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east**

Reporter

**THE
CHINA - INDIA
CONFLICT**

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INTRODUCTION

An understanding of the current dispute between China and India necessitates clarity as to the cause of the dispute and clarity as to the significance of the conflict. Americans, for the most part ignorant of the importance of the border areas, ask why these two countries should come to a shooting conflict over boundaries. Single news items fail to present the causes and significances of developments in the current relationships between these two great countries. FAR EAST REPORTER believes that this compilation of documentary material, largely from American sources, will help clarify the issues and will help toward an understanding of the role of our country in this Sino-Indian dispute.

THE CAUSES OF THE CONFLICT— THE HISTORICAL BACKGROUND*

Two large nations, each feeling strongly its new freedom, still have to work out one of the unsolved problems of their previous status as colonial and semi-colonial peoples: the boundary between their two countries.

"India is . . . seeking to defend its territories, trying to hold the frontier lines that were established in 1914, but have never been very clear" (Erwin Canham, Editor, *Christian Science Monitor*, Oct.

* The background of the current Sino-Indian conflict will be found in detail in a previous issue of FAR EAST REPORTER—"China and India? and Indonesia? and Burma?" (50c).

23, 1962). "No Chinese Government, whether Nationalist or Communist, has ever recognized the McMahon Line" (*Los Angeles Times* editorial, Oct. 23, 1962). The very name, McMahon Line, proclaims its imperialist parentage. "In pressing claims along the vague 2,500-mile border with India, Peking is doing what other Chinese regimes did, but with a difference; those regimes were too weak to enforce the claims against the powerful British in India. But the British have gone, and the militant Communists rule China. Peking has pushed . . . in two areas, the North East Frontier Agency, where the so-called McMahon Line was established as a frontier in 1914 but never accepted by China, and in the Ladak section 900 miles to the northwest" (*N. Y. Times* editorial summary, Oct. 29, 1962). "The territorial question involved has a long background. The old imperial government of China, the Nationalists, and now the Communists have consistently claimed territory that India has regarded as hers. Perhaps through weakness successive Chinese governments allowed border claims to lie dormant until the Communists came to power in Peking. Meanwhile, former British rulers of India had built up areas between two great empires—in Ladak, Nepal, Sikkim, Bhutan, Tibet and tribal territory that India calls the North East Frontier Agency. . . . New Delhi has endeavored to extend her control over the wild North East Frontier area which the British had administered only lightly" (*N. Y. Times*, Oct. 28, 1962). "The Taipei regime said that India was wrong. The Nationalists supported the claim . . . that the disputed territories along the 2,500-mile Indian-Chinese border belong to China" (*N. Y. Times*, Oct. 30, 1962). "Even Formosa, in a surly mood, turned on the United States for backing India's claim on territory up to the northeastern McMahon Line" (*Wall Street Journal*, Nov. 14, 1962). Li Tsung-jen, former Acting President of the Republic of China, co-signed a letter in the *N. Y. Times* (Nov. 11, 1962), saying: "No Chinese, regardless of political beliefs, will ever subscribe to the validity of the so-called McMahon Line. The Government in Taiwan has expressed the sentiment of all Chinese in its statement of October 30th. Bitter as it is against Communism, it is at one with the Chinese Communist

Government on this matter. 'The so-called McMahon Line,' it said, 'is a line unilaterally claimed by the British during their rule over India. . . .'" "The McMahon Line . . . has never been accepted by any Chinese Government and is imperfectly mapped" (Sulzberger, *N. Y. Times*, Nov. 10, 1962). "Eight years ago in the spring of 1954 Nehru and Chou En-lai met to discuss the problems arising from a common Himalayan frontier. Out of their discussions came Indian recognition of China's predominant interest in Tibet" (Oliver Clubb, in *National Observer*, Nov. 12, 1962).

India gained political independence from Britain in 1947; in 1949 China threw off the shackles of her semi-colonial status. Recognizing that the borders had never been properly delineated, these two newly independent giants began discussing the question. Ten years later, in 1959, this question became an issue. Why?

WHY THE BORDER QUESTION BECAME AN ISSUE

In addition to expression of their newly won independence and the need to right the wrong inflicted on them in colonial days, there are two other factors that have entered into this question between the two countries. One is the struggle going on in India between the interests of the ruling and reactionary forces and the interests of the Indian people. The other is the impact of the world-wide cold war struggle.

THE STRUGGLE WITHIN INDIA

Within India the border question was developed by the reactionaries into an issue as a political tool to affect the domestic political scene and as a political tool to affect their relationship with the Western capitalist world.

Internally, powerful members of the ruling Congress Party, Indian industrialists and Indian feudal landowners, have disliked Nehru's friendship with China, have feared the influence of China

on the Indian population, have been alarmed by the growth of the Indian Communist Party. What a convenient tool the border question became—to cover their failure to solve India's internal social problems, failure to improve the lot of the people who were increasingly aware of China's progress in this field. The boundary question was inflamed into an issue, used to create a sense of "national emergency" with China as the "enemy." In July 1960 an Indian magazine, *New Age*, wrote, in relation to a projected strike of several hundred thousand government workers, "The Parliamentary group of the Congress Party hoists the tattered banner of 'national emergency' to resist the demands of the workers . . . the border issue will be used to link the projected strike as 'unpatriotic' and fraught with risk to the future of the country." How better discredit the influence of China than by making her appear as an "enemy"? And what a convenient tool the "issue" became to sow dissension within the Indian Communist Party over the question of its attitude toward China!

In relation to the outside world, in spite of a declared policy of neutralism and an apparent division of the national economy into a socialist sector (more properly described as a "public sector") and a private sector, the leaders of India have all along favored continued and increasing relations with the capitalist sector of the world. Their preferred source of the badly needed funds for carrying out India's Five Year Plan was the capitalist West, principally the United States. Even in 1960 India's Finance Minister said, "Our resources are almost at rock bottom; there is no scope for running them further down; we have thus to depend wholly on foreign aid for the financing of our development plans." In July 1962 the *N. Y. Herald Tribune* wrote: "India's 3rd Five Year Plan is showing signs of running out of gas" (July 9, 1962). *Barron's* (magazine) said, "India's Finance Minister is chasing through the capitals of Europe in pursuit of \$220,000,000 to finance the second year of the 3rd Five Year Plan; meanwhile India's liquid assets have been dropping inexorably to new all-time lows" (July 16, 1962). The *New York Herald Tribune* (July 12, 1962) described Finance Minister Desai's efforts as "touring

Europe with the hope of drumming up more financial aid from the Common Market countries." "The World Bank provided another billion dollars toward India's economic development; without this sizable sum of money, India would be unable to achieve the goals set for the second year of its 3rd Five Year Plan" (*N. Y. Herald Tribune* editorial, Aug. 16, 1962). "Today India's foreign exchange reserves practically have disappeared and there is no money to pay for maintenance imports. . . . India is increasing, not decreasing, its reliance on foreign capital" (*Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 15, 1962).

HOW DOES THIS AID AFFECT THE BORDER ISSUE?

It is obvious that by adopting and intensifying an anti-China, pro-capitalist policy—for which the border question provided a convenient issue to be used as a political tool—the Indian reactionaries could secure continued financial aid from the United States. In the eleven and one-half years from 1949 to August 1, 1962 the United States had granted or promised \$4,754,000,000 aid to India (according to the report of the International Cooperation Administration); and if the additional funds given by U.S.-controlled international monetary agencies are added, the sum reaches the fantastic amount of over six billion dollars (\$6,598,000,000).

United States aid to India is given with the stated purpose of keeping India out of the socialist bloc. It is true that India has a mixed economy: part private capitalist and part government-owned "socialist"; but these government-owned enterprises—such as, for example, one-half of the steel industry—are in essence a bureaucratic monopoly (under the control of government officials who are capitalist), the bitter experience of which was one of the popular forces that drove the bureaucratic capitalist Chiang Kai-shek regime out of China (remember the hated "Four Families" who controlled China's pre-1949 economy). The West is well aware of this. John K. Galbraith wrote of "the Indian commitment to the semantics of socialism. . . . Even the most intransigent Indian

capitalist may observe on occasion that he is really a socialist at heart. . . . India has, in fact, superimposed a smallish socialized sector atop what, no doubt, is the world's greatest example of functioning anarchy" (*Foreign Affairs*, July, 1958, pp. 590, 501, 587). Averell Harriman said (May 4, 1959), "I think it is a good thing that they used this word 'socialism'; it is a highly popular word among the Asian peoples, where capitalism has become closely identified—almost synonymous—with colonialism. The Indians have taken it away from the Communists." "The United States and its allies have had to evaluate continued . . . aid to India in relation to a likely development of closer ties between India and the Soviet Union" (*N. Y. Herald Tribune* editorial, Aug. 16, 1962).

When the question of aid to India came up in the U.S. Congress in 1962 the *Wall Street Journal* wrote: "The Administration is defending its request for a boost in economic assistance to India on grounds that India is a bulwark against Red Chinese encroachments in the Far East" (July 9, 1962). Earlier Senator Sparkman, Acting Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, on a TV appearance on June 9 said that foreign aid to India is justified: "We know right now that India is pressing very hard against Communist China on her northern boundary line and her North East Frontier. . . . I feel we ought not to be discouraging India at the very time she is moving in the direction we have been wanting her to move for a long time." In the Indian election campaign in the fall of 1961 Krishna Menon said bluntly, "The United States has been pushing us to go to war with China."

