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
Japanese Occupied Areas

Communist Controlled & Liberated Areas

U.S. 14th Air Force H.Q. & Training Camps

U.S. Air Attacks on Enemy Shipping

Kuomintang Blockade of Communists



THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS

# THE CHINESE COMMUNISTS

by

STUART GELDER

("News Chronicle" War and Special Correspondent in  
China, India, Burma, 1943-45)

*Ron Hami*

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MAO TSE-TUNG, THE CHINESE COMMUNIST LEADER  
With acknowledgments to a photograph taken in Yen-an by  
Michael Lindsay

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## FOR ROMA

And in remembrance of my American comrades of Superfortress "353" bombing mission, India-China-Japan (Omura aircraft works), November 10, 11, 12, 1944; especially of Major Don Humphrey, our Squadron Leader and my friend, who died over Singapore, and of our Flight Engineer, "Brother" Posey, who also gave his life for the freedom of China. "Cactus" Van Horne, pilot; "Pop" Popiak, co-pilot; "Late" L. B. Tuck, navigator; "Pete" Peterson, bombardier; Ben Henderson, rear gunner; Mike Lazarus, radio; Willie Williams, left gunner; "Chief" Scamahorn, top gunner; Neuman Bodart, radar; John Pabin, tail gunner.

## GLOSSARY

Hsien . . . . .	County	
Chu . . . . .	Rural district	
Mow . . . . .	1/6th of an acre	
Li . . . . .	1/3rd of a mile	

16 liang = 1 catty

100 catties = 1 picul or tan

1 picul = 110 lbs.

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My most grateful thanks are due to Sir Walter Layton, Chairman, and Mr. Gerald Barry, Editor, of the *News Chronicle* for entrusting me with the task of reporting the Asiatic war; also to all those friends and colleagues who by their work in the office at home gave it the appearance of being better done than in fact it was.

## FULFILMENT OF A PROMISE

By STUART GELDER

THIS BOOK is the story of the Chinese Communists, by themselves and foreigners who have lived amongst them. By bringing it out of China I have fulfilled a promise which I made to General Chou En-lai, Second in Command to Mao Tse-tung, Chairman of the Chinese Communist Party, in December 1944, that it should be told in England and America. It came about in this way.

In December 1943 I arrived in Chungking as special staff correspondent of the *News Chronicle*. From then until May 1944, when I had to leave for Burma to replace my colleague, Stuart Emeny, who was killed with General Wingate, I attempted to report the Chinese scene. Censorship imposed by the Kuomintang authorities, ostensibly to safeguard China's military security, was used unscrupulously as an instrument for suppressing the truth on any subject when this involved criticism of the Kuomintang Party Government. Seventy per cent of the working time of any conscientious journalist, who was trying to present an accurate picture of China, was absorbed in fighting Government censors, whose task was to prevent him doing it. The censors nearly always won. For years, assisted by the personal charms of Madam Chiang and the Christian Methodist reputation of her husband, the Generalissimo, they succeeded in convincing the world that China was fighting a gallant and ceaseless battle against the Japanese and under their autocratic benevolence slowly but surely becoming a democratic State. Because I represented the *News Chronicle*, which is reputed throughout the Far East for its progressive policy, I was able to cable a few more half-truths than some of my colleagues.

The Kuomintang Government was particularly anxious to deceive me and to prevent me leaving the country to write the truths, unrestricted by its censorship, if a discreet leniency exercised in handling my dispatches would restrain me. But although they could prevent one sending the truth, they could not prevent one seeing and hearing it. They could forbid me sending an article giving the views of Madam Sun Yat-sen, widow of the founder of the Chinese Republic, on the failure of Chiang



Kai-shek to carry out her husband's policy, but they could not prevent her expressing them to me in her home. They could tell me it was useless my writing the opinion of Dr. Sun-fo, President of the Legislative Council and son of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, that democratic unity with the Communists was an essential prelude to the unity of China, but they could not prevent Dr. Sun-fo from telling me this in his private study. They could try to persuade me that the Communists were a gang of "red bandits" and prohibit my describing their achievements, but they could not prevent me talking with General Chou En-lai when he came to Chungking, or with other army and political leaders, and discovering for myself that they were nothing of the kind. They could disarm me while I was in China, as well as deceive my readers, but they were powerless to silence me when I left, and as I travelled by military transport instead of by Chinese civil aeroplane, their Customs officers and secret service agents could not examine my luggage and seize the documents which form this book.

When General Chou En-lai gave me these documents he was in Chungking. He had been sent by Mao Tse-tung from Yen-an, the Communist capital in Shensi, to negotiate peaceful settlement with Chiang Kai-shek, and avert civil war. The talks were a failure, as I shall tell later, and he returned to Yen-an empty-handed. As I write, civil war is still undeclared, but fierce fighting is taking place between Kuomintang and Communist armies in North China. Censorship remains in Chungking, through which all news of it is sent. Foreign newspaper correspondents and representatives of the news agencies—Reuters and the American Associated Press and United Press—are allowed to cable only what the Kuomintang Government wishes the world to know, and little of it will be favourable to the Communists. There could not be a more appropriate time for their story to be told. If civil war becomes widespread in China, America will not remain aloof. If Britain declares for a policy of non-intervention, this will in fact help the Kuomintang, as the same policy helped Franco in Spain, when he was receiving German and Italian assistance. It is therefore of vital importance that the people of Britain and America should know what defeat of the Communists, and with them the defeat of all Progressives in China, would mean.

Before I left Chungking Madam Sun Yat-sen sent me this note: "I have just heard the disappointing news, but you must come back, for China and not India will be the main theatre of the fight against Fascism."

She did not mean that the struggle of the Fourteenth Army,

which I was about to report in Burma, was less important than the fight of China against the Japanese. She meant what the daily news from Chungking means now, that after the victory over Japan had been won would come the fight between Progress and Reaction, between the Chinese themselves.

Long before I arrived in Chungking, Edgar Snow and Agnes Smedley had written their brilliant accounts of the Chinese Communist armies. They have earned the gratitude of millions of Chinese men and women for their work. I have learnt nothing which casts doubt upon it—much which endorses them. Now it is necessary to bring the report up to date.

What was the position in China in the winter of 1943?

The Japanese possessed all the ports and major cities. They controlled the entire coastline. The Burma road was closed. They had driven far inland into the provinces of Chekiang, Fukien, Kwangtung, Kiangsi, Anwhei, Kiangsu, Honan, Shantung, Hopeh and Shansi. American military estimates put their total military strength in China at half a million men. These were well trained, clothed and fed and adequately equipped with rifles, automatic light arms and pieces of artillery, ranging from mortars and mountain howitzers to seventy-five-millimetre guns. Tanks were not employed, but there was a small, efficient air force. Supply lines from Japan and Manchuria were secure.

The Chinese Kuomintang Government forces under Chiang Kai-shek were officially reported to number between 2,000,000 and 3,000,000 men. Of these, half a million were employed in blockading the Communists in the north and preventing any intercourse between them and the rest of free China. They were never in action against the Japanese. The Communist Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, which together formed the Eighteenth Group Army, numbered about 800,000 men, and in addition there were between a million and a half and two million People's Militia. A small Chinese Kuomintang Government Air Force, trained and equipped by the Americans with fighter aircraft, could be discounted as an effective weapon. The burden of the air war fell entirely upon the American Fourteen Air Force under the command of Major-General Claire Chennault, which included a highly efficient mixed Chinese-American wing. It operated from fields as far east as Kweilin and the south-west corner of Tungting Lake near Changsha.

This was the only American or other foreign fighting unit in China. The main task of the Americans was to train and supply the Kuomintang forces. Extensive training establishments, known as "Y" Force, were set up under the command of Brigadier-General Frank Dorn in western Yunnan.

The only supply route into China was the Himalayan airway from northern Assam to Kunming. This was maintained by American Air Transport Command, which flew a day and night service of Douglas and Curtis Commando Transports at heavy cost in lives and machines. They flew equipment to the Chinese, to the Fourteenth Air Force, "Y" Force and all American personnel. Chinese National Airways, with American and Chinese crews, flew a small civil freight and passenger service to Kunming and Chungking with conspicuous success. Every weapon and bullet that did not go to the Fourteenth Air Force or "Y" Force was delivered to the Kuomintang Government. Not one was ever sent to the Communists from the time America entered the war to the defeat of Japan.

The Kuomintang constantly excused military inaction by quoting the closing of the Burma road as the reason why they could not receive sufficient armament to enable them to take the offensive. The truth was that the quantity of supplies flown over the Himalayas far exceeded the total taken over the road, and would have enabled an efficient and determined army to deliver effective blows against the enemy, and forced him on the defensive, or compelled him to reinforce his troops from other theatres. This was known by all American commanders in China, who were bitterly critical of the Kuomintang for their failure to take any effective action at all. It was this knowledge which led General Stilwell to demand that he should be given supreme command in the field of the Chinese armies. He had proved in North Burma that given efficient training, clothing, food, equipment and fair treatment, the Chinese soldier could be made into a good fighting man. Every foreign soldier and every foreign war correspondent in China, as well as every sensible Chinese, knew that Stilwell was right, but Chiang dare not lose face by admitting his own failure. General Chou En-lai told me that if the American General had been given supreme authority the Chinese Communist armies would have been willing to serve under him.

With far fewer resources the Communists fought so effectively that the Japanese publicly acknowledged them as their most dangerous enemies in China.

For years Kuomintang propaganda deceived the world into believing that an inadequately equipped but heroic army was holding a 1000-mile battle front from the Great Wall to the southern sea, retreating step by step before overwhelming opposition. The truth was that the Japanese could have overrun Kuomintang China at any time they wished, if they had wished. They did not do so because it would not have brought them worth-while gain. They had already achieved their aim—to

seize the ports and principal lines of communication, at the minimum of military sacrifice. Occupation of the whole of China would merely have meant the liability of garrisoning it with troops which were required elsewhere. In other words, there was no object in further advance. Fighting was therefore restricted to periodic raids into the rice-growing areas, to steal crops and destroy those which could not be carried away. The same policy would have been pursued in the north if the Communists had allowed it. The Japanese were certainly not looking for a fight. But the Communist guerrillas carried the war to them, and they were compelled to retire or retaliate.

It was said by some foreign military observers in China that, far from being an embarrassment to the Japanese, the Kuomintang Government was worth ten divisions to them. If they took any action which might endanger its rule there might be a chance that China would unite and become a far more effective military force. Then it would be necessary to divert divisions from Burma and the Pacific, where they were heavily engaged. Why cause so much unnecessary inconvenience?

This might appear a startlingly cynical view, but what is there to deny it except a long series of Kuomintang military communiques which were regarded by every foreign military observer with amused contempt, and ignored by foreign newspaper correspondents? The only journalists to cable them abroad were those attached to the news agencies. I imagine they did so because they considered it was no concern of theirs to question a communique of an Allied Government, and secondly because they were in competition with one another to sell their incoming news services to the Kuomintang Government and did not wish to do anything which would be to their commercial disadvantage. I cannot believe there was an agency journalist in China who was so ignorant as to believe a word of what he was sending on these occasions.

There was only one real battle fought in Kuomintang China during the period of my first visit, from December 1943 to May 1944. This was at Changteh, when the Japanese made one of their periodic raids into the rice-bowl area round Tungting Lake and were making towards Changsha. The commander of the 57th Division was ordered by Chiang Kai-shek to hold Changteh to the last man. The Generalissimo was then in need of prestige at the Cairo Conference. The Japanese came on, and one by one the Chinese divisions refused action, except the 57th, which proceeded to fight one of the most gallant and hopeless actions of this or any other war. With the support of the Fourteenth Air Force and two American radio operators who transmitted to the planes

from the basement of a bank, they stood firm. And one by one they died until there were fewer than twenty left. The two Americans then decided it was time to leave, and told the Chinese commander so. This brave and sensible man looked at the shambles around him and decided to retreat with the few survivors. They escaped through the encircling enemy and joined up with another division which was supposed to relieve them. I sent an appreciative cable about the battle, and told the Editor of the *News Chronicle* that in my opinion it was one of the finest individual efforts of the war. And so it was. But instead of praise from Chiang Kai-shek, the commander was threatened with execution. A few foreign correspondents heard of this, and protested to the Government. We also threatened that if he were executed we would somehow send the shameful news to England and America. We were told that he had agreed to die, that at his request the Generalissimo had sent a sum of money for his widow and orphans and that discipline must be maintained. We asked how the Generalissimo proposed to treat his unsuccessful commanders if he shot such a gallant man as this. He was reprieved, but when I left China for the last time in December 1944 he was still in prison. His leader's "face" must come before his liberty.

What happened to the supplies sent to the Kuomintang by the Americans which were never used against the Japanese?

A large proportion of medical stores were sold straight into the black market, and soldiers continued to die in thousands from preventable diseases for lack of them. In the second week of December 1944 I took a photograph of a blackboard outside a chemist's shop in Kunming. It advertised every sulphur drug in the Pharmacopœia. Each tablet was being sold for ten shillings. While soldiers perished of pneumonia or developed tuberculosis, the shops of Chungking and Chengtu were also stacked with medicines subscribed by the British and American Governments or British and American charitable organisations. A Friends' Ambulance Unit doctor told me that at least a third of the medical stores sent to him over the "Hump" were stolen en route and sold into the black market. Only when the American army, or the Friends' Ambulance Unit were handling drugs could they be certain of reaching their proper destination. Thousands of Chinese are alive today who but for the Quakers would be dead. When I complained to a Government spokesman in Chungking that I could buy as many sulphur drugs as I could afford at the black-market rate, while Chinese soldiers were dying for lack of them, he said that if I would point out the offending shopkeeper he would have him shot. He would indeed. "Face" would have

been saved by his execution, and four or five hundred others would have continued to do flourishing business. One of the most prominent Government officials made a fortune out of black-market drug peddling and unashamedly did his best to persuade me to bring large supplies to him from Calcutta on the feeble pretext that he required them for his wife and children, who could not have consumed them in twenty years. Within twelve months he had become a multi-Chinese dollar millionaire.

The story of how Burma-Road transport was used to carry luxury goods to be sold at vastly inflated prices when China was in desperate need of war materials, is familiar. The shops of the major towns, packed to the ceilings with them, bore witness to it. There was no shortage for those who could afford to pay. And if British, American, Indian or Burmese articles would not do, there was always a wide choice of Japanese varieties. Enemy merchants in Shanghai, Hankow and Hongkong did excellent business with Chungking. To facilitate it there was a regular postal service between Free China and occupied territory, and passengers who could afford to bribe their way found little difficulty in passing in and out. Shortly before I left Chungking a woman who had previously escaped from Shanghai told me quite openly that she was preparing to return. Life was too hard in Free China, and she was looking forward to a nice time on the coast again. She spoke of the journey as though it would not be more difficult than travelling between London and Edinburgh. I was assured that if I looked like a Chinese and spoke the language fluently it could be arranged for me to visit any of the occupied cities and return to Chungking with a complete report of life under the Japanese. Trading with the enemy was not confined to civilians. It was said by American observers that Chinese officers on the Indo-China border were not kept there too long lest their comrades in the rear should be jealous of their profits, and that going "up the line" had become one of the most profitable perquisites of war. That arms and ammunition were sold over the frontiers became a stale complaint. Certainly the majority of equipment flown to China under Lend-Lease was never used against the Japanese. When Kuomintang troops were engaged under the eyes of American observers, as on the Salween river, or in North Burma, arms had to be employed, but every American officer with whom I discussed the situation was convinced that the Kuomintang had no intention of fighting the enemy when the Allies would do this for him, and that the greater part of equipment sent by America was being stored for civil war with the Communists.

The officers in charge of "Y" Force were continually dis-

couraged by General Ho Ying-chin, Kuomintang Minister for War, who, according to them, failed completely in his task of helping them to produce as many well-trained soldiers as they could pass through their schools in the shortest possible time. I remember talking for three hours with an American commander who concluded that the time had come for President Roosevelt to give an ultimatum to Chiang Kai-shek to place his armies under supreme Allied command or face the withdrawal of every American from China and a cessation of Lease-Lend supplies.

"It would not make the slightest difference to the war," he said. "The Japanese are not going to be beaten in China, and even if we took over control now it would take a couple of years to put ten divisions into real fighting shape. The first thing to do would be to slice the army in half, prepare one for highly mobile guerrilla war and send the other home. The majority of the men we receive are more fit for hospital than a training-camp. Before we can do anything with them we have to fatten them up for a few weeks and give many of them medical treatment. Some of them walk a hundred miles to report, and God knows what they eat on the way. The Kuomintang military machine is rotten right through. I don't believe all I hear about the Communists being so good. I think there's danger of over-estimating them by comparing them with these people who are so hopeless. But I don't think they could be so corrupt. If they were they couldn't have waged guerrilla war with any effect at all. But our politicians have their axe to grind, and I suppose they are going to keep in with Chiang at all costs for the sake of post-war trade. I've said this so often that one of these days I shall get the sack for it."

