was considered as truly socialist (even though in the 1970s Tirana increasingly fell out of step with China's foreign policy orientation). Socialist Vietnam, North

²⁴ The five principles are: mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; non-interference in internal affairs; equality and mutual advantage; and peaceful coexistence.

Korea and Romania were considered as “revolutionary,” so relations with their ruling parties were maintained.²⁵

The GDR received the most attention from among the “closely coordinating” Soviet allies.²⁶ Hungary came second, primarily because of the new elements in Hungarian domestic politics and economic reforms and the Soviet criticism of these phenomena. Poland (with whom Beijing maintained maritime relations even during the Cultural Revolution)²⁷ was third on the list, ahead of Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria. The Chinese revealed the “rankings” by sending minor signals to East European capitals, manifested by the date of the ambassador’s return, or the amount of the increase in bilateral trade.²⁸

As economic relations were not of primary interest for either side, the ups and downs of bilateral trade mirrored the state of political relations between the Soviet bloc and China. Although Chinese trade with Eastern Europe fell between 1965 and 1970, it stabilized after that with ECE countries showing steady growth. Annual increases exceeded 25 percent in 1970, 20-25 percent in 1971, and 10-15 percent in 1972 and 1973.²⁹ Trade delegations enjoyed warm receptions and during the negotiations the Chinese mentioned that bilateral trade “serves the interests of both socialist countries and are beneficial for both peoples.”³⁰ The structure of bilateral trade was indeed beneficial for ECE. Imports from China included strategic raw materials (non-ferrous metals such as wolfram and mercury) and consumer goods (frozen and canned meat) that replaced purchases from capitalist markets. Exports were mostly machinery. All this was carried out at prices well below world market prices.

²⁵ Hungarian MFA 4th Territorial Department: Proposal for the deputy-ministerial consultation: The foreign policy and domestic politics of the PRC, Hungarian-Chinese relations. Budapest, 4 October 1971, HNA XIX-J-1-j-Kína-14-00556/9-1971.

²⁶ The signing of the Soviet–West German agreement on 12 August 1970 was a major breakthrough in the process leading to the settlement of the German question. After the signing of the FRG-USSR agreement in 1970, the PRC paid special attention to wooing the GDR and in 1971 presented itself as the sole representative of East German interests. However, as it was clear for the PRC that the existence and security of the GDR depended on the USSR, apart from political-propagandistic support, GDR-PRC relations did not improve significantly faster than in other relations.

²⁷ Poland and China had a joint stock shipping company “Chipolbrok” established in 1951. The first ever Sino-foreign joint-venture deed of association after the proclamation of the PRC, it had existed ever since uninterruptedly, even during the time of ideological debates and hostilities.

²⁸ Chinese ambassadors returned to Budapest and Warsaw in August 1970, and to Berlin a month later. No PRC ambassador was sent to Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia until the summer of 1971.

²⁹ Hungarian MFA, 4th Territorial Department Report on Sino-Hungarian exchange of goods. Appendix No. 1. Budapest, 28 October 1982, HNA XIX-J-1-j-Kína-78-57-006148/1982.

³⁰ Hungarian Chargé d’Affaires László Bihari’s report: Our negotiations on machinery export. Beijing, 8 December 1970, HNA XIX-J-1-j-Kína-571-001334/9/1970.

It was mostly China that took the initial steps, but the improvement of state-to-state relations depended on ECE receptiveness as well. The Soviet satellites encouraged the Chinese initiatives but all their steps had to remain within the boundaries of the framework approved by Moscow. In this spirit, in May 1970, the Hungarian Politburo approved guidelines that remained in effect for the rest of the seventies. The resolution declared that Hungary should “in proportion to discernible Chinese readiness, endeavor to develop our interstate relations, bearing in mind the appropriate degree of caution,” but also added that “while taking steps we must weigh the situation of Soviet-Chinese relations at all times, and move in close coordination with Soviet comrades.”³¹

However, Chinese ambitions to improve relations were limited. Beijing showed no interest in renewing the legal framework of bilateral relations established in the 1950s, and refused any inter-Party contacts. The Hungarians were also suspicious. In 1972, Deputy Foreign Minister József Marjai argued that the Chinese method of turning the allies against each other was well known: “recently this is exactly what they do, but in such a sophisticated way, which takes its origins from their ancient culture, that we cannot even recognize it.”³²

Instead of rapprochement, armed conflict on the Sino-Soviet border served as catalyst to the further development of Interkit, assuring that most of the suggestions made at the Berlin meeting in January 1969 would eventually be enacted. While the Chinese were trying out their differentiation policy, Moscow stepped up coordination with its allies. In addition to various cooperative scientific projects and coordinated propaganda, Interkit called for meetings on foreign policy and economic issues. The report from the March 1970 Interkit in Warsaw—the third meeting of the group—specifically spoke of the “necessity” of carrying out the 1969 recommendations. The high price of all-out competition with China and the readiness of the USSR to pay that price was also mentioned:

If the present policy of the Chinese leaders continues for a long time, it will have serious consequences for the international correlation of forces. The Soviet Union

³¹ Minutes of the HSWP Politburo Meeting on 5 May 1970, HNA, M-KS-288f-5.a-517. ő. e. pp. 13-14. On Kádár’s proposal, the last point was slightly modified. The last sentence was omitted from the final text and was replaced by: “The abusive tone of the Chinese official propaganda should be avoided.” Decision of the Hungarian government on Sino-Hungarian relations, 4 June 1970, HNA XIX-J-1-j-Kína-14-00427/16/1970.

³² Hungarian MFA 4th Territorial Department China Desk, Lajos Hajdú’s report: Our Ambassador in Beijing’s oral report. Budapest, 24 August 1972 HNA, XIX-J-1-j-Kína-142-002863/2/1972.

will be forced to use a not small portion of its economic and military potential in defense against the adventures of the Mao-group.³³

Soviet concerns also deepened over the course of the early 1970s, as the violent Sino-Soviet border clashes of 1969 were followed over the next few years by a dramatic Sino-American opening and *de facto* alliance against Moscow. The Soviet directives for the fourth Interkit, in Sofia in February 1971, emphasized the risk of the Chinese splitting the socialist camp, by “giving itself a calm, attractive character ... using the desire of the fraternal countries to normalize relations with the PRC to worsen relations among the fraternal parties.” Behind the calm, according to the Soviet analysts, lay a clear policy of “differentiation,” that allegedly would divide the countries of Eastern Europe from the Soviet Union. This strategy was described as follows:

The Chinese leadership is willing to work toward a certain objectification of relations with the states of the socialist community on the basis of peaceful coexistence. Exploiting the interest of fraternal parties to normalize their relations with the PR China, this variant first wants to “neutralize” the socialist countries in their confrontation with the Chinese leadership’s policy (the Soviet delegation dubbed this as “Romanization”). At a minimum, China wants to separate them on this issue from the Soviet Union in order to finally draw them to Chinese positions (“Albanization”). With this policy of differentiation, Chinese leaders also try at the same time to break up the ideological combat front against Maoism [**Document 11**, emphasis in original].

This was not just an idle theoretical point, for the same meeting saw the Hungarians criticized for “underrating of the danger represented by current Chinese policy.”

The Soviet comrades brought a new level of aggressive initiative to Sofia. For the first time, foreign policy activities were specifically listed as part of Interkit’s role in the instructions to the Soviet delegation.³⁴ The “Conclusions” list the deadlines for carrying them out and the units responsible for their implementation. In 1971, only the CC International Departments and propaganda organs were tasked in this way [**Document 11**], but in 1972 the Foreign Ministries were added to the list to study “state-to-state relations with the PRC, while taking into

³³ Interkit Report 1970, SAPMO, DY 30, IV A 2/20/1151, 2-3.

³⁴ “About the Meeting of the Representatives of Central Committee International Departments of the Seven Brother Parties (KPSS, BKP, VSRP, SEPG, MNRP, PORP i KPCh),” RGANI f. 4, op. 19, d. 605, l. 40. This can be taken as initiative by the USSR against China or as a bureaucratic power-play of the Central Committee International Department against the USSR Foreign Ministry.

consideration the indications and recommendations worked out by the [Interkit] meeting.”³⁵ By 1973, when the group met again in Moscow, the Interkit mandate had been extended further with the meeting’s agenda including “coordinating work in the fields of foreign policy, economic relations, and propaganda, as well as the reconciliation of scientific research on the Chinese question [**Document 13**].”

Soviet commitment to Interkit also increased with Moscow delegates prepared to push their points in various ways. Moscow’s instructions encouraged Soviet delegates to be optimistically aggressive and report to their Interkit comrades that “the Chinese leaders are visibly alarmed by the effectiveness of the political, economic, and other cooperation of the socialist countries.”³⁶ But nothing would be left to chance with the Soviet comrades arriving “before the meetings in order to work out joint evaluations with some of the fraternal parties.”³⁷ Furthermore, within a few years of the Interkit’s founding, its resolutions lost their optional character: “fraternal” party committees were now fully expected to toe Moscow’s line. Thus, if in 1970 the agreed Protocol said: “The application of the jointly drafted materials...will be decided by the Central Committees at their own discretion,”³⁸ by 1973 the report of the Moscow Interkit meeting specified that “The Protocol and joint theses ‘China at the Beginning of the 1970s’ have been agreed. Both documents are to be the basis for all actions regarding the Chinese issue in the areas of foreign policy, propaganda and science.”³⁹ The power and reach of the Interkit and the Soviet pressure behind it was growing.

The Chinese kept on sending signals of their willingness to improve bilateral relations with Soviet allies. But by the early 1970s, as a result of Moscow’s intensified attempts to control the satellites’ relations with China, the ECE leaderships showed more restraint toward Chinese initiatives. On March 15, 1973, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry’s evaluation of Sino-Hungarian relations concluded that “recently the Chinese willingness to further develop bilateral state-to-state relations grew to such an extent that it exceeded our accepted framework of ‘gradual’ development and, because of Chinese attempts for demonstrative actions, resulted in tensions

³⁵ Compare 1971 SAPMO Interkit Sofia Report DY 30, IV A 2/20/1152, 8 and 1972 Interkit Prague Report DY 30, SAPMO IV B 2/20/580, 11.

³⁶ “About the Meeting of the Representatives of Central Committee International Departments of the Seven Brother Parties (KPSS, BKP, VSRP, SEPG, MNRP, PORP i KPCh),” RGANI f. 4, op.19, d. 605, l. 40.

³⁷ 1971 Interkit Sofia Report, 7.

³⁸ 1971 Protokollniederschrift, 1.

³⁹ 1973 Moscow Interkit Report, SAPMO DY 30, IV B 2/20/583.

between our principles for developing relations and the possibilities of their practical realization.” However, the report does not fail to add that “what we mean by possibilities is of course the level of relations achieved by the Soviet Union and the allied socialist countries in the given field, which limits [our scope of action] as well.”⁴⁰

The allies’ propaganda activities also intensified. In 1973, the 19 Hungarian central daily and weekly newspapers published over 320 articles on China. In 1974, in order to “help public opinion to correctly judge and condemn Maoism,” the five Hungarian central daily newspapers, apart from daily news reports, published over 50 comprehensive, analytical articles on China’s domestic developments, the continued internal struggle for power, the state of the military, economy, and “the maverick steps of China’s foreign policy.” These comprehensive evaluations of the Chinese situation by Hungarian authors were supplemented with translated articles from the Soviet press.⁴¹

By 1973—amid US-Soviet détente but also intensified Sino-American cooperation—the tone of the Soviet discourse had become fearful, even preemptory, with Rakhmanin noting that the Chinese had designated the Soviet Union as its Number One Enemy, suggesting that the honor should be repaid. Ponomarev noted that the Soviet Union was also trying to influence the Australian, French and Italian Communist Parties’ ties to Beijing.⁴² By 1975, when Interkit met in Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia, the tone had become shrill, almost hysterical: Chinese atomic weapons were targeting the USSR; Maoism was now a problem of global proportions; Maoism would outlast Mao; economic growth was being channeled into armaments; Maoism had become a “subspecies of Anti-Communism ... a second front of Anti-Communism.”⁴³

The history of the “Economic Interkit” illustrates the broadening mandate of Interkit’s coordination, a response to Chinese use of trade with East-Central Europe as a form of political influence. In January 1973, the Soviets initiated a new coordination process to make bloc-wide policy on trade to China, including all the members of Interkit.⁴⁴ At first, the mandate of the

⁴⁰ Hungarian MFA 4th Territorial Department, China Desk: Relations between the People’s Republic of Hungary and the People’s Republic of China. Budapest, HNA, 15 March 1973, XIX-J-1-j-Kína-14-002777/1973.

⁴¹ Mátyás Szűrös’s speech on agitation and propaganda work related to the China question. Ulanbaatar, 24-25 June 1975, HNA, XIX-J-1-j-Kína-25-004540/1/1975.

⁴² Ponomarev and Rakhmanin meeting reports at SAPMO DY 30, IV B 2/2.028, 55.

⁴³ 1975 Ulanbaatar Interkit Report, SAPMO, DY 30, IV B 2/20/588, 2, 6.

⁴⁴ There is some confusion regarding the founding meeting. Gardet’s chronology on pp. 689-90 lists the first meeting as January 1972, but then lists October 1974 as “either” the second or third meeting. On 332, however, she

Soviet version of COCOM only included trade and economic policy. Reporting to the general meeting of Interkit in May 1973, Soviet Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Ivan Grishin, listed the following tasks: Exchanging information on the terms of long-term commercial and economic accords to prevent the PRC from gaining advantages from individual countries; consulting to determine a joint approach to international organizations and conferences, while fighting Chinese efforts to develop influence in underdeveloped countries; and to bring commercial representatives of socialist countries and underdeveloped countries together to compare notes on information provided by the Chinese. Although Grishin suggested that a next meeting would occur already in 1973, it seems to have been postponed to 1974 in Budapest.⁴⁵

By 1975, Interkit had taken on even broader responsibilities, with economic issues giving way to military and security concerns. The Soviet delegation instructions to the Berlin meeting in October now added Cuba to the original seven parties, and included the institutionalization of a technology control regime as approved by the Central Committee of the CPSU on March 12. The Soviet delegates were “to announce that in the opinion of the Soviet side, under the present conditions, considering the general state of China’s relations with the socialist countries, scientific-technological cooperation should only be pursued in limited areas, not including military or related branches...” A reinforcement of secrecy measures to prevent leaks was also called for, but with so many involved it is doubtful if the Chinese were really in the dark.⁴⁶ Despite some moderating voices in ECE, the documents suggest that in fact during the period 1967-1975, the power and breadth of the Interkit increased steadily as resistance was overcome by the Soviet side, headed by Rakhmanin, and as fear of the Chinese second front increased after conflict on the Ussuri, and the opening to the Americans.

cites Ivan T. Grishin, Deputy Minister of Foreign Trade, speaking at the May 1973 Interkit in Moscow regarding “a secret meeting of the vice ministers of foreign trade...held in January of this year...” January 1973 seems correct since the 1975 directives for the Soviet delegation attending the continuation in Berlin references earlier directives issued by the CC CPSU on 12 January 1973 “on carrying out a meeting of representatives of socialist countries to coordinate trade and economic policy toward the PRC,” RGANI f.4, op.22, d.1601, l.1.

⁴⁵ Gardet, *Les Relations de la République populaire de Chine et de la République démocratique allemande (1949-1989)*, pp. 332-3.

⁴⁶ RGANI p.4, op.22, d. 1601, l. 4.

III. From Mao's Death to the Death of Interkit

Mao's death in September 1976 did not result in a breakthrough for Sino-Soviet relations. Even as China embarked on the road to reforms in 1978, tensions continued to mount. A major catalyst for this enduring hostility was the Soviet Union's ever friendlier ties with Vietnam, sealed in November 1978 with a treaty of alliance aimed principally against China. Oiled by a constant flow of arms and economic aid from the USSR and emboldened by postwar triumphalism, Hanoi took on the role of regional power. Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia in December 1978 to depose Pol Pot's Khmer Rouge regime effectively showed Vietnam's neighbors—especially China—who really was in charge in Southeast Asia. The Chinese did not take lightly to this challenge, resorting to a brief border war in February 1979 to “teach Vietnam a lesson.” The war having ended inconclusively, the real lesson was for China: that it had been encircled by hostile communist nations, and that deliverance lay in strengthening the anti-Soviet united front.

Soviet global strategy, Deng Xiaoping told visiting US Vice President Walter Mondale in August 1979, was like a “barbell,” with one side anchored in the Middle East, as shown in the Soviet push toward the Indian Ocean, and the other—in Southeast Asia. “If we do not try to frustrate their attack from this strategic perspective, then they would gain the strategic initiative in Asia and the Pacific.”⁴⁷ Frustrating these Soviet schemes required closer relations with Japan and the United States. The Japanese, who had normalized relations with Beijing after the Sino-American opening, signed a 1978 Friendship Treaty with China, prompting angry calls by the Soviet hardliners to “serve the Japanese some of their own [medicine]” (wisely vetoed by the more pragmatic Kremlin policymakers).⁴⁸ Sino-American normalization in December 1978 reinforced Soviet suspicion of collusion between Beijing and Washington, but seasoned observers like Kapitsa tended to downplay the prospects of an outright entente, not because

⁴⁷ Memorandum of conversation between Vice President Walter Mondale and Vice Premier Deng Xiaoping, 28 August 1979, p. 6, China/US Meetings/Trips, 5/18-9/82 (binder 3 of 7), box 92355, Douglas H. Paal files, Ronald Reagan Presidential Library, Simi Valley, CA.

⁴⁸ Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov, *Ot Kollontai do Gorbacheva* (Moscow: Mezhdunarodnye Otnosheni'ia, 1994), 276.

Deng's anti-Soviet outlook knew the bounds of reason but because "the American public correctly understands the danger of the US being pulled into China's anti-Soviet policy."⁴⁹

Under these circumstances, Interkit remained central to the Soviet effort to keep a tab on what other socialist countries were doing in relations with China, lest Moscow's allies became tempted to bury the hatchet of anti-Chinese sentiment in Mao's coffin. Still, Interkit became less and less effective. In 1976 Interkit did not meet but, tellingly, the preparatory materials ("China on the Eve of Mao's Death") agreed on by the Soviets and the Interkit hosts for 1977, the East Germans, were left intact on the grounds that "in its basics, [present Chinese policy] is but a continuation of the Maoist policy." The German report on the preparatory meeting of CPSU CC International Department Division Head Boris Kulik and his German counterpart Horst Siebeck for the Berlin Interkit in 1977 noted that some phrases, such as "Mao-clique" had been removed, but others such as "Maoism" remained. The Chinese did not respond to a brief pause in propaganda attacks in the open press, but instead played on Moscow's concerns by trying to develop better ties with East-bloc diplomats and representatives, not including the USSR [Document 16].

The decision to invite Cuba to join Interkit had been taken in 1974 and a Cuban delegation attended the meeting in Ulaanbaatar in June 1975, as observers. Havana was also represented at the "Economic Interkit" in Berlin that October. With Interkit postponed in 1976, the Cubans had only attended once, in 1977, before hosting their own Interkit in December 1978. On the day following the end of the meeting, Fidel Castro himself granted a two-hour audience to the foreign party delegations and lectured them on the importance of their work and the "historical hopelessness" of Maoism as an alternative both in Latin America and Africa, areas where Castro would have been considered expert. Castro hailed the decision to invite a Vietnamese delegation to the next Interkit, but in connection with developments in Cambodia, he spoke prophetically of having to take into consideration the possibility that China would intervene militarily [Document 17].

Although there is no evidence to link Vietnam's accession to Interkit with the Chinese "lesson" of February 1979, in late March a working group of Interkit was hastily gathered to Moscow to welcome Hanoi to the fold, express solidarity with its righteous struggle against

⁴⁹ Record of conversation between D. Yondon and Mikhail Kapitsa, 9 February 1979, Mongolian Foreign Ministry Archive, fond 2, dans 1, kh/n 440b, 131 khuu, Ulaanbaatar, obtained by Onon Perenlei.

Beijing and to condemn Maoism, once again.⁵⁰ All the ECE delegations supported these declarations, but by 1980 the effect had worn off. Together with commitments to Indochina and a new Soviet adventure in Afghanistan, ECE parties and even Cuba were ready to consider more open resistance to Moscow's insistence on anti-Beijing solidarity. If Moscow had turned its attention East, it would no longer have the backing of its clients to the West. It was one thing for Moscow to decide to wage a self-destructive two-front Cold War and another for Communist parties not directly threatened to agree to fight on those frontlines.

In this atmosphere, the Chinese launched a charm offensive aimed at Eastern Europe. On March 4, 1980, a telegram was sent to Soviet ambassadors in Berlin, Warsaw, Budapest, Prague, Sofia, Ulaanbaatar, Havana, Hanoi, Vientiane, Beijing, Pyongyang, Phnom Penh, Bucharest and Belgrade analyzing the Chinese tactic that divided the socialist countries into three groups to woo them away from the USSR in different ways. North Korean, Romanian and Yugoslav nationalist pretensions were supported to separate them from the "socialist community." Vietnam, Cuba, Laos and Mongolia were subjected to unceasing attacks. The Soviet Union's Eastern European allies were shown both the carrot and the stick, "rude interventions in their internal affairs" and hints of "big profits, especially in the sphere of trade and economics." The ambassadors were called on to conduct a steady campaign to warn the other countries against Beijing's true aims and to carefully control, to the best of their ability, contacts between Chinese representatives of all kinds in the countries in which they were accredited. The goal was "the neutralization of tendencies undesirable for us in the policies of individual socialist countries."⁵¹ First and foremost, this meant East Germany. Brezhnev himself set the tone by warning Honecker of the necessity to oppose Chinese policy: "The negotiations with China will require great patience, circumspection, and exact calculation of each of our steps. That having been said, I think it is important for all of us not to relent in our opposition against China's policy which runs counter to the cause of peace and international security."⁵²

Soviet concerns were not unfounded, for at the next Interkit, held in Poland in June 1980, the East Germans would lead resistance to Rakhmanin's continuing insistence on the unchanging nature of Maoism without Mao. Although the Soviets had sent two representatives

⁵⁰ RGANI, f.4, op.24, d.878,

⁵¹ RGANI f.4, op.24, d.1200, ll.1-4.

⁵² Transcript of Honecker-Brezhnev meeting, Crimea, USSR, 27 July 1979 (excerpt), *CWIHP Bulletin* no. 8/9 (Winter 1996/1997), p. 124.

ahead to work out the materials and draft conclusions, thus neutralizing any Polish resistance, the SED made 43 proposals for modifications of the final texts, many of which passed. In particular, the East Germans insisted on the removal of the phrase “Eurasian opportunism,” an attempt by Moscow to link Beijing to the dangers of Eurocommunism. A fresh analysis of realities in China was also demanded [**Document 20**].⁵³

Rakhmanin was able to fend off significant change in 1980, but by the May 1982 Sofia Interkit meeting, the SED delegation had an explicit directive to push for an “active policy toward China, corresponding to the long term interests of socialism and peace...” Interestingly, the main battleground was the interpretation of Brezhnev’s March 24 speech in Tashkent, which appeared to signal Soviet willingness to mend fences with China. The SED and Cuban representatives wanted to consider this a major initiative on which they could follow up, while Rakhmanin counseled against an erroneous interpretation. For him, Brezhnev’s speech had simply been a tactical move in line with previous policies and its importance was not to be exaggerated.⁵⁴ Reportedly the East Germans refused to sign the final protocol of the meeting. Rakhmanin was informed that Honecker was fed up with the whole concept of the Interkit, that the USSR had made many mistakes in relations with China, and that in any case, the GDR had its own interests and policy, different from the Soviet Union’s [**Document 23**].

Distraught by these developments, Rakhmanin attempted to consolidate his positions after coming back to Moscow. To this end, he prepared a report for the approval of the Politburo’s China Commission (of which he was the secretary). Rakhmanin proposed to continue to “expose Chinese hegemonism” and characterized developments in China as a “move toward the right.” The Commission disagreed on the course of action, with Iurii Andropov and Boris Ponomarev in favor of improving relations with China—while “giving them a rebuff when needed”—and Gromyko, by contrast, taking a hard line. According to Ponomarev’s (probably self-serving) account, Gromyko “demanded to push the Chinese, not to let them off lightly. And he was brusque in general, although it seems that as a diplomat he should have been more flexible [**Document 23**].” But these views were not uncommon among the diplomats. As

⁵³ RGANI f.4.op.24, d.1268, ll.1-5.

⁵⁴ Gardet, *Les Relations de la République populaire de Chine et de la République démocratique allemande (1949-1989)*, pp. 456-7, citing SAPMO, DY30/Vorl. SED 38 356.

Gromyko's First Deputy Viktor Mal'tsev put it a few days later, "the foam has gone down but the beer remains," meaning: "the essence of Maoist policy remains unchanged."⁵⁵

Whatever the disagreements, the China Commission adopted a 12-page document in Rakhmanin's style, which singled out Honecker for criticism, and proposed measures to bolster domestic conformity, lest Soviet China scholars or journalists step out of line. The Politburo endorsed both the document of the Chinese Commission and Rakhmanin's report, although Brezhnev reportedly protested feebly that the Tashkent line would have to be continued. Brezhnev's foreign policy aide Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov was furious with Rakhmanin's interference, as was Ponomarev's deputy at the International Department Anatoly Chernyaev who refused to sign Rakhmanin's report despite the latter's threats to take the matter to higher authorities [**Document 23**].

Chernyaev complained to Ponomarev:

I don't know if you are aware of this, but in the last 15 years while Rakhmanin has been responsible for China in the CC Department, and especially after he became the First Deputy, he wrote dozens of articles, brochures and even books (of course, with the help of Sladkovskii's institute and his aides). And all of this is about one thing: how to smash China. He perfectly understands that if relations changed, all of his "literature" will go into the trash bin. But he has already nominated himself for the elections to the Academy of Sciences and has no intention of abandoning this plan. So he will do anything to make sure that our line in relation to China remains such as depicted in his articles and brochures written under his four pen-names. But I think it is not appropriate to surrender this vital area of our state interests to Rakhmanin's personal interests [biznes] [**Document 23**].

Ponomarev seemed in agreement yet he signed under the Chinese Commission's endorsement of Rakhmanin's report, and he voted for the Politburo resolution, as did Andropov who better than most understood that Rakhmanin's policy harmed Soviet interests. Inertia was a powerful force, and Rakhmanin had a big clout. With the policy battle won (for the time-being), Rakhmanin continued to peddle his intransigent ideas to the East Europeans, as he did in a conversation with the Hungarian Ambassador Mátyás Szűrös on July 7: "Colleagues working in the field ... hold excessively positive opinions which may incite the leadership of fraternal Parties toward exaggerated development of relations. The socialist countries could objectively

⁵⁵ Viktor Mal'tsev comments to a Mongolian delegation, Mongolian Foreign Ministry Archive, 11 June 1982, fond 2, dans 1, kh/n 467, khuu 32,.

become part of the Chinese ‘broad anti-Soviet united front.’” The anxious Ambassador questioned Rakhmanin as to whether Hungary might have strayed and learned that, fortunately, no—Hungary’s position in Sofia had been much appreciated. The trouble was with the East Germans [**Document 22**].