NOT ONLY CAPITALIST AID, BUT ALSO WESTERN INVESTMENTS

Not only have the reactionaries of India been able to increase their ties with the West by accepting foreign aid, but they have also encouraged capitalist elements of the West to invest in the Indian economy.

It must be remembered that in securing freedom from capital-

ist relations China gained complete disassociation with foreign capitalist ties. India, on the other hand, retained within her borders the economic influence and ties with her previous overlords and other capitalist interests.

According to statistics presented to Prime Minister Nehru by the Secretariat of the Indian Cabinet in 1951, foreign capital then controlled 97% of the petroleum industry, 93% of the rubber industry, 90% of match manufacture, 89% of the jute industry, 86% of the tea processing industry, 62% of the coal mining industry, and 21% of the cotton textile industry. Although in the early days of independence the Indian Government nationalized a few enterprises run by British capital by paying large sums in compensation, the fundamental interests of imperialism in India were not touched. These foreign interests have continued to increase. In 1948 foreign investment in India amounted to two billion five hundred and sixty million rupees; by 1960 this investment had increased to six billion five hundred and fifty million rupees—an increase of 150% in 13 years. British investment between 1948 and 1959 doubled; United States investments increased seven-fold. A U.S. Department of Commerce Study, "Investment in India," declared: "India has been chosen as the subject for such a study because of the increasing interest which American businessmen are showing in the potentialities of that country. At the same time, the Government of India and Indian businessmen have also recently shown increased interest in and hospitality toward various types of investment by American interests" (Foreword by Samuel W. Anderson, Assistant Secretary for International Affairs, June 1953).

In the first month of India's independence the United States had flatly declared that no American capital would enter India on India's terms, the chief Indian stipulation then being that 51% of any enterprise established or shared by foreign capital must be India-owned. But by 1952 the Indian Parliament had removed the "51% India-owned" stipulation; and inducements were offered to foreign capital; in some cases these inducements included tax exemption, guaranteed remittance of profits, exemption from certain laws gov-

erning industry, the right of foreigners to own all or a major portion of the voting shares in any enterprise, and a guarantee that there would be no nationalization of the industry concerned for a specific time, and a compensation in the event of nationalization after that. According to a report by the Secretariat of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) entitled "Post War Foreign Investments in India" the total of post-war foreign (private) investment in India rose from \$537,000,000 in 1948 to \$1,073,000,000 by August 1962 (*Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 15, 1962). This was an increase in the value of private foreign investments in India of almost double in eleven and a half years; and, interestingly enough, the increase was due mainly to "the retention of profits by enterprises with which foreign private capital is associated"; and even then "the profits accruing to these enterprises and remitted abroad may be much larger than they are shown to be," the *Monitor* continues. The considerably increased United States investments have led Indian and American investors to join more closely in the exploitation of India.

Nor must one forget that a large proportion of the foreign aid received by India consists of loans payable with interest, with the annual interest in some cases running as high as 6%; so the foreign debt burden grows heavier and heavier—with India less and less likely to free itself from dependence on and control by foreign capitalism. *Link*, an Indian weekly, wrote (Aug. 15, 1962), "Instead of helping India to move ahead toward the goal of independence, these foreign loans will for a long time remain a halter around the country's neck."

WHOSE INTERESTS ARE SERVED BY THESE ECONOMIC TIES WITH THE WEST?

It is obvious that by providing American aid to India and by heavily investing in the Indian economy, the United States not only furthers its aim of keeping India within the capitalist orbit and not only helps buttress the Indian reactionaries against leftist strength

and tendencies in India, but the United States is equally furthering its anti-China policy.

It is to the interest of the Indian reactionaries to keep sharp and usable this convenient tool—the issue with China.

How neatly the objectives of the Indian reactionaries dovetail with the anti-China policy of the United States!

THE BORDER ISSUE COULD BE SETTLED BY NEGOTIATIONS

The border issue could be settled by negotiations. In fact, early in 1960 India and China appointed a Sino-Indian Commission to study all the relevant data about the boundary. Six months of study—three months in Peking and three months in New Delhi—have provided the factual basis for negotiations. But the reactionaries of India have halted every effort to use this documentary basis for a negotiated settlement. It has been to their advantage to keep the border issue alive.

Meanwhile China demonstrated that boundaries could be settled by negotiations. Burma and Nepal, both small countries that an "aggressive" China could easily have taken over as territorial bases for any desired attack on India, have settled their border question, also left over from colonial days. In fact, in the case of Burma, China exchanged territory she claimed, but on which Burma had built an economically important road, for less desirable territory. China and Pakistan are cordially working out their boundaries. On Christmas Day 1962 China and Outer Mongolia peacefully settled their 250-mile border by treaty agreement (*Christian Science Monitor*, Dec. 25).

WHAT DOES WORLD PRESS OPINION SAY?

Most Americans have to depend on the American press for news, facts and attitudes about the situation between China and

India. Press reactions in other countries can be helpful.

In Iraq the newspaper *Sawt Al Ahrar* (July 25, 1962) said that "India has not produced any treaty or agreement that substantiates her claims. She has produced only fiction and legends. China has produced historical documents and treaties dating back a hundred or two hundred years; two maps of China from 1918 to 1947 prove that the disputed areas belong to her; the Indian map of 1937 did not show the McMahon Line. . . . Imperialist states are seeking to fish in troubled waters."

The Burmese newspaper *The Ludu* (August 25, 1962) pointed out that during their rule the British colonialists had delineated the border as they desired. "We cannot say that the British colonialists did not seize the land of China which was very weak at that time and could be bullied. Whatever it may be, it is a heritage left over by history and therefore, since the two countries have become independent they must settle this question through peaceful means." Later, on August 3, *The Ludu* wrote, "For the past three or four years India has been deviating from the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence by using the tension over the border question as a pretext for getting U.S. aid."

The Burmese newspaper *Vanguard* wrote this fall, "India has earned a bad name as a result of its border dispute. India's prestige will be greatly enhanced if it can show to the satisfaction of the people of the world its honesty and that it is not making use of this dispute with China as a means of getting aid from the United States."

The correspondent of the Pakistan magazine *Dawn*, writing from New Delhi, said, "The recent tension created by the Indian Government along the Sino-Indian border is connected with the foreign aid bill being discussed in the U.S. Senate. It was on July 10th that India for the first time reported that one of its border posts had been encircled by Chinese on three sides. The announcement came as the U.S. Senate was discussing the foreign aid bill having a direct bearing on India. Thereafter different reports playing up tension on the Sino-Indian border went on coming so long as the Senate continued its discussion. There may have been

a few minor skirmishes in the Galwan Valley and some other areas."

The *Pakistan Observer* (Sept. 2, 1962), commenting on Nehru's Aug. 22nd statement in Parliament, refusing China's offer to negotiate, wrote, "Nehru characterized Pakistan's desire to seek an understanding with China on the location and alignment of the common border . . . as 'thoroughly opportunistic and adventurous'; this was a painful experience, that Pakistan's desire to establish peaceful and friendly relations with its neighbor China had so evidently pained Nehru. It is also of great significance that ideological differences did not prevent Pakistan from recognizing promptly the government of the People's Republic of China over a decade ago. Nehru's impolite statement would thus appear to reveal his own opportunistic mind."

An article late in August in *Dawn* accused India of following a double-dealing policy on the border dispute. "Nehru is not prepared to enter any substantial negotiations over the border issue. He has been talking about fighting against China 'if necessary' but at the same time he was expressing a desire to negotiate. All this was happening at a time when India's economy was in pretty bad shape, with her reserves at rock bottom and her exports registering a considerable decline. It was therefore thought necessary to create apprehension in the minds of 'those concerned' that India, if she was not given all the jam and honey she was after, might patch up with her powerful Communist neighbor, while at the same time giving the impression that New Delhi was not after all eager for such a rapprochement; if the United States gave India all she wanted, she would be depended upon to continue to act as an irritant to China."

A letter in the magazine *Epoch*, published in Calcutta, dated May 16, 1962, indicates that even in India there may be some questioning of India's stand.

" . . . If China has become an aggressor by occupying 12,000 square miles according to the Indian map, India has also become a greater aggressor by occupying 38,000 square miles according to the Chinese map. It would

not be justified to hope that the other party would throw his map into the waste-paper basket and draw his boundary exactly according to our map. . . . The most unfortunate aspect of the India-China border problem is that this has today become a weapon to fulfil political objects, not only delaying its solution, but possibly also leading the internal politics of the country onto an evil path by maintaining the problem. As a result of the second general elections (1957) there was an increase in strength of the left-wing forces and an Indian state went to the Communists. Since then we have been experiencing a gradually increasing trend of the Government toward the right. A considerable time before the appearance of the boundary problem Nehru called China undemocratic because China had solved its unemployment problem and made comparatively rapid progress. Later, warm praise of land reform in China by the Malaviya Commission sent by the Government naturally alarmed the domestic feudal elements. Finally, when the industrial goods of China became a hindrance to the Indian industrialists in reaping high profits on the east and west markets, it was almost to be presumed that relations would be aggravated on any pretext.

"After that the boundary problem came along as a boon. It was not only that an opportunity was found to distort everything concerning China, but an easy path was opened for censuring the gradually increasing progressive movements in the country. Within a very short period the boundary problem was first turned into border penetration and afterwards border aggression. Since then we have been experiencing its application everywhere—in the interim elections in Kerala, in food movements of West Bengal, in the strikes of government employees, and finally in the third general elections (1962).