He did, and so did Stilwell. This man was a most able commander, with a deep knowledge of and affection for the Chinese people.

Why was Kuomintang China in this position? To answer this it was necessary to go to Chungking to meet some of the men who were governing the country.

Ostensibly it was ruled on the advice of the People's Political Council, composed of members of all parties, including the Communists, who were supposed to express the will of the people to Chiang Kai-shek and the Cabinet. In fact this body was packed with Kuomintang reliables who behaved exactly as the Reichstag behaved towards Hitler. The vote of the minority counted for nothing, and counts for nothing today. The casual visitor might be deluded by the lack of obvious repression. For instance, the Communists were, and still are, allowed to publish a daily newspaper in Chungking. This is often put forward by Kuomintang apologists as a proof of their tolerance and demo-

cratic sympathies. They do not tell the world that not a word of this paper appears until it has been scrutinised by Kuomintang Party censors. They delete what they wish, and there is no appeal, for there can be no appeal beyond the Government which employs them. It is because the Kuomintang is anxious to persuade the people of Britain and America that it is democratically inspired that any Communist is allowed to remain in Chungking.

This party proclaims itself the true heir of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. It explains its dictatorial behaviour by referring to his programme for the reconstruction of China which he laid down in 1924. In this he envisaged three periods: (1) period of military operations, (2) period of political tutelage, (3) period of constitutional government.

During the first period the country should be subject to military rule. Opposition should be overcome so that the people could be enlightened by being taught the principles of the party. As soon as order was obtained in a province the period of political tutelage should begin. The people should then be prepared for local self-government by a series of reforms. The value of privately-owned land must be declared, and the local government should be empowered to purchase it at this value at any time. Any increase in value which resulted from improvement in administration should be set aside for the benefit of the community and not for individual owners. The annual revenue from land, increase in land value, produce from public land, forest revenue and income from rivers and mines, etc., should be spent in the development of industries, relief of public calamities and the care of the distressed. After the establishment of self-government the people of every district should be entitled to elect a representative for the formation of an assembly to participate in the political affairs of the nation. Constitutional government in a province should begin as soon as all districts were self-governing. When more than half the provinces had achieved local self-government in the districts, a National Congress should decide on the adoption and promulgation of a constitution. With the promulgation of the constitution administration of the Central Government should be vested in the National Congress. This would have power to elect and recall officials of the Central Government, as well as initiate and veto laws promulgated by the Central Government. Immediately after promulgation of the Constitution a national election should be held. Three months after the election, the National, or party government, should resign and hand over power to the Government elected by the people.

When Sun Yat-sen spoke of the necessity of overcoming opposi-

tion he was speaking of the opposition of war-lords and local tyrants who imposed their will upon the people by force, not of the Communists and minority parties. The Kuomintang claims to be the sole trustee of his will and guardian of his principles, and by this claim justifies suppression of all opposition. None of the reforms envisaged by Dr. Sun has been carried out. It is reasonable to suppose that his widow would be in a better position to understand his wishes than anyone else. Early in 1944 I went to her Chungking home and asked Madam Sun Yat-sen whether she considered Chiang Kai-shek, her sister's husband, was governing according to those wishes. I think if this cultured and most courageous lady had been given to such habits she would have spat on her carpet as she replied. I knew that she was a critic of Kuomintang Party policy and that she had protested vigorously against the blockade of the Communist armies and denial of supplies to them. I had not realised the bitterness of her attitude to her brother-in-law. "He has not even attempted to put one of my husband's principles into operation for twenty-four hours," she said.

She spoke in contemptuous terms of the inefficiency of Government services and the corruption with which they were riddled.

"You will discover this for yourself, and then when you write it they will accuse you of being a Communist," she continued. "They even call me a Communist, so there is no length to which they will not go to prove that anyone opposed to them is not what they call a 'red bandit'."

She went on to this effect:

There is only one hope for China, and that is a coalition government of all parties on a democratic basis. This is not a government. It is a dictatorial tyranny which makes the war an excuse for its repressions. But do not imagine that all members of the Kuomintang are responsible for it. That is not so. All members are not reactionaries, but all reactionaries are members. Some of them feel they may be an influence for good by remaining inside. The outside world must know that there are many Chinese in Kuomintang China who are truly Liberal and Progressive, but have no voice in affairs. We cannot say so, because we are not allowed. I am not allowed to leave Chungking without permission, and they will not allow me to leave China to tell the truth in America and England. Therefore it is important that you should do it. There is a great danger that when the truth does become known the world will hold the Chinese people responsible for the actions of this Government. But they are not, because they have no voice. There is no freedom here, and some of those in power are no better than gangsters. But we must go

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on fighting for the truth to be known because this may force them out of power.

What can be said for a Government which in the middle of a war with the Japanese sends half a million of its best troops to prevent supplies reaching other Chinese soldiers, just because they are Communists? Aren't they Chinese before they are Communists, and haven't they been fighting a most brave fight against our common enemy? Of course they have. Everyone knows it. My husband would have recognised it and sought their co-operation by giving them responsible share in the Government. All Progressives here take that view. It is the only sensible and just view. It is also important that the truth should be known, so that civil war shall not be encouraged. Perhaps the reactionaries won't dare to start it in the face of world opinion against it. That is why you can do so much, by telling the truth as you find it. It is the same struggle all over the world—progress against reaction and selfishness—and it happens to be very acute in China. We could become a far greater Spain, but that must not be allowed to happen.

I asked Madam Sun if she had expressed these opinions to Chiang Kai-shek. She answered:

"Yes, I have, whenever I have met him, but he doesn't like it, and so he doesn't speak with me any more. I suppose he has given me up as a red bandit, and that's the end of it. I have never hidden my views—that is why I no longer take part in Kuomintang Party affairs, because I will not allow my name to be identified with their actions."

It was not long before Madam Sun's prediction became true, and the censors and Government Ministers accused me of being a Communist because I wrote of the necessity of unity with them in the interests of successful prosecution of the war and the introduction of democratic government. Their principal anxiety was to persuade me that I was being deluded by Communist propaganda and that in fact the Communist armies were not fighting at all. On one amusing occasion this argument resulted in their being compelled to allow me to cable a Communist army report to London or lose "face". The Eighth Route Army office in Chungking gave me a military situation review covering the greater part of 1943 which they had received from Yen-an. It consisted of accounts of actions fought, casualties inflicted on the Japanese and losses sustained by themselves, etc. I wrote a cable and submitted it for censorship. Half an hour later the censor summoned me to his office and said it would have to be submitted to the Kuomintang Military Council to be checked-up.

"But," I said, "how can the Military Council check-up on

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Communist figures relating to military actions when they say that no such actions have been fought? On what basis will they make their check?"

The censor looked foolish, and in face of my insistence agreed that the report should go through if I would insert the words—"the Chinese Communists claim, etc.," which I did gladly.

Mr. T. V. Soong, the Chinese Kuomintang Premier, has referred recently to the lack of experienced civil servants in Kuomintang China. Doubtless this accounted for the naive behaviour of some of them in dealing with experienced foreign journalists. One night a Communist officer told me that the radio transmitter and receiver, which was the only link of the Communists in Chungking with Yen-an, had been closed on the orders of the Kuomintang Military Council. I asked him if he were quite certain, and he told me he had just left the office. The door of the radio room had been locked and sealed so that no one could enter without breaking in. I knew him to be a reliable person, and he was not gaining anything by telling me the story if it were untrue. I wrote it and submitted it for censorship. A few moments later a high official called at my room and said in a very confidential and friendly tone:

"I know you do not wish to cable anything that is untrue, so I have held up your message because it is not true that the Eighth Route radio has been closed. It is functioning quite normally. I have been assured of this by the Military Council."

I said that if I were mistaken I was sorry, and obliged to him for his correction. Relieved to escape my usual protests, he overstepped himself and said:

"Look here. I will take you there, if you like, just to prove it to you."

To his consternation I accepted the invitation, and we agreed to depart together at nine o'clock on the following morning. At five minutes to nine I called at his office and said to him:

"Look here. I don't wish to make you look foolish if you have made a genuine mistake. I merely want to say—will you please be sure that the radio station we are visiting is really the station of the Eighth Route, because you see I have been there, and know exactly where it is and what it looks like."

I was bluffing, because I had not visited the station. But it worked, and called his bluff too. He considered for a moment, and then said:

"Well, I will look into it."

Apparently he reported to the Military Council that it was no use taking me to another station because I knew the right one. At any rate, we never made that journey together, and my story

was suppressed. I did not refer to the incident again, but he looked uncomfortable for some weeks whenever we met. He was quite a pleasant person, and I did not wish to embarrass him any further.

For the same reason I discontinued visits to the weekly military Press conference. At this an officer appointed by the Military Council gave a lengthy report, monotonous with repetitions, of Kuomintang military victories which we all knew quite well had never taken place. At first we asked him questions, to which he could not reply. He would become confused, and promise to refer them to his superiors. We also knew that he would dare to do nothing of the kind. I obtained no useful news, and wasted no more time asking him for it.

In an effort to report the activities of the Kuomintang troops at first-hand, I believe I was the first foreigner to request accreditation as a Chinese war correspondent. This would have entailed no risk to military security, because all my reports would have been subject to military censorship. The fact was that the authorities had no intention of allowing any journalist to see the farce behind the scenes. A few days before I arrived in Chungking a party of pressmen was taken to the Changteh area, but only after fighting had ceased. This was one of the few occasions when there would have been something to describe, but apparently the Military Council did not expect even the 57th Division to put up a fight. I saw action in China only once, when I flew on an American Superfortress bombing mission from India via Chengtu to Japan and we shot down a Japanese fighter in flames north of Nanking.

Wherever a correspondent moved he was watched by Kuomintang secret police. Diplomats were subject to the same scrutiny. The wife of an Ambassador was informed by her Chinese butler that it was his duty to report the name and time of arrival and departure of every visitor to the Embassy to the authorities. No critic of the Government dared to express his views to a foreign correspondent unless convinced beyond all doubt that they would not be repeated. All visitors to the Press hostel, where we lived, were suspect. The Communists were suspect anyway, whatever they did, and therefore visited those of us who were sufficiently interested in the political situation, quite freely. It enraged officials that in this way we heard news from Yen-an we could not otherwise obtain, but they could not forbid such meetings without destroying the democratic pretence of freedom of speech and movement once and for all. On one occasion they went to extreme lengths to suppress facts.

At a Press conference a spokesman complained that we did not

seem to believe Kuomintang news about the Communists. In fact, there was no blockade of the Communist armies, merely policing of the frontier area.

We asked: "If we cable your statement, will you then allow us to give the Communist reply?"

The answer was that if we presented the Kuomintang case fairly by quoting the statement as it stood we could certainly state the Communist case as well. We therefore cabled it. The same evening Mr. Guenther Stein (*Christian Science Monitor*), Mr. Israel Epstein (who later visited Yen-an for the *New York Times*), the correspondent of the *London Times*, and myself, visited Mr. Tung Pi-wu, Communist liaison representative in Chungking. He gave us a calm, most moderately stated reply. His criticism of the Kuomintang was polite, even conciliatory. He repeated the statements of Mao Tse-tung that the Communists were willing to acknowledge Chiang's leadership in a constitutional democratic government. Not a word of our messages was ever passed by the Kuomintang censors. We were promised daily that they would be released as soon as "higher authority" had considered them. The fact was, of course, that the tone of Mr. Tung Pi-wu's reply placed the Communists in far too favourable a light. It was, plainly for all to see, not the utterance of a bandit, let alone a red one.

If the Kuomintang is persuaded to make peaceful agreement with the Communists, Dr. Sun-fo must be given very considerable credit. Like his stepmother, Madam Sun, he has no connection with the Chinese Communist Party other than sympathy for their just claims to inclusion in a constitutional government. I know that, like his stepmother, he has expressed his opinions vigorously in private conversations with Chiang Kai-shek because he told me so. A considerable section of the Chinese public has also been greatly impressed by his courageous attacks, both in writings and speeches, on reactionary cliques within the Kuomintang. As son of the founder of the Republic and President of the Legislative Council of the Kuomintang Government, he enjoys great prestige. He has never failed to use it rightly. In the spring of 1944 we discussed the Chinese political situation in his Chungking home. His forthright attitude was a refreshing change from the clumsy deceit of so many of his "Cabinet" colleagues.

I asked him if he was prepared to trust the Communists in a democratically constituted coalition government. He replied with an emphatic "yes". He added that in his view such a change must include all the Progressive elements in China, among whom the Communists must be included.

"I have no fear of them at all," he said. "On the contrary, I am of the opinion that the counsel of Mao Tse-tung and his

colleagues in our deliberations, and the ability of such a General as Chu-teh (Communist Armies Commander-in-Chief), must strengthen us in the war with Japan. This disunity has the most deplorable consequences. We should not deny support to the Communists because of their political opinions. I agree with Madam Sun that they are Chinese first. They are fighting our common enemy and this alone would entitle them to our recognition."

Dr. Sun also had no doubts about his father's attitude in such circumstances. He was convinced that he would have welcomed the Communists into the deliberations of the Government without hesitation.

He did not assume that the Communists should automatically share ruling power, but that immediately, in order to strengthen the fight against Japan, they should be given a share in it, and then, when free elections were held, should take their chance at the polls with the Kuomintang and all other political parties.

"I do not think," he said, "that Communism, of the Russian Soviet pattern, would be suitable for China. The Chinese Communists themselves have not attempted to impose it, but have so far largely confined themselves to agrarian reforms. Nor do I think they would be stupid enough to violate the Chinese character and tradition by forcing a political system upon the people against their will. If the people want it they can choose it in a free election, and if they don't they can reject it."

Dr. Sun was particularly contemptuous of those who were attempting to suppress free speech and writing by Gestapo methods. His opinion was that if the Kuomintang Government attempted to maintain itself in power by such methods, it would not long survive the end of the Japanese war in peace.

By remaining within the Kuomintang he runs the risk of misrepresentation by its opponents. He will be accused of hunting with the hounds and running with the hare. But I believe he is honestly persuaded that he is doing far more constructive work by exercising his moderating influence in the party than by remaining aloof. I am sure he is right. Moreover, while a man of his eminence in the Kuomintang stands for democratic unity with the Communists the reactionaries will always find it difficult to convince the world that Mao Tse-tung and his associates are unfit to be recognised by a responsible Chinese Government.

One of the most popular propaganda lines of the Kuomintang is to suggest to foreign correspondents that the "Yenan rebels" are preparing to sell-out China to Soviet Russia. So I was particularly careful to ask Dr. Sun-fo's opinion on Sino-Russian relations. His reply was categorical:

"I have no fear of Soviet Russia, and there is no reason to believe they have any aggressive intentions towards China. On the contrary, I had a long discussion with Stalin in Moscow on our relations. He gave me his personal and definite assurance that Russia would never be a party to aggressive action against us and that they had no territorial ambitions here. He also pledged his support of Mongolian independence. After all, it seems to me that Stalin was talking plain common-sense. Why should they wish to take over responsibility for any part of China? As you know, my father had profound admiration for the achievements of the Russians. He did not think their system could be applied to us, but that did not make him afraid of them, or cause him to mistrust them. On the contrary, he sought their support. As far as I know, and as far as anyone else knows, the Chinese Communists have never received any military support from Russia since the beginning of the Japanese war."

So much for accusations of a Fifth Column in Yenan.

Sometimes it was possible to report the blatancy of Kuomintang reaction by quoting official decrees, simply because their instigators did not appreciate they were reactionary. The most striking instance was the publication of a scheme by Chen Li-fu, then Minister of Education, who, with his brother Chen Kuo-fu, then head of the personnel appointments staff of Chiang Kai-shek, is leader of the "C.C. Clique", most powerful reactionary group in Kuomintang China. This prescribed conditions under which Chinese students were sent to study in foreign universities.

These were selected by Kuomintang Ministry of Education officials and then sent for preliminary training in the party political school. After being successfully indoctrinated with party principles they were free to go abroad. There they were responsible to Chinese Embassies, to which they were obliged to report their activities. It was the duty of the Embassies to control their thought and conduct. If this in any way infringed party thought or discipline they were subject to immediate recall to China on the orders of the Government. These rules applied to students who paid their own expenses as well as to those sent overseas at the expense of the Government. The only way in which the Embassies could keep check on the thoughts and activities of all students was through reports of students specially appointed to spy on their fellows.