The May 20 Politburo resolution included an instruction to publish an article about China in the leading journal *Kommunist*. The article was written under Rakhmanin’s supervision, and so contained brutal criticism of China’s domestic reforms and foreign policy. It was meant as a concise expression of the positions Rakhmanin had earlier elaborated at the Interkit. The editor of *Kommunist* Richard Kosolapov sent around the proofs of the article to the members of the editorial board. Chernyaev, a member of the board, thought that the article was a complete negation of the Tashkent speech, and expressed his reservations to Kosolapov: if the article were published, people would think that the Tashkent line had been abandoned, or that there is a policy struggle in the leadership. Kosolapov said he could not do anything: “Rakhmanin is sitting on my head.” Chernyaev took up the matter with his boss Ponomarev, a member of the China Commission. Ponomarev was wary: “Be careful, one should not make it look as if we (the International Department) are pro-Chinese, and Rakhmanin is the only one who struggles... [**Document 23**].”

Eventually Andropov heard about the conflict but he took an ambiguous line: on the one hand, criticizing Chernyaev for stirring a conflict between CC departments, and on the other—ordering Rakhmanin to cut down the article in the part dealing with the domestic issues. Andropov even said (so Ponomarev claimed) that “Rakhmanin is not behaving himself correctly. I warned him. If nothing changes, we will have to look for another place for him.” Rakhmanin, however, was hardly deterred, for the second draft of the *Kommunist* article was only marginally milder than the first. Rakhmanin was set to triumph, once again [**Document 23**].

Then, in early August 1982, Brezhnev forwarded a memo from his aide Viktor Golikov to Andropov, which argued that not enough was being done to promote the Tashkent line, that China was undergoing changes, which could no longer be ignored, that the Soviet Union’s main opponent was the US and not China—in other words, as Chernyaev characterized it—a memo of “completely anti-Rakhmaninite essence [**Document 23**].” Why or how Brezhnev chose to endorse a positive policy toward China is a good question. Since his return from Tashkent

(where he suffered an injury at an aviation plant from falling scaffolding) Brezhnev was barely in control of his mental faculties. He signed whatever his advisors happened to put in front of him. It was Rakhmanin's bad luck that Golikov—certainly far from a stalwart liberal—decided to champion the cause of better Sino-Soviet relations. Secret Sino-Soviet contacts in Moscow that August confirmed the trend toward rapprochement.⁵⁶ Brezhnev, speaking at the Politburo from prepared notes on September 9, mumbled: “now the policy of Beijing is apparently taking on new aspects. It seems that my speech in Tashkent is still working.”⁵⁷

But Rakhmanin did not give up. As the tsar of the Interkit, he packed a heavy punch, and represented, at least in the eyes of the East Europeans, the final Soviet word on anything that had to do with China. Disagreements would finally split the Interkit in December 1983 in Prague with the Soviets, Bulgarians, Vietnamese, Laotians and Mongolians refusing to see or make any changes, while the SED led the way in insisting on sounding out the possibility of reestablishing state-to-state relations. Rakhmanin concluded that the Chinese tactic of differentiation had ultimately been successful.⁵⁸ The East Germans and the Polish would lead the way in re-establishing party contacts with the Chinese in the fall of 1986, almost three years earlier than the USSR.

Indeed, although the Soviets continuously warned their allies not to be misled by the Chinese or fall victim to Beijing's anti-Soviet machinations, it became increasingly obvious for the East Central European leaderships that China's search for coalition partners no longer had direct anti-Soviet implications. In the summer of 1983, a Chinese diplomat told his Hungarian partner that “China had long given up turning Hungary against the Soviet Union, or to make it similar to Yugoslavia or Romania. He said that both sides must be practical, as there were many opportunities for the development of relations, even if we do not agree on certain political issues.”⁵⁹

In the early 1980s, the purely economic aspect of cooperation became increasingly important for both China and East Central Europe. Having surveyed their economies and

⁵⁶ Qian Qichen, *Waijiao Shiji* (Beijing: Shijie Zhishi Chubanshe, 2003), p. 7.

⁵⁷ Notes of Politburo meeting, 9 September 1982, reel 16, containers 23-24, Volkogonov papers, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

⁵⁸ Gardet, *Les Relations de la République populaire de Chine et de la République démocratique allemande (1949-1989)*, pp. 466-7, citing SAPMO DY30/Vorl. SED 38 357/1.

⁵⁹ Ambassador László Iván's cable. Beijing, 24 June 1983, HNA, XIX-J-1-j-Kina-135-002652/6-1983.

possible areas of cooperation, Beijing had clear ideas about utilizing the potential of ECE economies. The Chinese were interested in the development of economic ties and scientific-technical cooperation particularly in those areas which facilitated the growth of China's military-industrial complex. China's trade with East Europe grew, although these trade relations were still secondary compared to those China had with Japan and Western countries, and lagged behind Sino-Soviet bilateral trade.

In the meantime, another Interkit gathering was held in October 1984, in Tihany, Hungary, with the same old-styled Rakhmanin taking the lead.⁶⁰ But much against Rakhmanin's wishes, one already could see signs of improvement in Sino-Soviet relations.⁶¹ Deputy Prime Minister Ivan Arkhipov's visit to Beijing in December 1984 was a turning point: important economic agreements were signed, but true symbolism was in the hugs and the friendly toasts: Arkhipov was welcomed with open arms by the Chinese elders, his former comrades (he led Soviet advisors in China for a time in the 1950s). Rakhmanin, though, was bitter, telling his "fraternal" counterparts in February 1985 that the Soviet Communist Party's assessment of Arkhipov's visit was "strongly negative." According to Rakhmanin, "The CC CPSU concludes that the present anti-socialist line in the PRC's foreign policy is long-term and [includes] strategic cooperation with American imperialism. Beijing thinks that by weakening the USSR and the entire socialist commonwealth it will be able to carry out its own great power and hegemonic ambitions [**Document 24**, emphasis in original]."

After Konstantin Chernenko's death in March 1985 Mikhail Gorbachev assumed power, moving quickly to formulate his foreign policy priorities: mending fences with China was high on the list. Knowing that, Rakhmanin tried (successfully!) to publish his report from the Tihany Interkit in an internal party bulletin. Chernyaev tried to pre-empt the publication by calling Gorbachev's aide Andrei Aleksandrov-Agentov who opted out, saying: "ask for something simpler." Chernyaev called Rakhmanin directly, telling him that the report ran against the

⁶⁰ The Hungarian file of the 14th Interkit held in Tihany, Hungary on 30-31 October 1984 contains, among others, the text of Rakhmanin's statement, the draft Protocol (Protokol'naya Zapis') of the meeting prepared by the Soviets in September, the report prepared by the CC HSWP International Department for the Politburo, M-KS-288, f.32, cs. 111, HNA, ő. e. /1984.

⁶¹ On Sino-Soviet relations and eventual *rapprochement* in the 1980s, see Péter Vámos, "'Only a Handshake but No Embrace': Sino-Soviet Normalization in the 1980s." in Thomas Bernstein and Li Hua-yu (eds.), *China Learns from the Soviet Union, 1949-present* (Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), pp. 79-104 and Sergey Radchenko's forthcoming study of the Soviet Union and Asia in the 1980s.

substance of Gorbachev's policy. The latter "objected, saying that he does not see the 'difference' and is not inclined to withdraw the material. I replied: my duty is to warn; you are the one who will be responsible for it..."⁶² Rakhmanin was hardly deterred.

Rakhmanin's luck ran out some months later, when he incurred Gorbachev's wrath for an exceptionally hard-line article in the Soviet daily *Pravda*. Published on June 21, 1985 under one of Rakhmanin's pen-names, O. Vladimirov, the article criticized the East Europeans for "covert or even overt Russo-phobia and anti-Sovietism." Rakhmanin's case was taken up at the Politburo level, and although he managed to hold on to his office (prompting Chernyaev's comments: "something, someone is standing behind him"), Rakhmanin's power and influence were in decline.⁶³ In 1986 he was sent into retirement. Rakhmanin's involuntary demotion (he would die in 2010) signaled the demise of Interkit as well, now also an anachronistic relic of a passing era. It was not missed in East-Central Europe; here, all Soviet allies succumbed to China's charm offensive, and by 1987 relations between China and the East Europeans were completely normalized. Only the Mongolians and the Vietnamese continued to harbor resentment against Beijing, even though—with Rakhmanin gone and with conservative Gromyko replaced by an open-minded Eduard Shevardnadze—the Soviets were pressing to move forward in improving relations with China, a process that would culminate in Gorbachev's tumultuous May 1989 summit with Deng in Beijing amid the demonstrations in Tiananmen Square. As for Interkit, its records and structures were consigned to archives and fading memories, along with the artificially imposed Soviet-East Central European coordination of research on modern China and conformity it struggled to promote.

⁶² 11 April 1985 diary entry, Anatoly Chernyaev, *Sovmestnyi Iskhod. Dnevnik dvukh epokh. 1972-1991 gody*. (Moskva: Rosspen, 2010), p. 619.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, p. 639.

**APPENDIX I:
SELECTED TRANSLATED SOVIET-BLOC DOCUMENTS
ON CHINA AND INTERKIT, 1966-1987**

Document No. 1

Polish-Soviet Talks in Moscow, 10-15 October 1966

[Source: Andrzej Paczkowski, ed. Tajne Dokumenty Biura Politycznego PRL-ZSRR, 1956-1970 (London: Aneks Publishers, 1998), doc. 28 (pp. 364-432); translated by Malgorzata K. Gnoinska.]

Secret

(Excerpts regarding China)

[14 October]

[...]

Gomułka: I would like to discuss, in our opinion, the most important matters, that is, the war in Vietnam, as well as the whole situation in China and the CCP's position.

[...]

Gomułka: The second issue. We need to find an answer to the following question: how to assess the events currently taking place in China? I mean here the so-called Cultural Revolution. I have not yet encountered any deeper attempts to assess these events. It is difficult for us to provide such an assessment since all the information we get boils down to what the Chinese press is publishing and to what the Hongweibing [Red Guards] are writing about on their posters.

There is no doubt that the name itself—the Cultural Revolution—is a misnomer. This is just a façade behind something else taking place. The point here is the internal struggle within the [Chinese Communist] party. After all, this is clear from the communiqué of the XI CC CCP Plenum. It says clearly that the fire needs to be directed against the internal capitalists and

revisionists. Besides, the development of events testifies to this. The 18 [provincial party] committees have been either broken up or attacked. Apparently, a kind of situation has emerged over there, which was considered very dangerous by a particular group within the Chinese leadership.

It is clear from many statements that those who wanted to get closer to “the modern Khrushchevite revisionism” were represented in the party. This is understandable. Besides, it could not happen otherwise given the failure of their foreign policy. One has to only point to Bandung II, the events in Indonesia, etc. This was a bankruptcy of their policy. People must have given this some thought.

Given the situation of the war intensification in Vietnam, when the masses are being mobilized to fend off the U.S. aggression, there were surely those in the party who questioned whether they could do so alone without the Soviet Union. Some must not have liked Mao’s cult, which has reached the level of absurdity at this point. This must have also made some people think. You had the cult of Stalin, but in comparison with what has been happening in China, this was just an infantile illness. The cult [of Stalin] boiled down to and concentrated on political spheres. In China, however, there are absurd things happening. But, there are people who think clearly and who realize the ridiculousness of this phenomenon. Therefore, various factors could have caused the opposition.

Let’s take the army, for example, in which they got rid of the military ranks and which was transformed into a guerrilla army. Mao’s idea of the guerilla army is currently being implemented and carried out in Vietnam. According to this theory, the entire Chinese nation is being prepared for guerilla warfare. We should suppose that there must have also been elements of opposition within the army. Besides, we should look at things from the psychological point of view, that is, how people react to various kinds of events. In connection with the elimination of the military ranks, the economic situation of many people must also have worsened. This must have caused dissatisfaction.

The situation is being shaped in such a manner that the main force, which some in the Chinese leadership want to rely on, is the army. This is the kind of force which will resolve not only the external, but also internal, problems.

The question arises: why were the Red Guards created in the first place? It seems that they were created, most of all, in order to spread fear among the society and the party organizations. A particular situation then arises, that is, people are scared. Subsequently, they begin to adapt to the new situation. Or perhaps it was difficult to do this by using the normal administrative methods and means. Because when you get rid of [the first] secretary, then you need to create some kind of accusations. Then, a discussion will ensue. Apparently, they thought that this method wouldn't reach their goals.

We are currently in a situation where we actually don't know who is in charge of all of this. There is no doubt that these are not spontaneous phenomena, because the addresses are being given, they point out who should be attacked. There is some kind of a power center. Whether there are seven of them, or perhaps a bigger circle of people, we don't know. We know, however, that many people have been removed from the leadership itself. For example, they removed Peng Zhen, whom we know very well and who chastised "the revisionists" with foam in his mouth during our meetings. Liu Shaoqi is silent. We know that he has been removed from a series of positions he held. Also, a whole bunch of other people are being silent, for example, Deng Xiaoping, about whom we haven't heard anything recently. They have not been announcing any changes in leadership for years. This is why we don't know who is actually in charge of all of this.

There is no doubt that there's an internal struggle within the party. It is being played out in such a form for which the Chinese conditions allow. They want to get rid of the opposition. The question arises—what will all of this lead to? In order to answer this, we need to know the Chinese situation well. One thing is sure, that is, that such an attack on the party, which we are currently observing in China, would have disassembled the party in any other country for many years. Nobody would like to belong to this party. Who is doing this? The Hongweibing are, of course, working according to particular instructions. However, it would be a mistake to think that all of what the Red Guards are doing is based on instructions. There is much self-imposed initiative, for example, the destruction of cultural artifacts. I don't think that they were instructed to do so. But, they probably think that you can't make an omelet without breaking eggs. The situation in China is truly complicated. Unfortunately, we can't offer any deeper analysis unless we get to know better the facts, people, and the situation.

In connection with this topic, I would like to move on to the issue of the world conference of communist and workers' parties...I spoke about this issue with [John] Gollan [the leader of the Communist Party of Great Britain], telling him that in fact he's carrying out an opportunist policy. I said that the situation in the communist movement would change only when the CCP feels that is fully isolated or almost isolated. Only then will we be able to force it to change its position. [I told him] that with his wavering he was only helping the Chinese. This is opportunism. He read this as an offense and left without signing the communiqué about the talks.

When it comes to your formulation about closing oneself in and focusing only on one's own matters, and so on, I would not agree with that. I took this as if it were directed at us.

Brezhnev: Absolutely not. I was talking about the situation in general terms.

Gomułka: We don't exclude the possibility of convening the conference without the participation of the Chinese party. But under the condition that this party is in fact being isolated. We can't say that your hitherto tactics of not exacerbating the situation and keeping silent in face of the CCP's attacks did not bring any results.

Brezhnev: We also agree.

Gomułka: The Chinese have become isolated on a very important and concrete issue, that is, the issue of Vietnam. Nobody in the world understands why the Chinese don't want to create a joint front. Therefore, a calm tactic bore better results than a quarrel eye for an eye.

If we can bring about a conference in which the most important parties will take part (even though the quantity also counts), then we can organize such a conference also without the participation of China. But, if such a conference were to be an expression of an official split, which exists in reality, then would such a conference be really necessary?

[...]

Gomulka: ... Now the issue of Johnson's statement...The [U.S.] administration decided to take a step in order to strengthen its propaganda position, as well as to in fact get closer to the USSR.

This rapprochement, in our opinion, serves two purposes:

- I. To show that despite the war in Vietnam, they are able to come to an understanding with the USSR...
- II. They want to all the more pit the Chinese against the USSR, that is, if one is able to do more in this area. This would be very convenient for the US since this situation could lead to a further exacerbation of relations between the USSR and China, not even excluding a military conflict. This is a classic example of a policy conducted by the imperialist nation. We should also take into consideration this second goal.

[...]

[15 October]

[...]

Brezhnev: The Vietnam issue. We fully agree with your opinion that we need to know the real position and aims of the policy conducted by the Vietnamese Workers' Party. However, so far we have not been able to achieve anything on this end. We see the reflection of their dependence on the Chinese. We have done a lot to persuade the Vietnamese to sensible negotiations...

We are in full agreement with your analysis regarding China. I would only like to emphasize that our position will change on this issue. The situation has changed so much that we are of the opinion that we should tell our party and the nation everything. We will provide them with the assessment of these events.

I think that some kind of a misunderstanding took place between us regarding the issue of the conference of 17 parties. We consider this conference as useful. I only wanted to say that this phase is over. When it comes to an international conference, then our positions are the same. We think that we should present the issue openly, that is, without talking about the date or place for this conference. Our propositions were of a fully preliminary nature. The main point is eliminate

the ban of talking [?] about the issue of the conference. How we will go about it, then this is another matter which demands a more thorough planning [thinking].

The Chinese problem must be investigated. We don't know what the "Cultural Revolution" will lead to. They have already held campaigns to eliminate flies, sparrows, and so on. But, currently this campaign is a political one. I think that some kind of a social opposition took place over there. Chen Yi said clearly that the purpose of the Cultural Revolution was to avoid a state coup in China.

Some kind of a struggle must be going on over there. The CC CCP has 180 members, while at the latest plenum, according to the published documents, there were only 86 present. Where are the rest? Were they perhaps eliminated or removed from the CC? We know that they have removed an additional 10 members from the CC following the latest [August 1966] plenum. All of this testifies to the complicated nature of processes that are taking place over there.

The list of the members of the highest Chinese leadership was not published by mistake either. We agree with you. We will try to get to know the processes taking place in China. We also know very little of what is going on over there. Our embassy is working in exceptionally difficult conditions. And, just as in other socialist countries, we do not carry out intelligence activities.

[...]

Document No. 2

Minutes of Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Central Committee meeting, 12 April 1967 (excerpts)

[Source: Hungarian National Archives (HNA) M-KS-288. f. 4. cs. 87. ó.e. Obtained by Péter Vámos, and translated by Gwennyth A. Jones and Péter Vámos for CWIHP.]

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Prepared in 3 copies

MINUTES

of the Central Committee meeting held on 12 April 1967

Agenda

1. Presentation on international questions

Speaker: Comrade Zoltán Komócsin

Commenters. Comrades Sándor Nógrádi, István Csáki, István Friss, Gyula Hevesi, Géza Révész, and János Kádár.

The Central Committee approves the oral presentation by Comrade Zoltán Komócsin on international questions.

[...]

Dear Comrades!

Members of the Central Committee are aware that between 25 February and 1 March, Comrades János Kádár, Béla Biszku and Károly Erdélyi paid a visit to Moscow. The occasion was a direct, open and comradely exchange of ideas with the leaders of the Soviet Party and state, Comrades Brezhnev, Kosygin and Andropov.

Similar exchanges took place on 8 and 9 March in Budapest with leading Polish Comrades, Comrades Gomulka and Cyrankiewicz.

Both Hungarian-Soviet and Hungarian-Polish discussions concerned the same subject matters, and we hereby inform the Central Committee according to the order of exchanges.

[...]

[Pages 14-17]

Respected Central Committee!

An exchange of opinions on the events in China and their international consequences took place at discussions in Moscow and Budapest.

Regarding the Chinese situation, the **Soviet Comrades said** that the political struggle continues. Sending students back to schools, and the mass of calls to stimulate production show

that the vehemence of the mass movements will diminish. But there is no sign that Mao Zedong will put an end to his mindless affairs. The new momentum at present is Zhou Enlai's appearance in the forefront.

The most recent theoretical articles in *Pravda* have been useful. They have advanced international understanding of the situation, and at the same time provided support to the anti-Mao forces fighting in China. We must continue to study the processes in the next phase. The Soviets are preparing a draft statement which may, if necessary, be issued by the Central Committee and the government in order to clarify the events in China.

Comrade Gomulka said that the leadership of the Polish United Workers' Party holds patchy information from China. According to existing knowledge, the debate and later the split within the leadership of the Communist Party of China arose basically in connection with solving questions of internal construction.

According to Mao Zedong's concept, the rapid liquidation of China's backwardness, and the creation of modern military potential can only be achieved by means of an artificial restraint on consumption, lasting egalitarianism, emphasizing moral factors and the expansion of military discipline to all the people.

Although the details of Mao's opponents' concepts are not known, the source of their opposition may be different concepts of the means of socialist construction. The opposition's attempts clearly include whittling down the extremists, and turning toward applying more realistic political methods. This fundamental opposition is certainly interwoven with personal antipathies as well.

From the events of the past few weeks, it has become evident that the direction of the Mao Zedong line has retreated. This is natural. Despite the different character of Chinese tradition and its standard of political and economic development, the people there still want to live better. In the long term, it is inconceivable even in China that the hundreds of millions of people will not be stimulated to achieve great economic goals by the hopes for a better life or by material means, but with an abstract, ascetic approach and egalitarianism.

It is possible that due to specific relations, the masses of the people are not yet conscious of this realization. But one part of the Party's leading cadres sees clearly that the present methods

are not appropriate for the degree to which productive forces are developed, and are restricting China's economic development. These cadres represent Mao Zedong's opponents.

The present situation shows that the struggle against opponents has ended up with a split. It appears that the opposition of the Party and state apparatus is stronger than presumed. There are conflicts within the military leadership, the result of earlier dismissals. The anarchy of worrying measures has saturated the life of the country. The events have increased the international isolation of the Communist Party of China, with more Parties turning away from them. These reasons may have compelled Mao Zedong and his milieu to reduce the vehemence of the struggle and seek a compromise.

Although Mao Zedong's ideas indicate failure, it is too early to speak of defeat. It is impossible to sidestep him while he is alive because of his unquestionable popular authority. It is characteristic that his opponents have not dared take their struggles against him to a personal level, but rather sabotaged the Mao Zedong line. Regarding the future, and as we saw after the failure of the Great Leap Forward of 1958, it seems likely that the slogans will remain the same, but with new content.

Comrade Gomulka said that the great deficiency in the work of our like-minded Parties is that we were not able to resolve the analysis appropriate to the Chinese situation, or inform our Party members and public opinion. Our propaganda dealt with the extremists and sensational elements, and traced events back to one person's subversive thoughts. What is missing is the deeper connections of the events, the introduction and analysis of China's different relations. We must also see that forces opposing the Mao Zedong line cannot automatically be called adherents of friendship with the Soviet Union. However complicated the situation appears, we must still eliminate this deficiency in our communications.

We must strive in future to maintain relations and guard existing positions. The conduct of the Soviet Union is exemplary in this regard. At the time of the Peking atrocities, Comrade Brezhnev et. al. proceeded in cold blood and with great political prudence. The Western imperialists and Americans would like the socialist countries to cut their diplomatic relations and retreat from China. We do not want to give our enemies this pleasure. From the world historical perspective, the stake is too great.

Comrade Kádár pointed out to the Soviet comrades as well as to the Polish comrades that we held similar information and reached the same conclusions. We too see that the struggle is not yet over, and a dénouement in the near future is unlikely. The unbalanced situation could last for years, and we will need to take into account further surges of internal contradictions, flare ups and restraints.

The most recent events represented a great loss of prestige for the Chinese Party not only internationally, but also internally. The people expect from the new socialist social system not only material welfare, but law and order, a secure livelihood, and respect for human dignity. If the cornerstones of social order disappear, this can affect the credence and authority of the system.

The defeat of Mao Zedong's concept could disillusion the youth and part of the Party membership not only in their leaders' theories, but also in communism.

The development of the Chinese events will in all probability be the great question of our lives and struggle in the forthcoming years. In connection with various international problems we must time and again take into account China's extremist behavior. On the day-to-day level, we must consider that positive steps to improve relations with the Communist Party of China and the People's Republic of China cannot be expected. The Chinese will be absent from the common front for years, they will not have a positive influence over our common struggle, but it is possible that the negative influence of their actions might diminish in the international sphere.

[Pages 20-24, Excerpts from the discussion of the China issue]

Comrade SÁNDOR NÓGRÁDI:

Respected Central Committee!

I request to speak mainly to break the silence which has been present at the discussion of international questions during the last meeting of the Central Committee. In the information briefing at the last meeting, Comrade Komócsin raised some very interesting questions and we were informed, perhaps incorrectly, that speeches imparting information do not require a response. This is not the case! In the communist movement, if someone has something to say, he should respond to questions, whether it is a point of information, a proper speech or a normal agenda item, because if we do not speak, then we are not supporting the Political Committee

properly. This concerns questions of great importance! We should not become revisionists by not responding to international questions.

[...]

The second central question of the international situation is, I think, Vietnam, the filthy aggression of American imperialism in Vietnam! Whether the position of the Vietnamese comrades in Hanoi has become more rigid compared to last year is, in my opinion, not a decisive question. Far more decisive is the fact that the American imperialists do not want to give up the position they have secured for themselves in South Vietnam. I think that even if Ho Chi Minh et. al. had wanted to initiate talks in a smarter way with the Americans, they [the Americans] would have thwarted them anyway. And Comrade Komócsin was right when he said that [the Americans] are attempting a military solution. Whether they are successful is another question. They could get entangled in a war in the Far East that lasts for years, and by 1968 it would not end in their favor.

But in the background to this is the Chinese question. The Chinese have approximately as much interest in the continuation of the Vietnamese war as the Americans. Whether their thinking is the same is another question.

The Chinese have internal problems. This must be borne in mind and not overlooked. The Americans do not have internal problems like the Chinese, they have problems of international policy, problems in the Far East.