"Probably many people still remember that during the food movement the walls of Calcutta were covered with posters. 'Don't make any movement, China is deploying her forces on the border with a view to conducting aggression.' This propagated Chinese aggression is one of the main reasons of the rise of the utter rightist force today in Central and Northern India after the third general elections . . .

"The issue becomes most clear when we study the newer reports of Chinese penetration. Nowadays, in most cases, these new posts are either not found afterwards, or even if they are detected, it is found afterwards that they were a few yards within Chinese territory (Nehru's speech in Rajya Sabha about Chinese 'aggression' just on the eve of the election). Or, it is found that the report is published in bold type on the first day and after two days it is published in small type that the report is 'officially unconfirmed.'

"If China were expansionist, how could she settle her boundary disputes with Nepal and Burma? Now it is prohibited [by the Indian government—Ed.] even to raise these questions. It is being openly announced from all

sides that not to call China an aggressor is treachery to the country. . . . But what are we, the ordinary Indian people, getting from this? Probably we shall get a little more U.S. aid from the budget to secure 'democracy' in the East. But what next? What will be our answer to history? Peoples of newly awakened Asia and Africa from the Yangtse-Euphrates to the Nile-Congo have been advancing today at tremendous speed. Shall we be able to participate in the procession of peace and friendship by drowning this bitter cry from the past in the current of new life?"

As an illustration of the above writer's comments about "reports of Chinese penetration," these "penetrations" turned out to be Indian incursions into Chinese territory—patrols sent by India, after November 1959, behind Chinese lines.

An Indian note to China on July 10, 1962 charged that the Chinese were in "menacing proximity" to the Indian positions and conceded that Indian troops had established several check posts in the 12,000 square miles of disputed territory under Chinese occupation; that they were there "for defense purposes; they threaten no one" (*N. Y. Times*, July 14, 1962). On the 13th an Indian spokesman had warned the Chinese that if these troops "creep closer" to an Indian outpost, the Indian troops "may have to fire in self-defense." This spokesman also said, "We do not expect the Chinese to attack our post; we cannot however entirely rule out this possibility"; and he went on to say that he hoped the Chinese would—as in other incidents in the past—withdraw from the vicinity of the Indian outpost (*N. Y. Times*, July 14, 1962). Later the same newspaper reported an official spokesman of the Indian government as saying, "The Chinese forces surrounding the Indian outpost in the Ladak area have withdrawn further; they were within 15 yards of the post and fell back 200 yards. And then two days later, on July 18, it reported the Indian Foreign Ministry spokesman as saying, "Chinese Communist troops have withdrawn still farther from an encircled Indian outpost in the Ladak area, but are holding a position 400 to 500 yards from the post" (*N. Y. Times*, July 18, 1962). Chinese withdrawing from an "encircled post"—trying hard not to get involved in shooting activity!

1962 SUMMER PROSPECTS FOR PEACE?

In the summer of 1962 there were seeming indications of a settlement by negotiations. But behind a smoke-screen of faked negotiations possibilities, Indian spokesmen were at great pains to conceal their actual intensive preparations for heightening the conflict, and inspired Western reports were feeding this smoke-screen. One Indian observer remarked, "It is a war of protest notes, a never ending one" (*N. Y. Times* editorial summary, July 15). And the *Times* went on to comment "This reflected a feeling that neither country was prepared to go beyond protests to the stage of fighting." And when on July 22nd and 23rd China's Foreign Minister Chen-yi and India's Krishna Menon, then both in Geneva for the Laos settlement, met for lunch and breakfast, inspired Western observers concluded that the apparent "calm in the Ladak area is a result of an informal cease-fire agreement between Krishna Menon and Foreign Minister Chen-yi" (*N. Y. Times*, July 19). And to further buttress this indication of a possible peaceful settlement the *N. Y. Times* reported that the Soviet Union's Mikoyan, then visiting in India, told the Indian Government he would like the border dispute settled peacefully (*N. Y. Times*, July 23).

On July 26 India offered to negotiate the boundary dispute on the basis of the study undertaken jointly in 1960 (*N. Y. Times*, Aug. 14, 1962). On August 4 the Chinese Government responded and proposed that discussions begin as soon as possible. On August 22 an Indian note said that before discussions could take place the status quo on the Western boundary as conceived by India must first be restored. The Chinese responded on September 13 that there could be no pre-conditions; they then proposed that each side withdraw 12½ miles and that the representatives of the two countries meet on October 15 in Peking and then in New Delhi alternately. On September 19 the Indians agreed to the proposed date and place and agreed to send a delegation to Peking on October 15, but insisted that the talks should have the specific object of "defining measures to restore the status quo in the Western sector

of the border which has been altered by force in the last few years, and removing tensions in that area" (*N. Y. Times*, Sept. 22, 1962). On October 3 a Chinese note reiterated the proposal that both sides should enter speedily into discussion on the basis of the 1960 commission report and that in the course of discussion neither side should refuse to discuss any question that might be raised by the other side. On October 7 the Indian Government rejected the Chinese proposal and added that the Chinese should evacuate territory north of the McMahon Line.

WHY STALLING ON NEGOTIATIONS ON THE PART OF INDIA?

Some indications of the reasons for Indian suggestions for discussion and at the same time refusing to actually proceed to discussions are found in articles in the Indian press. In *Hindu* of August 6: "If the boundary talks are held by China and India it will give time for India to evolve a long range plan of action." On August 10 the India Press Agency quoted "well informed circles as saying that Indian defense experts believe that the question of holding Indian posts on Chinese territory for purposes of aggression 'should be seriously probed before winter.' It is in this context that the opening of talks—or at least preliminary diplomatic moves toward it—assumes a degree of urgency." In an article on August 15, *Link* said, "Only through talks with China could the Indian Government freeze the situation on the Ladak border and avoid forfeiting the advantage India has gained at the cost of tremendous effort and the heroic courage of our troops. The hard inexorable realities of Ladak geography require that the Government work for a temporary military standstill without giving up any of our claims. Coming talks with the Chinese will be approached with this limited objective in view." The German Press Agency on August 27 said, "Both sides will have to withdraw troops from advanced bases as snow falls in September and October. Snow storms make it impossible to supply troops by land and air.

There will be a pause at least until March. During the months of calm India could improve and expand strategic roads and supply lines. Such expansion would increase the possibility of success considerably. In regard to the forced winter calm the Indian Government would welcome resumption of Sino-Indian talks."

"There is no mood in the External Affairs Ministry to expect an early end of the crisis." The spokesman said that "the Indian authorities would make use of the frozen border situation before next spring to nibble away at Chinese territory on the western section of the Sino-Indian boundary. Within three months the military situation in Ladak will be frozen. It should be born in mind that in Ladak the current phase of the problem relates to our cautious but persistent effort to nibble back on our own land" (*Hindustani Times*, Aug. 25, 1962).

India was presenting to the world one face—willingness to negotiate; but her true face—preparing for a military showdown—was quite visible in India.

AND CHINA?

The Chinese note of October 3 had said, "The Chinese Government, proceeding from the fundamental interest of the people of India and China, have never made restoration of the original state of the boundary a precondition for the holding of boundary negotiations between India and China. The Indian note of September 19 says that only certain questions concerning the Western section of the boundary will be discussed. Why only discuss the Western section? The Eastern section being the most pressing question at the moment, what reason is there for not discussing it? The Chinese Government now once again proposes that discussions of the Sino-Indian boundary question be started at once between the two governments on the basis of the report of the officials of the two sides. As regards the concrete arrangements, the Chinese Government has noted that the Indian Government has agreed to the proposal for holding discussions on October 15, first in Peking

and then in New Delhi alternately. The Chinese Government is prepared to receive on October 15 the representatives to be sent by the Indian side."

MORE INDICATIONS OF INDIAN QUIBBLING, STALLING AND INSINCERITY

During late July, August, September and early October—while proposals for settlement discussions were going on between Peking and New Delhi—there were abundant indications of Indian stalling and insincerity, and of Indian preparations for military action.

Addressing the lower house of the Parliament on August 13 and 14, Nehru emphatically reiterated on both days that negotiations could take place only after "an appropriate climate was created; any discussion on the basis of the report of the officials [the 1960 Commission Report—Ed.] cannot start unless the present tensions are removed and the status quo of the boundary which existed before and which has since been altered by force, is restored"—thus demanding that China vacate areas of its own territory as a precondition for negotiations on the very subject. He went on to further water down India's apparent willingness to discuss with China by saying, "There is a good deal of difference between negotiations and talking; negotiations is a very formal thing: it requires a very suitable background; it should not be taken up unless suitable background comes," and, "on the other hand, talking must be encouraged wherever possible; but talking may not yield any result. . . . However, conditions being what they are, we have to prepare." Nehru told the Parliament of the government's preparation for war and the progress it had made in occupying Chinese territory during the last two years. "We have concentrated on increasing our strength, military strength, strength in communications, roads, etc. We have a special border roads committee formed which has done very well—I do not know exactly—thousands of miles in very difficult terrain. We built up

our air supply position by getting aircraft—big aircraft—from various countries; we have got some helicopters too; but in the main it consisted of big transport aircraft; there were some from the United States and some from the Soviet Union.” He told Parliament that in recent years India had spent much money on weapons of war. “We improved our military position, our supply position, and we have got our troops in various areas there with forward posts. If they (China) have got nine posts, we have got 22, or 23, or 24.”