When I asked Dr. Sun-fo his opinion of this technique he said:

"If they think that is the way to produce the finest students they will discover their mistake. It is, of course, ludicrous, but it is also disconcerting for the honest student who wishes to go

abroad to equip himself for a useful task. Realising the implications of this scheme, I imagine he will not avail himself of it, or if he does, he is unlikely to return to China at the order of the Government, or anyone else."

Although he held this view, Dr. Sun's influence was insufficient to rescind the decision. It was only on rare occasions that a scholar or student dared to express his true opinions. For three months I met a graduate of a foreign university two or three times a week. He was not a Communist. On the contrary, he was critical of Marxism. But he was also too Liberal to approve of the Kuomintang dictatorship. He was present at many discussions with mutual friends, but he did not dare to contribute to them on one single occasion.

A young student came to my room one night. I told him he was foolish to be associated with me because my attitude was by then known throughout Chungking as a result of the questions I had asked at Government Press conferences. He replied that he was past caring what might happen to him, and proceeded to tell me how it was impossible for Chinese undergraduates to speak freely on any political subject unless it was to express unqualified praise of the Kuomintang regime. If they did so, they were in danger of denunciation by student agents of the Government. At best they would be dismissed from the university and their rice subsidy would be withdrawn. At the worst they would be sent to a concentration camp. Some of his friends had disappeared for this reason.

Revelations of persecution of intellectuals and concentration camps will be strange news to those who have been accustomed to accepting the democratic speeches of Chiang Kai-shek and his wife at their face value. It is unnecessary for me to prove it by these personal instances. The following quotation is from *War-Time China*, written by Mr. Maxwell S. Stewart, published by the American Council, Institute of Pacific Relations, last year. This body has not been accused of disseminating Communist propaganda:

"The C.C. Group is a Chinese version of an American political machine. It has, indeed, been called China's Tammany Hall. It owes its immense political influence to the fact that its men hold most of the strategic positions in China's one legal party—the Kuomintang. One of the two Chen brothers who head the C.C. Group, Chen Li-fu, is Minister of Education, a post which gives him control over the indoctrination of students and the intellectual life of the nation. The other, Chen Kuo-fu, is head of the Personnel Division of Chiang Kai-shek's



headquarters, where he controls the distribution of Government jobs and is in charge of the appointment of county magistrates. Another C.C. leader, Hsu En-tseng, is Vice-Minister of Communications and head of the powerful Investigation Bureau, while another, Ku Cheng-kang, is Minister of Social Affairs. Through this latter post the C.C. Group not only has control over labour and the rural co-operatives but has full powers over all organisations in Chungking and vicinity. To buttress this political power the C.C. Group several years ago set up its own secret police patterned closely on the Nazi Gestapo. This police has directed its activities chiefly against students, university professors and other intellectuals suspected of either democratic or Communist leanings. Since both students and professors have been hard hit by the inflation and are dependent on a government rice allowance for existence, the supervisory activities of the C.C. secret police have been highly effective in controlling the expression of opinion. Because the C.C. Group has been highly critical of British and American policies since Pearl Harbour and is strongly anti-Soviet, its influence has caused many misgivings among United Nations leaders. The C.C. Group has often been accused by democratic groups within China of Fascist, and even pro-Japanese, sympathies. Charges of this kind cannot easily be proved or disproved. But the C.C. Group has invited it by adopting many of the trimmings of Nazism and Fascism in its methods of party organisation. Its secret police, for example, and its methods for the control of labour and the co-operatives, were consciously patterned after German and Italian models. In domestic policy the C.C. Group has consistently fought all efforts to make the Kuomintang more democratic and has taken the lead in urging the suppression of the Communists."

But this is not the only secret police force in China. Listen again to Maxwell Stewart. After discussing military leadership he says:

"There are many other military leaders with influence on the Chinese political scene, but we shall not complicate the picture with a longer list. Mention must be made, however, of Tai Li, whose name inspires fear in China. He is head of the secret police operating under the direction of the Military Affairs Committee. This is another Gestapo-like organisation, which has little connection with the C.C. political police, mentioned above; it is in some ways a rival body. Although active primarily in military zones, it is sometimes in conflict with the C.C. police. There are also the County Gendarmes, who

nominally have responsibility for policing communications in the war zones. Originally set up as a kind of military police to help maintain army discipline, the County Gendarmes frequently make unauthorised arrests. Indirectly connected with the Army is the San Min Chu I Youth Corps, named after the San Min Chu I, or Three People's Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. This organisation has as its purpose the training of young men and women in the teachings of Sun Yat-sen so that they may become politically informed members of the Kuomintang. Although bearing some resemblance to the Hitler Youth, it is not really a 'youth' corps but is made up in large part of older men. It has attracted, however, a good number of students and other young people. Since membership of the Corps is an aid in obtaining a rice subsidy, its ranks have grown rapidly since the war and it now constitutes an important political force. Although violently anti-Communist, it is independent of the C.C. clique. According to some observers the Youth Corps has become more progressive in the past few years but this judgment is disputed by others."

In fact, the only ideological and practical difference between all Kuomintang reactionary groups is the method of their rivalry for political power. It is futile for Chiang Kai-shek's Chinese or foreign apologists to protest his democratic sympathies in the face of his continued support of political reaction, maintained in power by "secret police patterned closely on the Nazi Gestapo".

Some recent Government changes have given the impression that he is broadening his attitude. What were these changes?

Dr. H. H. Kung, husband of the sister of Madam Sun and Madam Chiang Kai-shek, and Minister of Finance during the most critical period of the war, was dismissed to make way for their brother, T. V. Soong, who had long been in disfavour for his democratic sympathies. Soong was made Premier, and his place as Foreign Minister was filled by Dr. Wang Shih-chieh, who represented China at the recent conference of Foreign Ministers in London. Both these men would be regarded in England as right-wing Liberals, or left-wing Tories. Both have professed the practicability of peaceful settlement with the Communists. Apart from these two men, Madam Sun and Dr. Sun-fo, I did not meet one Kuomintang leader who produced any evidence of his democratic intention. General Ho Ying-chin was replaced as Minister for War by General Chen-cheng, most able of the Kuomintang commanders, who distinguished himself during the early Salween river campaign. He has always opposed war with the Communists for the military reason that there could be no

end to it. But the political cliques which rule the Government remain, secret police and all. Ho Ying-chin is still Chief of Staff of the Kuomintang armies in the field, and it is to him that the Japanese troops have been ordered to surrender. He has now invited the help of Generals who went over to the Japanese with their troops. Recently Chen Li-fu left the Ministry of Education to take over the post of his brother, who has been made Chairman of the Farmers' Bank—a switch which leaves their political and economic power unimpaired. Dr. Kung has returned to China from America. His financial power is enormous. His presence in China is also a constant threat to T. V. Soong. If his progressive policy becomes too strong Kung is always there to take his place and obey Chiang's orders unconditionally.

Why were these changes made?

My opinion, based on personal experience in China and on close contact with the Kuomintang, high American military circles and the Communists, is that General Ho was dismissed from the War Ministry under strong pressure from the Americans, who were no longer willing to work with him. It is probable that the appointments of T. V. Soong and Dr. Wang were made for two reasons: first, to appease growing discontent with reaction in China and convince the outside world that Chiang Kai-shek was fulfilling his promise to democratise his regime; secondly, because Chiang wished to strike a bargain with Soviet Russia and they were best fitted to do it for him. The result of this was the Sino-Soviet Pact. By this Chiang is left with a free hand to deal with the internal political situation as he thinks fit. Russia gains defensive territory in Manchuria and on the China coast, and strengthens her southern Chinese border. It is inconceivable that Stalin relished a sell-out of his Chinese Communist friends. He is well informed on Chinese affairs, and Russian newspapers have severely criticised the Kuomintang regime. On one occasion *Pravda* reprinted in full a highly critical article by me in the *News Chronicle*. Mr. Protsenko, the Tass Correspondent, who has visited Yen-an, was deeply impressed by all he saw, and he would not keep his opinions to himself. Most likely explanation of Russia's action seems to be that faced with American expansion in the Far East, or, to put it more politely, America's defensive Far Eastern policy, and the atom bomb, she is pushing out her own defences as far as possible.

Open Russian support of the Communists in the face of American support of Chiang would obviously increase the risk of bringing Russia and America into a state of war with each other, even though they might avoid armed conflict. This policy may not prevent American intervention, but it keeps Russia

clear of any charge of meddling in the internal affairs of China, on one side or the other, and throws the onus on the Americans of proving they are equally dispassionate. The Sino-Soviet Treaty is also only a bargain between Russia and China. Apparently it does not prohibit Russian self-defensive action if American intervention on the side of the Kuomintang in civil war is held to be an anti-Soviet act. I do not put this forward as an excuse for political expediency, but as one possible explanation of recent diplomatic events.

I do not think we need be deluded that the Sino-Soviet pact was anything more than a self-defensive act on Russia's part.

American intervention is already taking place. General Wedemeyer, Commander-in-Chief of American forces in China and military adviser to Chiang Kai-shek, has made several statements. The first was reported to be that he had received orders to give full American support to the Generalissimo. He denied, however, that this meant taking sides in civil war. It was merely fulfilment of an obligation to assist the Kuomintang Government to occupy areas surrendered by the Japanese. Later he was reported to have said, apparently in answer to questions, that "to be realistic" it must be admitted that the transportation of Chiang's soldiers to those areas which were now occupied by the Communists was in fact helping the Kuomintang against the Communists.\*

Did the Russians anticipate this development in the Chinese situation? Whether they did or not, they are, momentarily, well out of it. Whether the Americans think their actions constitute military intervention in the affairs of another nation or not, the Chinese Communists do, and have said so plainly. There are many Americans in and out of China who will hold the same opinion.

These reported statements by Wedemeyer remind me of a conversation with him in Chungking in the winter of last year when the Japanese advance up the Kweiyang road was threatening Kunming, the capture of which would have made China untenable for American forces. It was during this crisis that General Chou En-lai arrived in Chungking from Yen-an to discuss military unity with Chiang. One American airfield after another was falling to the enemy. American officers were openly discussing the inability of ill-led Kuomintang troops to stop him, and preparations were being made for the evacuation of all American personnel in the event of an advance to the gates of Kunming. For the first time Chinese newspapers expressed alarm. I flew to Chungking from Assam to report the military situation and the

\* General Hurley, the American Ambassador, has now resigned as a protest against American diplomats who have criticised this policy and advocated support for Communist claims.

political negotiations. At a private interview I asked General Wedemeyer:

"What in your view is the effect on military operations of the split between Kuomintang and Communist forces?"

He replied: "That is a political question."

A few moments before he had stated publicly that the situation was very serious indeed, but that America would never desert her ally.

Half a million of the best-trained, equipped and fed troops of the Kuomintang were still blockading the Communists in the north, and had not fired a shot against the Japanese. Thousands of refugees fleeing before the enemy were dying of starvation. One entire division of Kuomintang troops disappeared into the hills with their equipment, and at no point were Chiang's men offering organised or determined resistance. But, however many Chinese suffered, the American command must not intervene in Chinese politics. They behaved with perfect diplomatic decorum by continuing to support the most reactionary and incompetent opponents of the Japanese in China and by refusing to offend them by insisting on giving Lend-Lease military supplies to the most determined and successful Chinese armies—the Eighth Route and New Fourth, commanded by the Communist General Chu-teh. Observers who knew the facts had two hopes: (1) that exceptionally bitter weather would slow down the Japanese, (2) that this was a token offensive designed to frighten the Generalissimo and persuade him to avoid united military action with the Communists and reduce collaboration with the Americans. Just when Kweiyang seemed certain to fall, leaving the enemy a clear road to Kunming westward and Chungking northward, he began to withdraw. It was significant that this began to take place soon after a high Chinese general went to the front. It was common talk that he had made a deal. This, of course, cannot be proved, but it is a fact that without the slightest military evidence to support his optimism, Chiang Kai-shek expressed confidence that the Japanese would be driven back. His attitude was strangely inconsistent with that of a leader faced with a national crisis, and in sharp contrast to that of Wedemeyer, who did not persuade him to settle political differences with the Communists, but did persuade him to withdraw some of his soldiers blockading the Communists and send them to the Kweiyang sector. That they arrived too late to do battle before the enemy turned about was not the American General's fault.

I asked for an interview with Chiang. My interpreter asked me not to press the Kuomintang-Communist issue. I told him this was a strange request at a time when the Generalissimo was sup-

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posed to be making strenuous efforts to settle it, and made it the principal subject of our talk.

His nonchalance would have been astonishing in any man faced by a difficult military situation and determined to put the defence of China before political differences. It was true that the Japanese had begun to withdraw, but no one knew when they might come on again. American military intelligence was acting on the assumption that they might be regrouping for more effective assault. But Chiang was surprised by my own concern.

Only the Generalissimo and his Chief of Staff, Ho Ying-chin, appeared to believe the Chinese communiques.

I asked him how the visit of General Chou had come about. He replied that, being determined to settle the Communist question on a peaceful basis, he had sent an invitation for a Communist representative to come to Chungking for discussions.

"This is a political question," he said, "and can be settled by political means. The situation between us is much improved, and I am hopeful."

I asked him what were the obstacles to agreement. He replied that naturally there must be one Government in China. I reminded him that the Communists had expressed their willingness to accept his leadership, but only in a democratic constitutional Government. The Generalissimo appeared to be embarrassed, and the interpreter hurried to the next question. I returned to the point, and Chiang declared that China was already a democracy, but in a different form from the democracies of Britain and America, that the Communists were represented on the People's Political Council and were always welcome to take a share in the Government.

"I would welcome their co-operation," he added.

Such sentiments sent abroad by Kuomintang propagandists were accepted at their face value by millions in Britain and America. This was not the first time they had been spoken by the Generalissimo and denied by his actions.

Listen to Maxwell Stewart again:

"In what many observers regarded as an effort to quiet American, British and Russian fears of a civil war in China, Chiang Kai-shek issued an official statement on September 13, 1943, declaring that the 'Chinese Government does not have any particular demand to make on the Chinese Communist Party' and was prepared 'to be tolerant'. He added that the 'Communist problem is purely a political problem and should be solved by political means'. But then he went on to accuse the Communists of 'assaulting national Government troops' and

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'forcefully occupying our national territory'. He repeated demands previously made by the Kuomintang for the disbandment of the Eighth Route Army and the dissolution of all Communist governmental organisations, including the local governments, while offering no concessions to the Communist demand for guarantees for the rights of a minority party."

The Generalissimo displayed in my conversation with him the same contempt for facts as his subordinates. When I asked General Chou why he had come to Chungking, he told me that Mao Tse-tung had sent him in an effort to achieve a settlement to enable the war to be prosecuted more vigorously, and that the Americans had agreed to fly him in an American plane and guarantee him their protection. This was what he said about the Generalissimo's anxiety to come to peaceful agreement and form a united front.

"When I arrived in Chungking I was kept waiting for more than a week before Chiang Kai-shek agreed to see me. When he did there was no negotiation. He treated me with scant courtesy, delivered a series of harangues on the misbehaviour of the Communists, and demanded that we should disband our troops and place ourselves under the direction of the Kuomintang Government. He refused categorically to set up a coalition composed of members of the Kuomintang, Communists and other minorities. We got nowhere, as usual. He has told you that he is hopeful of the outcome of our talks. But I can assure you that they have already failed because he is not prepared to make the slightest concession. There is no point in hiding the fact, because tomorrow I am flying back to Yen-an to report to Mao Tse-tung, and I do not expect to return. We shall never agree to our subordination to the present Government.

"Now that we are able to talk frankly, let me tell you our point of view. We are willing to serve under the leadership of the Generalissimo within a coalition Government consisting of all parties. With such a Government in power there would be no major difficulty in coming to an arrangement about the control of the various armed forces in China. Why do we not wish to surrender our military independence now? Because we fear that the reactionaries of the Kuomintang would take the opportunity of destroying us. Is there any evidence that they might do so? Yes, there is the evidence of nearly a million Kuomintang troops still blockading us and preventing our throwing all our armed strength against the Japanese. We could serve in a Government with such men as General Chen, Dr. Sun-fo, Dr. T. V. Soong and Dr. Wang; also with many others. Madam Sun represents a

large body of liberal progressive opinion in China which is now inarticulate because of the suppression of liberty."

General Chou went on to say that, unlike the Kuomintang, the Chinese Communists had never sought to throw blame on the Allies for concentrating on the winning of the European war before throwing their combined resources against the Japanese in the Far East.