They want to secure their positions in the Far East. The Chinese question cannot be ignored. I have drawn attention to their internal problems: problems of food supply and production, and problems with the general mood of the people, and so on. And if Mao et. al. cannot liquidate the opposition that exists—though I would certainly not like to allow this prediction—I do not think that they will liquidate [the opposition], and so this situation will last a long time. And it is also possible that they will not be able to get away without internal civil war. They do not have the traditions of peaceful countries, they have assaulted their own country in the past century, in fact they have a thousand-year long and even longer tradition of civil war. Let nobody think that if Liu Shaoqi were removed from the position of chairman tomorrow, that

he or his followers would give up the fight. Who are his followers? Those who have been sawn off in at least 10-15 provinces. Communists, communists, at least half of them. These are his followers and the masses attached to them. And this is already tens of millions of people, or even hundreds of millions. Liu Shaoqi does not represent a person but a tendency. Liu Shaoqi is the chairman of the Republic, they have not yet been able to unseat him from his position. Deng Xiaoping is the First Secretary of the Party, and then there are others, like Zhu De, a national hero who led the army in the great war of liberation. Imagine that an eighty-year-old man decides to take a stand “against the great Buddha,” because it is evident that what Mao is doing is not practical policy or rational policy. It’s very interesting, what I read yesterday in the “confidential”, which I usually read. The “confidential” states that Liu Shaoqi has been accused I think in *Renmin Ribao*, the Party paper, of not agreeing with the Party on the question of material interests. Very interesting! Comrade Nemes argued with him at the time, and I also argued with him. He was strongly opposed to material interests—is this true? Now they write that he is in support. This is his point of view. But if he is in support, let us think this through, then it means that he agrees with us on many questions. It’s not yet certain that he supports us on all questions,—in fact it’s certain that he doesn’t support us on all questions, but on very many questions. And he does not call the Soviet Union revisionist because it placed material interests in the foreground during the era of constructing socialism and the first years of communist construction.

This means that Liu Shaoqi and others, Deng Xiaoping and the others are of the opinion that the standard of living in China must be raised. It is well-known that the standard of living there is very low. However, Mao Zedong and his colleagues are of the opinion that the people must primarily develop ideologically. When we discussed this question with Liu Shaoqi I went so far as to say to him, even though a Foreign Ministry official was there, because he started the discussion, that we committed such errors in the question of material interests that contributed largely to the ’56 counter-revolution: in the second Five Year Plan, we promised a 27 or 29 percent increase in the standard of living, which did not produce an increase, but in many categories a drop. This is a fact! And our Party started the consolidation with an increase in wages, by 16 to 20 percent if I remember, 16 percent. During that period, when the workers were

disappointed in us because of the standard of living, certain strata wavered, which can be attributed to this.

So, Comrades, the essence of all these words is that we must take these people up and support the Chinese opposition. Even if the population is 700 million people, and great masses stand behind them, and even if they are removed from their functions. And this struggle, internal struggle will not cease, they need international support. Let Mao et. al. say in their press, and their propaganda, and whatever other means, “Well look, these are the protégés of revisionists.” Let them say that, but Party functionaries know even in China that internationalism is a very great force and the international support carries enormous significance.

I now ask: are we supporting the opposition in China enough? No! Because we are silent. It has somehow emerged between us, and the other parties that there are two positions, two different lines, tactical lines. One is that of postponement, like the Italians for example, not to mention the others, the Romanians and the Dutch; the other wishes to clarify the situation in the international communist movement. This is our path, mainly with the Soviet Union. But it does not give any kind of perspective. That there will be some statement on the question of European security and a meeting will be convened, I think this seems likely. I think that for us Hungarians, Hungarian communists, we should not join the postponers, but those who wish to clarify the situation. I do not suggest rashness. However robust these movements are in China, they are not developing that quickly. Mao launched—when? One year ago?—The Cultural Revolution. And it is possible that many people have already been killed, but—I do not predict—they will not be able to resolve the situation, because these problems persist and that suite, the Mao suite, which is ageing and sectarian, a dogmatic suite, cannot resolve the problems. They divert their internal difficulties to international policy, to the Vietnamese question and the Soviet Union, and it is possible that they will launch a provocation against the Soviet Union, while there will be civil war there and a military provocation against the Soviet Union. Anything can happen there, everything is different there! It is very difficult to understand the Chinese mentality, it is not straightforward. The people, those simple people, 700 million of them, do not know what is going on, what is happening in the world. A slim stratum, say 25 million, soldiers, mainly army officers, then workers in the state and Party apparatus, they know. However at present, half of them are being decapitated. Can they remain quiet? If someone said to us, a sort of someone, this

is of course a hypothesis, that half this body consists of revisionists who must be decapitated, they must be destroyed, would we acquiesce? No, I think we would not. They are the same, it's the same thing there! A communist is a communist! I know a couple of them, they are not the ones who don't dare. They do dare! They take action. Deng Xiaoping for example is a physically strong man, and still young. Does he accept that he is being labeled as enemy of the people? No he doesn't. Liu Shaoqi is the same. So let us support in our international policy and dimension that line which demands holding an international gathering and extends some sort of support to the opposition that is taking shape in China. This is what I wanted to say.

[...]

Document No. 3

Record of Conversation between Polish United Workers' Party Politburo Member Zenon Kliszko and Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Secretary Liu Ningyi, 16 June 1967

[Source: KC PZPR, V/84 and XIA/23, Archive of Modern Acts (AAN), Warsaw. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Malgorzata K. Gnoinska..]

Confidential

Note from the Conversation between Comrade Zenon Kliszko and CC CCP Secretary Liu Ningyi

The meeting took place on June 16, 1967 in Beijing in hotel "Beijing." In addition to the CC CCP secretary Liu Ningyi, Deputy Foreign Minister Qiao Guanhua was also present. [Polish] Ambassador W[itold] Rodzinski was also present during the meeting.

Having passed on the greetings for Comrade Mao Zedong, Comrade Kliszko handed to Liu Ningyi a letter of parties and governments of six socialist countries regarding convening a conference of the countries of the socialist camp dedicated to the need to increase and coordinate the aid to Vietnam, as well as he explained the motives of this initiatives that was put forth by the CC PUWP. Comrade Z. Kliszko especially emphasized that in the face of the escalation of the

American imperialism's aggression against the Vietnamese nation, the socialist countries are faced with an urgent need to coordinate their actions in order to provide support to the Vietnamese nation to such a degree as to force the imperialism to stop the aggression. This is why six socialist countries are turning to the CCP leadership with an ardent appeal to, in the face of this grave situation, agree to take place in the consultations regarding a joint and coordinated action to aid Vietnam. Comrade Kliszko strongly emphasized that the proposition of the six parties and governments is not of a propaganda nature, and that we are taking it very seriously. He expressed hope that the Chinese comrade would fully consider this initiative.

At the same time, Comrade Kliszko pointed out that for the past several years we have been witnessing the strongest pressure of American imperialism on the socialist camp ever since its inception. [He said that] for the first time the American imperialism dared to undertake the bombings of one of the socialist nations while taking advantage of the existing divergences between them. Regardless of how great the differences in ideological views are, we cannot forget about the fact that we are facing a common enemy—the American imperialism. History will never forgive us if we are not able to move beyond our divisive divergences so we can defend what we share in common and what is most important to us at the end of the day. Comrade Z. Kliszko pointed to the global nature of the American imperialism's offensive. He recalled the tragedy of the Communist Party of Indonesia, as well as a series of reactionary military coups in Africa, Latin America, and Asia. The letter to the CC CCP was written still before the events in the Middle East, Comrade Z. Kliszko said, however, the aggression against the Arab nations will once more prove the need for a unified action of the socialist nations.

Liu Ningyi replied to the explanations of Comrade Kliszko with a violent attack both against this initiative and overall against other socialist countries and European communist parties. He stated that what the socialist countries are proposing is calling for a unity of action, and that the position of the CCP on this issue has already been presented in an empathic and unequivocal manner. He reiterated that the CCP did not want anything to do with a revisionist clique of the Soviet Union's leadership and its lackeys who provide a hypocritical support for the Vietnamese nation in its just struggle to save the nation against American imperialism, and in fact are betraying it, and who falsely come out against the American imperialism, and in fact

fulfill the role of its ardent helper and supporter. What kind of unity are we then talking about here?

In the process of the conversation, Liu Ningyi actually reiterated the content of the article published in Renmin Ribao titled “The bankruptcy of the new outcasts [drop-outs] of Europe” and which is a violent and accusatory attack on the Conference in Karlove Vary. Liu Ningyi defined the letter of six countries as a continuation in the spirit of the conference in Karlove Vary and “a fetus of this conference.” His pronouncement contained a series of accusations and epithets addressed at parties which participated in the conference in Karlove Vary.

In the final fragment of his statement, Liu Ningyi attacked the PUWP for “anti-Chinese articles, information, and reprints,” in the Polish press from March 1966 until March 1967. He stated: “We have not yet had the time to reply to these accusatory attacks. We haven’t had the time to do so and they are waiting for their own turn.”

Liu Ningyi said one more time that “there is not and cannot be any unity of actions between real Marxist-Leninists and revisionists.”

Comrade Z. Kliszko rejected all of Liu Ningyi’s accusations in a decisive manner. He stated, among other things, that he had never heard such loads of insults and names despite the fact that he has been in the communist movement for forty years. What you said here, Comrade Z. Kliszko said among other things, are only insults; there isn’t even a shade of trying to justify the accusations that you are directing against us, an insult is not an argument and does not solve any divisive issue. Comrade Z. Kliszko stressed that it is outright tragic that the Communist Chinese Party has not drawn any conclusions, did not learn anything in this great tragedy which the drama of the Indonesian communists and their party really was to the entire [communist] movement.

In the course of exchanging views, Liu Ningyi stated that the March 1965 conference led to the split within the [communist] movement for which there is no return. There is a chasm between the CCP and the parties which signed the letter; there’s no common language. Liu Ningyi returned several times to the accusatory thesis that the communist parties of Europe transformed themselves into “new social-democratic parties” and along with “the old social-democratic parties they serve as lackeys for reaction and imperialism.”

work out separately their positions on the policy of the Communist Party of China, on the internal and international situation of China, and on perspectives on Chinese development. Following this, representatives of the 6 Parties should meet in Moscow within the framework of a debate to harmonize their understandings. Delegations of 3-5 should represent the Parties at this conference. The CPSU concurs with the Polish comrades' proposal.

We have consulted with the Polish comrades on their proposal. They informed us that they proposed the end of September for the date of the conference, and that the head of the Central Committee International Department will lead their delegation. We also consulted with the Czechoslovak comrades, who agree with the Polish initiative. They reported that the head of the Central Committee International Department or his deputy will lead their delegation and that 3-4 theoretical experts and two representatives of the International Department will take part in the delegation.

On the basis of the above it is proposed that:

- a) the HSWP reports that it agrees with the Polish proposal;
- b) we propose that the conference should take place at the end of September or in early October;
- c) that the head of Central Committee International Department or his deputy should lead our delegation to the planned conference. The delegation members should be a theoretical expert on China and two representatives of the Central Committee International Department. Comrade Zoltán Komócsin should approve the list of delegates;
- d) on the basis of our position to date the International Department should work out detailed analytical material on the internal and international policy of the Communist Party of China and on the Chinese situation, and this material should be forwarded to Comrade Zoltán Komócsin for approval.

Frigyes Puja

Document No. 5

The Informational Note from the December 14-21, 1967 Meeting

[Source: AAN, KC PZPR, XIA/13. Translated for CWIHP by Malgorzata Gnoinska.]

As the result of the party consultations between the CPSU, BCP, CPCz, SED, HSWP, and the PUWP, the international departments of these parties were instructed to prepare materials that contain the analysis of the development of the situation within the CCP and the PRC.

Each of the abovementioned international departments (except for the BCP) shared their prepared materials with the remaining departments.

According to the agreement from 14 to 21 December 1967, a confidential meeting took place in Moscow between the representatives of International Departments of the abovementioned parties as well as the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party. The meeting was devoted to the exchange of views and discussion on the China question.

As the result of this meeting, materials were drafted and worked out based on the studies sent by individual International Departments to be possibly used by the Central Committees of the seven parties as they see fit.

The participants of the meeting also adopted "a protocol note." [Note: see below—trans.]

[...]

The International Department CC PUWP

2 January 1968

Protocol Note

On the days between 14 and 21 December 1967, a confidential meeting took place in Moscow between the representatives of the International Departments of the Central Committees of the BCP, the CPCz, MPRP, SED, PUWP, HSWP, and CPSU which was devoted to the exchange of views and discussion on the China issue. As a result of the collective work, the participants of the meeting prepared a joint material, containing the analysis of the situation

within the CCP and the PRC, the assessment of the so-called Maoism and the political course of Mao Zedong's group.

The participants of the meeting agreed that this material would be used by the Central Committees of their parties as they see fit.

The participants of the meeting exchanged their views on coordinating studies and research, as well as the propaganda and informational activity regarding the China issue, which will be conducted in individual socialist countries. The list of proposals regarding these issues is attached here.

Some of the delegations preliminarily made their remarks regarding the tactics on how to battle Mao Zedong's factional course.

The delegations expressed their wish to agree—after the consultations in the Central Committees of their parties—to hold no later than February 1968, a meeting of the representatives of the CC International Departments (at the level of heads or deputy heads of the departments) during which it would be necessary to exchange information regarding the attitude of the CCs of individual parties toward the concrete proposals that were put forth at the abovementioned meeting.

The delegations of the CC International Departments of fraternal parties emphasized the fruitful nature of the meeting, as well as a friendly and concrete atmosphere in which the meeting took place.

December 21, 1967

[Note: What follows are excerpts from a jointly worked out material entitled “About the Events in China”—trans.]

“About the Events in China:” (An excerpt from the material worked out at the meeting of the International Departments of 7 parties in Moscow in 1967)

It should be stated in the beginning that as the result of the events in China connected with the “Cultural Revolution” the sheer existence of the CCP was threatened, the danger of the

change in the nature of the state power took place, and as a consequence, there was also a real threat to China's socialist achievements.

These events are not exclusively China's domestic issue due to the following:

- Mao's group's policy is greatly damaging the cause of revolution and socialism and its activity on the international arena indeed favors the cause of imperialism;
- Mao's practical activity discredits the idea of socialism;
- Mao Zedong's policy conducts destructive activity in the communist movement;
- It causes commotion in the Third World;
- As a consequence, the course of Mao's group makes the struggle for peace, democracy and socialism very difficult, and makes it easy for the aggressive forces of imperialism to conduct their activities;

At the moment, it is still impossible to carry out the assessment of all issues. At the same time, however, many phenomena took on a sufficiently clear and complete form, a good deal of trustworthy facts were gathered, which enable us to assume a correct attitude toward the events in China, and to carry out their general assessments from the point of view of the Marxist-Leninist theory.

Document No. 6

East German report on Interkit meeting in Moscow, December 1967

[Source: DY 30, IV A 2/20/1150, Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv (SAPMO-BA), Berlin. Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer.]

Berlin, 27 December 1967

Report

About a Meeting of Representatives from the International Departments of Seven Fraternal Parties from Socialist Countries on Policy of the Mao Zedong Group between 14 and 21 December 1967 in Moscow (CPSU, SED, PUWP, CPC, HSWP, BCP, MPRP)

I.

Following an invitation by the CPSU Central Committee, a meeting was held from 14 to 21 December 1967 in Moscow between representatives of some fraternal parties from socialist

countries about the situation in the PR China and in the Communist Chinese Party (CCP). In preparation of the meeting the CPSU had forwarded to all participants a draft of an assessment about the Mao Zedong Group's policy and the situation in the PR China. SEC, CPC, HSWP and PUWP also provided the other participants with according material. Following a CPSU proposal, participants agreed to define the meeting as internal.

According to decision # 35/67 from 5 December 1967 made by the Politburo of the SED Central Committee (CC) the following comrades participated in the meeting as representatives of the SED:

- Paul Markowski, Candidate of the SED Central Committee, Head of International Relations Department of SED CC
- Heinz Bauer, Staff Member of SED CC
- Bruno Mahlow, Staff Member of SED CC

Among others, members of the CPSU delegation were: Comrade [Aleksei] Rumiantsev, Member of CPSU CC and Vice President of the USSR Academy of Sciences; Comrade [Oleg] Rakhmanin, Deputy Head of the Department for Relations with Fraternal Parties of Socialist Countries; Professor [Mikhail] Sladkovskii, Director of the Far East Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences. The other fraternal parties were represented by the heads and deputy heads of International Relations Departments.

According to a proposal made by the Soviet comrades the following agenda was agreed:

1. Compilation of a joint assessment in form of working material about the situation in the PR China and the policy of the Mao Zedong Group.
2. Oral exchange of information about these issues.
3. Exchange of opinions about the future course of the confrontation with the Mao Zedong Group's Policy, also about how to coordinate research activities and the exchange of information in this field.

A protocol was drafted concerning the convocation of the meeting (Appendix # 1 [not included—trans.]). As another result of the meeting, the attached assessment was passed (Appendix # 2 [not included—trans.]). In addition, proposals made by individual participants on how to proceed in the future were compiled for the CC with the recommendation to comment on them (Appendix # 3 [not included—trans.]).

Already before the meeting began, it was apparent how the Soviet comrades were attributing extraordinary high importance to the undertaking. As evident in later statements by Comrades [Mikhail] Suslov and [Boris] Ponomarev, as well as by Comrade Rumiantsev, the Soviet comrades currently view the determined struggle for a complete and comprehensive unmasking of Mao Zedong Ideology as extremely important. They base these perspectives on the assumption that the planned IX CCP Congress will create, under the label of a Chinese Communist Party, a party completely alien to Marxism-Leninism and molded in the shape of Mao Zedong's ideology and personal will. This could result in a new, even more dangerous situation within the communist world movement. Furthermore, the Soviet comrades showed grave concern over the intensification of the anti-Soviet and aggressive course by Chinese leaders. Its consequences are still unforeseeable.

Moreover, in the context of preparations for the World Conference of Communist and Workers Parties a continuous and consequent ideological debate with positions and actions of the Mao Zedong Group is of great importance for solidifying the unity and cohesion of communist and workers parties.

At the beginning of the meeting, the Polish comrades became very active in arguing against drafting a joint assessment. They demanded the meeting to become a non-committal exchange of information. Their main argument was, if this internal meeting becomes known, it will have negative impacts on preparing the consultative meeting in Budapest and a new world conference: By all means there must be no jointly agreed document, as it could be interpreted as forming a faction. Furthermore, the Polish comrades doubted whether it is possible to arrive at an exact analysis of the current situation in the PR China and the Mao Zedong Group's policy.

The CPC comrades also had certain reservations. At the beginning of meetings they were open to the Polish comrades' positions. Thus already before the conference, the Soviet comrades harbored certain doubts whether one would arrive at a joint assessment.

From the onset our delegation acted according to the SED Politburo decision. It opted for working toward a joint drafting of an assessment and talked accordingly to the other delegations. Polish concerns were successfully addressed, and the meeting proceeded in an overall constructive and comradely atmosphere.

During the drafting of the joint assessment proposals made by our delegation were met with full support. Our suggestions for amendments were incorporated in the document.

II.

During the meeting we had an interesting exchange of information on the current situation in the PR China, on the history of the CCP and the emergence of Mao Zedong Ideology, on the state of bilateral relations with the PR China, and on the international splitting activities by the Mao Zedong Group.

The CPSU comrades provided extensive information on Soviet-Chinese relations and emphasized the dangerous aggravation of the situation at the Chinese-Soviet border. They informed about major efforts by the Chinese leaders to spread disinformation within the Soviet public through massive radio propaganda, and also noted other attempts to infiltrate the Soviet Union with Mao Zedong Ideology. The Director of the Far Eastern Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences [Sladkovskii] gave a historical overview of the CCP's development. He proved how Mao Zedong placed himself at the helm of the CCP with schemes and violent methods, and how he always had fought a fierce struggle against internationalist forces and Marxist-Leninist members of the CCP leadership. Sladkovskii outlined the traditionally strident anti-Soviet positions of Mao Zedong. The Soviet comrades characterized the destruction of friendship between the Soviet and Chinese people as one of Mao Zedong's gravest crimes.

Comrade Sladkovskii informed that the Soviet Union is working on a five-volume history of the CCP. Comrade Rumiantsev provided an assessment of Mao Zedong Ideology as it becomes apparent from a six-volume edition of Mao Zedong's works. He informed that the Russian edition of these works was edited by Comrade [Pavel] Iudin so that many anti-Marxist, non-scientific, and anti-Leninist positions of Mao Zedong were corrected. Notwithstanding this, an overall analysis of Mao Zedong's existing work shows how he had never completely adopted a Marxist-Leninist basis. His nationalistic, anti-Marxist, and petit-bourgeois-anarchist positions permeate his entire oeuvre. Such gets confirmed when one compares these theoretical positions with Mao Zedong's practical policy.

The Soviet comrades provided the participants of the meeting with many written materials, such as a compilation of biographies from all the important people in the CCP and the PR China (Who is Who); a manuscript version of statements by Comrades Sladkovskii and

Rumiantsev; separate material on anarchist streaks in Mao Zedong Ideology; letters by Chinese internationalists to the CPSU CC for the occasion of the 50th Anniversary of the Great Socialist October Revolution; material about splittist activities by the Mao Zedong Group in the communist world movement, in the national liberation movement, and in international organizations; an assessment of the current economic situation in the PR China; material on violations by the PR China of principles of Marxist-Leninist policies toward nationalities.

The Polish comrades informed about some aspects of Chinese-American relations based on an analysis of ambassadorial talks in Switzerland and in Warsaw. This information revealed how certain agreements between the governments of both countries had been reached, like for instance the return of prominent Chinese nuclear physicists from the U.S. to the PR China, or about the situation in Southeast Asian territories etc.

Our delegation informed about the state of relations between GDR and PR China, the development of relations between West Germany and the PR China in particular in economic respects, and the splittist activities by the Mao Zedong Group in West Germany. We also provided for discussion a presentation about how the Chinese question was handled by the Comintern.

III.

There was consent during the meeting that confronting the policy and ideology of the Mao Zedong Group represents a basis question of decisive importance for the defense of Marxism-Leninism, the unity of the communist world movement, and cooperation with the national-revolutionary liberation movement. A plethora of proposals were made to maintain a regular and coordinated exchange of information, to coordinate research activities, and to consult each other about the ongoing policy of the Mao Zedong Group and the fight against its ideology and splittist activity.

Document No. 7

Telegrams from Romanian Embassy, Beijing, to Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 22-23-24 August 1968

[Source: Romanian Foreign Ministry Archives (AMAE), fond Telegrams, Pekin 1968, Vol II, pp. 272-274. Republished in Amb. Romulus Budura, ed., Romanian-Chinese Relations, 1880-1974. Documents (Bucharest, 2005), p. 901-902. Translated for CWIHP by Mircea Munteanu.]

Telegram no. 74320, 22 August 1968

22 August 1968. Nr. 74 320

Top Secret

At 2200 hours on 22 August 1968, I was received by Cde. Chen Yi, Deputy Prime Minister of the Council of State and Minister of Foreign Affairs. As instructed, I informed him of the situation developing in Czechoslovakia.

Chen Yi thanked me for the information, stating that he will present it right away to the Chinese leadership.

Chen Yi also stated that, in addition to himself, Premier Zhou Enlai will also attend the cocktail reception which we are organizing on 23 August, wanting to congratulate us on the SR [Socialist Republic of] Romania's national day. He mentioned that Premier Zhou Enlai is prepared to say a toast, and that he will enunciate the position of the Chinese government regarding the Czechoslovak events. He stated that the Premier will criticize the imperialist invasion perpetrated by the Soviet Union in Czechoslovakia.

After expressing his displeasure that there is no resistance [to the invasion] in Czechoslovakia, Chen Yi said the following:

“The Soviet leaders are accusing [Czechoslovak communist party first secretary Alexander] Dubcek that he is throwing himself in the embrace of the Western countries; in the embrace of West Germany. But who was the first to fall into the imperialist embrace? The Soviet leaders—Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Kosygin.

The Soviets say that they are defending socialism in Czechoslovakia, but Khrushchev was the first to abandon socialism in the Soviet Union. They pretend that militarily occupying Czechoslovakia is done to protect peace in Europe. What peace is there to talk about when they started the war?

Between us there are certain differences of opinions, but we remain good friends; this is why we can openly say what we think. You defend Dubcek. But we must say that Dubcek followed in Khrushchev's footsteps and trusted the Soviets, which is why he failed.

During many discussions we had with Cde. Ion Gheorghe Maurer, with Cde. Emil Bondaras, with other Romanian leaders, we showed that one cannot trust the Soviet Union, that they are not friends in need.

You already know that you cannot always go down the same road with the Soviet leadership, which sets you apart from the Czechoslovak leaders, from Dubcek."

Referring to the General Secretary Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu's speech of 21 August, Chen Yi stated that: "I was very happy to hear that you took steps to protect your independence and national sovereignty. I am convinced that if you remain resolute, your cause will succeed. We are behind you."

Considering the desire on the Chinese part that Premier Zhou Enlai give a speech at the cocktail [party] we are organizing on the occasion of 23 August, a speech in which he would express the position of the PRC regarding the USSR actions in Czechoslovakia, and considering that, initially, we did not envision speeches been given, I ask that you reply with instructions as to how to proceed, if possible before 7-8 in the morning (Beijing time), 2-3 AM Bucharest time, and, in case the idea of speeches is accepted, what should my speech contain.

I should mention that Chen Yi told me of the Chinese leadership's decision to give this speech without asking if I was planning to give a speech myself on this occasion.

(ss) A. Duma

Telegram no. 74350, 23 August 1968

23 August 1968. Nr. 74 350

Top Secret. Flash.

The embassy reception on the occasion of the Romanian national day took place on the evening of 23 August.

1. Premier Zhou Enlai, two deputy premiers, the Chief of the General Staff, his deputy, several Chinese individuals with high positions, as well as a large number of employees from various [government] institutions attended the reception.

The Chinese took great care of us, had a very warm and friendly attitude. Their reactions to my speech were positive and they expressed satisfaction [with it].

2. The diplomatic corps was massively represented at the cocktail reception through chiefs of mission, first secretaries, military attaches, and economic counselors. The diplomats of the five socialist countries [involved in the invasion] were present in great numbers; the speeches were followed with a great deal of interest. The large majority of diplomats expressed their satisfaction with the position adopted by our party and government with regard to the issue of Czechoslovakia. They viewed the speeches given, the Chinese participation, as a very important event and a success for the embassy of the S. R. Romania.

As they left, I was congratulated by a large number of chiefs of missions (France, Guinea, Mali, Congo, Tanzania, UAR, Cuba, Holland, England, Yugoslavia, and others), for the principled, firm, and courageous position of Romania expressed in my speech, and [they] wished continued success for the Romanian people.

The diplomats of the five socialist countries and of Mongolia left the cocktail party at the first mention made by Premier Zhou Enlai of “the Soviet revisionist clique.” The press correspondents from those countries remained.

3. The Czechs and Yugoslav diplomats were among the last to leave. The Czech charge d’affaires thanked us “from the bottom of his heart” for the extremely valuable support we gave his country, the Czechoslovak embassy, for the way the cocktail reception was organized, and the speech I gave. He said that he did not place too much emphasis on the mention of “the Czechoslovak revisionist clique” mentioned in Zhou Enlai’s speech, since he believes what is important in the Chinese attitude is the support given the Czechoslovak people, and in the unmasking of the aggressive act.