While Nehru was publicly suggesting talks and giving the impression that India was willing to move toward discussions, preparations were openly being made for a military rather than a negotiated show-down. Mr. Nehru, speaking at a meeting of Congress Party workers in Allahabad on July 27, said that India’s defense had “considerably improved” and that she was in a position to “give a good fight to Communist China if necessary” (*N. Y. Times*, July 28, 1962).

During the summer months of 1962 India was seeking to buy foreign planes. *The National Observer* (July 16, 1962) reported, “Mr. Nehru has been shopping around. India has felt the need to build up its armed forces because of the territorial dispute between China and India.” Mr. Menon reported to Parliament on August 21 that India was negotiating with the Soviet Union for the purchase of heavy transport planes “for immediate requirements.” The *N. Y. Times* reported that at that time India was already using Soviet planes and helicopters in forward areas in Ladak against the Chinese (Aug. 22, 1962). And from Washington it was reported that “much of India’s diplomatic efforts here have sought to convey the idea that Soviet MIGs as well as transport aircraft and the helicopters may well be used to defend India in her border dispute with Communist China” (*N. Y. Times*, Aug. 24, 1962).

The posture of peace and neutrality was steadily being exposed. The reactionaries were steadily turning India in the direction they had long worked for; their cultivation of the border question was coming to fruition.

WHO ARE THE REACTIONARIES OF INDIA?

A very pertinent question begins to arise in the reader’s mind: “What really has been the role of Nehru and Menon?” The American press has consistently imposed on its readers the impression that Mr. Nehru and Mr. Menon are victims of the Indian reactionaries, leaders finally forced from a posture of neutrality and socialism into a position of alignment with the West. American readers either do not realize or do not recall the domestic role of Nehru and Menon—their vigorous campaigning against the left in Indian elections; their putting more political prisoners in jail than their former colonial rulers did, their using the Indian army to smash an established people’s liberation government of five million Telengana-peasants in Southern Hyderabad; their unconstitutional voiding of a duly elected government in Kerala; and their carrying on warfare against the Naga minority tribes in the Northeast. On the international scene it is noticeable that India has sent 6,000 troops to the Congo; and that the United States, in spite of publicly expressed impatience with Nehru and publicized reluctance to give more “aid” to India has nevertheless made available to the Indian rulers over four billion dollars worth of aid. Once in awhile the truth seeps through the American press, as in the *U.S. News and World Review* article “A Close Look at the Man U.S. is Betting on in Asia: Jawaharrel Nehru, Prime Minister of India, is turning out to be a top favorite of the Kennedy Administration, among statesmen of the world” (May 29, 1961).

BEHIND “TALK OF NEGOTIATIONS”: INDIA PREPARES FOR FIGHTING

On October 5, two days before India replied to China’s October 3 proposal for speedy discussion, an Indian Defense Ministry communication announced that a few Frontier Corps had been created “to deal with the problems on the north and northeastern

borders" and also to protect the borders of Sikkim and Bhutan, two Himalayan states under the protection of India. This communiqué was issued following local New Delhi press reports that a "task force" had been created "to repel the Chinese" in the North East Frontier Agency area. The *Times* of London observed, "At the political level in New Delhi the feeling lately has been that such a move has been too long delayed" (*N. Y. Times*, Oct. 16, 1962). The London *Times* even then said that the army had been ordered to eject the Chinese with all necessary force. On October 7 India rejected the Chinese proposal of October 3 and called off the talks scheduled to begin in Peking on the 15th.

Really serious fighting for the first time in three years was about to erupt. "Authoritative sources in New Delhi predicted that Indian forces were about to move in an effort to oust the Chinese from Himalayan territory" (*N. Y. Times*, Oct. 12, 1962).

THREE YEARS OF BORDER DISPUTES. NOW WAR?

For three years China and India had been disputing the border question: by hundreds of notes, by a Sino-Indian Border Study Commission, by border patrols and clashes in which total casualties—dead, wounded and captured—on both sides counted only in the hundreds, by advances toward negotiations. Now, after three years, war was in the offering.

NEHRU ORDERS WAR

On October 12, Nehru announced that the Indian army had been ordered to oust the Chinese Communist forces from Indian territory near the Tibet border.

Is this war?

A *N. Y. Herald Tribune* editorial (Oct. 15, 1962) stated: "On October 12 Nehru issued a public statement which was tantamount

to a formal declaration of war." The *Manchester Guardian* editorial (Oct. 15) described Nehru's order for an attack on China as "an ultimatum." "Mr. Nehru has committed himself." The *Irish Times* of October 13 wrote: "Mr. Nehru has abandoned diplomacy and pinned his faith on force of arms." The *National Observer* (Oct. 15) wrote: "Last week Nehru turned to a new and more dangerous tack: he ordered his army to drive the Chinese out of the North East Frontier Agency region."

INDIA GEARS FOR WAR

Nehru ordered the Indian army to move on October 12. On October 13 he called upon his people for discipline and sacrifices to support India's efforts to oust Chinese Communist troops from the North East Frontier Region. Army commanders who had been ordered to oust the Chinese troops left for their headquarters at Tezpur, Assam, after consultation with the Defense Ministry. On the 14th, Krishna Menon, then still Minister of Defense, declared: "We will fight to the last man, to the last gun." On October 16th, the Indian Defense Ministry instructed the Indian ordnance factories to start maximum production even if it meant having three shifts and putting installations on a round-the-clock schedule to meet the need of the army for a large-scale attack on China.

On October 22nd UPI reported authoritative sources as saying that retired army officers up to 65 years old had been ordered to report for active service. On that same day Nehru in a broadcast to the nation said that India must build up its military strength and urged workers not to indulge in strikes; earlier he had told Parliament Opposition members that the Panch Shila (Five Principles of Coexistence) Treaty with China was dead (*Christian Science Monitor*, Oct. 23).^{*} In this nationwide broadcast Nehru "called Red China an 'enemy' for the first time" (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Oct. 23) and called upon the nation to put its economy on a war

^{*} All dates of sources are in 1962, unless otherwise indicated.

footing. On October 24th the Nehru Government rejected the Chinese proposal for a cease-fire under which each side would pull back its troops 12½ miles from their current position.

On the 26th, the Indian Government announced the formation of National Volunteer Rifles as an auxiliary to the Territorials (national guard) (*N. Y. Times*, Oct. 27). On the same day a state of national emergency was formally declared throughout India, needing only to be sanctioned by Parliament; a defense ordinance was issued, giving the Government special emergency authority, which took effect immediately with the mobilization of more defense forces (*N. Y. Times*, Oct. 27). Indian women were asked to "give up gold ornaments so the Government can buy weapons abroad with the proceeds." The Government was given the right to curb freedom of speech and the courts authority to take over complete rule in any of India's 15 states. Nehru told Delhi University students he was considering compulsory military training. Parliament was called to go into session on November 8, eleven days before it was due to convene. The Finance Minister announced an issue of defense bonds, (*Associated Press*, Oct. 27). The Indian Government restricted the movement of Chinese nationals in India (*N. Y. Times*, Oct. 30). "Today (Oct. 30) in army posts throughout India troops listened to a reading of the army's first order of the day describing the Chinese Communists as a 'treacherous enemy'" (*N. Y. Times*, Oct. 31). "All Indian political, social and economic dissension temporarily has been halted. All political activity, including holiday by-elections, has been suspended" (*Christian Science Monitor*, Oct. 31).

On October 31 an Indian order stripped citizenship from naturalized Chinese residents and forbade them to leave their residential area or be absent from their registered addresses for more than 24 hours without permission (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 1).

November 1 was National Crush the Chinese Aggressors Day, proclaimed by the National Council of University Students—accompanied by anti-China slogans, tearing down and burning signs of Chinese-owned shops and restaurants (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 2).

India's northern border regions were put under virtual war

alert; all able-bodied persons in the frontier areas were to receive rifle training, village defense committees were to be set up and air-raid precautions taken. On November 4th Nehru called on the Indian nation to increase its industrial and agricultural production as a part of "the war effort" against the Chinese attackers; he announced that a National Defense Council to consist of a six-member emergency committee, the chiefs of staff of the armed forces, a number of retired generals and prominent citizens, would be formed (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 5).

On November 6th, the Government announced that it planned to recall nearly 7,000 Indian troops serving overseas under the United Nations flag. On November 7th the Government ordered the arrest of 17 Indian Communists suspected of sympathizing with Peking. On the 9th the press reported that India had rejected China's proposal of the 4th for negotiations.

MR. MENON OUSTED: WHO REJOICES? AND WHY?