"With a victorious Germany we should be in much worse case," he said. "In the meantime, with the help which has already been given to China, we could do much. We have few enough resources in North China, but by establishing a Government in the interests of the people, thereby securing their enthusiastic co-operation, using our resources to the best advantage and with determination to fight whatever the odds, we have scored some notable successes. If all China were fighting the war vigorously there would be no time for excuses and regrets. We have not done all we might by any means. We have a great deal to learn. Our administration is not perfect. Some of our people have fallen into bad bureaucratic habits. It would be surprising if we had succeeded in everything. But in the main we have succeeded. We have assured the people of enough to eat and enough to wear, and we are all inspired with the will to fight. Otherwise we could not have organised guerrilla warfare. Imagine what would have happened to the Russian guerrillas if there had been a Fifth Column, or the people had been indifferent. They could not have fought with success. You cannot persuade peasants to help guerrillas by terrorism. They would soon betray you. The only way is to inspire confidence, and the only way to do that is to feel they are helping themselves."

Proof of the Communist success does not, of course, rest in such a statement by General Chou En-lai, but in the inescapable fact that the Communists have been able to resist much greater and better-equipped forces of Japanese and inflict more severe casualties upon them than the American-supplied Kuomintang.

Those who believed the Generalissimo's expectation of settlement were quickly disappointed, for General Chou returned to Yen-an, the Kuomintang blockade of the Communists continued and there was no more talk of democratic progress.

After the signing of the Sino-Russian pact it was announced that the Generalissimo had invited Mao Tse-tung to Chungking for further talks. Once again the world was temporarily deceived into believing that Chiang was becoming more democratic and that coalition Government in China would soon become an accomplished fact.

It should be made clear that the Communists have everything

to gain by making an agreement which does not destroy them as a political entity, and much to lose by remaining separated from the rest of China.

This was admitted in a recent broadcast from Hong Kong by a B.B.C. Correspondent, who was naïve enough to say that, faced with intolerable armed opposition, the Kuomintang was in a favourable position to resolve the problem at a time when the Communists were unable to obtain supplies.

This is quite true, and it explains exactly why Chiang Kai-shek's troops took the offensive against the Communists. The technique is too stale to deceive those with knowledge of the facts. First a gesture of reconciliation, followed by a meeting at which Chiang is supposed to be discussing practical measures for yielding dictatorship to democratic government; then the failure of the talks owing to reluctance by the Communists to yield their military independence; then the march of Kuomintang troops into Communist areas to take-over from the Japanese and restore order.

During the war the Kuomintang did not attempt to fight the enemy in this part of the country. When their troops were not actually fighting the Communists, they were blockading them. With the exception of rifles made from railway lines, cannon made of wood, home-made grenades and mines, the Communists have fought almost entirely with equipment captured from the Japanese. Hence the order of the Generalissimo to the Japanese commanders that in no circumstances must they surrender arms to the Communists. In effect this was asking the Japanese to continue fighting Chinese until the Kuomintang came to receive their surrender and relieve them. The Communists have recently charged Chiang Kai-shek with enlisting the support of the Japanese against them. This cannot be proved except by first-hand observation, but in view of the order to surrender only to Kuomintang troops, it is extremely likely.

Chiang was in a difficult position when the war ended, and if he did not intend peaceful settlement with the Communists it was important that they should not be allowed to obtain Japanese arms. His soldiers were far removed from the Communist-Japanese front, and he had no aeroplanes to take them there quickly. What could be more natural, therefore, than a request to the Japanese to hold on until the American air force could fly them and American ships sail them. This in fact has occurred. Clashes have also been reported between American marines supporting Kuomintang troops, and the Communists, and American fighters are said to have machine-gunned Communist forces. I do not believe, if this is true, that the Americans did so

deliberately, but if they were not in the area there would be no room for mistakes.

When I talked to General Wedemeyer he protested that he was a soldier and that politics were not his concern. He is now, according to reports from China, compelled to admit that if this was not the American intention, the effect of continuing aid to Chiang Kai-shek is to assist him in his war against Chinese people of different political opinions and practices. The American Government knows the facts. If President Truman has any doubts, there are many American officers who visited Yen-an who can tell him their opinion of the achievements of Mao Tse-tung, General Chu-teh and General Chou En-lai in helping America to win the war against the Japanese. If further evidence is required, it can be given by Foreign Correspondents who also went to Yen-an but were not allowed to cable the truth from China.

This was another instance of deliberate suppression of the facts by Kuomintang censorship. When I arrived in Chungking for the first time I was forbidden to go to the Communist areas. Day after day I was supported in my demand to be allowed to see the situation for myself by Israel Epstein, Guenther Stein and the London *Times* Correspondent. Just before I had to leave China for Burma in May 1944, the Generalissimo gave his consent. My colleagues went. They were all deeply impressed. They were allowed to travel with Communist army units, and no restriction was placed upon their movements. Epstein, who is one of the shrewdest and most able journalists I have met in twenty years, found there a genuine attempt to establish a Chinese democracy and an enthusiasm which he had not found anywhere else in China.

Most striking was the integrity of the Government leaders and the absence of corruption. The affection of the people and the army for Mao Tse-tung and General Chu-teh was apparent everywhere, and in dramatic contrast to the division between the Kuomintang rulers and the peasantry, which is such that soldiers are never allowed to fight in the provinces from which they are recruited and personal contact between the army and the people is discouraged.

That this is not an exaggeration was shown in an article in a Chinese "Liberal" newspaper last winter, which complained that so suspicious were the people of the army, that peasants had been known to bar their doors and refuse a cup of water to a thirsty man.

Before my colleagues left Chungking they agreed to a condition imposed by the Kuomintang that they should stay in the Communist areas for at least three months. Perhaps Chiang Kai-shek

genuinely believed that at the end of that time they would have had enough. Evidently alarmed by their appreciation of Communist achievements, accompanying Kuomintang officials suggested that they might like to return to Chungking at the end of two weeks. My friends politely retorted that it would be discourteous to the Generalissimo to break their promise, and stayed on.

But the Kuomintang had the last word but one. Until Epstein and Stein left China they were not allowed to write a single cable which was not mutilated beyond recognition by Kuomintang censors. One of the more amusing instances was the deletion of the words "well fed" in a description by Epstein of a Communist army mule train. Communist beasts, like Communist citizens, must be starving under a government of "red bandits".

Some American army officers who had no political sympathies with Communism, and were inclined to believe the rabid propaganda of the Kuomintang, were surprised by the efficiency of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, and by the spontaneous support of the people for the Communist Government.

One of the most striking testimonies came from a former American missionary who had been closely connected with the Chiang family for many years. He went to Yen-an expecting his worse fears to be confirmed. Like the rest, he was asked to return at the end of two weeks. To the annoyance of his Kuomintang friends, he declined, and insisted on remaining to discover the true situation for himself. He did not return a Communist, but he did return a convinced exponent of a united democratic China. His comment on the Communist regime was:

"This is the kind of China which I have always hoped to see."

I did not see Communist China for myself. My duties to my newspaper prevented this, but I have talked with the Communist leaders and with friends who have seen it. I did see something of the China under Kuomintang dictatorship. When I left in May 1944 I thought that perhaps my conflicts with censors had distorted my vision and that conditions were not really as bad as they appeared. When I returned seven months later, after experiencing some of the rigours of Indian political censorship, I was prepared to believe I had been mistaken, and that I had judged the administration too harshly. But I found nothing to correct my first impressions. There was the same suppression of truth, the same persecution of anyone suspected of progressive views. The members of the Friends' Ambulance Unit were still thought to be Communists because they treated all Chinese, whatever their political opinions, alike. Soldiers were still starving in the streets and begging for rice at the doors of restaurants.

There was the same enormous gulf between the few immensely rich, thriving on the profits of Government contracts and black-market deals, and the millions of poor. The shops were still filled with Lend-Lease drugs. There was still not the slightest attempt to control inflation, which had increased prices more than seven or eight hundred times. There was no sign that the army was fighting the Japanese. Chiang was still protesting democratic sentiments and preaching total war against the enemy, while he maintained the C.C. clique and Tai li in power and kept nearly a million troops on the borders of Communist territories, when they should have been driving back the Japanese. Overconfidential Kuomintang supporters were still boasting "between ourselves" that when the Japanese war was over they would deal with the Communists who wanted to nationalise all Chinese women.

It was a nauseating and depressing spectacle. But it was a worth while visit, because it confirmed that I had not been deceived during my first stay. It also gave me the opportunity of meeting Chou En-lai and bringing to England the documents which form this book. There could not be a more appropriate time for their publication.

I am not a Communist. Not one of my colleagues who went to Yen-an is a Communist. My sympathies are with the Chinese Communists in this struggle for the same reason that the sympathies of Madam Sun Yat-sen and all Progressives are with them, for the same reason that my sympathies during the Spanish civil war were with the Republican Government, as were those of all Progressives in Britain. In my view, it is the same struggle.

Fascism is not a system. It is an idea which is expressed in all countries where it has developed in the same way. It can be recognised wherever the welfare of the many is subordinated to the interests of the few who impose their will by armed force, suppression of conflicting opinion and the liberty of the individual to choose his rulers. To the question, Why do you support the Communists when you do not believe in Communism? I reply, Because there is no alternative. If Chinese Fascism wins, it will not be a victory over Communists alone, but over all professors of democratic opinion and practice, as Franco's victory was the defeat of democratic Spain. Progressives found themselves in strange company in the defence of Madrid—Catholics fought side by side with Communists, Anarchists with Liberals. This unity was forged out of a common fear and hatred of the Fascist idea. It was forged again in the countries under European occupation. And so it has been forged in China.

Anti-Communist as she is, and saturated with Kuomintang propaganda, it is unlikely that the Chinese can hope for widespread

sympathy in America. They are likely immediately to find a better hearing from the people of Britain, who were told that the Spanish war was a struggle with bloody red Bolsheviks on the one hand and the defenders of Christian order on the other, and then awakened during the second world war to find a Fascist Spain on their flank. Nevertheless, it seems to me to be a friendly act to point out American mistakes as I have seen them. I do not believe that Americans would be sympathetic to Chinese Fascism if they could see it in action. Millions are deluded, as millions of Britains were deluded during the Spanish struggle.

Let a Chinese speak to America for himself. A few days ago Major Chen Chia-kang, secretary to Chou En-lai, arrived in England from the San Francisco Conference, where he was a member of the Chinese Communist delegation. To prove their democratic outlook it was necessary for the Kuomintang to allow the Major to attend. This was what he said to me:

"I believe that civil war in China will end as soon as America makes it clear that she has no further intention of supporting the troops of the Kuomintang against the Communists. American intervention in any form is the greatest danger to the Chinese people today. If outside intervention were to help the Kuomintang to defeat the Communists quickly, we should, of course, have a kind of peace in China, though this would be undesirable to millions. But the fact is that without outside help the Kuomintang cannot, in our opinion, defeat us at all. The Communist Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are now 1,200,000 strong, and better armed than they have ever been. In addition, we have now 2,300,000 People's Militia, or Local Defence Corps, composed of peasants who resisted behind and among the Japanese lines during the war. As you know, we are very experienced in guerrilla fighting. We also have enthusiastic co-operation between the people and the troops, without which our guerrilla fighting would have been impossible. Our men are well-clothed and well-fed and their morale is high. Against us the Kuomintang have deployed about 1,500,000 of their 3,000,000 troops. For the most part they are ill-fed, badly clothed, and events have shown their morale to be low. Of ten divisions sent against us in South Hopei, seven were badly cut about, and a large body came over to us with their army commander, General Kao Shuh-shun.

"It was agreed between Mao Tse-tung and the Generalissimo at their recent negotiations for settlement of the Kuomintang-Communist split that no military action would be taken before the meeting of the new Political Advisory Committee on November 20. But General Kao informed our commanders that

he had received orders to deploy and attack us before that date. Since the agreement between Mao and the Generalissimo, Kuomintang forces have penetrated into the areas we liberated from the Japanese, although it was understood that the final occupation of these should be decided by the new committee, which consists of nine Communists, nine Independents, nine members of the Democratic League and nine members of the Kuomintang. With the help of American ships and planes Chiang's soldiers are being placed into position to fight us.

"As a result of Chiang Kai-shek's order to the enemy to surrender arms only to his troops, it is estimated that at least 40% of Japanese troops in China have not yet been disarmed. American intervention, which has been described by the Americans as helping the Chinese Government to occupy areas surrendered by the Japanese, has intensified the civil war because it has encouraged Kuomintang expectations of further help. If they are told that if they are determined to fight they will fight alone I believe they will stop immediately, and there is a chance that they will accept peaceful agreement to avoid protracted war. The issue today is not Communism versus capitalism but democracy versus totalitarianism. That is why we have the support of all Liberals in this struggle. All we ask is coalition government shared by all interests and then free elections.\* We are not afraid of fighting. We believe we can win, but such a war, bringing suffering to millions, must not be allowed to spread. The Americans who have so bravely fought one tyranny must not be deceived into supporting another."

At the head of Kuomintang troops now being transported by United States transports is General Ho Ying-chin, who has been described by Mr. Maxwell Stewart as follows:

"He has never got along any too well with British, American or Soviet military men. And he has made no secret of his opposition to the Chinese Communists. He opposed Chiang Kai-shek's decision to form a united front with the Communists before the outbreak of war, and he is believed to have been chiefly responsible for the attack on the Communist New Fourth Army a few years ago. Although his action in dispatching troops against the kidnapers of Chiang Kai-shek in 1936 is said by some people to have endangered Chiang's life, the Generalissimo has never disciplined him or openly opposed him in any way."

\* Since this statement General Chou En-lai has said that if this will end the civil war the Communists are even prepared to agree to a transitional period before coalition Government is established.

The truth is that as long as the Generalissimo sustains the reactionaries in power there is no hope of peaceful settlement with the Communists and the establishment of a democratic constitution with the help of all Chinese Progressives. The onus is upon him to prove that protestations of good intention are consistent with the retention of such men as Ho Ying-chin, the Chen brothers, Tai li and the rest.

Mr. Bevin, the British Foreign Secretary, has spoken brave words about Spain, and confessed that the British Labour Government would like to see a change of rule there. He has voiced strong objection to Russian behaviour in Eastern Europe. So far he has spoken of China only to say that the civil war is a Chinese affair and that he wishes to see a settlement. Does anyone in Britain or America believe that a totalitarian China with 450,000,000 people would be less dangerous than a Fascist Spain, or Imperial Japan?

In this introduction to the Communist report I have tried to preserve a clear distinction between the Kuomintang Government and the Chinese people. Among them I found a graciousness that I have not found elsewhere in the world. It is quite impossible to feel any sense of superiority in the presence of the poorest or most humble of them. Their life, through undernourishment, overwork and disease, is not always long, and yet one feels that while they have life they are in charge of it. If I were writing in another age, I think perhaps I should say of them that this people is possessed of the spirit of God. There is no decadence amongst them. By our standards they are backward, and yet I do not fear for them as much as I fear for ourselves. They are amongst the oldest civilised races of the earth, and yet they give the impression of being the youngest and most virile. They are, to me, the most admirable.

Acquiescence in this situation would justly earn us the contempt of all those Chinese men and women to whom, after we had seen their heroism and devotion to the ideals for which we ourselves were fighting, we gave our promise that we would write the truth.

If their defeat through any act of ours comes to pass, we should keep these facts firmly and clearly in our minds. For then we shall be seeing the defeat of those who gave millions a new hope when all but hope was gone.

*London. November, 1945*

## I

### ON COALITION GOVERNMENT

A POLITICAL REPORT BY CHAIRMAN MAO TSE-TUNG TO THE SEVENTH NATIONAL CONGRESS OF THE KUNGCHANTANG (CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY) ON APRIL 24, 1945

#### 1. The Basic Demands of the Chinese People

COMRADES! The long-awaited seventh National Congress of our Party is now opened. On behalf of the Central Committee, I am going to make you a report. The present situation demands that a number of important questions be discussed and decisions thereon made in this congress. Then we shall have to explain our decisions to the Chinese people, and co-operate with them if they agree to our decisions.

Our congress takes place in the following circumstances: The Chinese people, having fought against the Japanese aggressors resolutely, courageously and indomitably for almost eight years, experiencing untold hardships and making heavy self-sacrifices, helped to bring about a new situation; a decisive victory has been scored in the holy and just war; the time is near for the Chinese people, in collaboration with our Allies, to defeat the Japanese; but China, still hard pressed by them, is not yet united, and a grave crisis still exists. In such circumstances, what should we do? Indubitably, what China urgently needs is the establishment, through uniting all political parties and non-partisan leaders, of a democratic, provisional coalition government, so that democratic reforms may be instituted, the present crisis overcome, all anti-Japanese forces mobilised and united in collaboration with our Allies, and the Chinese people freed from the hands of the enemy. This being done, the National Assembly, based on broad democratic principles, will have to be summoned to form a regular democratic government of similar coalition nature embracing more broadly all parties and non-partisan representatives. This government will then lead the liberated people of the entire nation to build an independent, free, democratic, unified, prosperous and strong country—in short, to build a new China after defeating the aggressors through unity and democracy.