The speech by Premier Zhou Enlai was focused primarily on the situation in Czechoslovakia. He said that the Soviet Union committed “a violent crime against the Czechoslovak people,” that this type of behavior is “the most shameless, typical example of behavior by a fascist power,” and that the Chinese government and Chinese people “condemn

this crime of aggression” and are behind the Czechoslovak people. Comparing what was happening in Czechoslovakia with what Hitler did in that country, and what the US did in Vietnam, Premier Zhou Enlai stressed that “Soviet revisionism degenerated into Social[ist]-Imperialism and Social[ist]-Fascism,” and that the US and the Soviet Union are trying to divide the world [among themselves].

Saying that “Romania is facing the danger of foreign intervention and aggression,” Zhou Enlai stressed that the Chinese people are behind the Romanian people.

Zhou Enlai made no reference to the relations between our two [communist] parties, but stated that the RCP led the people in armed insurrection, and that “the Romanian people, and their leadership, have enjoyed significant successes.”

At the end, he gave a toast in Cde. Nicolae Ceausescu’s honor, mentioning the position of President of the Council of State,⁶⁴ and sent his congratulations to the government and people of Romania on behalf of the government and people of the PRC.

(ss) A. Duma

Telegram no. 74325, 24 August 1968

24 August 1968. Nr. 74 325

Top Secret. Flash.

On 23 August [1968], at 1800 hours (before the reception) I was received by Premier Zhou Enlai. Also present were Vice-Premiers Chen Yi and Li Xiannian. I passed along the information in your telegram Nr. 23/002617 (the declaration of the Grand National Assembly did not arrive yet, so I did not pass that along).

Premier Zhou Enlai reacted as follows to what I said:

“We consider that the events in Czechoslovakia are the inevitable result of the politics followed by the revisionist, Khrushchevite clique. Whatever Dubcek might be personally, one thing is clear—his clique is revisionist.

⁶⁴ Translator’s note: Ceausescu was not the President of the Council of State, a position held by Ion Gheorghe Maurer. He was the General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party. This must have been an intentional misrepresentation by Zhou Enlai, given the cool relations between the CCP and the RCP.

We believe that there were objective conditions for the Soviet aggression to take place in Czechoslovakia. It is clear that, if the Czechoslovak people were organized to resist, the Soviets would have backed down. The Czechoslovak revisionist clique did not order [the people] to resist, and thus the forces were disorganized. Dubcek remained in the building of the Central Committee, where he was taken prisoner.

[Czechoslovak President Ludvik] Svoboda is unsure, he is not organizing the resistance, but the Czechoslovak people are resisting, and that is a good thing. It might be possible that a group of the current Czechoslovak leadership will organize the resistance, and another group will kneel before the Soviet revisionist clique.

In any case, in Czechoslovakia an unfavorable situation has taken hold for the time being. You did not act like Czechoslovakia did.

You adopted a fighting stance, you begun a long time ago to carry out a position of resistance regarding the revisionist leadership of the Soviet Union, and now you adopted measures to defend the homeland, to be prepared for any possibility. We are behind you in your struggle to defend your independence and sovereignty.

Resist, if you have need, we'll give you cannons!"

In the end, Premier Zhou Enlai said that in his toast he will not mention Dubcek.

(ss) A. Duma.

The Telegram was read by me to the entire Permanent Presidium.

(ss) G. Macovescu

Document No. 8

East German report on Interkit meeting in Berlin, January 1969

*[Source: Political Archive of the German Foreign Ministry (PolA AA Berlin, MfAA), C 601/77.
Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer.]*

Confidential

Protocol

From 28 to 31 January 1969 a confidential meeting was held in Berlin with representatives from the Departments for International Relations of the Central Committees of the BCP, HSWP, SED, MPRP, PUWP, CPSU, and CPC.

Participants of the meeting had an exchange of opinions and information about the situation in the PR China and the policy of the Mao Zedong Group at the current stage. Joint material was worked out in form of theses containing a coordinated assessment about the situation in China and the policy of the Mao Zedong Group at the current stage.

Participants of the meeting agreed on options of how to utilize the theses. They also discussed concrete recommendations to coordinate and expand cooperation in the fields of propagandistic activities and scientific research to unmask the anti-Marxist theory and practice of the Mao Zedong Group.

The delegations arrived at the following joint conclusions:

I.

On the Evaluation of Theses “The Situation in China and the Policy of the Mao Zedong Group at the Current Stage”

The delegations presume that questions of concrete evaluation of the theses, and corresponding recommendations by participants of the meeting, will be decided by the CC of parties present according to their own judgment and under consideration of common practices in these parties.

Participants of the meeting agreed to recommend evaluation of the theses in party documents and speeches, in internal party information, during contacts with representatives from other Marxist-Leninist parties, in foreign policy activities of our countries, and in daily propagandistic work (press, radio etc.). Special attention was directed to the imperative to unmask the maneuvers by the Mao Zedong Group in context of the so-called IX CCP Congress.

There was full agreement on the assessment that the Mao Zedong Group is preparing this so-called IX Congress in a situation of a complete break with ideological and organizational principles of a Marxist-Leninist party and in an atmosphere of stoking hostility against the socialist countries and the communist world movement.

II.

The participants of the meeting propose to hold in a socialist country during May or June 1969 a meeting of representatives from the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of participating countries. Its objectives ought to be the exchange of information and assessments on the Mao Zedong Group's foreign policy and the further arrangement of state relations between the participating countries and the PR China.

III.

In light of the Mao Zedong Group's tactics toward the communist world movement under current new conditions, it was agreed to exchange material and information about the splittist activities of the Mao Zedong Group within the communist world movement and about its attempts to create special Maoist organizations in individual countries. It was agreed to coordinate activities for a further push-back of the Mao Zedong Group's policy, and for a defeat of their intentions to split the socialist community.

It was recommended to analyze jointly the activities by the Mao Zedong Group in the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America and to agree upon concrete measures in various areas.

IV.

About the Coordination of Propagandistic Activities and Scientific Research by Fraternal Parties on the China Question

The delegations rated positively efforts of participating parties to implement recommendations from the previous meeting. They noted a certain progress in the expansion of cooperation among the organs of foreign propaganda and the scientific institutes of our countries regarding the China question.

They hold the opinion that activities planned in the fraternal countries pertaining to W.I. Lenin's 100th birthday and the 50th anniversary of the Comintern's foundation ought to be used broadly also for the struggle against the gross deformation of Marxist-Leninist ideas and the discrediting of socialism's theory and practice by the Maoists.

This task is growing in especial importance given the hostile and splittist campaign by the Maoists against the International Conference of Communist and Workers Parties [in June 1969 in Moscow].

Participants of the meeting suggested further perfection in coordinating propagandistic activities and scientific research in application of established forms and practices of cooperation. They adopted the following recommendations for respective organs and institutions of their countries:

a) Organizational Measures

In June or July 1969 a meeting should be held in the capital of one of the participating countries featuring representatives from the press, radio, television, news agencies and publishers in order to exchange opinions on the increase and coordination of anti-Maoist propaganda.

b) In the Field of Radio and Television

- Exchange of audio and visual material to use it for domestic and foreign broadcasts and programs;
- Joint programs, especially operative programs used as counter-propaganda on the most important and recent problems;
- Production of a television documentary about events in China in the near future;
- coordination of efforts by our countries in the International Organization for Radio and Television (OIRT) and at Intervision;
- Mutual delegation of specialists to exchange experiences in the field of propaganda about the China question;
- Mutual information about the main directions of radio propaganda on the China question.

c) In the Field of Print Propaganda for Third Countries

- Coordination of activities by press and information agencies and other organs of the fraternal countries foreign propaganda apparatus concerning distribution of material on the China question in third countries;
- Joint preparation of a collection of material "About the Events in China". This collection should be translated into foreign languages (English, French, Spanish, Arabic) and distributed in third countries.
- Coordination of perspective plans of anti-Maoist propaganda;

- Regular exchange of material and information on the China question;
- Organizing cooperation between foreign correspondents of our countries regarding the collection and exchange of information about China.

d) In the Research Field

- Organizing a symposium in late 1969 on “Basic Problems of Socio-Economic Development in Today’s China” and publishing the material of this symposium;
- Exchange of researchers, research assistants, aspirants⁶⁵ and students who work on problems concerning China;
- Organizing a meeting of directors of research institutions from our countries in summer 1969 to exchange information and coordinate plans for publications and scientific works.

V.

The delegations from International Departments of the CC from fraternal parties listed above unanimously stressed the fruitful character of this meeting and its objective and companionable atmosphere. They emphasized that the organization of such meetings will develop into a good tradition and a useful form of cooperation between the fraternal countries represented at this meeting.

Delegations agreed to hold, after consultation with the CC of their parties, the next meeting in late 1969 in one of the socialist countries.

Besides the exchange of information about implementation of the agreement in Berlin, the next meeting will deal with the following questions and work out joint positions:

- Character of socio-economic processes on display in China after the so-called IX Congress;
- Additional phenomena of Maoism’s anti-Marxist character;
- Coordination of efforts by the fraternal countries and parties for the fight against subversive activities by the Mao Zedong Group in the international arena, in particular against the socialist countries, the developing countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America, and against the international democratic organizations.

Berlin, 31 January 1969

⁶⁵ Ph.D. candidates.

Document No. 9

Minutes of Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party Politburo meeting, 18 February 1969

[Source: HNA M-KS 288. f. 5/484. ő. e. Obtained by Péter Vámos, translated by Gwenyth A. Jones and Péter Vámos for CWIHP.]

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Prepared in 3 copies

MINUTES

of the meeting of the Political Committee on 18 February 1969

Agenda

3. Submission of International Departments' representatives on the Chinese question in Berlin, at talks held between 28-31 January 1969.

[...]

The Political Committee notes and approves our participating delegation's report on the Berlin talks.

It agrees with the proposals in the Memorandum, and instructs the Central Committee Agitprop and International Departments to carry out those proposals, taking into consideration our own resolutions in force.

The material entitled "The Chinese situation and the Mao Zedong group's policy at the present time" is noted as theses of political assessment of the present situation in China.

It endorses the publication of the theses, as an analysis prepared by fraternal Parties, in the Central Committee International Department Bulletin, for the purposes of information and use. The theses must however be preceded by a suitable introduction, to be approved by the Agitprop Committee.

Comrade BÉLA BISZKU:

How should these recommendations be understood?

Comrade ANDRÁS GYENES:

We understand these recommendations as unified forms of cooperation on the Chinese question, but those Parties showing willingness to cooperate or take part in a collective action,

can do so. As stated in the first point of the agreement, the Central Committees themselves decide at their own discretion how they wish to proceed with this question.

We shall not enter into details, because our obligation—and this has been emphasized both by ourselves and representatives of other Parties—extends only to issuing a statement to the Central Committee. The Poles in particular have emphasized that these ideas be regarded as recommendations, and that the Central Committees will then decide what they intend to take part in.

Comrade REZSŐ NYERS:

Unfortunately I have not been able to study the material, and so would only like to raise whether this represents some sort of modification to our earlier tactical line—if so, I am concerned. I think that the rug has fairly been pulled out from underneath the Chinese over the past few years, their plans to bring about splinter groups in the international workers' movement have not been successful. The influence they extend over the international workers' movement is significantly less than 3-4 years ago, therefore I do not think that a frontal political attack against them is justified. Besides, were we to initiate such a thing, we would need to bring the Asian Parties on board.

Furthermore, the opposition of the Japanese Party indicates perhaps clearly enough that they have got themselves into a mess, and we should take care not to give them new impetus with this initiative.

Comrade GYÖRGY ACZÉL:

First I would like to raise a concern and a question regarding the material. Aren't we deceiving ourselves? Doesn't the material embellish the situation, doesn't it portray Mao and his group more isolated and weaker, internally and internationally, than it is in reality? My first problem therefore is whether the Mao group's internal power role and international authority are as bad as the material states.

My second question is whether a bureaucratic military dictatorship is actually taking shape, or whether it is a great internal struggle, which of course does not contradict the former.

The third question that occurs to one is whether a formal, actual split with Marxism-Leninism has taken place so that [the CPC] has become a chauvinist, petty bourgeois Party.

To these questions, the material gives a fairly unambiguous yes, and suggests determined political consequences.

But questions also arise at the international level. If it is not clear at the international level that we wish to approach them, and that our approach is rejected by them, then I am not sure we would be helping the international workers' movement. I think it better if the "Wall of China" is erected by them, and not us.

Another problem: it is my opinion that we would do well to think a little in advance. We should analyze power relations realistically, and must also consider whether if a split still took place, what sort of impact there would be on the positive forces there, on the situation of the socialist countries and Parties, the parties of the capitalist countries, and what concerns me in particular, the situation of the third world. The impact of this unsubtle propaganda suggested by the material is not certain. This chauvinist hatred against white people on the part of the Chinese is not certain to produce the same result in the third world as in Europe, or the same in Latin America as in the developed countries.

In summary, my opinion is that a proposal is necessary, based on—even if there is one-thousandth of a chance of this—initiating state, cultural and economic relations, and that we should take the lead. As many [Chinese] as possible should know what sort of initiatives we have. At the same time we should continue the struggle of principles, but discretely, and should take care not to confuse our own wishes and desires with the existing situation there. I think that we could produce more, and more discrete results, than this material.

I would like to add that however correct the material is in part, the struggle is unavoidable. But we must also think what will be more helpful to the positive forces there, striving for a split or seeking connections. I think the response to this is beyond doubt.

Comrade ISTVÁN SZIRMAI:

I too have a few remarks on this question. My first is whether it is correct for us to form the orientation of the group of seven Parties in this way, even if it is on the basis of a collective decision. I think it would be better if discussions took place not in such a closed way between representatives of the seven socialist countries, but that we should bring in, for example, the Western European Parties to discussions. My opinion is that we would be able to give a more

realistic analysis of the Chinese situation if the question was being discussed by more than such a uniplanar group.

My second observation: it seems the Parties have decided they do not wish to excommunicate the Communist Party of China at the meeting of the communist and workers' Parties, this body however, which prepared this material, returns via another door only in order to exclude the Communist Party of China.

One more thing regarding the arguments. It is well known that there exist great general and very serious ideological disputes between the Communist Party of China and the other Parties. We must engage on every front—these are questions of ideology and principle—but as much as possible, we must continue to maintain our patient, friendly tone.

But more than the significant ideological differences between the Communist Party of China and the other Parties, in this situation I regard the power politics pursued by China more significant, and which power politics is turning against the socialist countries. This draft thesis or study does not analyze these contradictions of power politics at all, or deals with them only in brief, and incorrectly.

Here we have this American-Chinese pincer attempt around the Soviet Union. Of course I cannot say how serious and important this is. It is a very complicated matter. There is Asia, Southeast Asia, so the question is not straightforward. But it is precisely because it is not straightforward that it is worth dealing with.

[...]

Another thing: when we analyze China's internal situation, we should try to do so objectively and without emotion, in the interests of the international workers' movements and ourselves. The study lacks objectivity, but not emotion. Just one or two examples of this. Here on page 18 for example, it reads: "The aim of socialist society—Lenin emphasizes—is to ensure the complete welfare and free all-around development of every member of society. The Maoists have given up this aim." One thinks: is this the first socialist country where this has been violated? Wasn't this violated in the Soviet Union under Stalin, or in Hungary under Rákosi?

And was not socialism then built in the Soviet Union and Hungary? Socialism was built, so we should not say that in China everything that is socialist has been destroyed.

Allow me to illustrate the material's lack of objectivity with one more thing. On pages 36-37 we read of the mortal crime of the Chinese to broaden their relations with the Federal Republic of Germany. I know other such socialist countries whose largest trading partner is also the Federal Republic of Germany.

[...]

Comrade JÁNOS KÁDÁR:

The title of the material is: "The Chinese situation and the politics of the Mao Zedong group at present." Taking this into account I propose that we note the material, because the title is appropriate: a political judgment of a transient situation. I think the material is correct in its basic tendencies and also prognosis, because it does not say that this is not a socialist country, but that if they continue along this path, the achievements of socialism are in danger. On military dictatorship, it only states that this is in a developing stage. And this usually applies to all questions. Put plainly, Comrades have tried to do what they could in the present situation, and the material reflects this.

What do I think is the problem with the whole matter? The specified Parties must address the Chinese question, but in a different way. Judgment of transient political aspects is not enough, because this is a question of day-to-day politics. Rather, I suggest that in future there be some sort of common research work that we support, and we should suggest that questions of principle be taken up, questions that in fact give the whole matter its essence in principle, and then we will strike at the real questions. If we take a fundamental look at the situation and its social aspects, then we will have to say that the revolution has won, the socialist and national revolution too. They set out on a certain correct path, nationalized industry, took culture in hand, brought into being the appropriate means, and then this was followed by a split. We should address the reasons for this, why and how the split took place. We will encounter the questions and problems we often encounter in different socialist countries, and which we must absolutely address when the fraternal Parties wish to move forward. This is when things arise such as which

tasks brought the Communist Party of China to a halt, and why the thesis appears different there that socialist revolution, the socialist economy, cultural revolution and the development of socialist society must proceed together with the improvement of the people's welfare. Why was the Communist Party of China frightened by these tasks, and why were the leaders of the Chinese state frightened? Because they encountered difficulties not even we encountered starting from our semi-feudal base.

If we fundamentally and truly analytically address these questions we will encounter things we cannot avoid. We do not have to say how guilty we are, but examine whether the normal contact possible between socialist Party and state has been properly realized. I think that it has been realized. This Party has been independent until the end; nobody tried to intervene in its internal affairs because they were unable to.

And what sort of split and what sort of patience are we talking about? Which Party violated the Chinese Party's independence, and which Party intervened in China's internal affairs, and which Party says that we must split with China? Again and again we have invited them, even after they responded to our shared, collective approaches with the roughest rejection, and we have represented principled policy against China. This is also relevant, these need only be noted.

And so we come to the great questions of international politics. If we say that we live in peaceful coexistence with one another, does this look different in Hungary and Czechoslovakia than in China?

This is what I would call analytic work, on the basis of which a common denominator of what to do could be reached in overview. We must also value experiences here.

Let us take into account that this is what the examination has produced, and let us establish that we missed the fact they did not address the deep-seated, great questions of principle, and that this should be compensated for on the appropriate occasion. It is necessary to address fundamental questions such as the characteristics of socialist construction in China, and by examining those questions, the reasons for the conflict between us.

And what should *we* do? We usually have a few valid resolutions, and in this case I would not accept that the watchword should be defense. This is not sufficient here. We have a resolution that states that a proper plan is needed for propaganda and ideological work, where we

enter into unnamed, direct or indirect dispute with fake, anti-Marxist Chinese arguments, to propagate our own positions.

This applies to policy too. We have a resolution there too, and we implement it. This should be continued.

I can agree that we report the arguments in the International Department Bulletin, but it would be good if the Agitprop Committee prepared a heading for it. Something like that the Agitprop Committee has examined this material and finds that its main points reflect the current situation. We must continue to address the questions, exchange experiences with fraternal Parties, examine the great ideological questions too, and at the same time continue what we have been doing so far.

[...]

The matter of China and America has arisen. Of course all sorts of things will happen here, opportunities to exploit this and that. But we must see that the fundamental social contradictions are the same as those that Marxism-Leninism taught us, and China and America throwing themselves at one another is not such a simple matter. We should take into account that this Chinese policy has made serious attempts to embitter the situation with the Soviet Union, the other socialist countries and Mongolia, and to put pressure on us by cooperating on certain questions with American imperialism. The recommendation is correct: these attempts must be unveiled. But how? Let us write out the Chinese argument, and after that let us write what happened. They say that we are traitors because we have diplomatic relations with some capitalist countries. But we do what we say we do, but they do the opposite, and this must be exposed. Our relations with the FRG are not the same. Cooperation with the FRG has an entirely different significance in our politics, they are our largest partner by 30 percent, while the Chinese want to break with the socialist countries in the sphere of economic cooperation, and are seeking a capitalist orientation. If we expose them, we will not be making any split.

It is difficult to answer the other questions raised, for example, how we could create contact with the healthy forces. The Chinese have indicated that they will attend talks in Warsaw. I wish we could agree how the prognosis states. So the Chinese Party and government would end up in an

entirely different situation, and from our side the struggle becomes easier. But who knows who those healthy forces are. It is certain that there are proper communist and revolutionaries in China, but I fear that if we cite Liu Shaoqi too often, that won't please us either. For even he used to begin with that the Soviet Union and the socialist countries are pursuing a revisionist policy, etc. The situation there now is that everyone carries a flag with Mao's face on it, yet declares different policies. Both his and different ones.

Finally, I think that this material does not complicate our work, indeed, if we use it sensibly, it will help.

[...]

There is a recommendation among the organizational matters, that the press, radio, television, news agencies and representatives of book publishers hold meetings. This is a rather more complicated matter, and there is a concern that they might get over-excited, and all understand something different. The most sensible thing would not be for 34 Hungarians to travel to this meeting, but for one or two sensible people to observe the news agency organizations. One can be from the Party Centre, the other let's say the president of the radio.

[...]

On the proposed resolution, only to add that the Political Committee should approve only our work, not that of all delegations. And we should not decide what other Parties should do, but address our own tasks.

Document No. 10

Polish communist party memorandum on "The China Problem," March 1970

[Source: AAN, KC PZPR, 237/XXII-1732. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Malgorzata K. Gnoinska.]

Confidential

The China Problem following the Ninth CCP Congress

The following information constitutes a joint study designated for internal use only, as a result of consultations of the international departments of central committees of the socialist parties of fraternal countries. The draft was prepared by the CC CPSU International Department, presented for consultation, after which some editorial corrections were carried out.

The CC PUWP International Department, March 1970

Introduction:

[...]

Last year revealed new elements in China's domestic and foreign policies. The Ninth CCP Congress held in April 1969 ostensibly legalized the military-bureaucratic regime which was founded during the cultural revolution in the PRC. Without formally breaking with Marxism-Leninism, in reality, Maoism had transformed into a political trend which is hostile to the principles of scientific communism...The Maoists organized armed provocations on the Sino-Soviet border, they came out with a program of full preparations for war and further militarization of China's society. Given the above, we need to conduct deeper analysis of the Chinese events, their causes, sources, and possible prospects.

[...]

The situation is all the more complex since the current stance of the Chinese leadership, which is pitting the PRC against the socialist commonwealth in military and political terms, forces us in many cases to exclude China's material and human potential from the world power of the socialist system. The following [factors] confirm this thesis:

a) Maoist China is blocking the resources of the socialist world (both in terms of numbers and military aspect), especially when one takes into account armed provocations and war

preparations by Beijing on the Sino-Soviet border. At the same time, this gives imperialism the opportunity to maneuver and carry out counterattacks against revolutionary forces;

b) China's current foreign policy is one of the most serious factors of maintaining and deepening the international tensions, and it enables hawkish circles of imperialism to intensify the arms race;

c) The Chinese leadership strives to pit the national liberation movement against the communist movement, it brings about a split to the anti-imperialist front and at the same time weakens and limits its capabilities in the liberation struggle;

d) Since Maoists considered the USSR, on the par with the US, as the PRC's main enemy, then it should not be excluded that in case of a great conflict between imperialism and socialism, China could stay on the sidelines, while trying to take advantage of this as far as its nationalist goals [dictate]...

Finally, Maoism continues to influence, exceptionally negatively, the balance of power in terms of ideology. First, while officially representing the banner of Marxism-Leninism, the Chinese leadership with its practice and reactionary concepts (especially inciting nationalism and hailing the views of chauvinism) discredits scientific communism and repels the masses of the capitalist world from socialism. Secondly, while hardly attacking socialist countries and communist parties, the CCP leadership in reality finds itself in the ranks of anti-communist countries...

In the 1970s, and especially in the far future, regardless of future developments in China's domestic events, China will exert influence on the balance of power in the world, on the anti-imperialist struggle, and the entire revolutionary process, and on the historical fate of mankind.

If the CCP leadership continues the current domestic and foreign policies, then the extent of danger, emanating from these policies, will be all the greater to socialism.

[...]

The China question is one of the greatest problems of the modern age. The communist movement very much wants that the CCP, revived on the basis of Marxism-Leninism, returns to

cooperation with fraternal parties, and for the PRC to follow the road of socialism in the alliance with all world countries of the socialist system. Of course, this will take great efforts, as well as, the extreme and, most likely, a long-term struggle of all communists, especially the Marxist-Leninist and internationalist forces within the CCP.

[...]

Conclusion:

[...]

The development of socialism in China (and in the Third World countries of similar conditions) inevitably leads to the establishment of the “barracks communism” with the extreme suffering and sacrifices of the masses. These arguments need to be critically examined.

[...]

While the Soviet Union had been the only socialist country in the world for thirty years [since the Russian Revolution], having its own proletariat and communist vanguard ultimately rely on the outside [Marxist] ideology, the Chinese working class and the Chinese Communist Party, prior to and especially after the revolution of 1949, was able to rely on the fraternal internationalist support of the USSR and other socialist countries. This support enabled [China’s] overwhelmingly proletarian tendencies and made sure that China’s leadership followed a correct policy, remained on the socialist path, and did not embark on the historical “zigzag” [barracks communism].

[...]

The events in China are the result of a temporary victory of reactionary tendencies of petty bourgeoisie and one can call them, with full justification, a zigzag in the development of the Chinese society in the history of world socialism.

[...]

While spreading war scare and using social demagoguery, Mao Zedong succeeded in cheating the working class to a great degree...and in temporarily uniting the most backward strata of society on the basis of nationalism. The opponents [to Mao's group] are split and devoid of any most basic conditions for a political struggle...

[...]

Marxist-Leninists have no doubt that the Chinese communists and the working class will ultimately put an end to the Maoist order and bring life in China back to one based on the theory of scientific communism and on cooperation with the communist movement and socialist countries.

[...]

While decisively fending off the anti-Leninist political line carried out by Mao Zedong, by undertaking all possible means to thwart his provocations, the socialist countries favor normalizing state relations with the PRC... Precisely, such a policy will lead to the isolation of the Maoist group inside China and will contribute to the consolidation of real Marxist-Leninist forces within the CCP in the struggle for socialist China.

[...]

We need to carry out the task of thwarting the attempts [by apologists] who romanticize Maoism and justify the falsely understood definition of "the Chinese model of socialism."

[...]

Document No. 11

East German report on Interkit meeting in Sofia, February 1971

[Source: SAPMO-BA Berlin, DY 30, IV A 2/20/1152. Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer.]

Berlin, 24 February 1971

Report

About an Internal Meeting of Delegations from the International Departments of Central Committees of CPSU, BCP, MPRP, PUWP, SED and HSWP in Sofia.