On October 31st Krishna Menon was dismissed from his post of Defense Minister after ten days of merciless pressure from Indian politicians, the public and army leaders. "At the moment the politicians are jubilant over their victory" (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 1). Mr. Menon was given a lower post, Minister of Defense Production, the lowest Cabinet position. On November 6th, sixteen of the twenty-four members of the Congress Party's executive committee signed a letter to Mr. Nehru demanding Mr. Menon's removal from the Cabinet. On November 7th, to the cheers of many Indian politicians, Nehru announced the resignation of Mr. Menon from the Cabinet (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 7). More than 500 members of the Parliament who belong to Mr. Nehru's Congress Party applauded Mr. Menon's downfall. There was jubilation among the Indian military circles, long irked by the political Mr. Menon's control over their objectives and policies. Noted the *National Observer* (Nov. 5): "Dependent so long on Menon for advice,

Nehru now apparently is relying on military advisors, some of whom had been retired or down-graded because of their opposition to Menon." And there was satisfaction among American politicians over the ouster of Mr. Menon who had favored British rather than American influence in India. The *Los Angeles Times* reported Mr. Nehru saying: "After independence we leaned heavily on Britain for our arms purchases" (10-3-62) and the *Los Angeles Times* further noted that "V. K. Krishna Menon had blocked the generals' efforts a year ago to turn to the United States for weapons" (10-29-62). The American press reporting on the ouster tried to impose the impression that this was due to Mr. Menon's "pro-Communist," "left-wing," "pro-socialist and non-alignment views." But the real reason for rejoicing was that American military aid could now flow more freely into India. "Almost simultaneously with the ouster of Mr. Menon the United States announced that it was airlifting weapons to India" (*Los Angeles Times*, Nov. 1). "Americans did not hide from important Indians their conviction that military equipment would flow faster and in greater supply if Mr. Menon were not the man through which aid would have to be channeled" (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 1). "Airport from moral support, material aid is now beginning to reach the forward lines, behind which the Indian Government, having removed a major political encumbrance in Mr. V. K. Krishna Menon, is also changing its peacetime philosophy and policies . . ." (*Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 12). Yes, the policy of close alignment with Britain, pursued by Menon, is now replaced by a policy of accepting the increasing role of the United States in India.

The ouster of Mr. Menon is a classic example of the reactionary forces using an individual as long as he is useful in serving as a "liberal" front.

CHINA'S RESPONSE TO NEHRU'S CALL FOR WAR

On October 13 China called upon Nehru to "pull back from



the brink of the precipice" on the disputed Tibetan frontier. This protest was lodged officially in a note delivered to the Indian Embassy in Peking. The note pointed out that although the Chinese had never recognized the McMahon Line, Chinese troops have never crossed it; and that territory now being guarded by Chinese troops was all north of the Line. The Peking *People's Daily* charged that the areas "forcibly occupied" by Indian troops were all to the north of the Line and that those who should really be cleared off are the intruding Indian troops and by no means Chinese troops who are defending their own territory. On October 17th China charged India with repeatedly violating China's air space (alleging 20 instances of Indian intrusion over Chinese territory in August and September) and invited India to shoot down any Chinese planes if they flew over Indian territory (*N. Y. Times*, Oct. 19). On October 20th the "heaviest fighting since the Chinese-Indian border clashes erupted three years ago" took place. The Chinese Defense Minister said the Indian troops had launched an "all-out attack"; the Indian Government said "the Chinese launched a massive two-pronged attack." Reuters reported "the Chinese swept over the McMahon Line," thus confirming the Chinese assertion that they had not previously crossed it; Krishna Menon said of the battle that the Chinese had advanced four miles south of the border—again confirming the Chinese assertion (*N. Y. Times*, Oct. 21). The *Christian Science Monitor* said, "The reports said the attacks had carried the Indians north of the McMahon Line." Thus, all reports confirm China's assertion that up to this time she, though claiming territory south of the Line, had remained north of the boundary claimed by India. Even India admits that China did not cross the line before September 8, 1962: "That was the day India charged the first Chinese troops crossed the McMahon line" between Tibet and the North East Frontier Agency (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Oct. 26).

In the Western section too the Chinese had not crossed the disputed boundary. Though within six miles of the Indian airbase at Chushul the *New York Times* reported, "The Chinese would have to cross the line they claim as the border of the dis-

puted territory to capture the airfield (*N. Y. Times*, Oct. 23).

Although by October 24 military operations on all fronts had been in China's favor, the Chinese Government on that day sent a letter to Nehru making four proposals:

- "1) Both parties affirm that the Sino-Indian boundary question must be settled peacefully through negotiations. Pending a peaceful settlement, the Chinese Government hopes that the Indian Government will agree that both parties respect the line of actual control between the two sides along the entire Sino-Indian border, and the armed forces of each side withdraw 20 kilometers from this line and disengage.
- "2) Provided that the Indian Government agrees to the above proposal, the Chinese Government is willing, through consultation between the two parties, to withdraw its frontier guards in the eastern sector of the border north of the line of actual control; at the same time, both China and India undertake not to cross the line of actual control, i.e., the traditional customary line, in the middle and western sectors of the border.
- "3) Matters relating to the disengagement of the armed forces of the two parties and the cessation of armed conflict shall be negotiated by officials designated by the Chinese and Indian Governments respectively.
- "4) The Chinese Government considers that, in order to seek a friendly settlement of the Sino-Indian boundary question, talks should be held once again by the Prime Ministers of China and India. At a time considered to be appropriate by both parties, the Chinese Government would welcome the Indian Prime Minister to Peking; if this should be inconvenient to the Indian Government, the Chinese Premier would be ready to go to Delhi for talks."

India rejected the proposals; and on the 27th China made it clear, in a *People's Daily* editorial, that any cease-fire must be on its terms, declaring that the Indian proposal that the armed forces of both sides retire to positions held on September 8 were "absolutely unacceptable." China could not accept any precondition

to talks. It said that the Chinese Government statement constituted a renewal of its 1959 proposal, since the line of actual control mentioned in the statement is basically the line of actual control between the two sides in 1959, and that while the Chinese troops had "in some places" moved below the 1959 line "while fighting in self-defense against invasions by Indian troops," they would be withdrawn to north of the line "through consultation between the two sides" (*N. Y. Times*, Oct. 28).

THE REACTIONARY RULERS OF INDIA WIN THEIR OBJECTIVES

The reactionary rulers of India had successful in inflaming the left-over colonial border line question into an issue, a convenient tool to accomplish their objectives. They had clamped emergency control on the people of India, they had immobilized the Indian Communist Party. They were now openly lined up with the West and had forged closest ties with the West's most powerful capitalist member, the United States.

INDIA OPENLY SEEKING MILITARY AID FROM THE WEST

On October 17th India was reported making quiet unofficial approaches on the possibility of obtaining military equipment in the United States (*N. Y. Times*, Oct. 18). "Nehru is ready to ask the United States for arms to fight China; he agreed with his generals that only a massive volume of American arms can turn aside the Red China threat; he is personally consulting with top generals on both the arms supply and the tactical situation at the front; he has pushed aside Krishna Menon who blocked the gen-

erals' efforts a year ago to turn to the United States for weapons" (*L. A. Times*, Oct. 29). On October 30 the *N. Y. Times* said that Nehru made an urgent request to the United States for military assistance and received an immediate pledge that weapons would be rushed to India; and in a second article on the same day the *Times* reported that United States air transports loaded with guns and ammunition are expected to arrive by the end of the week. The *Christian Science Monitor* reported on the same day: "American sources say that American infantry weapons will be airlifted to India and hope the first shipment can reach India by the end of the week." The *Wall Street Journal* reported the State Department as saying Nehru was informed that the United States would supply as much as possible in arms to aid India. "Bolstered by the promise of military aid, India scorned Peking peace overtures and rushed reinforcements to the front on Monday (the 29th)" (*L. A. Times*, Oct. 30). Even earlier India had been at work securing arms support. "Three months ago the United Arab Republic had agreed to sell arms to India and during Nehru's visit there in October this promise had been approved in principle" (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 2). On October 29th Krishna Menon announced that India had received weapons from abroad, "probably Britain" and will be buying more (*Christian Science Monitor*, Oct. 31). Even U.S. sources disclosed that during the last few weeks India had acquired some military supplies from the United States, including transport planes and radio equipment (*N. Y. Times*, Oct. 30).

"Arms aid from the Western world spearheaded by Britain and the United States has begun to flow into India on terms which virtually amount to an outright gift" (*Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 1). The same day the *N. Y. Times* reported that support now being given to India by Britain consists of logistical supplies: "ammunition and other stores, small arms, medical equipment and trucks." The next day qualified sources in London said the British Government would carefully and sympathetically consider any Indian request for British troops. "A 5-man Indian military mission is negotiating to buy arms from the United Arab

Republic" (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Nov. 2). Canada has ordered the dispatch of heavy transport planes and offered bazookas and other hardware (*Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 2). It was confirmed by Cairo officials that the UAR will sell arms to India—a light type produced by Egyptian military factories—rifles, pistols, machine guns and some light artillery (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 3).

The United Kingdom in concert with the United States, Canada, and other like-minded countries, is preparing an extensive lend-lease program of military equipment to India (*Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 5). On November 12th India asked the United States to provide transport planes and machinery for the production of some weapons to help India in her fight with Communist China, this equipment to be part of a military supply line to India opened on November 3. In the week that followed 60 planeloads of automatic weapons and ammunition were flown to India, the average load of each plane 40,000 pounds. The first emergency phase has ended. But U.S. and Indian officials have emphasized that the military pipeline remained open and that requests were still coming from India. Urgently needed weapons and supplies will continue to be flown to India. Heavier equipment will be sent by sea (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 13).

INDIA'S "NON-ALIGNMENT" POLICY ABANDONED

India's already advanced process of abandoning "non-alignment" culminated on October 25th when Nehru suggested "a possible dramatic shift in government policy"—that of "accepting help from friendly nations instead of paying cash" for arms. Diplomatic sources said "an understanding has been reached between India and both the United States and British governments for rushing arms and equipment to India" (*L. A. Times*, Oct. 26). The *N. Y. Times* called it "a momentous step" (Oct. 31) which will begin a historic new chapter in relations between the two

countries—the first time in India's 15 troubled years she has made a direct appeal for arms" (Oct. 30). The *L. A. Times* said, "Nehru is no longer worried about compromising his long-cherished non-alignment policy in the cold war. He has always held that he could not accept arms aid because it would destroy nonalignment. But officials indicated India wanted arms on any terms" (Oct. 29). Said Walter Lippmann: "The Indian policy of nonalignment which depended on Soviet support has broken down and the proof is that Prime Minister Nehru has openly appealed to the United States for military aid" (Nov. 1). "India, for fifteen years a leader of the neutrals, last week turned to the West" (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 4). And the *National Observer* wrote, "India rapidly lost its status of nonalignment as it asked for and got arms from the United States, Britain, Turkey, Canada, West Germany and South Korea" (Nov. 5).