We think that only by so doing can the basic demands of the Chinese people be met. Hence my report is mainly concerned with discussions of these demands. It also treats with emphasis the problem of coalition government, as that problem has been regarded with great interest by the Chinese people and the Allied Press.

The Kungchintang has overcome many difficulties and achieved great results in its work in the eight years of anti-Japanese war. But, in the present circumstances, grave difficulties still confront the Party and the people. The situation demands that our Party intensify its efforts in further overcoming these difficulties, and in striving to realise the basic demands of the Chinese people.

## 2. The International and the Domestic Situation

Can the Chinese people realise these basic demands? The answer, in our opinion, depends on the extent of the people's awakening, solidarity, and effort. But the present international and domestic situation offers them many advantageous conditions, which, if well utilised, will undoubtedly facilitate their task of defeating the aggressors and building up a new China. The Chinese people should redouble their efforts for the accomplishment of their own task.

What is the present international situation?

Contrary to the expectations of Chinese and foreign reactionaries, the three great democracies—Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union—remain united. Disputes among these democracies did, and may in the future, exist; but after all unity reigns supreme. This all-decisive condition, finally demonstrated at the Crimea Conference, was created in the most critical moment in the history of the world—in the 1940's. It was created when, as the Fascist war of aggression threatened the existence of the peace-loving peoples of the world, reactionary forces in many of the more important nations (not all the nations), who had aided the Fascist aggressors by opposing the Anglo-American-Soviet unity, were forced down the political stage *en masse*, and anti-Fascist forces in favour of the Anglo-American-Soviet unity came to power. The whole aspect of the world has changed since that condition made its appearance. All Fascist forces, including their hidden agents in various countries, must be extirpated, international problems must be solved by conferences led by the three or the five major nations; internal problems of the various nations must be solved, without exception, in accordance with democratic principles; the world will be led towards progress instead of reaction. Such is the new aspect of

the world: But whoever fails to be fully alive to the possibilities of certain transient or even grave setbacks in history, or to understand the still considerable strength of disunity-advocating reactionaries who hate to see unity, progress and liberation in their own and other peoples, and who do not like the new world order led by the united Britain, the United States, the Soviet Union, France, and China, will be making a political error. However, the general trend of history is fixed and cannot be changed. The world has been given a new aspect.

This new aspect is unfavourable only to the Fascists and to their assistants, the reactionaries in all nations (including China). To the plain peoples and to organised democratic forces it is glad tidings.

The people, and only the people, is the motivating force of creation. The Soviet people has created a mighty force which was mainly responsible for the defeat of Fascism. The strenuous efforts of the people of Britain, the United States, China, France and other anti-Fascist nations made possible the defeat of the Fascists, after which the peoples of these nations will build a world peace that is durable. The United Nations Conference in San Francisco which began on April 25 will be the starting point of this peace.

War has educated the people. They will win the war, the peace and progress. This is the rule in the new situation.

This new situation is radically different from that of the first World War and the so-called era of "peace" immediately following it. At that time there was no Soviet Union as it is today; there was no such consciousness in the peoples of Britain, the United States, China, France and other anti-Fascist nations as they now possess, and consequently there could not be the solidarity shown by the world led by the three or the five major nations. We are in a totally new situation. We now have increasingly conscious and united peoples all over the world, as well as their organised forces, factors determining the direction of history and the path it takes.

The defeat of the Fascist aggressor nations and the appearance of general peace do not mean that there will be no more fighting. Widely scattered remnant Fascist forces will continue to do mischief; the anti-democratic forces existing in the anti-Fascist camp will continue to oppress the people. Hence, after the realisation of international peace, the struggles between the anti-Fascist peoples and remnant Fascist forces, between democratic and anti-democratic forces, will go on in most parts of the world. The broadest popular victory will be achieved only when, after long-drawn-out struggles, the remnant Fascist and anti-

democratic forces have been overcome. That day will not come quickly or easily, but, nevertheless, it will come. Its coming, prepared by the victory in the Second World War—the anti-Fascist war—will make the peace firm and enduring. It is the bright future of the world.

Due to the solidarity of the three great democracies—Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union—and other European nations, the war to end Fascist Germany will soon be brought to a close. The Red Army will soon capture Berlin—the nerve-centre of Hitlerite Germany; Anglo-American-French forces are battering the remnants of Hitler's hordes; the Italian people have risen in revolt, Hitler will be beaten, and after that a new situation will be created. The liberation of Europe immediately enhances the possibility of the liberation of Asia, which will be brought about.

Britain, the United States and China are united in the anti-Japanese war. The prolonged and arduous fight put up by the Chinese people in their eight years' war of resistance, the participation of Britain in the Far Eastern war, and in particular the American victories in the Pacific, have brought the war to the very doors of Japan. Yet though the Japanese aggressors are in a very unfavourable position and their morale is more shaken than ever, they will have enough strength to prepare for a protracted struggle, and are hoping to obtain, through the vacillating elements in China and the Allies, a negotiated peace. However, the interests of the people of all Pacific nations demand the complete extermination of the Japanese aggressors. The Soviet Union has denounced its neutrality pact with Japan, an act that greatly heartened the Chinese and other Pacific peoples. In the present circumstances, we may say that an arduous path lies ahead in our task of finally and completely exterminating the Japanese aggressors, that we must not under-estimate the enemy, but that we are surer of victory, we are sure to win.

The Chinese people have never before encountered such favourable international conditions, which encourage them to fight a protracted war.

What is the present domestic situation in China?

The prolonged war has exacted, and will continue to exact, huge sacrifice from the Chinese people, but at the same time it has fortified, and will continue to fortify them for the heroic struggle. It has awakened and united them to such an extent as was never before seen, not even in the great struggles of the past hundred years. Confronting the Chinese people are not only powerful national foes, but also powerful reactionary forces that actually support the national foes. On the other

hand, the Chinese people are not only awakened to an unprecedented extent, but they have also established strong and extensive liberated areas in China, and are in the midst of a powerful, ever-rising democratic movement. These are the favourable conditions in China. If we say that all popular struggles in the past hundred years in China failed to achieve their ends because of the absence of necessary international and domestic conditions, then the result will be different this time, because all necessary conditions are here, and the possibility of avoiding defeat and achieving victory fully exists. If we can unite the people of the entire nation in their fight and provide them with the proper guidance, we shall have victory.

The confidence of the Chinese people in their ability to defeat the aggressors and build up a new China through unity has been greatly strengthened; the opportunity for the Chinese people to overcome all difficulties and realise their historically significant basic demands has arrived. Can there be any doubt of this? I do not think there is any.

Such is the general situation, international and domestic.

### 3. Two Courses in the Anti-Japanese War

#### THE CRUX OF THE CHINA PROBLEM

Speaking of the domestic situation, we should specifically analyse China's anti-Japanese war.

China is one of the five great nations in the anti-Fascist camp, the major nation on the Asiatic mainland to oppose the Japanese aggressors. The effect of the Chinese people's action is great not only on the war against Japan, but also on the post-war world peace, while on the maintenance of Far Eastern peace it will be decisive. In the eight years of their anti-Japanese war the Chinese people have made great exertions for their own liberation as well as to help bring about an Allied victory. Large numbers of Chinese soldiers have shed their blood on the battle-field; Chinese workers, peasants, intellectuals and industrialists are all working hard in the rear; overseas Chinese have contributed much to the war-chest; all anti-Japanese political parties, with the exception of some of the anti-people elements, have contributed something towards the war effort. In short, the Chinese people have sweated and shed much blood in their courageous fight against the Japanese these eight years. But for many years Chinese reactionaries have succeeded in distorting or preventing the truth of the Chinese people's fight against the Japanese from reaching the general public. Meanwhile, no one has yet summed up the total experience of China's

eight-year war with Japan. So this congress should make a proper summary of this experience, both as a lesson to the people and as a basis on which we shall make our decisions on policy.

Speaking of summing up our experience, we can see clearly that there exist in China two different guiding courses: one of which helps to defeat the Japanese aggressors, but the other, while incapable of defeating the Japanese aggressors, in some respects actually helps them to undermine the war of resistance.

The negative policy adopted by the Kuomintang Government towards the war with Japan and its reactionary policy towards the people have resulted in military defeats, the loss of large areas of territory, a financial and economic crisis, the oppression of the people, many hardships suffered by the people and the breaking up of national unity. These policies hamper the mobilisation and unification of the people's anti-Japanese forces for effectively waging the war, and impede the people's awakening and solidarity. But the process of the people's awakening and unity has never been halted; it has been developing in a circuitous manner under the double pressure of the Japanese aggressors and the Kuomintang Government. The two courses—the Kuomintang Government's course of oppressing the people while carrying on a war of negative resistance, and the Chinese people's course of awakening and unity for the prosecution of the war—have existed in China for a long time. This is where the crux of the China problem lies.

#### HISTORY ALONG A TORTUOUS PATH

In order to understand why the crux of the China problem lies in the existence of the two courses, we must turn back to the history of our war against Japan.

The Chinese people's war has been developing along a tortuous path. It was begun in 1931, when, on September 18, the Japanese aggressors occupied Mukden, and within a few months the whole of the Three North-eastern Provinces. The Kuomintang Government adopted the policy of non-resistance, but the people and part of the patriotic troops in the Three North-eastern Provinces, led or assisted by the Kungchintang, and acting in contravention of the Kuomintang's wishes, organised the North-east Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army and embarked on a courageous guerrilla war, which developed into a large-scale war. The Volunteer Army has since met with many difficulties and setbacks, but has never been destroyed by the enemy. In 1932 the Japanese aggressors attacked Shanghai, but were resisted by the Nineteenth Route Army led by the patriotic

elements in the Kuomintang whose wishes they disobeyed. In 1933, when the Japanese aggressors invaded Jehol and Chahar, other patriotic elements in the Kuomintang, acting in contravention of the Kuomintang's wishes for the third time, organised the Anti-Japanese Union Army and offered resistance. All these resistance movements were supported by the Chinese people, the Kungchintang, other democratic factions and overseas Chinese. The Kuomintang, basing its policy on non-resistance, did nothing to help. On the contrary, the Kuomintang Government wrecked the resistance movements in Shanghai and Chahar. The Popular Government set up by the Nineteenth Route Army in Fukien in 1933 was also destroyed by the Kuomintang Government.

Why did the Kuomintang adopt the policy of non-resistance? The main reason lies in the fact that it destroyed the Kuomintang-Kungchintang collaboration and the unity of the people in 1927.

In 1924, Dr. Sun Yat-sen, accepting the proposal of the Kungchintang, summoned the First National Convention of the Kuomintang, in which the Kungchintang members participated and the three policies of alliance with the Soviet Union, alliance with the Kungchintang, and assistance to peasants and labourers were initiated. It was then that the Whampoa Military Academy was founded and the United National Front among the Kuomintang, the Kungchintang and the people was realised. In 1925 the reactionary forces in Kwangtung were wiped out; and in 1926-27 the Northern Expedition was victoriously launched, the Yangtze-kiang and the Huangho drainage areas were occupied, the northern militarist Government was defeated, and a widespread war of emancipation, unparalleled in the history of China, was begun. But in the early summer of 1927, when the Northern Expedition was developing to its crucial stage, the United National Front and its revolutionary policy, representing the emancipation of the Chinese people, was destroyed by the Kuomintang's treacherous, anti-popular policy of "purging the Kuomintang" and massacring the people. The allies of yesterday—the Kungchintang and the people—were now regarded as enemies, while the enemies of yesterday—the imperialists and feudalists—were now regarded as allies of the Kuomintang. This sudden and treacherous attack on the Kungchintang and the Chinese people killed the glowing Revolution. Thereafter national unity was replaced by civil war, democracy by dictatorship, and light by darkness. But the Kungchintang and the people were not frightened into submission or exterminated. They stood up again, wiped the bloodstains from themselves, buried the bodies of their dead comrades, and carried on the fight.

They held high the banner of Revolution, carried on armed resistance, set up popular governments in large areas, carried out land reforms, created the people's army—the Chinese Red Army—and preserved and developed the revolutionary forces of the Chinese people. Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary San Min Chu I, forsaken by the reactionary elements in the Kuomintang, was and has since been inherited by the Kungchantang and other democratic elements.

When the Japanese aggressors invaded the North-east the Kungchantang in 1933 proposed a truce with all Kuomintang armies then attacking the Soviet area and the Red Army, so that a united front might be presented against the Japanese, with these conditions: (1) cessation of hostilities; (2) recognition of the people's freedom and rights; and (3) the arming of the people. This proposal was rejected by the Kuomintang authorities.

Thereafter the Kuomintang Government's civil war policy was carried out with greater fanaticism than ever. On the other hand, the people's demand for stopping the civil war and for a united front against Japan was gaining force, and various popular patriotic organisations were set up in Shanghai and many other places. In 1935-36 the main forces of the Red Army on either side of the Yangtze River, under the direction of our Party Central, and after enduring untold hardships, were moved to the north-west, where they were joined to the Red Army forces there. In the same period the Kungchantang, adapting itself to the new circumstances, decided upon and followed a new and complete political course of a United National Anti-Japanese Front, aimed at national unity, armed resistance and the building up of a New-Democratic republic. On December 9, 1935, Peiping students and masses, led by our Party, launched a courageous patriotic movement by forming the Chinese National Liberation Pioneer Corps, and later the movement was taken up by other big centres. On December 12, 1936, two groups of patriotic elements in the Kuomintang—the North-eastern Army and the Seventeenth Route Army—jointly started the famous Sian Incident, courageously defying the Kuomintang's reactionary policy of appeasing Japan and massacring the people. At the same time, other patriotic elements in the Kuomintang were also feeling dissatisfied with the policy of their party. In these circumstances the Kuomintang was forced to give up its civil war policy and recognise the people's demands. National unity was initiated, with the peaceful settlement of the Sian Incident as the turning-point of the political change, and later the national anti-Japanese war was waged. In May 1937, on the eve of the Lukouchiao Incident, our Party held a historic National Representative

Meeting, in which our new Party line since 1935 was ratified.

From the Lukouchiao Incident on July 7, 1937, up to the loss of Wuhan in October 1938 the Kuomintang Government waged the anti-Japanese war with comparatively strong effort. In this period the onslaught of the Japanese aggressors and the rising wave of national indignation resulted in the Kuomintang Government stressing the anti-Japanese side of its policy, culminating in the high tide of national anti-Japanese feeling and the appearance of new signs of vigour. The entire nation, we Kungchantang members, and other democratic parties and groups, placed great hopes in the Kuomintang Government at that time, hoping that it would undertake democratic reforms and carry out Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary San Min Chu I while the nation was in peril and public feeling was running high in favour of reform. But these hopes were dashed. In those two years the nation's war effort was comparatively positive; the Government did modify its attitude towards the Kungchantang and other anti-Japanese parties or groups. On the other hand, the governmental authorities continued to oppose the mobilisation of vast masses for waging the people's war and to restrict the people's voluntary efforts at unity and resistance, as well as other democratic activities; it refused to give other parties equal status, tried energetically to limit their activities, and did nothing to release the numerous patriotic political prisoners. This was mainly because the Kuomintang Government persisted in maintaining the form of oligarchic autocracy it had adopted since the outbreak of the civil war in 1927, and failed to set up a nationally supported democratic coalition government.

It was then that we Kungchantang members pointed out the two courses in China's war against Japan. There must either be a total war involving the entire nation, which would result in our victory, or a partial war with the people oppressed, which would lead to our defeat. We also pointed out that the war would be protracted, that we were going to be faced with many difficulties and hardships, but that through the people's effort the ultimate victory would be ours.

#### THE PEOPLE'S WAR

In the same period the main body of the Chinese Red Army, moved to the north-west at the direction of the Kungchantang, was reorganised and named the Eighth Route Army of the Chinese National Revolutionary Force; and the guerrilla units of the Red Army left behind along the lower Yangtze River were reorganised and named the New Fourth Army. These two armies

then fought respectively in North and Central China. In the civil war times the Chinese Red Army, at one time several hundred thousand strong, maintained and developed the democratic tradition of the Whampoa Military Academy and the National Revolutionary Force of the Northern Expedition times. Due to the Kuomintang Government's savage attacks on our southern base, losses sustained during the Long March, and other causes, the Red Army was reduced to several tens of thousands strong. It was then ignored by certain people, who thought the Kuomintang was mainly responsible for the anti-Japanese war. But the people were the best judges of such things. They knew that the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, though then numerically weak, were of very high quality and that they could truly wage the people's war, once moved to the battle-fronts and united with the vast masses. The people were right. While I am making this report, our regular forces have been expanded to the strength of 910,000 men, not including the more than 2,200,000 militiamen. Our regular forces are still numerically smaller than the existing Kuomintang army (including central forces and provincial troops) by hundreds of thousands, but considering the number of enemy and puppet troops they are opposing, the vast territory they have to defend, their combat strength, their collaboration with the people, the militia and the self-defence corps, their political quality and their internal solidarity, our regular forces have become the mainstay of China's resistance.