Following an invitation by the BCP Central Committee, between 15 and 18 February 1971 the fourth internal meeting of delegations from the International Departments of Central Committees of fraternal parties was held on current issues concerning the policy of the Chinese leadership under Mao Zedong and the situation in the PR China.

I.

About Tasks and Results of the Meeting

1. The meeting was scheduled to analyze the policy of the Chinese leadership and developments in the PR China at the current stage. It was based on the presumption that a couple of new elements have surfaced in the Chinese leadership's policy during the past year. Especially the Soviet comrades put great emphasis on working out a joint assessment at the eve of a couple of upcoming party congresses of fraternal parties.

2. The development of the situation in the PR China, and its basic tendencies in the Chinese leadership's domestic and foreign policy, underscore the validity and actuality of assessments and conclusions made in the joint material emanating from the third meeting "The Chinese Problem after the IX CCP Congress" [Interkit in Warsaw 1970—trans.]. Despite all its new maneuvers the Chinese leaders are still pursuing their old strategic goals. They continue the political line of the IX CCP Congress without any change. We figured out that the Soviet Union and the entire socialist community remains the main enemy of the Maoist leadership.

New elements in Chinese leaders' national and international policy are exclusively tactical changes, modifications of political slogans, new means and methods to realize the old great-power chauvinist hegemonic and anti-socialist goals.

It cannot be excluded that contradictory tendencies in Chinese policy reflect also certain conflicts within the Chinese leadership.

The main tactical changes in international policy are as follows:

- In 1970 Chinese leaders backed off from unpopular war slogans and shifted the tactical focus to “revolution.” Using the Maoist thesis “Maturing of the Revolution”, the Chinese leaders place, even more so than in the past, the following patterns in the center of their policy: Support for any forces working toward the overthrow of the existing order in the Soviet Union and other socialist countries; undiminished instigation of tensions at the hot spots of international class struggle; and the adventurist promotion of numerous armed conflicts and local wars in particular in Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

- The new Maoist thesis of “both superpowers” is a reflection of hegemonic intentions to stitch together a bloc to fight the two “superpowers” under Beijing’s leadership. The main focus of this policy is directed against the Soviet Union.

- The Chinese leadership is willing to work toward a certain objectification of relations with the states of the socialist community on the basis of peaceful coexistence. Exploiting the interest of fraternal parties to normalize their relations with the PR China, this variant first wants to “neutralize” the socialist countries in their confrontation with the Chinese leadership’s policy (the Soviet delegation dubbed this as “Romanization”). At a minimum, China wants to separate them on this issue from the Soviet Union in order to finally draw them to Chinese positions (“Albanization”).

With this policy of differentiation, Chinese leaders also try at the same time to break up the ideological combat front against Maoism.

- Regarding the communist workers movement, and besides the previous strategy to establish pro-Maoist groups and trends in individual countries and parties, the Chinese leaders have shifted toward establishing official relations with individual parties (RCP, JCP, KWP,

VWP, SCP⁶⁶). Their efforts are primarily oriented toward those parties that continue to propose a different position from the joint line espoused at the International Conference [of Communist and Workers Parties in Moscow] in 1969.

It can be expected that Chinese leaders will resume, with these intentions in mind, their activity in international democratic organizations.

3. During the meeting the following main causes for the Chinese leaders' changed tactics were identified:

a) Apparently the Chinese leadership is guided by an assessment according to which its rule in the country's interior was solidified through the "Cultural Revolution" and the IX Party Congress, to an extent allowing major activities in the field of international politics to unfold again. In spite of ongoing domestic problems and contradictions, a certain consolidation of the current power structure and the military-bureaucratic regime has occurred. This relative stabilization also allows the Mao Group more leverage for its international policy and more flexible tactics. In order to realize its great-power chauvinistic plans, the Mao Group now wants to break out from the international isolation it had moved itself into through its rudeness and any norms and customs violating methods of the "Cultural Revolution".

b) The consequent repudiation and unmasking of the Chinese leadership's policy by the Soviet Union, by us socialist countries, by the communist world movement, and by large parts of the anti-imperialist movement, have induced the Chinese leaders to adopt new tactical means.

The decisive, and for the Chinese leaders painful, repudiation of their border provocations by Soviet forces had made them think twice.

c) The development of international events and the correlation of forces in the world confirmed the correctness of the common line from the International Conference of 1969. The latter did not turn out favorably for the Mao Group and disqualified its policy of stirring up international tensions.

- In Europe a significant movement of correlation of forces in favor of socialism has occurred as a result of consequent and unified efforts by the states from the socialist community. Speculative Maoist hopes to aggravate tensions up to a military confrontation in Europe remained unfulfilled.

⁶⁶ Romanian Communist Party, Japanese Communist Party, Korean Workers Party, Vietnamese Workers Party, Spanish Communist Party.

- In the Middle East the alliance between progressive Arab states and the Soviet Union and other socialist states has been strengthened. The “permanent people’s war” propagated and instigated by China has been thwarted.

Apparently the Chinese leaders, too, have learned how Soviet positions in Europe and in the Middle East are so strong that the United States does not dare to launch a direct military conflict with the Soviet Union.

- With expansion of U.S. aggression into Laos and Cambodia the situation in the Southeast Asian region also becomes more complicated for the Chinese leadership. This expansion of aggression increasingly affects Chinese security directly. The question arises for the Mao Group with heightened urgency whether to intervene directly in this conflict in order not to lose credibility given Chinese assurances to support the revolutionary anti-imperialist struggle of Asian peoples. Yet this would also lead to the feared direct confrontation with the United States.

Recent agreements between the U.S and Japan bolster the latter’s function as the first ally of U.S. imperialism in East and Southeast Asia, i.e. right in front of China’s doors.

This affects a “doctrine” of Chinese policy, namely to avoid under all circumstances a closer alliance between Japan and the U.S. as it will obviously be directed against the PR China.

Speculative hopes on the side of the Chinese leaders to replace losses, incurred through the dismantling of economic relations with the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, by expanding trade with the developed capitalist countries remained unfulfilled.

4. At the meeting the necessity was stressed to work continuously toward an objectification and normalization of state relations with the PR China in the interest of common anti-imperialist struggle. At the same time, ideological confrontation between Marxist-Leninist parties and theory and practice of Maoism must increase. The Soviet comrades referred to an undiminished anti-Soviet campaign within the PR China. They expressed concern that new provocations by the Chinese leaders before the 24th [CPSU] Party Congress better not be excluded.

With satisfaction the meeting recognized the progress made in scientific-academic cooperation to research current features of the China problem.

It was agreed to convene another meeting of representatives from the seven fraternal parties for fall this year in Prague to work out new joint material on the Chinese leadership’s policy and developments in the PR China.

As a special contribution, the Soviet delegation informed about developments in Soviet-Chinese relations.

There was also a discussion of the situation in the PR Albania and the policy of the Albanian leadership.

II.

On Presentations by Delegations

The CPSU delegation contributed the bulk of efforts for preparation and performance of the meeting. Its contributions and material demonstrated high expert knowledge. They analyzed developments scientific-theoretically and carved out relevant patterns and trends of current Chinese policy.

Contributions by other delegations, with the exception of the HSWP, completely agreed with positions of the CPSU delegation and added a couple of detailed issues to the Soviet material.

The HSWP delegation demonstrated its underrating of the danger represented by current Chinese policy. In its contribution, the Hungarian delegation one-sidedly focused on a maximum development of bilateral relations without undertaking a basic assessment of the Chinese leadership's policy or outlining the concrete tasks for ideological confrontation.

The delegation from the SED International Relations Department dealt in its contribution with current problems of the Chinese leaders' international policy. It proved in concrete terms how there is no change whatsoever in the Mao Zedong Group's foreign policy strategy but just some new variants of tactical moves. Furthermore, we did provide to the other delegations material on recent domestic developments in the PR China.

III.

Conclusions

1. The material from the meeting will be thoroughly analyzed and used as a basis for future research on current problems of developments in China.

Commissioned: Working Group China at the Chair International Workers Movement in the Institute of Social Sciences at the SED Central Committee

2. Based on the meeting's materials, internal party information about the situation in the PR China and about the Mao Zedong Group's domestic and foreign policy will be prepared for SED base organizations in preparation of the VIII [SED] Party Congress.

Commissioned: Department of International Relations

Department of Agitation

3. Based on the material of the meeting, an article on current issues of the Chinese leaders' foreign policy will be published in the weekly paper "Horizont".

Commissioned: Editor-in-chief "Horizont"

Department of International Relations

Date: March 1971

4. The books "A Survey History of the CCP" and "PR China" (survey of developments in the PR China's economy, state and culture), produced by the Far Eastern Institute of the USSR Academy of Sciences, will be distributed as internal material of the SED.

Document No. 12

Polish communist party note on "Current Policy toward China," 28 April 1972

[Source: AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-506. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Malgorzata K. Gnoinska.]

The International Department

CC PUWP

Secret

Warsaw, April 28, 1972

Note regarding our current policy toward China

[...]

Conclusions regarding Sino-Polish relations:

The fundamental principle of our policy toward China is to fully cooperate with the Soviet Union—our main ally. This principle favors both the interests of the socialist commonwealth and those of Poland.

Given the above, our party and government conduct a concurrent China policy with that of the CPSU and the Soviet government. Together with the CPSU we are decisively countering the factional course of the Chinese leadership both in the area of international politics and within the international communist and workers' movement.

Our China policy should continue to be consulted with the CPSU, it should cooperate with the Soviet policy on every single stage.

Just like the USSR, we are in favor of a gradual normalization of state relations between Poland and China. At the same time, we are decisively rejecting all efforts of such normalization which would be based on the anti-Soviet aspects... We must limit ourselves to maintaining our diplomatic relations and gradually developing economic exchange. However, we should continue to conduct a thorough observation of China's capabilities and intentions with regard to a possible activation of bilateral state relations. The conclusions which will be reached regarding this matter will be presented to the party leadership.

Given the above, the International Department proposes the following:

1) At the current stage, we should limit our contacts to a working level regarding economic matters, as well as those in science and technology, and to continue the diplomatic activity of our embassies and consulates as we have been so far; any contacts of some other type could play a role only under the conditions of significantly positive changes in China's current policy; and they should be consulted with Soviet comrades;

2) While being in favor of activating economic relations and taking on concrete necessary means in this direction, we should at the same time maintain economic contacts at relatively low and working levels...;

3) In connection with China's presence at this year's Poznan Trade Fair and Poland's consent to this fact, we should point to the nature of the Chinese exhibits which should be purely economic so they cannot be exploited for political and propaganda purposes;

4) While expressing consent in principle to the Chinese propositions to renew contacts in the area of science and technology, we should limit them at the moment and absolutely not include the areas of the economy connected with defense and the most modern areas of science (e.g. electronics);

5) We should begin to systematically examine the issues of contemporary China, as well as to create a suitable academic base. This is why we propose for this purpose to have the following institutions and suitable academic circles to take on the abovementioned topics within their capabilities:

- The Higher School of Social Studies—the examination of the Maoist doctrine (in cooperation with the East-West Center)

- The Polish Institute of International Relations—the analysis of the influence of China’s policy on the situation in Europe

- The Department of Philology (Sinology) of the Warsaw University—social, cultural, scientific, and economic issues of contemporary China (We should also create a group to implement the above; currently, the Sinology Department in the Institute of Oriental Studies is primarily focused on classical philology from the medieval times and it trains Sinologists who are of little use to our current needs)

6) To express consent to the activity of the Sino-Polish Friendship Society in the areas which correspond with our current political needs (currently this activity has been suspended), that is, in the area of organizing parties of exclusively cultural nature. We should also reorganize the leadership of the Society while ensuring that they are in tune with the current demands of our relations with the PRC. Through the activities of the Society we could stress our admiration for the cultural achievements of the Chinese nation while maintaining unchanged and principal political critique of the activities of the PRC leadership;

7) We should not currently accept the Chinese propositions regarding establishing tourist contacts which the Chinese side desires to exploit for political and propaganda purposes. All future contacts in the area of sports can only be taken up after a careful investigation of their real aims;

8) Our delegations should closely cooperate with the USSR delegations in the area of the UN and other international organizations in all of the issues connected with their propositions or initiatives. We should also, together with the USSR and other socialist countries, counter China’s attempts to impose its ideological polemics on the forum of these organizations, as well as to counter the PRC’s tactics of pitting “Third World” countries against the socialist nations;

9) We should continue to publish in the press, and especially in political and academic journals, well-researched publications which criticize “Maoism” as an ideology which runs contrary to Marxism-Leninism, as well as we should criticize the factional aspects of the PRC’s policy.

Our policy toward China should, at all its stages, be closely coordinated with the position of the leadership of the party. In connection with this, all departments and institutions are obligated to consult all their moves regarding China with the International Department of the CC PUWP. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is in constant consultation of coordinating all moves toward the PRC.

The CC PUWP International Department

Document No. 13

East German report on Interkit meeting in Moscow, May 1973

[Source: SAPMO-BA Berlin, DY 30, IV B 2/20/583. Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer.]

Report

About the 6th Internal Meeting of Delegations from Departments for International Relations of Central Committees of CPSU, BCP, MPRP, SED, PUWP, CPC and HSWP.

Following an invitation by the CPSU Central Committee between 16 and 18 May 1973 the sixth internal China meeting of delegations from the International Departments of Central Committees of above-mentioned fraternal parties was held in Moscow.

The SED participated with a delegation chaired by Comrade Gerd König, Deputy Head of the SED CC International Relations Department.

The meeting had the following agenda:

1. Exchange of opinions and information on “China at the Beginning of the 1970s”
2. Exchange of opinions about coordinating work in the fields of foreign policy, economic relations, and propaganda, as well as the reconciliation of scientific research on the Chinese question.

Participants of the meeting drafted and unanimously adopted a protocol transcript and the joint theses “China at the Beginning of the 1970s” (Appendices #1 and #2 [not included, BS]). In addition, 21 different materials on the current situation in China and the Chinese leaders’ domestic and foreign policy were exchanged (Appendix #3 [not included, BS]). The meeting confirmed jointly held positions by the 7 fraternal parties concerning essential elements of the Chinese question, and the parties’ pursuit of close coordination of their policies toward the People’s Republic of China.

Participants of the meeting reinforced the positions of their parties that the internal China meetings, while running over a course of six years, have made decisive contributions toward a comprehensive Marxist-Leninist assessment of Maoism’s theory and practice.

The 6th internal China meeting focused on the following questions:

- the ongoing deformation of the superstructure and its impact on the base; the rightist turn in the Chinese leaders’ domestic and foreign policy;
- the special role of the subjective factor;
- the struggle about the question “who—whom;”
- prognostic deliberations on China’s development in the coming years;
- the drafting of a long-term and complex program by the community of socialist states to countervail Maoist policy and ideology as an inseparable part of our fraternal parties’ entire coordinated activity. This way collusion by the socialist fraternal countries on the Chinese question will be elevated to a qualitatively new level.

The Central Committee of the CPSU attributed great importance to this meeting. As always, the Soviet comrades made the major contributions during the course of the meeting. Drafts for the protocol transcript and the joint material were prepared by the Soviet comrades well in advance and personally edited by Comrades Suslov, Ponomarev, and [Konstantin] Katushev.

Comrades Ponomarev, Katushev and Rakhmanin, and other leading comrades from the CPSU CC, had several talks with the heads of delegations where they informed the latter about current issues of the Beijing leaders’ policy and on the international situation.

The delegation from the SED CC actively contributed to the meeting, made multiple statements, and provided to the other delegations some additional material.

It was agreed to hold the next internal China meeting in 1974 in Budapest.

I.

In their assessment of the situation in China, and the current domestic and foreign policy of Beijing's leaders, participants of the meeting arrived at the following conclusions:

1. The situation in China is dominated by elements that push the country further in an anti-socialist direction. The policy of the Chinese leaders is characterized by a serious rightist turn.

2. In China all the main elements of the Mao Group's military-bureaucratic dictatorship stay in place. The army continues to remain its main pillar of support. Changes currently occurring in the PR China (like the construction of a Maoist party and Maoist mass organizations, the reference of forms and methods of economic steering borrowed from socialism, the reemergence of former leading functionaries) aim at solidification of the Maoist regime that is hostile to the people.

The entire development of society is characterized by coercive militarization.

3. Even after the purge of Lin Biao and many of his supporters, conflicts in the center and in the provinces are continuing. A fierce power struggle is raging between the two most important groupings in the leadership, the supporters of the group around Mao Zedong's wife and the supporters of the group around Zhou Enlai.

4. The long-term negative impact of the Maoist course on the country's development pertains to all areas of China's domestic and foreign policy. The deformation of the socialist economic base and of the superstructure going on for 15 years is continuing. Specifics of deformation do not consist in a liquidation of state and collective property but in the latter's subordination under Maoism's anti-socialist objectives. This deformation is connected to a change in the social function of the Chinese state. As a consequence of these impacts, production relations are losing step by step their socialist content. The moment is coming near where the quantitative, and in part qualitative, changes can lead to a basic turnaround of the country's entire development.

5. The fact that China is considered a socialist country does not change anything in principle for the assessment of the Mao Group's policy. Maoism is an unforgiving enemy and antipode of socialism.

6. The existence of state and collective property objectively entails a potential opportunity for a development of Chinese society within the framework of socialism. However, the precondition for such developments consists in a fundamental change of China's political course.

7. Beijing's foreign policy wants to safeguard international conditions for an accelerated turn of China into a superpower and its establishment as the center of global policy. Its foreign policy is currently characterized by the following three elements:

a) active global countervailing against socialism's peace offensive and the course of the communist world movement;

b) rightist turn and increasing alliances with imperialist states based on anti-Soviet foundations;

c) further pursuit of the claim to be leading the "Third World" (China as a "developing country");

Dangerousness and adventurism of the Chinese leaders' current policy is resulting from all of this. It further substantiates the correctness of the statement that the Chinese leaders have de facto opened a second front against socialism. In this context, the Soviet comrades informed about ongoing provocations at the Chinese-Soviet border, the increasing attempts to infiltrate agents into the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic, and the expansion of China's entire intelligence activities abroad under inclusion of their diplomatic representations. In conjunction with the upcoming visit by Comrade L. I. Brezhnev to the United States the Beijing leadership has already announced a new large anti-Soviet campaign.

8. The active countervailing by the socialist fraternal countries and the Marxist-Leninist parties, their successes in the construction of socialism and communism, and the successful implementation of the coordinated course in foreign policy significantly narrow Maoist policy options and neutralize many of its negative impacts. With our active foreign policy we counter their efforts to ally themselves with the imperialist states and to establish hegemony in the "Third World."

II.

In their assessment regarding potential developments in China in the near future, participants of the meeting assumed that China's course in the 1970s will pass through a tense

situation and be determined by many permanent and temporary, objective and subjective, factors of both domestic and foreign policy character. In this context, some of the following prognostic thoughts were expressed:

1. Maoism has a certain base among the ideologically backwards segments of the population, but at the same time discontent with Maoist policy is growing. The lack of a constructive program to develop society, and the unresolved socio-economic core issues confronting the Beijing leadership, are objectively causing the social base of resistance against Maoism to expand. New clashes and upheavals cannot be excluded.

2. In general, the PR China's domestic and foreign policy will further be determined by the attempt of the current leadership to realize its great-power chauvinist plans.

3. Despite active efforts to expand its military-industrial potential, even in 10 to 15 years from now the economic-military strengths of China will still be substantially below those of the USSR and its allied socialist states at the current stage. The superiority of the USSR and the socialist community of states will continue to have a dampening effect on the Chinese leaders.

4. Much will depend on the complicated twists of factional infighting in the Chinese leadership. The current leadership contains no Marxist-Leninist forces. For probably a long time a nationalist leadership will persist. The current leadership has many strong differentiations. As long as Mao and Zhou dominate policy there will no basic change of the present course. When Mao leaves the political stage, the power struggle will automatically intensify. If Zhou maintains the upper hand, pragmatic policy elements will increase, however, with the chauvinist course staying intact. Yet Zhou's position is not as strong as that of Mao Zedong. If both Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai leave the political stage, tense conflicts will erupt in the leadership. Their outcome will be decided by those on whose side the army will end up. In this case a civil war and an increase of separatism is possible.

5. Maoism is going through a deep crisis but it would be illusionary to believe in an automatic collapse of the Maoist regime. Maoism will continue to remain a serious threat, in particular to the Soviet Union whose border with the PR China is the longest land border in the world. Yet there must not be any passive wait and see in the struggle for a socialist perspective of China: Today this struggle demands the unmasking of Maoism and the effective thwarting of its policy.

6. In a time far from today, a possibility may be realized that opposition forces will gain the upper hand in China, or people will come to power who will conduct a socialist policy. This would create an entirely new situation; yet currently this is still not predictable in any concrete terms.

III.

All delegates underlined the requirement to realize consequently a direct cooperation in the field of foreign policy based on the protocol transcript. Participants of the meeting considered the expansion of the joint front to fight Maoism as an important task. This requires an activation of our work with the fraternal parties of non-socialist countries. Propagandistic and scientific work, and coordination of efforts by our seven parties, must be raised to a higher level. Soviet comrades informed, for instance, that in the first four months of 1973 alone the central newspapers and journals of the USSR published about 90 contributions about the struggle against Maoism. In the period between early 1972 and the end of April 1973, more than 50 books and pamphlets were published on the subject. The news agency APN performs extensive information activity abroad and works closely with respective institutions of the fraternal countries.

The CC of the CPSU decided to publish an edition of [Petr Parfenovich] Vladimirov's book "China's Special Area"⁶⁷ (memoirs of a Comintern activist who stayed with the CC of the CCP in Yan'an between 1942 and 1945 and gave extensive assessments of the Chinese leadership). This book was handed to all delegations as a pre-print. In this context, the Soviet comrades again insisted on the importance to publish as soon as possible the memoirs of Comrade Otto Braun⁶⁸ about his work in China. Right after its release in the GDR it will also be made public in the USSR. PUWP and CPC delegations were also interested in a reprint of Comrade Braun's book as soon as possible.

⁶⁷ Published in English as *The Vladimirov Diaries: Yanan, China, 1942-1945* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1975).

⁶⁸ Otto Braun (1900-1974), a German communist, served in China between 1932 and 1939 as a Soviet-delegated military adviser to the Chinese communists. He was the only foreigner participating in the Chinese Red Army's long march in 1934/35. Published in English as: "A Comintern Agent in China, 1932-1939" (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1982).

In order to make cooperation among China scholars of our seven countries more efficient in the future, and following a proposal by the CC of the CPSU, it was agreed to establish a joint scientific Coordination Council.

IV.

Conclusions

1. The protocol transcript and the joint theses “China at the Beginning of the 1970s” were adopted. Both materials are to be used as a base for all activities concerning the Chinese question in the fields of foreign policy, propaganda, and scientific research.

2. A letter by Comrade Erich Honecker, First Secretary of the CC of the SED, to the General Secretary of the CC of the CPSU, Comrade L. I. Brezhnev, will inform about the GDR evaluations of the 6th internal China meeting and our conclusions. It will also express thanks to the Soviet comrades for the organization of the meeting by the CC of the CPSU.

[...]

[Abridged; only East German specific activity plans to follow]

Document No. 14

Excerpts from the “Protocol Transcript of the Moscow Meeting” held on 16-18 May 1973, including specific recommendations of coordinating policy toward China

[Source: AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI—1027. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Malgorzata K. Gnoinska.]

[...]

Generally, we should expect that the PRC’s foreign policy will develop toward the direction of implementing its great power, nationalistic, and hegemonic plans by the Chinese leaders. One cannot exclude the possibility, however, that the opposition against the Maoists

could come to power and present socialist slogans, which could unite the Marxist-Leninists in the PRC, and they would ask for support from the socialist countries. Then, a totally different situation will evolve which we cannot possibly analyze in details at the moment.

[...]

While being guided by the line of our parties in coordinating our efforts and developing our cooperation on the China issue, the members of the meeting agreed as to the instructions regarding a further and effective countering of the acrimonious policy of the Chinese leadership:

The Area of Foreign Policy

[...]

In Europe

- to decisively counter Beijing's hostile activities directed against the Soviet Union and other socialist countries, to unmask the efforts of Maoists who are counting on weakening the unity of fraternal nations and sowing factionalism in its collective organs such as the Council of Economic Mutual Assistance and the Warsaw Pact Treaty;
- to cut short the efforts of the Chinese leadership in hampering the process of détente in Europe...;
- ...in practical [economic] dealings with China to follow the "Joint Market" [directions] agreed upon at the 62-nd session of the Executive Committee of the CMEA.

In Asia

[...]

- in Southeast Asia and in Indochina, to strengthen and raise the prestige of the DRV and counter Beijing's hegemonic ambitions;
- ...to expand ties with India and Bangladesh and to improve relations with Pakistan;

- to expand concrete cooperation with Japan based on mutual benefits as a counterweight to closer Sino-Japanese relations which are fueled by racial principles;
- to consistently and methodically propagate the idea of collective security in Asia...

[...]

Third World and Non-Aligned Movement

[...]

- to actively coordinate work to unmask the real propositions of the Chinese leadership...that run against the interests of socialism and the national liberation movement;
- take all possible steps to counter the Maoist activities which attempt to implement the struggle “with the hegemony of two superpowers.”

The U.S.

[...]

- to continue to expand mutual and beneficial contacts by socialist countries with the US, while stopping the American governing circles from playing “the China card,” to harm the socialist commonwealth;

[...]

The UN and Other International Organizations

[...]

- to carry out a tighter cooperation among the representatives of fraternal countries in the UN and other international organizations;
- ...to consult with other suitable institutions of socialist countries to work out a joint position on the forum of international economic organizations...;

In the Area of the Socialist Countries' Inter-State Relations with the PRC

The Chinese leadership continues to implement its policy of differentiation, which counts on separating the socialist countries from one another and isolating the Soviet Union. This is why Beijing proposes, in a very selective manner, to renew economic, science and technology, and cultural cooperation with some of these countries in order to spark some kind of a competition among these nations as far as their contacts with the PRC. Some Chinese high-level officials cunningly suggest that expanding the relations with the PRC with this or another socialist nation would favor a normalization of Sino-Soviet relations.