WHAT DO THE TERMS OF PAYMENT FOR WESTERN ARMS INDICATE?

The authorities in New Delhi agreed that India could not pay for the arms, but said they were hopeful Washington would think of some face-saving "deferred payment" plan (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Oct. 29). The *N. Y. Times* admitted: "The United States' quick decision to give military aid to India is not a commercial transaction" (Oct. 30). The *Christian Science Monitor* reported, "Arms aid by the West, spearheaded by the United States and Britain, has started to flow into India on terms that virtually amount to an outright gift." When the *Monitor* correspondent in New Delhi questioned a high official in the ruling Congress Party about nonalignment, the reply he got was, "All India can now see who are our real friends: it is the people in this crisis who are now beginning to shape our policies" (Nov. 1). Two weeks later: "Mr. Nehru said the arms were being obtained on 'very special terms' that would have been 'impossible in time of

peace'” (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 15). Let the reader draw his own conclusions about “the terms.”

WHAT THE ABANDONMENT OF INDIA'S NONALIGNMENT MEANS TO THE WEST

“The fact that in her hour of danger from Communist China India looked westward for succor and received it might turn out to be an emotional and political turning point for this country; Mr. Nehru's decision has major political implications for the United States and the Soviet Union” (*N. Y. Times*, Oct. 30).

The “major political implication” is the opportunity India's shift to open alignment has given the West to pursue its driving interest, the cold war, in an area long desired. The United States, through irked by Mr. Menon's pro-British stand and anti-American criticisms, though irked by Mr. Nehru's self-appointed stance as world peace leader, has nevertheless been patiently wooing India with monetary aid. Great financial and political effort by the United States has gone into keeping India out of the socialist orbit, into bringing India in as ally in the cold war, into getting a material base in that greatest southeastern Asian nation. The Sino-Indian border dispute was—and is—of major concern to the United States, said Walter Lippmann, and wrote, “We are deeply involved in the Eurasian crisis” (Nov. 1). In Great Britain “the Government ministers take some comfort in the belief that the Indian Government will never go all the way back to an attitude of neutrality in the world struggle with Communism” (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 2). The *Times* editorial summary of November 12 wrote, “Last week Nehru made his first appeal for military help; the response of the West was immediate. It was a sharp departure in New Delhi's policy; a shift had occurred which was expected to have profound effects on India's future course and on the neutralist world. The pressures of the struggle were expected to turn India increasingly toward the West.” Mr. Sulzberger of the *N. Y. Times* wrote, “We cannot afford to let India disintegrate. Apart from its weight on

the strategic scales, its potential success could prove democracy's best argument against dynamic Communism in the Orient.” Mr. Nehru himself testified that the aid came not merely because India was being invaded but because of Asian issues of vast importance in which the United States and Great Britain are themselves interested (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 1). “The airlift itself testified that almost as much to Washington as to New Delhi the security and safety of India are vital” (*Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 12). “The United States is tentatively counting a gain for the West in the remote border war in India. Ultimately, officials think, it could be quite a sizable plum if the United States earns increased favor and Russia grows increasingly estranged from the world's leading uncommitted nation” (*Wall Street Journal*, Oct. 30).

Last June Ambassador Galbraith, testifying before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, spoke of the importance of the aid program to India and “the great returns the United States is getting from it.” “India,” declared Mr. Rusk, speaking to the House Appropriations Committee on June 7, “is situated in a most strategic part of the world” and the United States has “enormous stakes in the development of India.” In a TV interview on July 8 Rusk said it would be “calamitous” if Mr. Kennedy's hands were so tied that the United States could not give aid to India.”

Oliver Clubb, former American foreign service officer in China, wrote in the *National Observer* (Nov. 12), “For the United States in one sense the Sino-Indian conflict has been a windfall. Soviet influence in India has been weakened; leftist Indian Defense Minister, Krishna Menon, until recently a possible successor to Mr. Nehru, has been toppled from power; and America's ties with India have been strengthened as a result of prompt American military assistance. . . . Neutralist India, not pro-Western Pakistan or Thailand, clearly has become the strategic key to southern Asia and the principal balance to Communist China. . . .”

American readers were assured of the gains for the West: “Evidence continues to pile up that the China-India war has been one of the most important developments of the decade—a diplomatic

and psychological earthquake with side effects highly beneficial for the free world. Whatever may be said publicly, there is a de facto military alliance between the United States and Britain, on the one hand, and India on the other. Though ostensibly still non-aligned, the great giant of Asian neutralism is in fact emotionally, politically and militarily with the West . . ." (William Frye in the *Austin American* 12-9-62)

India, the largest country of Southeast Asia, had remained outside the coterie of smaller nations the United States has enlisted or used to encircle China; she stayed out of the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), she refused American arms, she maintained relations with China, she assumed leadership of the neutralist nations. All this time, up to mid-1962, Nehru was, on the surface, apparently resisting American pressure to join the cold war. Today India is well on the way to becoming the desired "strategic key" to southeast Asia and "the principal balance to Communist China." The objectives of the reactionaries of India and the cold war policies of the United States have joined hands.

India's anti-China stand, keeping alive the border question, not only served to get continued American dollars for India's hard-pressed development plans, not only aided the Indian reactionaries in their drive to gear India into the capitalist camp, but has now led India into openly becoming a partner of the West in the cold war. The reactionaries of India have won, and the cold war protagonists of the West have won. However, the victory of the West carries along with it some disrupting problems.

PROBLEMS FOR THE WEST: PAKISTAN AND THE WEST'S MILITARY ALLIANCES

For instance, Pakistan, India's neighbor, presents problems for the West. India and Pakistan are in a territorial dispute over Kashmir, with the troops of both countries facing each other in an agreed truce. "The United States and Britain are reported quietly working for a new Indian-Pakistan standstill pact over Kashmir. . . . More than half of India's army is tied down in the dis-

puted territory facing Pakistani forces" (*Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 1). . . . President Ayub Khan has resisted Western pressures to commit Pakistan to India's side in the Indian warfare with China. . . . Leaders of all political parties and Kashmir officials assure President Ayub of their support in resisting Western pressure for freezing of the Kashmir border dispute during the fighting" (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 5).

Why does Pakistan refuse to support India and refuse to "freeze the Kashmir dispute"? There are three reasons. One is Pakistan's fear that Western arms going to India will be used against Pakistan. "While the Kashmir dispute is pending we are apprehensive of massive United States aid to India as it will prove detrimental to Pakistan interests," the *N. Y. Times* quotes Pakistan Foreign Minister Mohamed Ali as saying on October 30th: "President Ayub expressed concern over the supply of arms to India by Great Britain, the United States and others. He said it could only enlarge the conflict and prolong the conflict and arouse serious concern in the minds of the Pakistani that these weapons would be used against them in the absence of an overall settlement with India" (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Nov. 6). Secondly, Pakistan is irked that the United States is arming her enemy, India, especially as Pakistan and the United States are formally allies, both being members of the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), a military alliance that India refused to join. Thirdly, Pakistan feels that since her ally, the United States, is giving arms to India, Pakistan should have increased military aid from the United States.

Not only is there friction growing between Pakistan and the West centering on the question of Pakistan's quarrel with India, but an even more disrupting factor has emerged: Pakistan's membership in the West's military alliances, SEATO and CENTO. Not only is Pakistan a member of SEATO along with the United States and Great Britain, but Pakistan is also a member of CENTO, in which the United States though not a formal member is a dominant participant. Pakistan is thus a link-pin between two Western-sponsored military alliances.

Turkey is a member of CENTO and the United States had

expected that arms for India would be airlifted from that nearby military ally. But "Pakistan protested an offer by Turkey to send mountain howitzers to India" (*N. Y. Times* editorial, Nov. 6). So Turkey refused. "Turkey will not provide arms to India for use in that country's border conflict with Communist China. Foreign Minister Feridum Kemal Erkin, in a written statement said, 'The decision was taken in view of a request from the Government of Pakistan which expressed fears that such arms might be used against Pakistan in the dispute over Kashmir'" (*Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 9). The *Wall Street Journal* said, "Heavy pressures from Pakistan forced the Turks to withdraw the offer of mountain artillery to India" (Nov. 14).

So the military alliances in which the United States participates, built up to contain China, are showing cracks. Reported the *N. Y. Times*, "*The Pakistan Times*, largely controlled by the Government, said that if the West continues to ship arms to India Pakistan might switch her allegiance from the West to Moscow" (Nov. 6); and eight days later the *Wall Street Journal* reported, "President Ayub has sternly criticized the United States' arms shipments to India on the ground that such assistance threatens Pakistan and he warns that he may seek the aid of the Soviet bloc." A crack in these alliances is bad enough; but Pakistan may be pouring salt into this scratch. A *New York Times*' editorial noted: "Pakistan now puts her developing friendship with China above any unconditional rapprochement with India in the latter's hour of trial" (Nov. 6). "A Government spokesman, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Minister of Industries, assured the National Assembly that Pakistan would not join India in any action against Communist China even if the Kashmir dispute was resolved amicably. He said, 'There are no conditions to our friendship with China. Friendship with the Chinese people is fundamental'" (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 27).