Our forces are powerful because all who have joined them are conscientiously disciplined. They have come together and fought not for the selfish interests of a few or a limited group, but for the people's war of justice, for the interests of the vast masses and the entire nation. Their sole aim is to stand closely by the people and to serve the Chinese people with all their heart and will.

Guided by this aim, our armies possess that determined spirit necessary to overcome their enemies without being overcome by them. So long as a single man is left, this man will fight on, no matter under what difficult conditions.

These armies possess a high degree of solidarity, both with themselves and with others. Solidarity must be maintained internally between the officers and men, the upper and lower ranks, and among the military, political and supply services; and externally: between the army and the people, the army and the administration, and between our armies and all friendly forces. Anything that impairs this solidarity must be overcome.

Our armies adopt the correct policy of winning over enemy officers and men and treating prisoners of war well. All enemy or puppet soldiers who, after surrender or laying down their arms,

wish to join in the fight against the common foe are welcome to do so, and will receive suitable training. The killing, abusing or insulting of any prisoner is strictly prohibited.

These armies have invented a series of tactics and strategy necessary for the prosecution of the people's war. They are past masters of guerrilla warfare, with their adaptability to changing conditions, and are skilled in conducting mobile warfare.

They have initiated the political work necessary for the prosecution of the people's war. They have been striving for their own unification, for the co-operation of friendly forces and of the people, so as to shatter the enemy and secure our victory.

Under the conditions of guerrilla warfare, all our armies have been working at the production of foodstuffs and daily necessities while they are not fighting or not in training, that they may be self-supporting in varying degrees in certain requirements, economic difficulties may be overcome, the soldiers' living conditions improved and the people's burden lightened. Every possibility has been exploited in setting up small-scale military industries in our various military bases.

Our armies are powerful because they are assisted by such large armed organisations as the People's Self-Defence Corps and the militia, who fight side by side with them. All young, middle-aged, and even old men and women in the liberated areas in China are voluntarily, democratically organised into the anti-Japanese People's Self-defence Corps, on the principle that they are not separated from production work. The abler elements of the self-defence corps often join the regular armies or guerrilla units, or they may be incorporated into the militia. Without the support of such massed armed strength it would be impossible to defeat the Japanese aggressors.

Our armies are divided into Main Force and Regional Force groups; the former execute super-territorial combat orders, while the latter are confined to the task of defending certain areas or attacking enemy forces in those areas in collaboration with the militia and self-defence corps. Such a division has been heartily supported by the people. If no such correct division were made, if, for example, attention were centred exclusively on the Main Force groups, ignoring the role of the regional groups, then, under conditions indigenous to the liberated areas, it would be impossible to beat the Japanese aggressors. The Regional Force groups have organised many well-trained Armed Work Units soundly grounded in military, political and mass-movement work, which have reaped invaluable results by attacking the enemy from his rear and inciting the people to armed resistance, thus helping the front-line fighting in the liberated areas.

In the liberated areas all anti-Japanese elements in labour, peasant, youth, women's, cultural and other organisations, under the leadership of a democratic government, are engaging themselves heartily in various work to help the army, such as persuading people to join the army, carrying food for the troops, giving preferential treatment to the families of soldiers, and solving material difficulties for the troops. In this respect their important contribution is the mobilising of guerrilla units, militiamen and self-defence corps to attack the enemy, lay mines, do reconnaissance work, look out for spies, carry and protect the wounded, and give direct support to regular troops in combat. At the same time, all the people in the liberated areas are co-operating heartily in political, economic, cultural and health work. The most important achievement in these fields is the general mobilisation for the production of foodstuffs and daily necessities, making even Government organisations and schools, with only a few exceptions, join in the production work in their spare time, so that self-sufficiency may be achieved. This has resulted in a great production wave, which sustains the prolonged fight against the Japanese and is a characteristic feature of the liberated areas, where the destruction brought by the enemy is keenly felt and floods, drought and locust plagues often occur. But the people in the liberated areas, led by a democratic government, are overcoming these difficulties. Their work of exterminating locusts, preventing floods and of relief has achieved results, enabling the anti-Japanese war to be carried on indefinitely. The main slogan and aim of all the soldiers and civilians in the liberated areas are, in short: all for the front, all for the overthrow of the Japanese aggressors and for the liberation of the Chinese people.

This is truly the people's war, only by waging which can we defeat the enemy. The Kuomintang has failed because it obstinately opposes waging such a war.

Once they are equipped with modern weapons, our armies will be the more invincible and able finally to defeat the Japanese aggressors.

#### TWO BATTLE-FRONTS

The China Theatre has been split from the beginning into two battle fronts: the Kuomintang front and the Liberated-Areas front.

After capturing Wuhan in October 1938, the Japanese aggressors stopped their strategic assaults on the Kuomintang front, gradually shifting their main force to the liberated areas. At the same time, prompted by the defeatist feeling in the Kuomintang Government, they announced that they were

willing to negotiate with it for a peace. They also induced the traitor Wang Ching-wei to desert Chungking and to set up a puppet government in Nanking, so that they might carry out their policy of deceiving the Chinese nation. The Kuomintang Government then began to change its policy, gradually transferring its attention from the battle lines to the home front. The change was first reflected in its military policy of passive resistance, aiming at preserving its military strength while putting the burden of the war on the liberated areas, so it might watch from a safe distance the Japanese attack the liberated areas.

In 1939 the Kuomintang Government adopted the reactionary "Measures for the Restriction of Alien-Party Activities", retracting all the rights granted to the people and certain anti-Japanese parties in the early stages of the war. Thereafter, the Kuomintang Government has succeeded in driving underground all democratic parties in the Kuomintang-dominated territory, particularly the Kungchantang. The prisons and concentration camps in this territory have been filled with Kungchantang members, patriotic youths and other democratic fighters. In the five years beginning from 1939 to the autumn of 1943, the Kuomintang started three waves of anti-Kungchantang attacks, splitting the internal unity and causing serious threats of civil war. The notorious "New Fourth Army Incident", in which the New Fourth Army was "dissolved" and about 9,000 of its members were slaughtered in South Anhwei, happened in this period. Up to the present attacks on the armies in the liberated areas by Kuomintang troops have not ceased, and there is no sign of their cessation. In such circumstances the reactionary elements in the Kuomintang are very vituperative. Their favourite missiles aimed at the people are "the traitorous party", "the perfidious army", "the vile areas", and "undermining the war of resistance and the nation". To cope with the crisis, the Central Committee of the Kungchantang issued a manifesto on July 7, 1939, in which these slogans were adopted: "Resist to the End, No Surrender! Unity Instead of Dissension! Go Forward, Not Backward!" Guided by these slogans, the three waves of reactionary anti-Kungchantang attacks were repulsed with vehemence, and the crisis was overcome.

In recent years practically no serious fighting has occurred on the Kuomintang battle-front, the sword of the Japanese aggressors being pointed at the liberated-areas front. By 1943, 64% of the Japanese forces in China and 95% of the puppet Government forces were contained on the liberated-areas front; only 36% of the Japanese forces and 5% of the puppet troops were contained on the Kuomintang battle-front.

In 1944, when the Japanese aggressors were battling for the possession of a trans-continental communication line, the Kuomintang's astonishment and weakness were at once revealed, and large parts of Honan, Hunan, Kwangsi and Kwangtung were lost to the enemy within a few months. It was only then that a change in the proportion of the enemy forces in the two battle-fronts took place. But even as I am making this report, out of the forty divisions of 580,000 enemy troops in China (not counting those in Manchuria), twenty-two and a half divisions of 320,000 men, or about 56%, are being used on the liberated-areas front; only seventeen and a half divisions of 260,000 men, or about 44%, are used on the Kuomintang front. There is no change in the disposition of puppet forces.

We should point out here that the majority of the puppet armies of more than 800,000 men (including the regular troops and regional armed forces) were formed either by Kuomintang officers who deserted to the enemy or by troops led by deserting Kuomintang officers. Prior to the desertion of these officers, the reactionaries in the Kuomintang supplied them with such fallacious theories as "National Salvation through a Curved Line", later supporting them morally so that they might attack the liberated areas in collaboration with the Japanese aggressors. In addition, troops numbering 797,000 men were used in blockading and attacking the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region and the liberated areas. Such serious matters have never been known by the majority of the Chinese people and foreigners, on account of the Kuomintang Government's policy of news-blockade. Many people know that there was one Mihailovich in Yugoslavia, but do not know that there are tens of Mihailovichs in China.

#### THE LIBERATED AREAS IN CHINA

The liberated areas in China, with a total population of 95,500,000, are placed as far north as Inner Mongolia and as far south as Hainan Island. Wherever the enemy goes, there the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and other popular forces will be active. The liberated portion of China consists of nineteen large areas, extending over the provinces of Liaoning, Jehol, Chahar, Suiyuan, Shensi, Kansu, Ninghsia, Shansi, Hopei, Honan, Shantung, Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, Kiangsi, Hupeh, Hunan, Kwangtung, and Fukien, with Yen-an as the directive centre. Within the vast liberated territory, the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region west of the Yellow River, with a population of 1,500,000, is only one of the liberated areas, and the smallest in point of population, with the exception of the

East Chekiang and Hainan areas. Certain people mistake the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region for the whole liberated territory, a mistake attributable to the Kuomintang Government's policy of blockade. In this vast liberated territory the necessary policy of the anti-Japanese National United Front has been carried out, a government elected by the people—a regional coalition government in which Kungchantang and other parties and independent elements collaborate, is in the process of being set up, and the people are wholly mobilised. This has enabled the liberated areas to stand firm, to develop themselves, to expand at the expense of enemy-occupied territory, and to become the model for a democratic China, the centre in the fight against the Japanese aggressors and for the liberation of the Chinese people in spite of the enemy's pressure, of the Kuomintang's blockade and attack and of having no outside aid. The Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies and other popular forces in the liberated areas are exemplary not only in fighting the Japanese, but also in carrying out the democratic policy of the anti-Japanese National United Front. On September 22, 1937, the Central Committee of the Kungchantang issued a manifesto, in which it recognised China's need of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's San Min Chu I and pledged itself to strive for its complete realisation. This manifesto has been fully carried into effect in the liberated areas.

#### KUOMINTANG-DOMINATED AREAS

The chief ruling cliques in the Kuomintang have persisted in maintaining a dictatorial rule and carried out an anti-popular domestic policy of passive resistance. As a result, the Kuomintang armies have shrunk to half their former size and the major part of them have almost lost their combat ability; a deep chasm exists between the Kuomintang Government and the people, causing poverty, discontent and revolts among the people; the Kuomintang itself has not been able to function properly in the war against Japan, and moreover has become an obstacle to the mobilisation and unification of China's anti-Japanese forces.

Such things happen under the leadership of the chief ruling cliques of the Kuomintang because these ruling cliques represent the interests of China's big landowners, big bankers and the compradore class. These extremely small, reactionary groups control the military, political, cultural and other important organs under the Kuomintang Government. They place the preservation of their selfish interests above the war effort. They, too, speak of "the Nation Supreme", but their actions do not comply with the needs of the majority of the people. They also speak of "the State Supreme", but what they mean by

"State" is the feudalistic, Fascist dictatorship of the big land-owners, big bankers and the compradore class, instead of a democratic State of the people. Hence, they are afraid that the people may rise, afraid of democratic movements, afraid of truly mobilising the nation for the war against Japan. That is why they adopt the policy of passive resistance against Japan, as well as the anti-people, anti-democratic, anti-Kungchintang, reactionary domestic policy. That is why their policy assumes a dual character; on the one hand they wage war against Japan, on the other hand they adopt the policy of passive resistance, and so become the recipients of repeated Japanese peace offers; on the one hand they clamour for the development of China's economic resources, on the other hand they actively support bureaucratic capital—the capital of the big land-owners, big bankers and compradores, monopolise China's chief economic interests, and oppress the peasants, the workers, the petit-bourgeoisie and the liberal bourgeoisie; they loudly claim to practise "democracy" and to "return the political power to the people", yet they actually suppress the people's democratic movement, unwilling to effect the slightest democratic reform; they claim that "the Kungchintang problem is a political problem, and should be solved by political means", yet at the same time they persecute the Kungchintang members militarily, politically and economically, regard the Kungchintang members as their "No. 1 Enemy" and the Japanese aggressors as their "No. 2 Enemy", and are actively preparing for another civil war to exterminate the Kungchintang; they assert that Kuomintang members should be "firmly united", yet actually they encourage the Central armies to treat the provincial armies (the so-called "mixed armies") overbearingly, incite the absolutist faction to oppress the democratic faction, and encourage the antagonism of the various factions, so that they may utilise the situation to continue their dictatorial rule; they announce that they will build up a "modern nation", yet they uphold with all their might the feudalistic Fascist dictatorship of the big land-owners, big bankers and compradores; they formally maintain diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union, yet in reality they adopt an anti-Soviet attitude; they rely on Britain and the United States for help, but oppose the liberalism of the Anglo-Americans; they sing the same "Asia before Europe" tune with the American isolationists, so as to prolong the life of Fascist Germany, and of all Fascists, including their own, but at the same time they play the opportunist in the family of nations, putting on the disguise of anti-Fascist heroes. These conflicting, double-faced policies came from the big land-owners, big bankers and compradores.

But the Kuomintang is a motley political party. It is controlled and directed by the reactionary cliques representing the big land-owners, big bankers and compradores, but they are not the whole Kuomintang. Many of its leaders do not belong to these cliques, who bully or spurn them. Many of its officers, members, and members of the San Min Chu I Youth Corps are dissatisfied with the leadership of these cliques, some are even opposed to it. Such dissatisfaction exists in the armed forces, in the Government, economic and cultural organisations under the Kuomintang. Large numbers of progressive, democratic elements may be found in these armed forces and organisations. The reactionary cliques are divided among themselves, and, far from being a unified whole, often quarrel with one another. It is very improper, therefore, to regard the Kuomintang as a unanimously reactionary party.

#### A COMPARISON

The Chinese people can get a clear idea of the liberated areas and the Kuomintang-dominated territory by comparing them.

The two courses stand out clearly: the course of the people's war, and the course of passive resistance, the direct opposite of the first. The former will bring victory, even with the unenviable position of the liberated areas, deprived of outside help; the latter will bring defeat, even with the advantageous position occupied by the Kuomintang-dominated territory and with foreign assistance.

The Kuomintang Government blames the lack of armament for its failures. But which are more inadequately armed, the Kuomintang armies, or the armies of the liberated areas? The latter are the most inadequately armed of all Chinese armed forces. They produce their own weapons under very difficult conditions or take them from the enemy.

The weapons used by the Kuomintang's central armies are far better than those used by the provincial armies. But the former's combat ability is frequently lower than that of the latter.

The Kuomintang is in a position to draw upon vast resources of man-power, but due to its defective conscription policy, man-power replenishment has become an extremely difficult problem. The liberated areas, though hemmed in by the enemy and the scene of frequent battles, can mobilise their man-power without interruption because the system of the militia and self-defence corps, well-adapted to the needs of the people, has been generally instituted and because man-power resources are never abused or wasted in those areas.

The Kuomintang rules over large, well-provisioned areas,



where the people give annual contributions of rice amounting to 70,000,000 or 100,000,000 shih tan (statute piculs). However, a large part of the rice goes to line the pockets of those who handle it, so that Kuomintang soldiers are regularly starved. The liberated areas, some destitute like North Shensi and mostly behind enemy lines, therefore subject to ruthless destruction under the enemy's policy of "burn all, kill all, and loot all", successfully solve their food problem by the self-relying development of agricultural production.

With the major part of their industries gone bankrupt, the Kuomintang-controlled areas are confronting a grave economic crisis. Even such consumer goods as cloth have to be imported from America, whereas the liberated areas develop their own industries and produce their own cloth and other consumer goods.

The workers, peasants, shop clerks, Government employees and intellectuals in the Kuomintang-controlled areas live under extremely painful conditions, whereas all in the liberated areas have enough to eat and to wear, and are provided with jobs or schooling. In some places they have attained the state of "well fed and well clad".

War profiteering, officials-businessmen, corruption and shamelessness are the characteristic features of the Kuomintang-controlled areas. Struggling hard, exemplary behaviour, spare-time production, encouragement of honesty and prohibition of corruption are the characteristic features of the liberated areas.

In the Kuomintang-controlled areas the people are deprived of their freedom; in the liberated areas the people are allowed complete freedom.

Who is to blame? the foreigners for not helping China, or the Kuomintang Government's dictatorial rule, corruption and incompetency? Is not the answer obvious?