We need to do the following to counter this policy:

- in developing state relations by each of the socialist countries with the PRC (political ties, trade and economic, science and technology, cultural and all other types of cooperation) we need to adhere to a jointly agreed level, not allowing for any other approaches that could be used by the Chinese leadership to undermine the unity of socialist countries and pit them against one another;
- to build mutual relations with the PRC so as it does not lead to strengthening Beijing's positions in their struggle against the socialist commonwealth, and in increasing their military and economic potential of Maoist China;
- in order to coordinate the policy of fraternal socialist countries toward China, we need to exploit such forms and methods, such as a systematic exchange of information and regular meetings at the level of interested ministries and institutions, to expand and strengthen the cooperation between our diplomatic representatives in accredited nations;
- to continue the practice of yearly meetings of the representatives of foreign trade ministries of fraternal socialist countries on issues of coordinating trade and economic policy toward the PRC;

- while taking into account the special meaning which Beijing attaches to trade and economic ties in implementing their differentiation policy toward socialist countries, we should instruct the ministries of foreign trade of the countries which participated in today's meeting to continue the implementation of concrete steps worked out at the conference of deputy foreign trade ministers of fraternal countries in February this year;

- to implement the coordination between the proper institutions of fraternal countries on the question of inviting the PRC to international exhibits and trade fairs organized on the territory of fraternal nations as well as to consult on issue of organizing in the PRC specialized trade exhibits of the socialist countries...;

[...]

In the Area of the International Communist Movement

[...]

- to activate the work of fraternal parties in capitalist and developing countries in unmasking the anti-Marxist, anti-Leninist essence of the theory and practice of Maoism and to mobilize these parties to successfully counter this chauvinistic ideology and the policy of the Chinese leadership...;

- to systematically inform fraternal communist parties and some of the friendly social democratic and national democratic parties about the situation in China, about the negative aspects of the activities of Beijing leaders on the international arena, about their hostile activities against the socialist commonwealth, about their factional line of Maoists in the world communist and national liberation movements...;

- to adopt a custom of carrying out theoretical studies of the Chinese issue together with other Marxist-Leninist parties, to encourage them to take part in international and national symposia and conferences devoted to this issue;

- examine, generalize, and widely propagate the positive experiences of the struggle of communist and workers' parties against Maoism...;

- to cooperate with appropriate communist parties and representatives of other progressive forces in creating anti-Maoist propaganda centers in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America...;

[...]

In the Area of Ideological and Propaganda Struggle

- be aware that a decisive and multilateral unmasking of the anti-Marxist theory and practice of Maoism...is one of the most fundamental tasks in the defense of the Marxist-Leninist theory, an important element in the unity of the socialist commonwealth and the workers' movement, for a return of China to the family of socialist countries, and for strengthening the international anti-imperialist front;

- ...to unmask the activities of Maoists which aim to weaken the unity of the socialist countries and undermine the collective organs—CMEA and the Warsaw Pact

- ...to unmask all of Beijing's efforts to drive a wedge between the socialist commonwealth and the countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin America;

[...]

- to adhere to a custom of maintaining regular bilateral and multilateral contacts between ideological and propaganda institutions of fraternal countries to intensify coordination of their activities and providing mutual assistance in the struggle against Maoism...;

- to widely use mutual reprints of articles on China from the media of the socialist countries participating in this meeting...;

In the Area of Academic Work on the China issue

- to use conferences, seminars, and international symposia regarding various issues to explain and propagate the views agreed upon by our parties regarding China;

- to hold at the end of 1973 or early 1974, a conference of sinologists with the participation of Marxist theorists and progressive sinologists of various countries during which a thorough

analysis from the Marxist-Leninist position would take place regarding the current state and future tendencies of China's development, including the assessment of the cultural revolution and its consequences for the future of socialism in the PRC;

[...]

- ...organize closed symposia, joint research, preparing monographs, exchanges of academics, lectures, doctoral candidates, and students regarding China within the framework of academic cooperation...;
- in the first quarter of 1974, to organize an academic symposium on the topic "The Ideological Basis and Political Practice of Maoism;"
 - to consult the topics of papers and statements on China for the participants of the XXIX International Congress of Orientalists to be held in Paris in July this year;
 - to create a united and cooperative academic council on the Chinese affairs to coordinate study and research, and to invite the leading sinologists of our parties;

[...]

Document No. 15

Cable from Polish Embassy, Moscow, to Polish Foreign Ministry, 23 January 1976

[Source: z-Depesze, Moskwa 1976, Archive of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (AMSZ), Warsaw; obtained and translated by Malgorzata K. Gnoinska.]

Secret Telegram No. 969/I

From Moscow to Warsaw, January 23, 1976

To [Foreign Minister Olszowski]

From the conversation with First Secretary Deputy Head of the International Department of the CC CPSU, Oleg Rakhmanin:

[...]

4. The situation in the PRC is getting increasingly complicated. Mao lost two loyal people—Keng Sheng and Zhou Enlai, who skillfully implemented his policy line. We should expect that the power struggle in the PRC will intensify. The group of the so-called leftists and others—is making efforts to increase their influence, but it is also encountering the opposition.

However, Rakhmanin personally thinks that there will be those with professional training in the Chinese leadership, and especially in the national economy. There are no changes in the CPSU stance toward China. Mao continues to remain the main executor of the PRC's anti-Soviet course. They continue to conduct a hostile campaign toward the USSR. The USSR will not give up on the battle front either...

[...]

/-/ [Polish Ambassador in Moscow Władysław] Napieraj

Document No. 16

East German record of talk with Soviet communist party official Boris Kulik, 26 January 1977

[Source: SAPMO-BA, DY 30, IV B 2/20/126. Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer.]

Department of International Relations

N o t e

about the Meeting with Comrade Kulik, Division Head in the CPSU CC Department,
on Preparation for the 9th Interkit and the Situation in China on 26 January 1977

1. On Interkit

The Soviet comrades have completed a first draft of their main statement. It is quite comprehensive material of about 80 pages, supposed to be provided to representatives of the

fraternal parties. The Soviet presentation [at the Interkit meeting] will be an abridged version of this material.

It is organized in the traditional form (Introduction, domestic situation, international policy, Soviet-Chinese relations).

The theses, initially prepared for September 1976, are currently being revised by the Soviet comrades. Then they will be handed to us [the SED CC] since we are the co-authors. They are titled “China on the Eve of Mao Zedong’s Death” and may be given out as joint CPSU-SED material to participants of the [Ninth Interkit] meeting.

2. On Assessing the Developments in China (Theses of the Soviet Main Statement)

Currently it is very hard to arrive at final conclusions. The policy of today’s Chinese leadership is not finalized yet, both in terms of domestic and foreign policy. However, basically it is just the continuation of Maoist policy.

Domestically all the fundamentals of the Maoist regime are still on display. The CCP is not a Marxist-Leninist party. Its theoretical and political foundation is Maoism.

The power regime is unchanged in its anti-democratic character. So far the National People’s Congress has not been convened. There has been no session held by the Central Committee of the CCP. Decisions are made in an undemocratic manner. There are no indications for a process of democratization. The CC military commission -where power is essentially concentrated- has no constitutional basis. There are executions by firing squads without legal sentences.

The social situation also has not changed from the period before Mao Zedong’s death. Nothing has changed regarding the status of the working class. The trade unions as the largest mass organization play no role whatsoever and are left completely unmentioned. Even the term dictatorship of the proletariat —which the Beijing leaders used to brag with constantly- is encountered only rarely.

The situation of the peasants is like it always has been. There are only a few tactical modifications vis-à-vis the intelligentsia.

In the economic area the military component is stronger than ever. Since 9 September 1976 [Mao’s death—trans.] there have been two nuclear tests. One satellite was launched into space.

Also unchanged is the material situation of the workers. There are no announcements whatsoever about lowering prices, increasing wages, or expanding social benefits.

The economy continues to be run according to the motto “Learn from Dazhai and Daqing.”

Also there are not the slightest changes in foreign policy. Anti-Sovietism has been even intensified. Between 9 May and 31 August 1976 there appeared 989 anti-Soviet articles in both central newspapers (“Renmin Ribao” and “Guangming Ribao”). Between 9 September and 31 December 1976, however, there were 1,112 such pieces. Radio propaganda against the Soviet Union is extraordinarily malicious. They talk about a fascist dictatorship in the Soviet Union and increase personal attacks against the leading comrades of the CPSU.

Actual foreign policy has not seen any new positions. This also concerns attitudes on the Helsinki process and on détente. There is no improvement in any area of foreign policy. You can put an equal sign between the policies before and after 9 September 1976.

Positions toward socialist countries also remained unchanged. In contrast, special care is taken of representatives from fringe groups. The Chairman of the CC of the CCP has so far received guests from 10 splittist parties. Mao Zedong himself had mostly refrained from that. All Soviet initiatives have been rejected by the Chinese side so far.

All of the above, however, does not mean that nothing has changed at all. Such would be a wrong assumption. There are some domestic changes occurring, for instance in these regards:

- Maoism is applied in words but undergoes corrections in practice. Through the struggle against the “Gang of Four” many Maoist postulates have come under fire. The defeat of the “Gang of Four” is also a strong blow against Mao Zedong.
- The current leadership is looking for new methods to steer the economy (more focus on industry, agriculture, application of foreign experiences). They are also in search for new solutions to cultural work.
- So far the raising of these questions did not yet mean the implementation of actually new ideas. There is an ongoing process of reconsideration.

In regard to foreign policy, it is also remarkable that Chinese representatives are making more efforts to establish contacts with diplomats from socialist fraternal countries.

Finally Comrade Kulik stressed that currently available material [on the situation in China] is insufficient for a final assessment. A transformation of accumulated quantities into a new quality cannot be defined by a timeline.

3. In response to my question, Comrade Kulik then outlined the course of the Soviet comrades concerning publications.

Literature about Maoism and policy of the Chinese leaders is still on sale like it was before Mao Zedong's death.

New titles are in preparation and will come out in larger numbers in the first half of 1977, like for instance the encyclopedia "China in 1975." These books contain a note that they are based on material published before the end of 1975. They are written in a calm style. Terms like "Mao clique" or similar ones were edited out. Yet such phrases like "Maoism" and "military-bureaucratic dictatorship" were left in.

Soviet newspapers are publishing news about events in China. If necessary, they contain references to the fact of continuing anti-Soviet propaganda. Academic journals are supposed to continue publishing material to confront Maoism.

If, in the context of anti-Sovietism, relations between the Soviet Union and fraternal countries are attacked, reactions by these countries would be preferably done in an objective fashion (like by using phrases such as "it is surprising that", or "it is generally known that attacks on the Warsaw Pact only benefit the enemies").

[signed]

Horst Siebeck

Document No. 17

East German record of talk with Fidel Castro after Interkit meeting in Havana, December 1978

[Source: SAPMO document on Parallel History Project on Cooperative Security (PHP) website. Obtained by Bernd Schaefer and translated for CWIHP by David Wolff.]

Havana

vvs 282/78—Lightening

Comrade Honecker

Comrade Axen

The final meeting for delegations to the China Consultation was with Comrade F. Castro for two and a half hours together with Comrades Blas Roca and Machado Ventura, as well as Secretaries Valdes Vivo and Antonio Perez Herrero. Comrade Castro's speech was very warm. Comrade Castro showed that he was familiar with the contents and course of the consultation. The draft stenograms and theses had been reported to the [Cuban] P[olit]b[uro]. Comrade Castro emphasized the importance of the China consultations among the fraternal parties that always brings in new materials for the re-evaluation of the situation. He greeted the inclusion of the Vietnamese at the next meeting and considered developments in Vietnam as a big defeat for the Chinese leaders.

Comrade Castro pointed out:....

The real danger that the Imperialist powers [will] do the same with China as the Western powers did at Munich with Hitler....

Comrade Castro asked after developments in Kampuchea and noted his fears that if the revolutionary front worked with the Chinese intervention then the regime might be saved.

The extensive comments of Comrade Castro about the Cuban exiles lead one to suspect that Castro and the entire leadership are very concerned with this issue, especially with the strong institutional bond of this group to Cuba.

We must make better use for the revolution of the exiles' feelings for Cuba, he said.

He said it is better to have a "Trojan horse" over there in America than in Cuba and that dissatisfied Cubans who move to the US could contribute to friction between the exiles and the US government....

Langer

Mahlow

14.12. [1978]

Copies to Comrade Fischer

Comrade Dr. Winkelmann

Document No. 18

Mongolian record of conversations with Soviet officials in Moscow, February 1979

[Source: fond 2, dans 1, kh/n 440b, Mongolian foreign ministry archive, Ulaanbaatar. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Sergey Radchenko.]

Top secret

MPR Embassy in the USSR

Memorandum of conversation

Regarding steps following China's cancellation of the 1950 Soviet-Chinese friendship, alliance and mutual aid treaty

First Deputy Minister of the MPR MFA D. Yondon and his accompanying people were received, separately, by the First Deputy Minister of the Soviet MFA V[iktor] F. Mal'tsev and a member of the collegiums, head of the first Far Eastern Department M[ikhail] S. Kapitsa.

D. Yondon met with M.S. Kapitsa on February 9, 1979 from 13 to 13 hours, and with the First Deputy Minister V.F. Mal'tsev on the same day from 16 to 17 hours.

[...]

1. During the meeting with M.S. Kapitsa:

D. Yondon asked for the Soviet comrades' opinion and clear explanations regarding steps to be taken in connection with the possible cancellation of the 1950 Sino-Soviet treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Aid, on the Chinese initiative, as well as regarding questions to be discussed at the deputy foreign ministers' meeting, which would take place in Ulaanbaatar in accordance with the 1979 plan of cooperation between the two Foreign Ministries.

M.S. Kapitsa—With regard to the deputy foreign ministers’ meeting, you should yourself put this question to comrade Mal’tsev. Because he is himself connected with this question, it is best to take the answer from him.

It is appropriate to think about, and plan for the possible cancellation of the Sino-Soviet Friendship Treaty on the initiative of the Chinese side. We are also thinking about it (having said this, he let D. Yondon read confidentially the draft of the Soviet government’s information [on this subject]).

But if you give a memorandum to China demanding explanation regarding questions mentioned in the memorandum accompanying the treaty [regarding MPR independence], first, they will probably not give any answer. This would be really bad. Secondly, if you write a memorandum touching on questions of your own independence, this would be good “food” for the Chinese leaders.

In the second article of the memoranda exchanged by the Soviet Union and China at the time of conclusion of the Friendship Treaty, the provision regarding respect for the independence and sovereignty of the MPR does not at all mean that the MPR’s political independence was established by this memorandum of China and the USSR, but that [both sides pledged] to strengthen and develop Mongolia, which had been independent and sovereign since 1921.

After the Mongolian referendum held on December 20, 1945, the Executive Yuan (Parliament) of the Republic of China made a decision recognizing the independence of the MPR within the now existing borders. On the basis of this decision, the Guomindang government officially (de jure) recognized MPR in early 1946, and established normal diplomatic relations with your country. It is necessary to publish information that the cancellation of the Sino-Soviet treaty on the part of the Chinese leaders is sharply against the interest of the Soviet and the Chinese people; it will further worsen relations between the two countries; it is incompatible with the interests of world socialism, and it shows that the Chinese leaders are openly connected with the evil forces of world imperialism. But one may not touch the Mongolian subject.

If it comes to the cancellation of the treaty, the Chinese leaders will point to different “reasons.” Probably they will say that the nature of the USSR has changed, that aggression is occurring in every corner of the world; that Vietnam is interfering in Cambodia’s internal affairs;

therefore, PRC cannot be bound to the USSR by the treaty of friendship, alliance and mutual help.

But they have not officially raised the question of the treaty's cancellation. We should not hurry. We'll see what reasons the Chinese leaders put forward, we'll see how they'll cancel it, and then we'll take our step. Under Khrushchev, we hurried too much in cancelling the Anglo-Soviet treaty, which served us no good, but became an obstacle. The preservation of the Soviet-Franco treaty throughout the Cold War is helping our relationship a great deal now. Therefore, we will wait and see what steps the Chinese leaders take regarding the cancellation of the Sino-Soviet friendship treaty. As for you, comrades, it would be correct on your part to maintain the treaty concluded with China. Your treaty is not about alliance after all.

Recently Deng Xiaoping went to the USA. The purpose of the trip was to bring China under the US nuclear umbrella, to clear up the question with the island of Taiwan, to stop the SALT-2 agreement, and to use the USA for their own policy. This aim was not accomplished. Sino-US relations directly depend on the extent of Soviet-American relations.

Deng Xiaoping made a big mistake. The US media and the public understood him correctly, depicting him as a "smiling barracuda" (they are saying a man-eating carnivorous fish is 'laughing' [note-taker's explanation of 'barracuda']). This shows that the American public correctly understands the danger of being pulled over to the side of the Chinese anti-Soviet policy.

Deng Xiaoping was looking for financial aid in the USA, but the USA will not give anything to China for free. There is no internal capital for carrying out the "Four Modernizations" planned by the Chinese leaders. They will get 60 percent of the capital internally and 40 percent externally. They cannot pay back the foreign capital. Just to account by oil extraction, China will reach the 1977 Soviet level by year 2000.

In the USA they think that Deng Xiaoping is more intelligent compared to the former Chinese leaders. But Deng does not have much time to carry out his ideas. It is difficult to say what the Chinese leaders think of Carter.

What is happening on the Vietnamese border worries the USSR a great deal. China has assembled 18 divisions on the Vietnamese border. But the Vietnamese army is a million strong, well-armed, well-experienced and battle-worthy. If it comes to a fight with Vietnam, one needs

to fight really well. Or they [the Chinese?] will be completely crushed. If a war happens, the world public opinion will support Vietnam. The Chinese are really scared of the USSR. China will probably make a single strike against Vietnam. Probably they will do it like they did it in 1962, when they make a strike against India, going in 20-30 kilometers. Then they will try to capture a large number of Vietnamese soldiers (a response to the capture of Chinese soldiers in Cambodia). But, he said jokingly, Vietnam may be able to break through by 10-15 kilometers into China.

If there is a need to strike against China to protect Vietnam, we'll let you know. Our Far Eastern forces, and the Zabaikal military district are receiving special orders. Questions of Soviet-Mongolian relations are fine.

[...]

America and China, pushing from two sides, have started a “dialogue” between the two parts of Korea. There is information that the Americans are telling South Korea to “widen relations with regard to getting closer to North Korea, to calm the passions, to establish postal service, exchange tourists, but not to negotiate the question of uniting two Koreas into one.”

North Korea has proposed to have relations within the sphere of the united front program proposed in 1972. South Korea refuses to accept this.

The Korean comrades put forward the question last autumn about urgent dispatch of a party and government delegation to the USSR. We postponed this until 1979. The Koreans were quiet until February, but now they are starting to talk again. We'll look into this a little bit.

There were anti-Soviet publications in the North Korean press, but now they are stopping. They do not support Vietnam and Kampuchea.

Two years ago Korea was the friend of both China and the Soviet Union. They are really afraid of China, but there is no reason to be afraid of us. But China was pushing the Koreans in our direction. If the need arises, one can strike back at the anti-Soviet publications which come out in Korea.

Koreans want to get 2 billion U.S. dollars worth of weapons from us. We tell them that we can give them 100 million's worth. We don't need to hurry in our work with regard to North

Korea. We lost out when Khrushchev hurried in relations with Albania. You, comrades, should also be on good terms with Korea.

We openly criticize some things that appear in the Yugoslav press. But we don't criticize the things that appear in the Korean press.

D. Yondon—At which stage is the Iranian situation now?

M.S. Kapitsa—The possibility of a military coup d'état does not exceed 50 percent. If there is no coup d'état, the Shah's rule will fall. Probably a rightist bourgeois democratic state will be established. Internally, a hardline Muslim regime will be established. It will be like Pakistan. If in the process of a bourgeois democratic revolution a leftist force emerges, the question will be altogether different.

If it comes to the entry of an external military force, this will also be an invitation to us. We have a treaty with Iran, concluded in 1921.

Although we did not participate in the events in Iran, they are useful to us from all sides. But it will be a dangerous situation if it comes to an internal Civil War, as this cannot be controlled or directed.

D. Yondon—Is anything special happening in the Chinese internal situation?

M.S. Kapitsa—There has not been democracy in China. The struggle for power between Deng and Hua is like that between two goats on a narrow bridge. If force is used, there is danger that both will fall into the water. Deng has a lot of international experience, but he is a person who does not have much time to work with, he'll work at most for five years. Hua wants to wait until Deng's time is up. Both of them graduated from university many years ago, both are backward in terms of their knowledge, and especially incapable of directing the economy.

The Chinese have ideas to come closer to us. They have the idea to exchange athletes. They have a policy to widen trade. This is a policy directed at maintaining permanent tensions in relations with China, and using the Soviet Union. We will treat this carefully.

Document No. 19

Polish record of Soviet alliance meeting in Moscow, February 1980

[Source: AAN, KC PZPR, XIA/620. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Malgorzata K. Gnoinska.]

Secret

Note

On February 26, 1980, a meeting took place in Moscow of the representatives of fraternal parties of six socialist countries...including the heads of International Departments of these parties...The meeting was devoted to the international situation and conclusions emanating from it...

[...]

...All delegations took a uniform position on Beijing's policy.

[...]

[Excerpts from the statement of the Polish representative, Andrzej Werblan]

[...]

7. Imperialist policies have intensified in the area of armament and tensions and have found a clear and loyal ally in China. Currently, the PRC leadership is conducting an open course of aggression. The most vivid reflection of this is [the PRC's] attack on the Socialist Republic of Vietnam. Currently, China cooperates with organizing a military diversion against the progressive government of Afghanistan. We fully agree with Soviet comrades' assessment of Beijing's politics. We see the need to actively unmask, and especially to reveal to the public, the damaging aspects of the alliance between Beijing and the cold war forces of the United States and the FRG. Recently, we have developed a pretty good [study] center to investigate these issues which will provide materials for the ideological and propaganda work.

[...]

[Excerpts from the statement of Boris Ponomarev]

[...]

The US decisions to restore the most favored nation status to China could lead to accelerated economic ties between China and the US...The most important thing is that the US is ready to increasingly sell strategic goods to China. All of this, in addition to a slew of political and diplomatic contacts, testifies to Washington and Beijing's willingness and intentions to coordinate their efforts which go against détente, the socialist commonwealth, and the national-liberation movement.

[...]

...China aspires to take as much advantage as possible from the current world situation. Their leadership is clearly not interested in improving relations with the USSR. The talks in Moscow fully reflect this trend. The goals we may have reached on individual issues do not provide any basis for future progress in our relations with the PRC.

In China, another round of a harsh internal power struggle has matured and will transform into a great card shuffle in the army, party, and administration. According to our information, Deng Xiaoping's group, which is supported by the West, currently has the advantage. We cannot exclude the possibility that the West is directly influencing the power struggle in Beijing. We can clearly conclude, however, that the Chinese leadership is not going to improve its policies toward socialist countries. This also means that Beijing will repay the West for their support with a dogged anti-Sovietism. We should thus pay special attention to providing assistance in all areas to Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, as well as jointly and strongly counter Beijing's attempts to undermine these countries' positions and fuel the military conflict in Indochina...

[...]

Document No. 20

East German report on Interkit meeting in Poland in June 1980

[Source: SAPMO-BA Berlin, DY 30, IV B 2/20/593. Translated for CWIHP by Bernd Schaefer.]

Report

About the 11th Internal China Meeting of Delegations from Central Committees of BCP, SED, PCC, MPRP, PUWP, CPSU, CPC, HSWP, and VWP

I.

The eleventh internal China meeting took place from 11 to 13 June 1980 in Mierki [Marki] (PR Poland).

For the first time the VWP was officially represented at such a meeting, after it had already participated in two operative working meetings on the Chinese question by representatives of the fraternal parties.

The meeting adopted a protocol transcript (Appendix #1 [not included]), recommendations for propagandistic and scientific work, and the analytical material “China on the Eve of the XII CCP Party Congress.”

At the meeting the proposal by the Vietnamese comrades was approved to also invite representatives from the CC of the Laotian Revolutionary People’s Party in the future to internal meetings on the Chinese question.

In the context of the meeting in Mierki there also was an exchange of opinions by heads of delegations on some current issues of international developments.

II.

At the meeting the following characteristic elements of China’s current phase of domestic and foreign policy were analyzed, under special consideration of the upcoming XII CCP Party Congress.

1. The Chinese leadership has turned to an alliance with the imperialist states as a strategy for the long haul.

Most significant is a comprehensive expansion of relations with the U.S. that recently have seen increasing military cooperation. After the United States it is Japan that has become the

most important country in Chinese foreign policy considerations. Not only is Japan China's largest trading partner; Chinese leadership also makes efforts to use Japan in order to achieve its own dominant position in the Asian region. Among the Western European imperialist countries the Chinese leaders are viewing primarily the FRG as a promising partner in the struggle against the Soviet Union and the fraternal countries. China's modernization program is based on a rapid expansion of economic relations with all imperialist states.

At the same time, our meeting also noted the contradictions regarding relations between Chinese leadership and imperialism; and it underlined the need to exploit these contradictions from the side of the fraternal countries.

2. A certain domestic regime consolidation has created new material foundations and opportunities to realize China's hegemonic course.

Strongly pressured by objective realities, chauvinistic-pragmatic forces have prevailed in China's leadership. They introduced steps to adapt the mechanism of political power to requirements for the "Four Modernizations," and thus to the perfection of this mechanism, to the regulation of the economy, and to the forced development of military-economic potential with the assistance of imperialism. All that objectively impacted the current situation in the country in a stabilizing fashion.

Yet this stabilization is neither deep nor permanent. The decisive cause for the political crises and upheavals in society has not been eliminated. The current leadership was not even able to implement its political line within the party itself. Conflicts within the leadership about the course of the "Four Modernizations," and how to evaluate the results from the "Cultural Revolution" and Mao's ideological legacy, are increasing again. There is a possibility that the political situation in the country might be deeply influenced by ongoing activities of ultra-leftist Maoist forces, or those other forces pushing into the bourgeois direction. In the long term, the course of "Four Modernizations" can turn into a source for new political crises. In such a process the spontaneous ant-Maoist current in the country will further expand and organize itself.

3. Beijing has expanded the frame for its intended united global front against the Soviet Union. It is undertaking efforts to include parties with nationalist or opportunistic positions.

This way Beijing undertakes a new attempt to split the international communist movement and to cover up its policy of open collaboration with imperialism. To the subsequently resulting

danger to the communist movement the fraternal parties react with patient and smart cooperation on a principled basis, even toward those parties targeted by Beijing through its splittist activity.

4. Modernization of Maoism has adopted a visibly radical character. This way the current Chinese leadership is carving out for itself new opportunities for ideological collaboration with imperialism and opportunism against Marxism-Leninism and real socialism.