On November 21 Pakistan President Mohammed Ayub Khan was reported to have outlined an increasingly neutral international policy for Pakistan; he told the National Assembly that in the future Pakistan would have to seek more friends even though they

might not be fully satisfactory. On the 23rd, in a secret session of the National Assembly Pakistan's pro-Western foreign policy was sharply criticized by Opposition members; they are trying to push through a resolution demanding Pakistan's immediate withdrawal from SEATO and CENTO. "The Government would find it embarrassing publicly to oppose a resolution calling for Pakistan's withdrawal from the Western alliances" (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 24). The Foreign Minister has accepted an invitation from the Chinese to visit Peking. On the 26th the *N. Y. Times* reported, "Pakistan and Communist China are negotiating a formal declaration of renouncing war as a means of settling disputes between the two countries, official sources here (*Rawalpindi*) said. . . . According to present plans, the declaration would be added to the border agreement being negotiated by the two countries."

On January 7, 1963 the *Christian Science Monitor* reported: "Pakistan and Communist China signed their first trade agreement Saturday. This agreement followed another pact between the two nations, a border agreement reached on the eve of Pakistan talks with India over Kashmir." An editorial in the *Peking Daily News* (December 29th) on the subject of this boundary agreement serves to underline China's rational and peaceful approach to border questions with her neighbor: "The areas which adjoin China and the defense of which is under the control of Pakistan involves Kashmir, whose possession is still being disputed between India and Pakistan. China has always adopted a position of non-involvement in the Kashmir question and has always sincerely hoped that the two sister countries, India and Pakistan, would settle the question through consultation without intervention by outsiders. In view of the specific situation of Kashmir, China and Pakistan had announced at the very outset of the boundary negotiations that the boundary agreement would be a provisional agreement and that after the question of Kashmir's possession was solved, the sovereign authorities concerned would conduct fresh negotiations with the Chinese government on the question of Kashmir's boundary to sign a formal boundary treaty in place of the provisional agreement . . ."

INDIA AND THE COLD WAR

India may find it difficult now to settle by negotiations—without war—her border dispute with China. For India has allowed the cold war interests of the United States and Britain to plant some seedlings, military and political, on her soil. On November 2nd the *Times* stated, "Four United States officers arrived in India to help work out a list of Indian requirements and to indicate to the Defense Office which items the United States feels it can supply quickly." On the 3rd the *N. Y. Herald Tribune* reported that "American relief crews were flown into India to refuel the giant planes (American jet transports from Rhein-Main), and hustle them back to Germany." On the 4th the *Times* reported, "Thirty United States airmen will be stationed at Calcutta to allow American planes to make a quick turn-around for the trip back to Germany. Thirty-five traffic specialists and maintenance men will be stationed in Calcutta to service 15 jets assigned to the airlift by the United States." On the 15th the *Tribune* reported, "A State Department spokesman said the United States will increase its embassy staff in New Delhi by adding military experts to expedite the arms shipments." On the 19th the *Times* reported, "It was announced that in line with the agreement reached between the United States and India last Wednesday a United States inspection team headed by Brig. Gen. John E. Kelly had arrived here in New Delhi. The team has 112 members and will remain in India during the fighting with China. A fact-finding mission of U.S. Senators also arrived today. It is headed by Sen. Michael J. Mansfield of Montana, the Majority Leader. The Mission will report directly to President Kennedy on the border situation." "Other Government authorities said that American arms aid was continuing regardless of the Chinese cease-fire statement and that recent Indian requests for more arms were being processed" (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 21). One wonders: how easily can these planted seedlings be pulled up, especially when there are indications of cold war preparations to widen the India-China conflict?

On November 6th, senior military delegates from the Central

Treaty Organization (CENTO) countries began a two-day meeting of the groups of military committees behind closed doors. The delegates are from Pakistan, Iran, Turkey, Britain and the United States" (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 8). And on the 16th "members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) were urged to supply 'all assistance that is possible' to India. The recommendation came in the form of a committee report to the plenary session of the NATO Parliamentarians Conference here in Paris" (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 16).

CHINA MAKES A DRAMATIC PEACE OFFER

On November 20 (November 21st in Peking time, 20th in the U.S.A.) came the dramatic announcement from China. "Communist China announced today that it was ordering a cease-fire along the entire Indian border at midnight tonight and would start pulling back its troops December 1st in an effort to bring about a settlement of the hostilities between the two countries. The Government statement said that, starting December first, Chinese frontier guards will withdraw to positions 12.43 miles behind the lines of actual control which existed between China and India on November 7, 1959. The statement said China was making the move to correct the present border situation and bring about the realization of the three-point proposal it made October 24. The statement warned that China 'reserved the right to fight back in self-defense' if Indian troops 'continued their attacks' after the Chinese cease-fire or withdrawal. The withdrawal would move the Chinese forces North of the McMahon Line on the eastern sector of the border and from their present positions in the other sectors of the 2,000-mile Himalayan frontier, the statement said. The statement said that provided the Indian Government agreed to take corresponding measures 'Indian and Chinese officials could immediately appoint officials to meet along the border to discuss the troop withdrawal.' It said the two sides could also discuss the

establishment of checkpoints by each side and return of personnel captured since major fighting broke out last month. And that after the results of such talks had been implemented, Nehru and Chou En-lai could meet either in Peking or New Delhi to discuss an overall border settlement" (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 21).

THE RESPONSE: WASHINGTON, INDIA, GREAT BRITAIN, CANADA, AUSTRALIA, WEST GERMANY

What was the response of the West and of India to the Chinese cease-fire statement?

President Kennedy had a press conference three or four hours after the Chinese statement came over the United States radio. He mentioned the Chinese statement and then went on to announce that he was sending "a team of high officials headed by W. Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, to India. The United States Team will include Paul H. Nitze, Assistant Secretary for Defense and other officials from the Defense Department and the State Department. Mr. Kennedy said he understood a similar mission would be sent by Britain" (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 21). "Other government authorities said that American arms aid was continuing regardless of the Chinese cease-fire statement and that recent Indian requests for more arms were being processed" (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 21). The *Christian Science Monitor* reported, "Phase two of the arms aid program is about to start rolling. This phase involves dispatching, perhaps mostly by sea, of much heavier hardware than was flown in recently by the United States. The implications are also of a heavier commitment than before by the Western world in India's future" (Nov. 21). On November 22nd, the *N. Y. Times* told of a "State Department announcement that the United States was sending 12 turbo-jets with American crews to India to assist in the border war against Communist China." And the State Department spokesman Lincoln White said officials in Washington were "urgently work-

ing" on emergency requests from India for military equipment beyond transport planes." And India? The Indian Ambassador at Washington, B. K. Nehru, speaking to the National Press Club on the 21st, said that "his Government was still considering breaking relations with the Peking regime and possibly declaring war on China . . ." (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 22). And: Ambassador B. K. Nehru told President Kennedy that New Delhi will not ask the Soviet Union for further aid at this time (*Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 21). P. M. Nehru in New Delhi said, "We shall continue to receive aid from friendly countries and strengthen our defenses" (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 22).

Prime Minister MacMillan and other Government officials were wary of Peking's proposals for a cease-fire and withdrawal of Chinese troops from positions they have won on India's northeast frontier, reported the *N. Y. Times* (Nov. 22) and added, "British military aid is to continue to 'build up the strength of the Indian army . . .,' Mr. MacMillan said."

Australian Minister of External Affairs, Sir Garfield Barwick also pledged Australia's "resolution and determination to help" (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 22). And the United States, too: "The announced increase of American arms aid which started three weeks ago indicated the Government was unimpressed by the Chinese announcement of a cease-fire issued yesterday" (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 22).

Even West Germany got into the act. "President Heinrich Lübke of West Germany arrived here (New Delhi) for a visit of diplomatic support to India. He said at the airport, 'You may be sure the sympathies of the entire German people are at your side in this conflict . . .'" (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 27). "West German defense equipment is now enroute" (*Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 27).

By November 23rd it was evident that the West was not giving any encouragement for a cease-fire. "On the night of the 22nd the Harriman Mission arrived and also a similar British Mission. Mr. Harriman brought with him 26 civilian and military experts. The Indians made it clear, despite their relief that the Chinese thrusts in their territory had ceased, that they would use the respite

to build up their badly shaken forces. The Indian government spokesman announced the conclusion of a leasing arrangement with the United States for a squadron of 12 C-130 Hercules transport planes with a cargo capacity of 20 tons each . . . they will be manned by United States air crews" (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 23). "Despite the cease-fire in the Indian-China border conflict the United States is gearing its long-range planning to the possibilities that hostilities may resume, may continue for a long time, and may become an all-out war. . . . It is being said that if Communist China starts to push southward again the Western powers will have to move in forcefully; it is understood that India's fellow-members in the Commonwealth would be the first in line to give substantial support, including troops. Before such moves are made, however, the United States expects India to do more than she has done in mobilizing her resources to combat the Chinese. For one thing, Washington would want India to take most of the crack troops now stationed on the Pakistan border and move them into the fighting lines. India is said to have three or four divisions guarding the frontier because of her dispute with Pakistan over Kashmir. Another division is supposed to be tied down in the northern region where the Naga tribes have been hostile to the Indian Government" (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 23). Prime Minister Nehru gave little indication whether he would accept the cease-fire. He said there had been an effective cease-fire but warned Indians to prepare for a long war with Red China (*Wall St. Journal*, Nov. 23).