#### WHO UNDERMINES THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AND THE NATION?

Is it not the Kuomintang Government itself that actually undermines the Chinese people's war of resistance and jeopardises the nation? For ten years that Government devoted itself to civil war, treated the people as enemies, neglected every form of national defence, and threw away the four north-eastern provinces through the policy of non-resistance. When the Japanese invaded China proper, it kept on retreating from Lukouchiao to Kweichow. Yet it accused the Kungchantang of "undermining the war of resistance and jeopardising the nation". (See the resolutions of the 11th Plenary Session of the Kuomintang, Central Executive Committee, September 1943.) The accusation

was based on the fact that the Kungchantang had created the liberated areas, together with other political parties and the people. There is apparently such difference in the logic of the Kuomintang and that of the Chinese people that it is small wonder that so much confusion exists.

Two questions:

(1) What caused the Kuomintang Government to abandon so much territory and so many people by retreating first from Heilungkiang to Lukouchiao, and then from Lukouchiao to Kweichow? Is it not the Kuomintang Government's policy of non-resistance, and then the policy of passive resistance and of repressing the people's war?

(2) What caused the liberated areas to beat off the long and brutal attacks of the Japanese and puppet armies, to recapture from the enemy so much territory, and to liberate so many people? Is it not the correct course of the people's war?

#### THE SO-CALLED "DISOBEDIENCE TO GOVERNMENT AND MILITARY ORDERS"

The Kuomintang Government has been accusing the Kungchantang of "disobedience to Government and military orders". We can only say that fortunately the Kungchantang members have enough sense not to obey the so-called "Government and military orders" that would have returned the territory taken with much difficulty from the Japanese to the Japanese, such as "Measures for the Restriction of Alien-Party Activities" of 1939, the orders to "dissolve the New Fourth Army" and "to retreat to the north of the old Yellow River" in 1941, the demand to "dissolve the Kungchantang" in 1943, the demand to "disband all the armed forces above the limit of ten divisions" in 1944, and the recent proposal that our armies and regional governments be handed over to the Kuomintang, that there should not be a coalition government, and that, in return, a few Kungchantang members would be appointed officials in the Kuomintang dictatorial government. The Kuomintang even called this proposal its "concessions". Fortunately, we have not obeyed these orders, and so have retained some free territory and a gallant anti-Japanese army for the Chinese people. Should they not congratulate themselves on this disobedience? Is it not enough that the Kuomintang Government, through its Fascist and defeatist orders, has already made a present to the Japanese of the vast territory from Heilungkiang to Kweichow, together with its people? Who, except the Japanese and the reactionary factions, would welcome these "Government and military

orders"? Without a really democratic coalition government, is it imaginable that the Chinese people would permit the Kungchintang to hand over to the defeatist and Fascist Kuomintang dictatorship the liberated areas and the embattled people's army? If there were no liberated areas and their armies, what would the people's anti-Japanese war be? What would the nation's future be?

#### THE DANGER OF CIVIL WAR

Up to the present, the chief ruling cliques in the Kuomintang are still persisting in the reactionary course of dictatorship and civil war. There are indications that they have prepared, or are preparing, to launch another civil war once the Japanese aggressors are sufficiently driven out of China by invading Allied armies. They also hope that certain Allied officers will fill the same role in China as they did in Greece. They cheered the bloody career of the reactionary Greek Government. They want to hurl China again into a civil war, like the one of 1927-1936. Under the smoke-screen of "convening the National Assembly" and "solution by political means", the chief ruling cliques of the Kuomintang are secretly carrying on their preparations for another civil war. If their sinister plans are not exposed and their preparations stopped, the nation will one day hear again the gunfire of fratricidal strife.

#### NEGOTIATION

To defeat the Japanese aggressors, to build a new China and to prevent another civil war, the Kungchintang, with the consent of the other democratic parties and groups, proposed before the People's Political Council in September 1944 the immediate ending of the Kuomintang dictatorship and the setting up of a democratic coalition government. Undoubtedly this proposal was very timely, because it was soon warmly supported by the majority of the nation.

Negotiations were conducted between us and the Kuomintang Government to discuss the way to end the one-party dictatorship, to form a coalition government and to effect the necessary democratic reform. However, all our proposals were rejected by the Kuomintang Government, which was unwilling not only to end the one-party rule and to set up a coalition government, but also to effect any necessary democratic reform, such as the liquidation of Special Service organs, the rescinding of reactionary decrees that deprived the people of their freedom, the release of political prisoners, the recognition of the legal status of the various political parties, the recognition of the liberated areas or the withdrawal

of the troops surrounding and attacking the liberated areas. Thus China has been placed in a very grave political situation.

#### TWO FUTURE COURSES

Viewing the situation as a whole and as analysed above, I must warn you against thinking that all our undertakings will be successful and perfectly smooth. Far from it! The fact is, two probabilities, two future courses, one good and the other bad, are co-existent. Persistence in dictatorship and in preventing democratic reform; the policy of oppressing the people instead of fighting the Japanese aggressors; the possibility of another civil war which will drag China to her former dependent, undemocratic, disunited, poor self, even if the Japanese aggressors are beaten. This is one of the probabilities, one of the future courses. It still exists, and has not been removed by the favourable turn in the international situation, the increasing consciousness of the people at home, or the development of the people's organised strength. Those who hope for the materialisation of this probability are the anti-people groups in the Kuomintang in China and the reactionary elements in foreign nations who believe in imperialism. This is one side that must not be ignored.

But, on the other hand, viewing the same situation as a whole and as analysed above, we are encouraged to grasp the other probability, the other future course, that is, to overcome all difficulties, to unite the entire nation, to abolish the dictatorship, to effect democratic reform, to consolidate and expand the anti-Japanese forces, to beat the Japanese aggressors completely and to build up a new, independent, free, democratic, united and prosperous China. Those who hope for the materialisation of this probability are the people, the Kungchintang and the other democratic elements and groups in China, as well as all the other peoples who consider us their equals, the progressive elements and the masses in foreign nations.

We know very well that many difficulties are still confronting us and the Chinese people, and that a tortuous path beset with obstacles lies before us. But we know equally well that we and the Chinese people will certainly be able to overcome all these difficulties and obstacles, and to accomplish our mission. To oppose the first probability and to strive for the materialisation of the second is the chief task of the Chinese people and of us. The main conditions, international as well as domestic, are favourable to us and to the Chinese people, as was clearly explained before. We hope that the Kuomintang authorities, conforming to the trend of the world in general and the Chinese

people in particular, will resolutely change their erroneous policy, so that the war against Japan may be won, the suffering of the Chinese people relieved, and a new China born. No matter how difficult it may prove to be, the task of liberating the Chinese people and giving them independence will be accomplished, and the opportunity for such accomplishment has arrived. The magnificent ideals of our countless revolutionary heroes will have to be realised by the present generation. Their realisation cannot be stopped.

#### 4. The Policy of the Kungchintang

I have just made an analysis of the two courses of China's war against Japan. Such an analysis is, I think, necessary, because part of the Chinese people is still ignorant of the truth of China's anti-Japanese war. The Kuomintang Government's policy of news-blockade throws much dust into the eyes of many living in the Kuomintang-controlled areas and foreign countries. Before the Press Party and the American Observers Group came to the liberated areas in 1944, many foreigners knew almost nothing about these places. The *New York Times* on January 28, 1945, said: "The best way to solve the Chinese Communist problem is to allow people to travel between these different areas. In this way much misunderstanding will vanish." But the Kuomintang Government is afraid to do this. Immediately after the Press Party's tour it closed the door, and has since allowed no newspaper man to travel to the liberated areas again. The Kuomintang Government imposes a similar blockade in the areas under its control. I feel, therefore, that we should make it our duty to reveal to the public as much as possible the truth of "The Two Areas". Only when the complete truth is revealed can the world understand why such difference exists in the policies of China's two major parties—the Kuomintang and the Kungchintang, and the reason for this struggle of the two courses. Only then will people understand that the disputes of these two parties concern matters of life and death for millions of people, and are not merely unimportant or even wilful quarrels, as certain people have alleged them to be.

Confronted by the present grave situation, the Chinese people, all Chinese democratic parties and elements, all foreigners who are concerned for China and many United Nations Governments hope that China will be united again and that she will effect democratic reforms. They also want to know the Kungchintang's policy *vis-à-vis* the present problems. Members of our party are, of course, also interested in it.

Our policy of Anti-Japanese United National Front has always

been clear, and has been tested throughout the eight years of war. This congress should draw conclusions from this policy, to be used as a guide for future action.

I will explain presently certain conclusions respecting our policy made while the party was trying to solve China's problems.

#### OUR GENERAL PROGRAMME

To mobilise and unite all the anti-Japanese forces in the Chinese people, to annihilate the Japanese aggressors, and to build an independent, free, democratic, united and prosperous China, the Chinese people, the Kungchintang and other anti-Japanese democratic parties and groups urgently need a common programme upon which they can all agree.

This common programme may be divided into two parts: general and specific. We will first deal with the general programme, and then with the specific part.

For the annihilation of the Japanese aggressors and the building of a new China, the fundamental views of us Kungchintang members are, at the present stage, identical with those held by the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. These are: firstly, China should not have a feudalistic, Fascist, anti-popular system of government exclusively controlled by big landowners and big capitalists, because such a system has been proved to be entirely bankrupt by the chief ruling cliques of the Kuomintang in their eighteen years' rule. Secondly, China cannot, and should not attempt to, build a State along the old democratic lines entirely controlled by the bourgeoisie. In China the bourgeoisie class has so far proved itself to be very weak economically and politically, while on the other hand there has been born a politically powerful factor that leads the vast masses of the peasant class, the petit bourgeoisie, the intellectuals and other democratic elements—the Chinese proletariat with its leader, the Kungchintang. Thirdly, in the present stage, while the task of the Chinese people is still to oppose imperialistic and feudal oppression, while the requisite conditions of socialist economy are still absent in China, the Chinese people cannot, and therefore should not attempt to build a socialist state.

Then, what is it we want? We want to build, after annihilating the Japanese aggressors, a system of government based on the support of the overwhelming majority of the people, on the United Front and the coalition of democratic parties and groups. We will call this the New Democratic system of government.

This system is truly in conformity with the demand of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people, for, firstly, it has the support of several million industrial workers and tens of

millions of handicraft workers and farm labourers; secondly, it has the support of 360,000,000 peasants and farmers, or about 80% of the entire population; thirdly, it has the support of numerous members of the petit bourgeoisie, the bourgeoisie, the enlightened gentry and other patriotic elements.

Of course, these classes have different demands. In this respect there still exist among them conflicts—for instance, the conflict between capital and labour. To ignore these demands and conflicts would be insincere and erroneous. However, these diverse demands and conflicts should not, in the stage of the New Democratic system, be allowed to develop to the point where they would endanger the common demand. These diverse demands and conflicts can be harmonised in the political, economic and cultural reconstruction of the New Democratic State.

The New Democracy we uphold demands the expulsion of imperialistic oppression and the overthrow of the feudalistic, Fascist oppression. But after removing this oppression, we do not propose to set up an old democratic political system. Instead, we want to set up a political system based on the United Front in which all democratic classes collaborate. These views of ours are identical with those of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. In the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang, Dr. Sun Yat-sen said: "The so-called democratic system in modern nations is often exclusively controlled by the moneyed classes, and is therefore a tool with which to oppress the common people. But the Kuomintang's democracy is meant for the general mass, and not for a few." This great political revelation from Dr. Sun Yat-sen should be observed and resolutely put into practice by the Chinese people, the Kungchintang and all other democratic elements, who should also fight against any one or group that violates or is hostile to this revelation, so as to safeguard and develop this completely correct political principle of the New Democracy.

The formation of this New Democratic Government should be based on the system of democratic centralisation, with various grades of people's assemblies making decisions on the administrative policy and electing the Government. This system is at once democratic and centralised—that is to say, it is centralisation of power based on democracy, and at the same time is democracy directed by centralised power. This system alone can give expression to democracy in the broad sense of the term by investing the highest power in the various grades of people's assemblies; at the same time it permits the State affairs to be dealt with in a centralised manner, with the various grades of governments doing the work entrusted to them by the various grades of

people's assemblies and safeguarding all the necessary democratic activities of the people.

The problems of the New Democratic State and Government include in them the problem of a union of States. The various races in China should, in accordance with their own wills and principles of democracy, form a Union of Democratic Republics of China, and set up a Central Government based on that union.

Troops and armed forces form an important part of the New Democratic State authority. Without them, the nation is without protection. Like all other governmental authorities, and completely different from the old-time troops and police who belong to a few, and are tools for oppressing the people, all armed forces of New Democracy belong to the people and protect them.

Our views on the New Democratic economy also conform to the principles laid down by Dr. Sun Yat-sen. On the question of land, Dr. Sun maintained that "every tiller should have his own land". On the question of industry and commerce, Dr. Sun said in the Manifesto mentioned above: "All native or foreign enterprises that are either of the nature of monopolies or on a scale beyond the means of private interests—for instance, banking, railways, shipping, etc.—should be managed and controlled by the State, so that private capital may not control the livelihood of the people. This is the essence of the restriction of capital." Our views on the present stage economy are in complete accord with those of Dr. Sun Yat-sen.

Some people fear that the Kungchintang members are opposed to the development of individuality, the development of private capital and the protection of private property. These fears are unfounded. Imperialistic and feudal oppression has restricted the development of individuality and private capital, and has ruined the property of the masses. The task of our New Democratic system is to remove this restriction and ruination, to safeguard the free development of the people's individuality in their social life, to promote the free development of private capitalist economy that benefits and does not control the people's livelihood, and to protect all proper private property.

Dr. Sun's principles and the experience gained in the Chinese Revolution show that China's present economy should be managed partly by the State, partly by private concerns, and partly by co-operatives. Here "State" is not one "monopolised by a few" but a New Democratic State "of the common people".

The New Democratic culture should also belong to the common people—that is to say, should be national, scientific and popular in character and should decidedly not be monopolised by a few.

Such is the general, or basic, programme advocated by us Kungchintang members in the present stage—the stage of the bourgeois democratic revolution. In contradistinction to the future, or ultimate, programme of our Socialist or Communist system, this is our minimum programme. The carrying out of the programme will push China one step forward from her present national and social character—that is to say, from her colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal character to the national and social character of a new bourgeoisie-democracy. It will, with the annihilation of the Japanese aggressors, build up an independent, free, democratic, united and prosperous nation of such a character.

The carrying out of this programme cannot advance China to Socialism. This is not a question of the subjective willingness or unwillingness of certain individuals to do the advancing: it is due to the fact that the objective political and social conditions in China do not permit the advance.

We Kungchintang members never conceal or disguise our political aims. Our future, or ultimate, programme will advance China into the realm of Socialism and Communism; this has been settled and cannot be doubted. The very name of our Party and our Marxian conception of the cosmos definitely points to this boundlessly bright direction of our highest ideal. When we joined the party, we had in our mind two clearly defined objectives: to fight for the new bourgeois-democratic revolution, and to strive for the materialisation of the future Socialist revolution of the proletariat. We must resolutely rebut the ignorant and base enmity, false accusation, vituperation or sneer of the enemies of Communism. To the sceptics bearing no ill-will, we should explain good-naturedly and patiently our cause. Such things are very clear, definite and not the least bit ambiguous.

But all Kungchintang members and their sympathisers must fight for their immediate objective: they must fight against external and feudal oppression, to deliver the Chinese people from their tragic world of colonialism, semi-colonialism and semi-feudalism, and to build up an independent, free, democratic, united and prosperous China in conformity with the new bourgeoisie-democracy, the New Democracy, and Dr. Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary San Min Chu I. We have been doing this. We Kungchintang members, assisted by the majority of the Chinese people, have been striving for this end for twenty-four years.

Any Kungchintang member or Kungchintang sympathiser who would not fight for this objective, who slighted this bourgeois-democratic revolution, would fight only half-heartedly for it,

without meaning to be ready to lay down his life for it, and yet talked unpractically of Socialism and Communism, would be inadvertently or intentionally repudiating Socialism and Communism, and therefore could not be considered a conscientious and sincere Kungchintang member. Socialism can be reached only through democracy; this is an undisputed truth of Marxism. In China, the period of striving for democracy will be very long. Without a New Democratic, united State, without the economic development of a New Democratic nation, without the development of a private capitalist and co-operative economy, without the development of national, scientific, popular—namely, New Democratic—culture, without the emancipation and development of the individuality of millions of people—in short, without the thorough, democratic revolution of a new-bourgeois nature, to establish Socialism on the ruins of the colonial, semi-colonial and semi-feudal China would be a Utopian dream.