As a result of 20 years of Maoist rule and policy there exists a deep crisis of confidence in China. Among the people and within the party political-ideological indifference is on the rise. Against this background, a dangerous ideological pragmatism represented mainly by Deng Xiaoping and his supporters is growing. Not only do these forces implement under the guideline “Practice as Criterion for Truth” a far-reaching correction of Maoism’s ultra-leftist ideology, they also de facto advocate further abandonment of Marxist-Leninist principles. In this context “Sinicized Marxism”, as it was declared as the foundation for the party’s actions already at the VII CCP Party Congress of 1945, is raising its head again. This is also where the so-called rehabilitation of Liu Shaoqi comes in. It is not the development of socialism’s social quality that is important for Deng and his supporters but the material-technological conditions to realize their hegemonic objectives.

5. The splittist policy by Chinese leaders toward the socialist countries today consists of a variation of methods of direct pressure and military threat on one hand, and more refined methods on the other in order to arrive at relations with individual countries except for the USSR. Through the growing Chinese military potential and military cooperation with imperialism the threat of direct military action by China against its socialist neighbors is increasing (USSR, Vietnam, Mongolia, and Laos). Beijing is making assurances that its struggle against the Soviet Union does not necessarily have to impact development of normal bilateral relations with the socialist countries.

III.

In his opening statement PUWP CC Secretary Comrade Jerzy Wasczuk stressed how, in the light of imperialism’s current attempts to launch a counter-attack on the positions of socialism, issues and results of our meeting and the arrival at jointly held positions are of special importance.

The CPSU CC delegation leader, Comrade O. B. Rakhmanin, defined in his presentation the current stage of development of Maoism and the Chinese leaders' policy, as well as its subsequent dangers for the global correlation of forces. Due to Beijing's policy the current bilateral relations between the USSR and China are at a stage of confrontation. This makes it impossible for the Soviet Union to surpass its repeated proposals for normalization. For Beijing the USSR is the main enemy. This is not just a verbal statement but a daily dangerous practice.

The Soviet comrades made the main contribution to the meeting, both during preparations as well as during the final editing process of the materials adopted.

The head of the PWV delegation based his statement on the Chinese aggression against the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) and its impact on all aspects of social life in China and on the Beijing leadership's policy.

Southeast Asia remains the main direction of Beijing's expansionist policy. A new military aggression against the SRV, as well as military actions against Laos, cannot be excluded. He stated that the reactionary policy by China's rulers has resulted in a destabilization of the country's political life.

The head of the PCC delegation noted that the Cuban CC was not able to discuss a thorough positioning on prepared meeting materials since it received them too late. She advocated a closer coordination by fraternal parties of their policy toward the PR China. She also demanded a more exact collective analysis of what can be understood of Maoism today, in particular as an ideology.

The head of the CCP delegation spoke out directly against positions advocating an option of influencing the positions of Beijing's leaders by maintaining a minimal level of party relations with the CCP and expanding bilateral state relations. Our fraternal parties ought to make it clear to the Beijing leadership that we are unwilling to follow either the Romanian or the Yugoslav path regarding establishment of relations with the PR China.

He noted how imperialism and Beijing' leaders meet in their objectives to create conflict spots near the borders of the countries of real socialism.

The Chinese leadership would not succeed in consolidating and stabilizing the situation in the country.

The HSWP delegation leader assessed further activation of China's role in the communist world movement and international democratic organizations to be expected, and it would create another front of conflict. He demanded closer coordination on these matters.

The MPRP delegate dealt extensively with national problems confronting Mongolia by the policy of the Beijing leadership concerning Inner Mongolia.

The head of the BCP delegation underlined the need to unmask through respective propaganda the unity in action between imperialism and Maoism. On the other hand he also proposed to devote major attention to scientific work to research contradictions between imperialism and Maoism.

The statement by the PUWP representative outlined how China's economic situation is far from a state of stability.

IV.

Following the suggestions by Comrade Hermann Axen, our delegation was represented through the delivery a general statement, working in the editing commission, and by talks with representatives of the fraternal parties. In particular the following issues were emphasized:

- It is necessary to conduct a thorough and sober analysis of the situation in China and the ongoing changes there. Based on that, our delegation stressed the prevailing tendency of temporary stabilization of the domestic situation before a background of still unresolved problems in society, and subsequently in continuing intensive conflicts.
- When confronting Beijing's course, it is important to always eye the overall policy of our community. The statement by the SED delegation made clear how it is indispensable to solve these questions: What opportunities of active countervailing against Beijing's foreign policy course do we have? Regarding impact on China's domestic developments: Do the fraternal parties actually have such impact, and how can they put it to use? In the wake of a changed domestic situation and the dominant position of capitalist countries on the Chinese market we must take into consideration the political aspect of our economic relations with China. We have to conduct deliberations as to how the currently shrunk percentage of trade between CMEA countries and China can be at least maintained.

- In close correlation with this question, we have to discuss our approach to communist parties that are taking positions of deviation from basic [Marxist-Leninist] positions on a couple of issues and are establishing contacts with Beijing with increasing quantity. Due to objections by the SED, the term “Euro-Asiatic opportunism” was deleted from the drafts prepared. Instead there was an orientation toward continuing patient and principled work with the communist and workers parties on the Chinese question.

- Together with the emphasis on growing danger to peace and social progress by an alliance China-United States-Japan (in which Western Europe and particular the FRG are increasingly going to be included), we must also analyze and define problems and contradictions existing between these different forces. We have to exploit those in our policy of countervailing in both comprehensive and targeted fashion.

- Our delegation stressed that scientific-theoretical work in our countries on current China policy must primarily focus on changes in China, including on respective aspects in policy and ideology of Chinese leaders since the death of Mao Zedong.

In the editing commission our delegation submitted a number of proposals for amendments. The majority of them were accepted for both the protocol transcript and the analytic material. They pertained to an emphasis on relative stabilization, to the term of Euro-Asiatic opportunism, and to partial deletion of a phrase on differentiation policy in the protocol transcript (Appendix #2 [not included]).

Not in every case the meeting succeeded to reach consensus on amendments for protocol transcript and analytic material, like for instance regarding Chinese policy of differentiation toward the socialist countries (see Appendix #2 [not included]). Our proposals to present deeper evidence for characterizing the economic situation in China (Thesis #10), as well as to use the economic situation as a starting point in the passages on domestic policy, were not accepted.

V.

In its recommendations for propagandistic activity the meeting listed, among other things, the following points:

- Portraying the dangers for peace stemming from Beijing's parallel actions with U.S. aggressive circles and the imperialist countries, as well as their extension of mutual military relations;
- Decisive support of positions held by Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, Kampuchea, and Mongolia—all of which are subject to threats and attempts of blackmail by the Beijing leadership;
- Unmasking of Beijing's dangerous subversive actions, as well as of the American-Chinese conspiracy toward the countries in Southeast, South, and West Asia, in particular concerning Afghanistan and Kampuchea;
- Unmasking of Beijing's hegemonism and its practical effects toward developing countries and the Non-Aligned Movement;
- Criticism of Maoism's latest modification that is still based on great-power chauvinism, anti-Sovietism, and hostility toward global socialism.

Concerning future scientific research, the necessity was emphasized for perfecting the coordination on the most important problems of China's current situation, and for continuing Marxist-Leninist analysis of the class content of Chinese events, and of the causes for the current course of the CCP leadership. This pertains to the following main areas:

- Character, main phases, and perspectives of social evolution in the PR China, in particular since Mao's death;
- China and its role in the world.

Document No. 21

Hungarian report on “economic Interkit” meeting in Bulgaria, October 1980

[Source: HNA XIX-J-1-j-Kína-78-50-6423/1980. Obtained by Péter Vámos, translated by Gwenth A. Jones and Péter Vámos for CWIHP.]

No. 1 0046/3/1980

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

Prepared in 12 copies

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REPORT

On the deputy ministers' coordination meeting held on 27-28 October 1980 in Lovech, Bulgaria, regarding questions of trade and economic policy and scientific-technical cooperation to be applied in contacts with the People's Republic of China.

Delegations from Bulgaria, Hungary, the GDR, Mongolia, Cuba, Poland, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia took part in the meeting. The substantial part of the talks is summarized as follows:

In comparison with 1979, trade estimates for the participating countries for 1980 are lower. There have been more contractual problems this year than previously (the Chinese have withdrawn from purchasing many items due to lack of demand, and rigid behavior was witnessed at price talks). By the end of the year, it is expected that the Chinese will have achieved a positive balance of trade in all relations. Forecasts for 1981 are no better. The Chinese have indicated to us and other countries that as a result of the rectification policy, they do not wish to buy several machines or equipment that they used to buy in previous years. This would produce, within two years, a reduction in volume of 40-50%. In the Hungarian context for example, from our earlier traditional exports, [the Chinese] have not required the transport this year of 500 lorries, 200 buses, 4 thousand tons of steel pipes and machine tools, with a total value of 56.7 million clearing Swiss Francs. (The total value of our exports is 130 million clearing Swiss Francs.) They have further withdrawn from purchasing 6 thousand tons of steel-aluminum cables and 10 thousand pieces of oxygen bottles, with a total value of 18.4 million clearing Swiss Francs. In a departure from the practice of earlier years, "pre-agreements" between companies for expected quota will exist only in very small number, if at all. Many countries have emphasized that the Chinese only intend to begin trade talks with them for 1981, in March next year.

The discernible tendency is that the Chinese want to reduce socialist machine imports from the list of traditional products, in particular from the GDR, Czechoslovakia, Poland and ourselves. The countries affected hope to maintain their machine export levels by introducing new machine products. The reduction of Chinese transports however clearly necessitates, on the import side, capitalist imports, which we cannot offset with Chinese-made goods. Opposed to this is Soviet behavior; they do not propose to expand the present nomenclature of transported goods, because they are scared of strengthening the Chinese military potential. A forceful

argument developed between representatives of both views in the editorial group. The only passage to eventually appear in the memorandum says that parties should avoid the exchange of goods which directly helps the Chinese military potential.

The Soviet representative generally urged great caution in all forms of new cooperation proposed by the Chinese. According to [the Soviet] judgment however, this is all part of the evolving Chinese policy of detachment. At the same time Bulgaria, the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia have shown great interest in new forms of cooperation, because only this way can they hinder the reduction in important import items. This position was also represented by the Hungarian delegation. It became clear that the Chinese only made a new cooperation proposal to Poland (to participate in the reconstruction of an ore mine, a flax processing plant and a house-building factory. Polish machines, equipment, planning and technology would be exchanged for raw materials. Talks are still at a preliminary stage.)

The Soviet delegation proposed, in the interest of avoiding harmful leaks of technical-scientific findings—that a coordination meeting be convened on questions of technical-scientific cooperation at the level of member countries' National Council for Technical Development deputy leader. We regard this as an overstatement. Accordingly, despite the earlier request, we did not bring a representative from this field to the meeting. The Soviet proposal however was finally endorsed by a majority.

The leader of the Soviet delegation, Comrade [Ivan] Grishin, expressed his dissatisfaction at the price negotiations. (He mentioned, by way of example, that the Chinese, as the greatest Wolfram exporter, first set the 200-300 ton transport prices for small countries and then want to apply this to Soviet purchases of a few thousand tons.)

During the meeting, it was clear that the Soviets have a clear picture of the situation, and its proposals were motivated by keeping relations at the same level, and a tendency to block Chinese attempts at development.

The next meeting of autumn 1981 will take place in Budapest.

10 November 1980, Budapest

János Vas

Document No. 22

Cable from Hungarian ambassador to Moscow regarding talk with Soviet China expert

Oleg Rakhmanin, 7 July 1982

[Source: HNA XIX-J-1-j-Kína-103-004774-1982. Obtained by Péter Vámos, translated by Gwenth A. Jones and Péter Vámos for CWIHP.]

Hungarian Ambassador to Moscow Mátyás Szűrös

STRICTLY CONFIDENTIAL

CIPHER TELEGRAM

Moscow, 7 July 1982

On 7 July 1982 I paid a farewell visit to O.B. Rakhmanin, first deputy head of the CPSU Central Committee International Department.

Comrade Rakhmanin evaluated the development of Hungarian-Soviet relations positively, and emphasized that relations between parties continued to develop both quantitatively and qualitatively. There are no problems in our relations.

With the future in mind he regards it important that the socialist countries should mutually inform each other of their own internal matters and anticipated international courses of action, and not create unforeseen situations. Second, it is important to act in unity against attempts to split the socialist countries.

According to Comrade Rakhmanin, China is attempting to play the so-called “GDR card”, citing the development of GDR-Chinese relations putting pressure on Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia. The GDR press deals with China too positively, and has taken up Comrade Zagladin’s statement on China from Italian sources. The excerpted—and distorted by the Italians—interview gave an incorrect impression of Soviet policy. Ambassador Abrasimov objected twice to the behavior of the GDR press to Comrade Honecker.

The CPSU does not oppose gradual cultivation of trade relations or other contacts with China. Colleagues working in the field however hold excessively positive opinions which may incite the leadership of fraternal Parties toward exaggerated development of relations. The socialist countries could objectively become part of the Chinese “broad anti-Soviet unity front.”

Any form of rivalry would be damaging. We need to agree on our position, but do not regard it as realistic or necessary to convene a separate meeting at the highest level on this question, as proposed by Comrades in the GDR.

It is very important that our ambassadors in Peking are of the appropriate orientation. An impression has arisen that the ambassadors of some socialist countries evaluated the processes in China with excessive optimism, from which unjustified conclusions have been drawn.

It would be correct for the press in the socialist countries to occasionally expose the anti-Soviet policy of China and criticize their position on Cambodia and other questions.

Comrade Rakhmanin responded to my question that there are no negative observations of Hungary. The position of the HSWP leadership on Interkit in Sofia is highly regarded. [...]

No. 248. Szűrös

Document No. 23

Entries from diary of CPSU International Department official Anatoly Chernyaev regarding Soviet policy toward China, summer and fall 1982

[Source: Anatoly Chernyaev, *Sovmestnyi Iskhod. Dnevnik dvukh epokh. 1972-1991 gody.* (Moskva: Rosspen, 2010), pp. 488-9, 494-9, 503, 507. Translated for CWIHP by Sergey Radchenko.]

c. 21 May 1982⁶⁹

The Chinese problem. My clash with [Oleg Borisovich] Rakhmanin. Back in the beginning of May, I, as a member of the editorial board of *Kommunist*, received a review article written by [Mikhail] Kapitsa (MFA) about a book by [Oleg] Borisov (?). I did not take the trouble to think who that Borisov was [Borisov was one of Rakhmanin's pen-names], but I called [the editor of *Kommunist* Richard] Kosolapov and told him that I am categorically against such an article. This was nothing but apologetics for the book and curses of China, as if there never was a speech by Brezhnev in Tashkent.

⁶⁹ 29 May is given in the original but this is definitely a mistake, for the entry refers to events that happened between 15 and 20 May (approximately), and is followed by an entry dated 24 May.

On May 11 another “Interkit” took place in Sophia—a secret meeting of the deputy heads [of relevant Central Committee departments] of the six socialist countries on the Chinese question. We were of course represented by Rakhmanin who first imposed “directives” for his trip to Sofia on the CC, and there [imposed] the protocol (as the basis of propaganda and scientific work in the participating countries and for publicity). However, for the first time the plan misfired. The Germans (Bruno Mahlow) first introduced 100 amendments to the draft of this protocol, and then refused to sign it.

Probably, the same Mahlow reported to Rakhmanin that Honecker “is generally pulling his hair” [*rvet i mechet*] about this Interkit. He, allegedly, has been preparing for fifteen years [sic], writing down various loud phrases about China (dictatorship, military-bureaucratic regime, alliance with imperialism, degeneration, surrender of position of capitalism etc.), but life goes on. The CPSU, allegedly, made all sorts of mistakes with China, it may be a good time to “apologize.” In any case, we have “our own” interests and must have “our own” policy in relation to China. That’s how it is!

Having returned to Moscow, Rakhmanin sent a “report” to the CC, signed by the four departments [responsible for foreign affairs]. He called me—and, true to his manner of “quickly-quickly”—[said]: sign it, everything has been agreed upon. I read it and decided that I will not sign it, that much I told the assistant who brought the paper.

Instead of this I send it to Ulianovskii. He read it and on the following day sent me his “thoughts”—also against Rakhmanin.

In the evening, Oleg Borisovich “personally” stormed into my office:

- Where is the paper?
- Ulianovskii has it.
- What for? Everything has been agreed upon. The Politburo commission (on China) met today, they basically approved my memorandum, and even instructed to “toughen” I. Aleksandrov’s article for *Pravda*...

He had a threatening appearance, unreceptive to objections.

- I will not sign this paper.

He turned around and slammed the door.

By the way, about I. Aleksandrov's article⁷⁰ ... It was circulated in the Politburo just before. I made amendments for B.N. [Ponomarev], taking out any mention of the names of the Chinese leaders and some virulent remarks—the atavisms of the “Cold War” with China. The article was not prepared by Rakhmanin's team but, probably, at Lubyanka [KGB]; it was written in the spirit of Tashkent and was fundamentally different from both Rakhmanin's memorandum and from the protocol. It was in this form that it was published in May 20... In spite of...

Indeed, the same day as Rakhmanin stormed [into my office], there was the Chinese commission. In the morning B.N. told me that, allegedly, they discussed: he (B.N.) and Andropov spoke in favor of improving relations with China (“but of course giving them a rebuff when needed!”), but Gromyko, allegedly, surprised [them] by demanding to push the Chinese, not to let them off lightly. And he was brusque in general, although it seems that as a diplomat he should have been more flexible.

A “worrying” message came from Pyshkov (from the blabbering of the assistants, and more probably from Rakhmanin who is a member of the PB Commission): that the commission took even more rigid positions than that of Rakhmanin's memorandum and of the protocol. However, I returned this memorandum to Rakhmanin, without signing it, although he threatened over the phone that he will report to Chernenko that the International Department is refusing to sign.

However, I thought it necessary (and I had to do it as a matter of work duty) to shortly explain on a note for Ponomarev why I did this.

To be precise: the memorandum departs from the Tashkent line, its main task (that it proposes to accomplish) is to expose Chinese hegemonism, it rules out reasonable prospects, using propaganda to create an atmosphere, which will undercut the opportunity to establish normal relations. And also because it characterizes the situation in China as a “move toward the right”. “Toward the right,” I wrote to B.N.—“everyone knows what that means in our party terminology. This means, ‘things are getting worse.’ But in comparison with what? With how things were under Mao, how things were under Hua Guofeng, a year or two ago?”

⁷⁰ The reference here is to the article by Igor Aleksandrov [pseudonym], published by *Pravda* on May 20, 1982. Translation in “Pravda: Soviet-Chinese Differences ‘Will Have to Be Removed,’” *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, May 21, 1982. SECTION: Part 1 The USSR; A. INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS; 3. THE FAR EAST ; SU/7032/A3/1.

And, in the end, it is not admissible that Rakhmanin's line blocks the Tashkent line, but this is happening because the implementation of policy has been practically surrendered into the hands of Oleg Borisovich, to whom I always was well-disposed, in personal terms."

I sent this to Balmashnov to pass it on to B.N. when he returns from the Komsomol congress. He [Balmashnov], having read it, and true to the principle of "hope nothing happens," immediately sent me 12 pages on chalk paper, "The conclusions of the Commission of the Politburo on the Chinese question"... Half of the text was devoted to Honecker, with the conclusion: "measures must be taken," especially that he [Honecker] conspires on the German question, and on the Polish one, ... and in general.

About the Chinese—in Rakhmanin's style, but in addition it was advised to call to account [*pristrunit*] "some Soviet communists," connected to the Chinese problem in the institutes, in the mass media, who incorrectly understand the policy of the party, engage in conversations alleging that the party and the government do not make use of all opportunities to normalize relations with China, etc. That, allegedly, one has to bring into line [literally "conduct work with"] the directors and managers of official agencies...

Therefore, Rakhmanin, with the help of the Politburo, decided to intimidate [*prishchuchit*] all of his competitors and opponents, establish himself in the role of [Trofim] Lysenko for Sinology.

I understood why Balmashnov hurried to slip this document to me: so that I know my place and do not stick my neck out, because otherwise I might let Ponomarev down, especially that he is also a member of the Chinese commission, and his signature, like the signatures of Chernenko, Andropov, Gromyko, Kirilenko, Zimianin, Zamiatin, Rakhmanin was also affixed under this "report," intended for the endorsement of the Politburo on Thursday.

On the following day after the meeting of the Politburo Ponomarev called me up. We talked about this and that, in particular about the need to prepare a new edition of Brezhnev's biography for the USA.

- By the way—B.N. suddenly says—about the memorandum on China. The Politburo just met...

- Boris Nikolaevich, I interrupt. I read the report of the China commission. I was surprised by many things there. If you read my little note, I have no need to say again that it (the report)

departs from the Tashkent line; in essence there is no policy in it—no direction nor goal to pursue, [no sense of] what we want in our relations with China... And moreover, one should not allow Rakhmanin to make a policies of such importance.

- B.N. in his turn, wanted to stop me but I was carried away.

- I don't know if you are aware of this, but in the last 15 years while Rakhmanin has been responsible for China in the CC Department, and especially after he became the First Deputy, he wrote dozens of articles, brochures and even books (of course, with the help of Sladkovskii's institute and his aides). And all of this is about one thing: how to smash China. He perfectly understands that if relations changed, all of his "literature" will go into the trash bin. But he has already nominated himself for the elections to the Academy of Sciences and has no intention of abandoning this plan. So he will do anything to make sure that our line in relation to China remains such as depicted in his articles and brochures written under his four pen-names. But I think it is not appropriate to surrender this vital area of our state interests to Rakhmanin's personal interests [biznes].

B.N. became alert. He took it with obvious interest: such reasons are especially understandable to him, he likes this [sort of thing]. Finally, he responded:

- Well, take it easy, Anatolii Sergeevich—the resolution of the CC (Politburo) will be completely different, not the same as in the Commission report. Leonid Il'ich spoke at the Politburo—here, I wrote it down—(he took up a piece of paper)... and he said: "We should continue an active [*initsiativnuiu*] policy toward China, we should improve relations. I think, we should instruct the relevant comrades to prepare new steps with an eye to sorting out relations on the basis of what I said in Tashkent."

Now, that's a twist!

Here is, probably, what happened. Andrei [Aleksandrov-Agentov, Brezhnev's foreign policy aide], having received the report of the commission, immediately grasped that it was Rakhmanin's dirty business, and immediately read out talking points for L.I.'s statement at the Politburo. B.N. doubted Rakhmanin's "information" about Honecker etc. And where were you before, members and candidate members of the Politburo? Or the great power complex goes off automatically? In its name [the great power complex's name], one can take for granted anything, even "sanctify" Rakhmanin's monopoly in the Chinese matters, which means that the CC with

its own hands is closing the opportunity to receive objective information (and studies) on China, because all of [our] science is already under the paw of Oleg Borisovich!...

10 July 1982

[...]

My war with Rakhmanin has gone up a gear. As I have already written, he managed to get “Interkit” endorsed at the Politburo with a provision—to publish an article in *Kommunist* on the basis of that same anti-Chinese nonsense [*bodiagi*], to which the Germans refused to subscribe this time. Having returned after an illness I discovered proofs on my desk (as I am a member of the editorial board of *Kommunist*) and was shocked once again. In 21 columns (this is about 66 typed pages) there was smacking [*dolbezh*] of China in all directions. Two thirds of the text are devoted to internal affairs: party, constitutional, the economic situation and so on—and in such a raucous style that we never allowed ourselves anything like this with respect to many imperialist countries, and with respect to France and the FRG—not for the world. Not to say anything about foreign policy.

In a word, complete disavowal of Brezhnev’s Tashkent speech.

Because what it said about China’s internal affairs - ... any reader will be surprised: how could we even call this country “socialist”[?] Or: if China so deeply (and irreversibly) became mired in an alliance with imperialism, how could one count on normalization with it, on improvement of relations and cooperation[?]

Therefore, Tashkent is either a conjectural (basically hypocritical) tactical move, or our right hand does not know what the left hand is doing, or there is a “struggle” under way in our leadership on the question of China.

The first question they will ask in the West: is Tashkent over with?! And China will have a new excuse to respond with still greater condemnation of our internal politics and “hegemonism.” I call Kosolapov. Explain all the conceivable arguments to him. He tells me: there is a PB CC resolution, and Rakhmanin is sitting on my head... And the issue has been sent into print.

I call Ponomarev, he tells me: “I cannot cancel a Politburo resolution.”

- But you are a member of the Chinese commission, you can tell Andropov. I am certain that when the decision on the publication was made, none of the CC Secretaries and members of the PB read Rakhmanin's composition. This is a question of big politics. And God forbid if Brezhnev was informed that a mine was being put under his Tashkent line...

- And do you know what the Chinese are writing about us every day? And what a bad speech the Chinese made in the UN?

- I know. But I also know that a lot of what they used to write half a year earlier they no longer write. The whole world sees that. It's enough to glance through TASS. But Rakhmanin is hiding this from the CC. But the main thing is—Tashkent—does it go on or not? If yes, one must not allow propaganda to diverge from policy...

- A lot of water has flowed since Tashkent...

- Huh? That means....

- No, no, you misunderstood me (got scared). What am I suggesting to you? Let Kosolapov, if he sympathizes with you, call Andropov... But in general be careful, one should not make it look as if we (the International Department) are pro-Chinese, and Rakhmanin is the only one who struggles...

- OK.

Kosolapov, however, did not dare to call Andropov. I, he said, will call my immediate boss, Zimianin.

In the morning I still knew nothing about the results. (I don't like to push... and put people in a difficult situation). And B.N. is already calling: how did this end? [I said:] I don't know. But just in case (I report to him) I myself called Andropov's aide Vladimirov (Suslov's former aide). He, I say, became very worried. And promised to report right away, as soon as the Politburo finishes. Then Kosolapov informed about the results of his conversation with Zimianin. He also became worried. He called [head of the Department, Rakhmanin's boss Konstantin] Rusakov and together they decided to propose to Kosolapov to circulate this article in the Chinese commission, and to remove it from the pending (10th) issue.

This is how it ended for now.

7 August 1982

It looks like the main thing that happened during the days missing in the diary is once again China. A week passed by. It turns out, as Ponomarev told me unhappily, Andropov called him and said: it seems that your Cherniaev wrote up some kind of declaration about this article... It is not good if there is conflict among the departments... Let them hammer it out. I, Ponomarev (apparently scared) responded that Cherniaev, allegedly, never made any statements but merely, as a member of the editorial board of *Kommunist* (God forbid as a deputy in his Department) spoke up in favor of cutting down... the criticism of internal policy of the PRC.

I tell him (insolently): nothing of this nature, Boris Nikolaevich. I generally spoke against the publication of such an article because it contradicts the Tashkent line, wrote up a fairly sharp review and sent it to Kosolapov.