On the 24th, the *Christian Science Monitor* correspondent in Washington started off his dispatch: "The presence of the 24-man United States Mission in New Delhi demonstrates the seismic impact the Chinese-Indian border has had on Indian-American foreign policy. This American visit to New Delhi, led by Averell Harriman, Assistant Secretary of State, can be seen as a historic diplomatic probe. The high level talks could go beyond immediate military matters. The American group is in the capital of nonaligned India to offer arms and military aid." President Kennedy had told the American people in his press conference on the 20th

that the Harriman Mission was going to India "to better assess" India's need for U.S. military aid. To "assess need"? To "offer arms and military aid"? To "go beyond immediate military matters"?

"On hand to advise and guide Indian leaders at this critical juncture are two top missions from the United States and Britain. Their arrival coincides with the abandonment by India of its original stand that no foreign military or quasi-military personnel should be employed on India soil. . . . India will now avail itself of guidance and advice from foreign logistics and supplies experts" (*Monitor*, Nov. 25). The correspondent goes on: "Certainly the Administration is being cautious and most circumspect to preserve a facade of being 'unallied' with India"! And: "Observers here (in Washington) agree with Secretary Rusk who just said this is 'a period in which some of the customary patterns of thought will have to be reviewed and perhaps revised.'" And: "Despite the 'cease-fire' officials here (in Washington) realize that the Indians still need help in tactical and strategic terms." And in another article on the same day the *Monitor* tells: "Treasury and budget officials are pondering just how a really effective aid program for India would fit into the already strained administration budget for next year. One estimate is that an adequate military-assistance program for India—enabling the government to rebuild India's forces on modern lines—would cost in the neighborhood of \$1,000,000,000." Can the American people stand a one billion dollar outlay to India? And for war purposes?

THE WESTERN SECTOR

What about the western sector (which Indians call Ladak) of the Sino-Indian border? Oliver Clubb in the *National Observer* of November 12th pointed out that Southern Asia's pre-colonial history was rife with territorial disputes and wars of conquest; exact boundaries were almost non-existent; that India's former British rulers extended their influence into that area—Afghanistan, Nepal,

Bhutan, Sikkim and even Tibet; and that boundaries defined by colonial powers are not always accepted by the Asian countries today.

Why is this bleak, mountainous area, so important? "Why," asks Mr. Clubb, "why has Peking sacrificed its once friendly relations with so important a country as India for the sake of a few, wild almost uninhabited pieces of ground?" India claims it, but the people of this area are Tibetan rather than of Indian racial stock. The Indians never even policed it; it was three years ago, in 1959, before India discovered that China had started building a road there in 1956. Even Mr. Nehru had described this desolate tundra area as "a barren uninhabited region without a vestige of grass." It wasn't until 1960 that India began setting up military outposts in this area. (Note that it wasn't until 1960 that the Indian reactionaries had succeeded in turning the border question into an issue, a tool which by 1962 they successfully used to turn India openly toward the West.

Why does India reject China's offer to modify her claim to the North East Frontier Agency area—this rich Assam plain with its oil and farmlands—in return for India to quit claiming this bleak western area? "Assam's \$200,000,000 tea industry provides some 10% of India's export earnings and the Diboi and Nahorkatiya oilfields of Assam and associated oil refineries are vital to India's energy requirements. Kashmir by contrast is an economic drain and recent events confirm that it is increasingly a military and political liability to India" (*N. Y. Times* editorial, Nov. 26).

Walter Lippman noted (*N. Y. Herald Tribune*, Dec. 10, 1958): "The road in Ladak between Tibet and Sinkiang has no strategic or political relevance to India and is in fact designed to connect two great Chinese territories. . . . The disputed territory is about as inaccessible from India as is the South Pole."

"Ladak has little value to India" (Sulzberger, *N. Y. Times*, Oct. 23). To whom then does it have value?

"Decades ago Sir Halford MacKinder, the geo-politician discussed the goal: conquest of Asia and then of Europe starting from the Central Asian plateau" (Sulzberger, *N. Y. Times*, Nov.

10). The British tried making deals with the local Tibetan authorities, behind the back of the central government in Peking, during their colonial rule in India. The United States has been contriving to get a foothold there—and their mawkish concern for the Dalai Lama's fate is more than a humanitarian pose; it represents a deep disappointment that their goal of getting a foothold in Tibet was foiled. Their continued concern for the "God King" is a political shred that may still be useful. The Dalai Lama's promulgation a Tibetan constitution in October 1961, may have been intended to establish a "government-in-exile" (self-exiled, by the way) that may yet be of use as a political figurehead front for further attempts by the West to get control of that desired Central Asian plateau.

The Chinese, by denying that key area to the Western cold war planners, may be thus helping save peace in the world. The Soviet Union is only about 250 miles from the Karakoram Pass. How strategic a foothold—political and economic if not military—that area would be against the Soviet Union, and how strategic a foothold to force the small neighboring nations—Afghanistan, Pakistan, Sikkim, Bhuta, Nepal—into the orbit of the so-called "free world"!

But an equally important, if not *the* really important, reason why China claims that area is both historical and current. Through that area ran the ancient trade routes that linked China's economy with the countries of the west and southwest. Today one of China's modern highways runs through that area. "Ladak has little value to India but serves as a connection between Lhasa and Sinchiang" (Sulzberger, *N. Y. Times*, Nov. 10).

An India unrelated to the cold war has no vital interest in this western section, an area almost inaccessible from India. China six years ago began constructing a highway, coming in from its province of Sinkiang to the north—a long-way-around highway to Tibet, a province whose eastern borders are all but insurmountable mountains. This new easy-level highway is of vital economic importance to China, now busily engaged in modernizing the economy of this formerly most feudal and backward province. How the Western

powers would like to deal China a blow by crippling her access to this province!

PEACE OR WAR?

The world waits to see whether this conflict which began between two Asian nations over a border question, easily solvable by negotiations, is to be inflamed into a full-fledged war between China and India; waits to see if the cold-war policy of the West succeeds in exploiting this conflict for its purposes; waits to see if the efforts of the still nonaligned nations for a peaceful settlement will prevail.

There are ominous shades and there are some streaks of light breaking through the clouds.

"In New Delhi top-level British and American fact-finding missions have become working parties closely meshed with Indian Government activity at all levels," planning "strategy for the immediate future in light of Chinese Communist cease-fire proposals" and "making on-the-spot study of the momentary defense situations" (*Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 27).

On the other hand, "India appeared to be under heavy pressure from friendly countries to accept the peace terms offered by Communist China . . . applied by smaller countries that once shared with India faith in nonalignment with power blocs" (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 26).

"India is sending out missions, one to African capitals and one to Asian capitals, to explain her stand concerning the Chinese Communists unilateral cease-fire. Prime Minister Nehru indicated in Parliament that the missions were aimed to prepare for a possible African-Asian conference proposed by Ceylon to consider the crisis between China and India. The Indian Government has not favored such a conference but nevertheless wants to make sure that her point of view is represented fully" (*N. Y. Times*, Nov. 27). China too has been explaining its position to the Asian-Africa governments and people.

"During the past month most of the nonaligned countries insisted that Communist China and India cease fighting and sit down to negotiate the delimitations of their boundaries. Never have they considered that Peking was impelled by ideological motivations or that it committed an act of aggression. . . . The Afro-Asian group at the United Nations met several times, formally and informally to discuss the problem, but the majority made clear that it would not support India against Communist China. Reluctantly India reached the conclusion that it could count only on Western support. . . . As a consequence, the Chinese are today in a position to state that their unilateral decision to stop fighting and invite direct negotiations is in keeping with the Afro-Asian wishes and has the interests of the two continents" (*Christian Science Monitor*, Nov. 27).

CONCLUSION

In the current dispute between China and India we see the remnants of the old colonialism a source of conflict—the imperialist imposed border line creating a conflict between two great Asian nations; and we see the retained economic foothold of British imperialism in India, joined by exploiting American interests, undergirding and collaborating with reactionary Indian nationalism, in conflict with the interests of the Indian people.

We see the major Western cold-war protagonist, the United States, using the border dispute to further its anti-China policy and in the process becoming a more dominant foreign force in India, turning India from its nominal non-alignment stance into a potential cold-war ally and base in Asia.

We see China working for a settlement of the border question by the two countries concerned. We see China's efforts for a peacefully negotiated settlement, and demonstrating its possibility by her border agreements with her other neighbors. We see China showing great restraint, refraining from military aggravation of the dispute, taking military action only when attacked and when

the nature of the dispute had widened into India's open alignment with the Western cold-war protagonists. We see China continuing to press for a peaceful settlement of the question of boundaries between the two countries.

Washington's current cold-war policy, as illustrated by its intrusion into the Sino-India boundary question, contains few, if any, avenues toward peace. But pressure from the American people, joining with pressures from many Asian-African countries, for non-involvement by the United States, could be a factor helping toward a rational and peaceful solution of the Sino-India conflict.

It is in the interest of all peoples—including the Chinese, Indian, Asian-African and American—that such pressures be intensified.

This documentary report has been presented in some detail not only because it concerns one of the major happenings on the international scene today, but also because it helps reveal a pattern of causes and significances of happenings in other areas and other issues. This report may help American readers to understand the true nature of Washington's cold-war policy, a policy that could lead the American people into a costly and destructive conflict, costly not only militarily and financially and in American lives, but also in the alientation of our people from the peoples of Asia.

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