B.N., however, attributed such a “limiting” action to me in his conversation with Andropov because he played along [*poddakival*]. Andropov told him that he demanded from Rakhmanin to “sharply reduce the internal part” and generally cut down the amount of virulent remarks. To my insolence, which was followed once again by elaborations on the account of Rakhmanin’s composition, B.N. declared that he will not deal with this anymore, and does not advise me to.

In the meantime, [head of the USA and Canada Institute Georgii] Arbatov and I ended up in the Theatre of Satire, at the “Imposter” by Erdman, 1930. Constant hints and “associations.” After this until 2am Arbatov dragged me around the Arbat lanes around his house and again cursed all and everyone for greater power policy in relation to the Comecon countries. [...] I for my part told him about the Chinese affairs. In response he, cussing Rakhmanin and co., offered his services: I will, he says, call Laptev (this is *another* of Andropov’s aides), perhaps Blatov, who is in the South near Brezhnev and carefully let them know that, he says, *Kommunist* may again publish the wrong thing... And you send me your review, which you sent to Kosolapov, so that I have the arguments. This was on Friday night.

On Monday I sent Arbatov a copy. In the evening of the same day I had the aforementioned conversation with Ponomarev, from which it followed for me that my subsequent actions may be viewed as an attempt to weave intrigue against a Politburo resolution, and as a violation of party discipline. On Tuesday I called Yurka [Arbatov] and told him not to do anything with my paper... It turns out he already spoke to Laptev and Shishlin who was going

South that day to help Blatov. But I (Arbatov) did not send the paper to anyone, everything was oral. In the meantime, for I don't know how many days I have the second proofs from *Kommunist* sitting on my desk. Kosolapov sent it to me, so to speak, in violation of instructions, because it was ordered to send it only to the members of the Chinese commission of the Politburo. In essence, nothing was changed there, perhaps it was cut by about a fifth, and even Andropov's direct instruction was in fact not implemented. The circular, naturally, came to Ponomarev, as a member of the commission. Balmashnov, the aide, sent the circular to Kovalenko (another of our deputies who deals with the East)—in order that he reports his opinion to B.N. He reported, as is the norm in these cases. Balmashnov put this [report] on B.N.'s desk. The latter responded: "I said I will not deal with this anymore, and I ask not to waste my time." Having received a usual slap in the face, "San Sanych" (Balmashnov Aleksandr Aleksandrovich) came back to his office and, of course, called me, knowing about my engagement in this matter and also because he had sent the material to Kovalenko with an addendum: report to Cherniaev. In any case, Balmashnov did not dare to go to B.N. again with the Chinese question.

What is to be done? On the one hand, one has to neutralize the accusation of violation of discipline, especially if Arbatov's intervention reaches Andropov's ears (additional downside: plugged in a person from outside the *apparat*, even if he is trusted and "accepted" at large courts and even at Andropov's. Yurka frequently comes to his place, back from the times when he was the head of a consultants' group in the Department, which was run by Iu. V. in the 1960s). On the other hand, one cannot allow for the article to go forward in *Kommunist*—there is State interest at stake.

I call Sharapov, Andropov's aide, who handles international relations, and with whom I had a conversation earlier, in relation to the first set of proofs, after I understood that my conversation with Vladimirov on this subject was futile: he [Vladimirov] handles domestic questions and at least promised to report to Andropov about my concerns that the article in *Kommunist* goes against Tashkent. He probably did not do that, or asked Sharapov to do it.

So I call him [Sharapov]:

- Are you still interested in the Chinese question? (as if joking).
- Yes, didn't you promise to send your opinion about the second proofs. On the first, as I

told you, Iu. V. called Rakhamin and ordered him to “sharply cut down the internal part and then let it go out.”

- I am prepared to give my opinion to you. The article, even though it has become shorter, but the essence and the tone remained the same. Would you like for me to express my opinion on paper?

- Please.

I sat down and composed two polite but quite resolute pages, insisting that until the Chinese congress at least one should not come out with this article. I sent it. Three days passed by. Did not hear a word about it. In the meantime, Kosolapov's deputy Bugaev calls me, Kosolapov decided to slip out to a vacation, out of harm's way.

- What am I to do, Anatolii Sergeevich? I only received comments on the second set of proofs from [Dmitrii] Ustinov (PB member, Minister of Defense). Well, [he] weakened the virulent remarks here and there, and sharpened them in some places... But no one else...

Then, he says, it turns out that Rakhmanin (as the secretary of the Chinese commission) made sure that all amendments are sent to him, and not to the editorial office, and he will send us the final test.

- I don't know what to do, Evgenii Iosifovich... I did all I could and now I don't even have the right to send you my comments on the second proofs.

- By the way, I received a phone call from... (here he broke off, did not say the last name but I understood that he was talking about Zimianin). He started yelling at me in his, you know, “comradely” (fraternal) style: “What, two Politburo decisions, and one of the CC Secretariat, are not enough for you?! Why are you not publishing the article? And so on.” I tell him calmly: I have nothing to publish. Rakhmanin took everything, I don't even have the text, and I am not receiving any comments. Besides, Mikhail Vasil'evich, until I receive a text, endorsed officially by the PB commission, I will not publish anything. Because the editorial board has in fact been removed from this affair at a time when all members of the editorial board without exception are against this article (here he added: I, Anatolii Sergeevich, fully, 200% support your opinion, Kosolapov showed me your review). For this reason neither I nor the editorial board will not take the responsibility in this important question. I am an old party man and will not go against my convictions, and I am convinced that our policy will suffer a big blow.

I don't know if this is what he told the CC Secretary (on the other hand, he could well do, he is a direct, confident, beaten and honest man), but he received a response: “Well, beware, beware. [*smotri, smotri*].”

After this conversation with Bugaev I decided to call Sharapov after all. He: I reported to Iu. V. (Andropov) but sort of on my own behalf...

- Why is this? Why didn't you think it possible to refer to me. After all, I am not hiding, I just did not feel it appropriate to call myself...

- Well, that's how it is. I decided this would be better.

- Ok, and what?

- He said that... and repeated the same thing—that one needs to cut down the internal part and let it go out. (Only later did I understand what the problem was—but more on that in the finale.) However, your comments to the actual text are useful in my view.

- But I don't have the right to send them even to *Kommunist!*

- But try to hand them to Boris Nikolaevich. He is a member of the commission after all.

- Ok, thanks!

I write a memo for Ponomarev: I say, I talked to Sharapov—I cannot say if he reported the general considerations to Andropov (attached!), but comments to the text he found “substantial” (also, attached!).

Two days passed by. Balmashnov calls me up: Boris Nikolaevich returned me your comments, your memo and your copy of the article, without saying a word. I will send it to you... In other words, the same “policy” as with Kovalenko: I told you I will not deal with it and that's it! I understood that it is also useless to knock myself against other walls and decided to wait submissively for the article to appear in the next issue of *Kommunist*.

But yesterday the following happened.

B.N. called me up (today he went for a vacation): he says, we should talk before his departure. I come over. He is a-shining. I come to the desk. He throws me some text, saying: Take it and read it. You have won!

I read: a note by Brezhnev addressed to Andropov, very short, one paragraph. I am attaching, it says, a note by my aide c. Golikov on Chinese affairs. I think it has some reasonable ideas. I request that it is discussed at the Chinese commission of the Politburo.

And Golikov's memo, about 15 pages in length, contains the following: one gets a sense that the significance of normalization with China is being underestimated. Our propaganda weakly supports the Tashkent line, and sometimes it comes out with materials, which in fact undermine it (there is a reference, among other things, to the article in *Pravda* dated 20 July). No one wants to see the changes in China but they are taking place. Our main enemy is US imperialism, therefore the main strike should be directed there. Otherwise, it looks like in terms of negotiations, contacts, exchanges we allow many things with the US (even at a sharp time like now) which we do not allow with regard to China. One needs a strategic, Tashkent-like approach to the problem of China. One needs to do everything possible every day in order to remove tension, develop cooperation, achieve mutual understanding, not to push China in the direction of the USA. And so on.

The memo does not say a word about the article for the *Kommunist*, or about Rakhmanin's line, but it is of completely anti-Rakhmaninite essence.

About Ponomarev's reaction to this—he is completely transparent. He tells me: I sent this text to Kovalenko. You know some time ago we prepared a letter for the fraternal parties about the China question, now it needs to be amended in the spirit of this note by Leonid Il'ich. Andropov almost agreed to our draft but now he is asking to “have a look at it” again (the letter, of course, although it is not completely in Rakhmanin's spirit but almost... And the basis was written by Rakhmanin's team, and our [team] only edited—“weakened” Rakhmaninism).

I called Kovalenko right away. We sat down, the three of us, and B.N. even left his desk and sat next to us, at a small add-on table. I became completely insolent, saying: B.N., perhaps we should not send it at all? What's the point, if we are for normalization, how can we talk the others out of it?...

- No, no, don't get carried away!

And he went into the editing.

While Kovalenko was on his way, B.N. managed to tell me the “details”... Andropov called him... telling him in this connection—in some context, of course: “Rakhmanin is not behaving himself correctly. I warned him. If nothing changes, we will have to look for another place for him. And I told his Sharapov—they are friends with Rakhmanin, at one stage they were in China together, or even studied together: either you carry out your responsibilities as an aide

as you should, or you should leave the *apparat*.”... So that’s how it is! And I knocked at Sharapov’s, hoping for understanding and support. It turned out that each word and paper of mine were immediately made known to Rakhmanin!

But who inspired Golikov? Or, perhaps, he is the source of the Tashkent line. And “came up” with this note “independently,” perhaps even without the knowledge of the article for *Kommunist*. But he could not *not* know about the “Interkit”... The main thing is that his intervention came in at the right time!

And look at my Ponomarev! “I will not deal with it anymore!” A political figure equal to a minor apparatchik, who pulled tricks all his life just to stay in the cabriolet! [...]

11 September 1982

[...]

An episode with the paragraph cursing China in Ustinov’s speech at the award of an order to the city of Kuibyshev. Aleksandrov immediately grasped it: this is even despite Brezhnev’s note and the decision of the Chinese commission! If this is of Rakhmanin’s doing, his head will roll! Checked it: indeed, the circular did not have this paragraph. This means it appeared after “comments.” Turned out that yes, exactly Oleg recommended to restore it!

But this is already just an episode. At the first PB meeting chaired by Brezhnev after his vacation, he made a statement on all “questions under discussion”. About China (along the lines of his note) and to the effect that one should be calmer and more skillful in the appraisal of the international situation: “there is no negative without positive.”... [...]

2 October 1982

[...] B.N. made a report [on] “Lenin’s strategy of peace” in the Column Hall at the readings [held by the] M[oscow] P[arty] C[ommittee]. He is happy.

In the circular, Rakhmanin (as in the case with Ustinov) tried to put some of his Chinaphobia into his report, but B.N. this time rejected it resolutely, surprised by the stubbornness and insolence of Rakhmanin. He and others cannot wait for the Chinese to pull something to cause Leonid Il’ich’s “wrath”, in order that the whole Tashkent line and, especially,

the Politburo course adopted in August after Golikov's note, go to hell. There is a complete inability to think in historical categories, lack of understanding of what state policy is. But the fact that we and the Chinese were at each other's throats [*tsarapalis*] for an extra 7-8 years is Rakhmanin's deed, an obvious mediocrity. [...]

Document No. 24

Polish report on meeting in Moscow with Oleg Rakhmanin, February 1985

[Source: AAN, KC PZPR LXXVI—710. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Malgorzata K. Gnoinska.]

Note

From a working meeting of the CC International Department deputy heads of fraternal parties of socialist countries regarding the assessment of the situation and coordination of relations with the Chinese People's Republic

Moscow—February 18, 1985

I.

The major presentation was given by Comrade O. Rakhmanin, the CC CPSU International Department Deputy Head. The Soviet comrades also prepared and handed out a large study which contained the actual analysis and the assessments of the PRC's foreign policy and its domestic situation.

The main purpose for holding this meeting earlier (it was scheduled to take place in October 1985) was to present the conclusions reached by the Deputy Prime Minister [Ivan] Arkhipov, following his visit to Beijing, and the current directions in China's foreign and domestic policies.

The CC CPSU assesses the political results of Arkhipov's conversations held in Beijing, as well as the current direction in Chinese foreign and domestic policy, as strongly negative. The Chinese People's Republic does not want a true normalization of relations with the USSR. The Chinese continue to adhere to their three well-known conditions (the withdrawal of Soviet soldiers from Mongolia, the withdrawal of Soviet soldiers from Afghanistan, and the withdrawal of the USSR's support for the Indochinese nations). They also pose territorial claims to the

Soviet Union, support other nations (Japan), and reject the proposition of signing treaties which could introduce the feel of security and stability in their relations with the USSR (a non-aggression agreement, borders, etc.).

The PRC also cooperates with the imperialist powers on a global scale. China, just as the U.S., is in favor of revising borders and agreements which regulate the post-war political reality; the Chinese are supporting the idea of the so-called German unification by criticizing the Yalta agreements...China's activities opposing the peaceful policy conducted by the USSR and other socialist countries on key issues, such as peaceful defense and stopping the arms race, are well-known.

The PRC is using all platforms and opportunities to conduct this policy: bilateral contacts, the UN, multilateral meetings and parties, and social and youth organizations (for example, during the Youth Festival in Moscow). One of the most important elements of Beijing's policy is to use China's economic, political, and other relations with the USSR and socialist nations in order to break the unity of the socialist commonwealth and to bring about the ideological diversion.

Beijing attempted to exploit Deputy Foreign Minister [Ivan] Arkhipov's visit for its own propaganda aims. On the one hand, the anti-Soviet campaign intensified in the Chinese press; on the other hand, the published information exaggerated the results of [Sino-Soviet] economic talks. In reality, the USSR has not changed its position, agreed upon during consultations with fraternal nations, on the issue of economic policy toward the PRC. In particular, the Soviets refused, for example, assistance regarding China's construction of two nuclear power plants.

The CC CPSU concludes that the present anti-socialist line in the PRC's foreign policy is long-term and [includes] strategic cooperation with American imperialism. Beijing thinks that by weakening the USSR and the entire socialist commonwealth it will be able to carry out its own great power and hegemonic ambitions. Objectively speaking, there is a dangerous resemblance between China's strategy and that of U.S. imperialism: Reagan wants to open the Eastern front against the USSR; Beijing aspires to strengthen its military potential for hegemonic purposes and also seeks a military cooperation with the U.S. in this respect. Together, this is a joint aspiration of Beijing and U.S. imperialism in order to change a global system to the disadvantage of the USSR and the entire socialist commonwealth.

As far as the assessment of the PRC's internal situation, Soviet comrades focused on criticizing the economic reforms. They pointed out that China's hitherto course points to the restoration of some elements of capitalism. The capitalist penetration accompanies this opening, as does the training of economic personnel with the aid of the American specialists...It was proposed that the next meeting (in October in Moscow) will be devoted to a deeper analysis of the internal situation in the PRC.

Given the above analysis, the Soviet comrades presented the following conclusions:

- We need to continue to tightly coordinate the policy of socialist countries toward the PRC. In particular, we must counter Beijing's policy of differentiation toward the countries of the socialist commonwealth;

- We need to counter Beijing's efforts to separate economic, cultural, science, social and other issues from those in the area of politics and ideology. This is because while conducting an unrestrained and complete political and ideological struggle against the USSR and socialist countries, the PRC strives to develop economic relations, in particular, which are most beneficial to the PRC...and which can be used as an element of political and ideological diversion in socialist countries.

In making economic decisions, we need to follow political criteria, and always take into consideration that the PRC continues political and ideological struggle against the socialist commonwealth.

- We need to actively counter Beijing's foreign policy...to harshly criticize China's cooperation with imperialism and to provide our support to Afghanistan, Vietnam, and Cambodia...

- We need to follow with great care the extent and quality of the economic cooperation, so we don't bolster the PRC's military potential...This is why the CC CPSU proposed to introduce during the upcoming meeting of secretaries of CC fraternal parties on economic matters to be held in May 1985 "the implementation of political criteria to the economic cooperation with China;"

- In implementing any kinds of contacts and exchanges of delegations, we need to pay attention to the need to counter the so-called Beijing's "people's diplomacy." By using their hospitality and acting nice [while talking about] some topics, the Chinese want to win over the

representatives of our parties and to sow the seeds of mistrust as to the correctness of the party line;

[...]

- We need to strengthen our research institutions which study China. According to the Soviets, the Chinese have extensively developed their research on history and culture of socialist countries, as well as China's relations with them. They [Chinese] are also collaborating with similar institutions in the US and other capitalist countries...

Conclusions [of the Polish delegation]:

- ...When compared with a similar meeting of this nature (Tihany, October 1984), one should note that the Soviets have intensified their criticism of Chinese foreign policy. There was a complete lack of any positive acknowledgment on the Soviet side, and even a negative assessment, of the PRC's accelerated rate of developing [mutual] relations...The Soviets even added a postulate to use political criteria which takes into account a real anti-socialist course of Beijing's course;

- We should expose, in the press and other media, our criticism of some elements in the PRC's foreign policy, especially on the issues of Afghanistan, Vietnam, and Cambodia. We need to thoroughly censor the material for publication on Chinese topics;

- We need to instruct our economic delegations to avoid making political comments, because they could be taken as direct or indirect support for China's policies...;

- The implementation of the CC PUWP delegation's visit in Hanoi, Phnom Penh, and Vientiane is very beneficial, as it will serve as an example of our contribution to the implementation of coordinated policy of socialist countries in this region;

- We need to tightly control and ensure the right selection of non-governmental and social contacts with the PRC;

- We need to, within the framework of our party work and activities, deepen our information about the current situation in China, especially the negative aspects of Chinese foreign policy;

- We need to deepen Sinology research in Poland and have our Sinological institutions cooperate with those in the USSR;
- The Soviets did not call for giving up or limiting economic, trade or other contacts with China, except for the party and military ties. However, they clearly recommend that we increase our selection in such contacts by paying more attention to the political criteria.

/-/ Janusz Lewandowski

Deputy Head of the CC International Department

Warsaw, February 22, 1985

[Note: Lewandowski's conclusions were adopted by the leadership of the CC PUWP and forwarded to Moscow to the leadership in the CC CPSU International Department, MG]

Document No. 25

Note on Polish communist party delegation visit to China, September 1987

[Source: AAN, KC PZPR, LXXVI-714. Obtained and translated for CWIHP by Malgorzata K. Gnoinska.]

Note from the visit of the CC PUWP International Department delegation in the PRC

On September 8-15, 1987, a three-person delegation of the CC PUWP International Department, including a representative from the CC PUWP Political and Organization Department, visited the PRC. The delegation was headed by the Deputy Head of the International Department, Janusz Lewandowski. Following the results of the visit and the decisions made during the talks between the First Secretary CC PUWP W. Jaruzelski and Deputy [sic] Secretary General CC CCP Zhao Ziyang, the delegation agreed upon the proposition of the inter-party cooperation plan for 1988-1989. The delegation conducted the exchange of information regarding the social situation in both countries and the views on international topics. The delegation met with the head and deputy head of the CC CCP International Communication

Department...It paid a visit to the Central Party School of the CC CCP and got to know its functioning. It also visited the Canton Province and the Special Economic Zones in Shenzhen...

[...]

Conclusions:

[...]

2. The talks prove that the PRC will maintain its full autonomy in the area of foreign policy... The PRC can count on some political and economic benefits resulting from the rivalry between the USSR and the US... China will strive to affirm its interests in the [Asian] region, even more than before, especially in Southeast Asia and the entire Pacific region—the areas of Asia which it considers to be its priorities. Based on our conversations, the Chinese do not seem to be renewing their contacts with the CPSU in the near future. They reiterate the thesis of the existence of “three obstacles,” especially the USSR’s responsibility for introducing and maintaining Vietnamese troops in Cambodia. Therefore, while positively assessing M. Gorbachev’s domestic policy, the Chinese add that “this course has not yet encompassed the USSR foreign policy to the sufficient degree.”...

3. There is no doubt that the CCP treats the issue of acceleration and economic development of China as its biggest priority...The concentration of power in the hands of the party apparatus (including administrative power) serves as a trailblazer for the [economic] reform.

4. One should expect that the XIII CC CCP Congress will also be devoted to defining the direction of China’s economic and social development ...

5. The results of [China’s] economic reform have been undoubtedly successful so far...These processes have also brought an increase in the standard of living...

6. The Chinese realize that the politics of reform, the opening, and the economic revival require changes in the functioning of the political center. In this area, their overall directions generally correspond with the actions taken up by the PUWP at home. This particularly pertains to the problem of the managerial role of the party, as well as the separation of work between the

party and state, especially at middle and lower levels. The issue of democratization of political and social life looks similar. The main difference is that the Chinese are approaching this problem with great care and carefully study the processes taking place in other socialist countries. Generally speaking, according to our Chinese interlocutors, political reforms will be much harder than the economic ones. They are stressing that the politics of the economic reform and “the opening” will cause negative social and political phenomena, which would have to be overcome with the aid of ideological work.

7. The CCP confirmed its existing position of not participating in multilateral meetings organized within the framework of the communist and workers’ movement. However, one can notice the CCP’s growing interest in such meetings. One can expect that the Chinese will gradually join this multilateral cooperation, especially at the academic level... We reiterated that we would inform the CCP about these types of meetings, especially those organized by the PUWP, and in case the CCP showed interest in such meetings, we would be happy to send them invitations.

8. One can state that there is a good atmosphere within the CCP for developing and strengthening the cooperation with the PUWP...

The International Department
CC PUWP

APPENDIX II: LIST OF INTERKIT MEETINGS

December 14-21, 1967, Moscow

January 28-31, 1969, Berlin

March 10-13, 1970, Warsaw

February 15-18, 1971, Sofia

July 3-5, 1972, Prague

May 16-18, 1973, Moscow

March 25-26, 1974, Budapest

June 24-28, 1975, Ulaanbaatar

June 15-16, 1977, Berlin

December 11-13, 1978, Havana

June 11-13 and October, 1980, Mierki (Poland)

May 11-12, 1982, Sofia

December 6-7, 1983, Prague

October 30-November 1, 1984, Tihany (Hungary)

February 18, 1985, Moscow

APPENDIX III:

PROGRAM OF FEBRUARY 2010 BUDAPEST WORKSHOP

China and the Communist World in the Second Half of the Cold War:

New East-Central European Evidence on 'Interkit' and the Sino-Soviet Split, 1967-1986

A Documentation Workshop

Budapest (February 26-28, 2010)

February 26, 2010

1300 Strategy meeting of participants to prepare questions for veterans' session

1500 Interkit, Sinology and Foreign Policy: A Critical Oral History Seminar

Participants:

Józsa, Sándor (1928) sinologist, diplomat

1950-55: studied Chinese language and history in Beijing as graduate student („aspirant”)

1955-57: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Far Eastern Department, desk officer

1957-2008: associate professor of Chinese language and history at ELTE University, Budapest

1972-1976: diplomat in Beijing, area of expertise: Chinese domestic and cultural policy

Nagy, János (1928) diplomat

1957-1960: ambassador in Jakarta

1963-1967: ambassador in New Delhi

1968-1971: ambassador in Washington

1971-1980: deputy minister of foreign affairs

1980- secretary of state at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Tálas, Barna (1928) political scientist, Sinologist

1950-55: studied Chinese language and history in Beijing as graduate student („aspirant”)

1955-1957: diplomat in Beijing

1958: desk officer MFA

1958-65: research fellow, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics

1965-69: diplomat in Warsaw

1970-73: MFA head of department

1973-82: deputy director, Hungarian Institute of Foreign Affairs, head of China Research Group

1982- head of department, National Planning Bureau, Institute of Planned Economy

1800 Dinner with Participants in Seminar

February 27, 2010

900 Welcome from the Sponsors

Péter Vámos (Hungarian Academy of Sciences)

Mircea Munteanu (CWIHP, Woodrow Wilson Center)

David Wolff (Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido U.)

Opening Remarks and Agenda

James G. Hershberg (George Washington University)

David Wolff (Hokkaido University)

930—1300 Focusing on Interkit (Chair: David Wolff)

Bernd Schaefer, East German Documentation on Interkit

Malgorzata K. Gnoinska, Polish Documentation on Interkit

Péter Vámos, Hungarian Documentation on Interkit

Sergey Radchenko, Mongolian Documentation on Interkit

David Wolff, Russian Documentation on Interkit and China

1300—1400 Lunch Talk: Jordan Baev (Bulgarian Intelligence and China)

1400—1730 Interkit and its Context (Chair, James Hershberg)

Oldrich Tuma, Czechoslovakian Documentation on Interkit and China

Mircea Munteanu, Romanian Documentation on Interkit and China

Sergey Radchenko, “The End of Interkit and the End of the Cold War”

1730—1830 Open Discussion: Next Steps

Sponsors: Hungarian Academy of Sciences
Cold War International History Project, WWCIS
Japan Society for the Promotion of Science

James Hershberg is associate professor of history and international affairs at The George Washington University; former director of the Cold War International History Project; and author of *James B. Conant: Harvard to Hiroshima and the Making of the Nuclear Age* (Knopf, 1993) and *MARIGOLD: The Lost Chance for Peace in Vietnam* (forthcoming; Wilson Center Press/Stanford University Press, 2011).

Sergey Radchenko is lecturer at the University of Nottingham, Ningbo, China. Radchenko is the author of *Two Suns in the Heavens: the Sino-Soviet Struggle for Supremacy, 1962-1967* (2009); co-author (with Campbell Craig) of *The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold War* (2008); *The Soviets' Best Friend in Asia: The Mongolian Dimension of the Sino-Soviet Split*, CWIHP Working Paper No. 42; and *The Soviet Union and the North Korean Seizure of the USS Pueblo: Evidence from Russian Archives*, CWIHP Working Paper No. 47.

Péter Vámos is senior research fellow at the Institute of History of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. He earned a CSc (PhD) from the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. Vámos has published widely on China's modern history and foreign relations, Sino-Hungarian relations, and the history of Christianity in China including *Sino-Hungarian Relations and the 1956 Revolution*, CWIHP Working Paper No. 54. He has been the principal investigator of the research project 'The Soviet Bloc and China, 1949-1989', funded by OTKA (Hungarian Scientific Research Fund, project no: 78484). He would like to thank FRIAS School of History, where he is an External Senior Fellow in 2010-2011, for its support of research into relations between the Soviet Bloc and China.

David Wolff is professor of Eurasian history at the Slavic Research Center, Hokkaido University, Sapporo, Japan. Wolff is the author of *To the Harbin Station* (Stanford University Press, 1999), coauthor of *Le KGB et les pays baltes* (Berlin, 2005) and CWIHP Working Paper #30 entitled '*One Finger's Worth of Historical Events': New Russian and Chinese Evidence on the Sino-Soviet Split, 1948-1959*'.