Some people cannot understand why the Kungchintang members, far from being antipathetic to capitalism, actually promote its development. To them we can simply say this much: to replace the oppression of foreign imperialism and native feudalism with the development of capitalism is not only an advance, but also an unavoidable process; it will benefit not only the bourgeoisie class but also the proletariat. What China does not want is foreign imperialism and native feudalism—not native capitalism, which is too weak. Strangely enough, certain spokesmen for China's capitalist class fear to advocate openly and directly the development of capitalism; they talk about it in a very roundabout manner. On the other hand, some people maintain that we should not allow capitalism to develop freely in China, and that San Min Chu I and Socialism can be established "in one stroke". Obviously, such things reflect at once the weakness of China's bourgeoisie and the deceitfulness of the big landowners and big capitalists to the people. We Kungchintang members, understanding the Marxist law of social development, knew very well that under the conditions in China and the rule of the New Democratic State, private capitalist economy, in addition to State economy, the individual economy of the labouring classes, and co-operative economy, must be given facilities for free development, if the State, the people and the forward development of our society are to be benefited. No empty talk and deception can possibly mislead the clear-headed Kungchintang members.

Some people doubt the sincerity of the Kungchintang members when they "recognise China's need of the San Min Chu I in the present stage", and "will fight for its complete realisation". This

comes from not understanding the fact that the fundamental principles of San Min Chu I, as explained by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang in 1924, concur with certain fundamental principles in the present—that is, the minimum—progress of our Party. It should be pointed out, however, that Dr. Sun's San Min Chu I concurs only with certain fundamental principles in our present programme, and not with the entire programme. The New Democratic programme of our Party is of course much more complete than Dr. Sun's programme. Events in the Chinese revolution in the twenty years after Dr. Sun's death have helped to develop our New Democratic theory and programme and their implementation; this development will continue. Judged by its intrinsic character, Dr. Sun's San Min Chu I, as explained in that Manifesto, is New Democratic, and should be distinguished from the older San Min Chu I. This new San Min Chu I is what China needs at present, and of course we are willing to fight for its complete realisation. To the Kungchintang members to fight for the Party's minimum programme and to fight for the revolutionary San Min Chu I—the new San Min Chu I—of Dr. Sun is basically (not completely) the same thing. Therefore, it has been and will be proved that the Kungchintang members are sincerely and thoroughly carrying out the San Min Chu I.

Some people wonder if the Kungchintang members, once in power, will establish a dictatorship by the proletariat and a one-party system, as they have done in Russia. We can tell those people this: a New Democratic State of a union of democratic classes is different in principle from a Socialist State with the dictatorship of the proletariat. China, throughout the period of her New Democratic system, cannot and should not have a system of government of the character of one-class dictatorship or one-party autocracy. We have no reason not to co-operate with non-Kungchintang political parties, social groups or individuals who are willing to co-operate with the Kungchintang and are not hostile to it. Russian history determined the Soviet system. There the social system in which man exploits man has been abolished; the newest form of democracy—the Socialist political, economic and cultural system—has been established; all anti-Socialist political parties have been rejected by the people, who support only the Bolshevik Party. To the Russians such a system is completely necessary and rational. But even in Russia, where the Bolshevik Party is the only political party, the governmental authority is invested in the hands of workers, peasants and intellectuals, or in the hands of Party members and non-Party members, and not in the hands of the working class or the

Bolsheviks alone. In the same way, Chinese history will determine the Chinese system. A peculiar form—a New Democratic State and regime of a union of the democratic classes—will be produced, which will be entirely necessary and rational to us and different from the Russian system.

Here I want to answer another question, which is this: You Kungchintang members advocate the setting up of a coalition government, because, in place of a democratic election system, a coalition government is necessary for national unification and for waging the anti-Japanese war; but why insist on setting up a coalition government in the future too, when there will be a democratic election system? Why not let the majority party in the National Assembly set up a one-party government? Our answer is this: China's historical conditions prescribe a coalition government. I have said somewhere before that matters have been changed by the appearance of the Kungchintang, which represents not only the proletariat, but, by virtue of its programme and actual work, also the vast peasant class, the petit bourgeoisie, the intellectuals and other democratic elements. Any government that excludes from itself the Kungchintang will be able to achieve nothing good; this is one of the fundamental characteristics of the New Democratic stage. As far back as 1924, when Dr. Sun Yat-sen established in reality a coalition government in which the Kungchintang participated, he did accomplish something great. Since 1927 the Kuomintang Government has been repudiating the Kungchintang, and for some time waged a ruthless anti-Kungchintang war; this Government has since launched itself on a reactionary career. Today, confronted by the Japanese aggressors, the Kuomintang Government is trying to get rid of the Kungchintang members by local fights, special Secret Police methods, blockades, slanderous propaganda, preparing for another civil war and refusing to set up a coalition government, instead of openly declaring war on them. But the more it tries to suppress the Kungchintang the more degenerate will it be. Under the present conditions in China, a government that repudiates the Kungchintang repudiates the overwhelming majority of the people. No one can entertain the idea that the Kungchintang members demand to be admitted into the Government because they covet the positions; participation of Kungchintang members in the Government means the carrying out of New Democratic reforms. Even when China has a democratic electoral system there should be a coalition government working under a commonly accepted New Democratic programme, for better accomplishing the constructive work of the New Democracy, no matter whether the Kungchintang is the majority

party in the National Assembly or not. This necessity has become quite clear now.

#### OUR SPECIFIC PROGRAMME

Based on the general programme mentioned above, we should draw up specific programmes for different periods. In the whole bourgeois-democratic revolution stage our new democratic general programme remains unchanged. But conditions in the various periods within this stage are ever changing and so it is necessary that changes should occasionally be made. For example, from the Northern Expedition through the Agrarian Revolution to the Anti-Japanese War periods, our New Democratic general programme has undergone no change, but our specific programme has suffered changes in these three periods, because changes have occurred in our relationship with our enemies and friends.

We are at present living in the following circumstances: (1) the Japanese aggressors have not yet been defeated; (2) the Chinese people urgently need unity and democratic reform, which will effect national unification and speedy mobilisation and unification of all anti-Japanese forces for the final defeat of the Japanese aggressors; (3) the Kuomintang Government impairs national unification and resists democratic reform. What is our specific programme—that is, the Chinese people's present demands—in these circumstances?

We consider the following demands appropriate and the least the people can make.

The Chinese people demand the mobilisation of all forces for the annihilation, in concert with the Allied Nations, of the Japanese aggressors and for building up an international peace; they demand the abolition of the Kuomintang one-party regime and the setting up of a democratic coalition government and a coalition supreme command; they demand national unification and the punishment of the pro-Japanese, Fascist and defeatist elements that impair national unification and oppose the people; they demand the punishment of those reactionary elements that instigate civil war, and an assurance of internal peace; they demand the punishment of traitors and Japanese spies, and the prosecution of officers who have surrendered to the enemy; they demand the abolition of concentration camps and the reactionary Secret Police organisations and activities that are used for suppressing the people; they demand the rescission of the reactionary decrees that suppress the people's freedom of speech, of publication, of assembly, of association, of thought, of belief and of body, so that the people may enjoy their rights; they demand the recognition of the legal status of all democratic parties

and groups; they demand the release of all patriotic, political prisoners; they demand the withdrawal of all armed forces now surrounding and attacking the liberated areas, and employment of these troops on the anti-Japanese front; they demand the recognition of all anti-Japanese forces and popularly elected governments in the liberated areas; they demand the expansion of the liberated areas and their armed forces at the expense of enemy-occupied areas; they demand that the people in enemy-occupied territory be given assistance in organising underground forces for an armed revolt; they demand to be armed for the defence of the nation; they demand the political and military reforming of Kuomintang-directed troops that always lose to the enemy, always oppose the people and non-Kuomintang forces, and the punishment of the officers responsible for China's defeats; they demand the improvement of the conscription system and the living conditions of the rank and file; they demand privileges for the families of soldiers, that they may be relieved of their worries for their families; they demand special privileges for the families of soldiers killed in action and for disabled veterans, and employment for veterans; they demand the development of the armament industry for better waging the war; they demand the fair distribution of Allied military and financial aids to all anti-Japanese forces; they demand the punishment of corrupt officials, and the instituting of clean-handed ones in office; they demand better treatment for middle and lower classes of Government employees; they demand the democratic right of self-government for themselves; they demand relief for war refugees and famine-stricken areas; they demand the setting apart of large funds for the relief of the people in enemy-occupied areas when these areas are recovered; they demand the abolition of oppressive taxes and the imposition of a consolidated progressive tax; they demand rural reforms, reduction of rent and interest, proper protection for the rights of tenants, low-interest loans to poor peasants, and organisation of the peasants for the development of agricultural production; they demand the prohibition of bureaucratic capital; they demand the abolition of the present system of economic control; they demand the checking of endless inflation and rise of commodity prices; they demand assistance to small industries by extending to them loans and facilities in purchasing raw materials and in sales; they demand the improvement of the living conditions of workers, relief for the unemployed and the organisation of workers for the development of industrial production; they demand the abolition of party-controlled education and the development of national, scientific, popular culture and educa-

tion; they demand the assurance of the livelihood of teachers and the freedom of study; they demand the safeguarding of the interests of youth, women and children, relief for refugee students, the organisation of youths and women for war and social work, freedom of marriage, equal status for both sexes, and education for youths and children; they demand better treatment for the racial minorities in China, according them the right of self-determination and of forming a union with the Hans on a voluntary basis; they demand protection for the interests of overseas Chinese and assistance for returned overseas Chinese; they demand protection for aliens fleeing to China from the Japanese, and assistance to them in their anti-Japanese struggle; they demand the improvement of Sino-Soviet relations. To meet these demands, it is necessary to put an end at once to the Kuomintang dictatorship, and to set up a nationally supported, democratic, unified, provisional Central Coalition Government that includes all anti-Japanese political parties and representatives of non-partisan elements. Otherwise, it will be impossible to institute reform on a national scale—that is, in Kuomintang-controlled areas.

These demands are the voice of the vast majority of the Chinese people, and of the Allied Press.

As it is vitally necessary to formulate a minimum specific programme to which all anti-Japanese, democratic parties can agree, we propose to negotiate with other political parties on the basis of the programme outlined above. The various parties may have different demands, but they should agree upon these common demands.

As regards the Kuomintang-controlled areas, this programme is, for the time being, a series of demands; as regards enemy-occupied areas, it can be carried out only after they are recovered, with the exception of that part dealing with the organisation of an underground army for armed revolt; in the liberated areas it has been, and is being, carried out.

#### THOROUGHLY EXTERMINATE THE JAPANESE AGGRESSORS, NO HALF-WAY COMPROMISES!

The demands of the Chinese people, or our specific programme, imply some war-time and post-war problems of importance that require clarification. While clarifying these problems we will criticise some of the erroneous views held by the chief ruling cliques of the Kuomintang, and at the same time will reply to some questions put by certain people.

The Cairo Conference correctly decided that the Japanese

aggressors should be made to surrender unconditionally. But, as the Japanese aggressors are secretly attempting to secure a negotiated peace, and as the pro-Japanese elements in the Kuomintang are not checked in their secret dealings with the Japanese via the puppet Government at Nanking, the danger of a half-way compromise is not completely past. It is very good, too, that the Cairo Conference further decided to return to China the four North-eastern Provinces, Formosa and the Pescadores. But the present policy of the Kuomintang Government makes it impossible to recover all lost territory by itself. What should the Chinese people do in such circumstances? They should ask the Kuomintang Government to annihilate the Japanese aggressors, and not to compromise with them; all attempts at compromise must be immediately stopped. The Chinese people should demand that the Kuomintang Government change its present policy of passive resistance and employ all its armed forces in active combat. The Chinese people should expend their own armed forces—the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and other popular forces, voluntarily increasing the anti-Japanese forces in areas under enemy occupation; be ready to fight by the side of Allied forces and to recover all lost territory, but should not rely entirely on the Kuomintang. The extermination of the Japanese aggressors is the right of the Chinese people, who should deal determined blows to any reactionary attempting to deprive them of it, to suppress their anti-Japanese activity or to undermine their anti-Japanese strength, because such reactionary and traitorous attempts actually help the Japanese aggressors.

#### ABOLITION OF THE ONE-PARTY AUTOCRATIC RULE AND ESTABLISHMENT OF COALITION GOVERNMENT

To annihilate the Japanese aggressors it is necessary that democratic reforms should be effected on a national scale, which is impossible unless the Kuomintang dictatorship is abolished and a democratic coalition government set up in its place.

The Kuomintang one-party rule is in practice a dictatorship by the anti-popular groups within the Kuomintang. It is the disrupter of Chinese national unity, the one responsible for China's failures in her war against Japan, the obstacle to the mobilisation and unification of the anti-Japanese forces of the Chinese people. The sad experience of eight years of war has taught the Chinese people to demand its immediate abolition. It is an anti-democratic dictatorship and the root of civil war, which it will bring about if it is not abolished.

The demand of the Chinese people for the abolition of this



anti-democratic dictatorship is so universal and loud that the Kuomintang authorities themselves cannot help recognising openly the need for an "early conclusion of Political Tutelage". This shows how corrupt and bankrupt is the so-called "Political Tutelage" or "One-Party dictatorship". No one now dares to defend them, or to argue that they should not be abolished. This is a great change in the present situation.

That it should be ended is no longer doubted. But opinions vary on how it should be ended. One would say: it should be ended immediately and a democratic provisional coalition government set up. Another would say: we can wait until the "National Assembly" returns "the rule to the people", we cannot return the rule to the coalition government.

What is the meaning of this difference?

It means two methods of approach, one earnest and the other pretentious.

The first method calls for the immediate announcement of the abolition of the Kuomintang one-party rule, the setting up of a provisional central government jointly by the Kuomintang, the Kungchintang, the Democratic League and other non-partisan elements, and the promulgation of a democratic administrative programme, like the one outlined above, for the restoration of our national unity and the defeat of the Japanese aggressors. A Round-Table conference of representatives of all political parties and non-partisan leaders should be called to discuss these measures, an agreement should be reached, and action should be taken at once. This method is conducive to unity, and is resolutely supported by the Chinese people.

The second method, by ignoring the demands of the overwhelming majority of the people and democratic political parties, is to convene the "National Assembly", controlled by the anti-popular groups in the Kuomintang. This "National Assembly" will pass the so-called "constitution" that in reality maintains the dictatorship and opposes democracy; it will put the cloak of legality on the illegal "National Government", set up by several Kuomintang men and entirely unsupported by the people; it will outwardly "return the rule to the people", while in reality letting the anti-popular groups within the Kuomintang retain the "rule". What is more, it will label those who oppose this method, enemies of "democracy" and "unity", and, armed with this excuse, will not hesitate to use force. This method is conducive to disunity, and is resolutely opposed by the Chinese people.

These measures, based on such a method, are ready to be adopted by our anti-popular heroes. They are preparing to

put a noose—called the "National Assembly"—around our necks and tighten it so that it cannot be loosened. They intend to make the "National Assembly" a weapon with which they can counter the Coalition Government proposal, maintain the dictatorship and prepare for civil war. But the logic of history goes opposite to their wishes. For, as everybody knows, the people have no freedom in Kuomintang-controlled areas, they cannot participate in elections in enemy-occupied areas; and the status of those in the liberated areas is not even recognised by the Kuomintang Government. In such circumstances how can representatives be elected? how can the National Assembly come into being? The "National Assembly" that is scheduled to convene soon was created by the Kuomintang dictatorial Government eight years ago, in the period of civil war. The convening of this "Assembly" will certainly provoke indignant protests from the entire nation, much to the embarrassment of our anti-popular heroes. Even should the "National Assembly" be successfully convened, they would succeed only in splitting China into many pieces.

We Kungchintang members do not want China to be torn by internal rift, and we propose two measures to save her from this fate. The first, which deals with the present period, calls for the setting up of a provisional coalition government through the conference of representatives of all political parties and non-partisan elements. The second, which deals with the future, calls for the convocation, through free and unrestricted election, of the National Assembly, which will set up regular coalition government. In short, it is necessary to set up a coalition government, which will unite all classes of the people and all parties under a common, democratic programme for the fight against Japan and the future reconstruction work.

China will take this course, despite the opposition or unwillingness of the Kuomintang or any other party, group or individual. This is a certainty, an irrefutable historical law that cannot be changed by any force.

Respecting this problem and any problem concerning democratic reform, we Kungchintang members wish to state that despite the persistence of the Kuomintang authorities in their erroneous policy and their recourse to negotiations as a means of gaining time and to appease public opinion, we are willing to resume negotiations with them if they will renounce their present erroneous policy and agree to effect democratic reforms. But these negotiations must be based on the general anti-Japanese policy of unification and democratisation. We cannot agree to any measure, plan or grandiose but empty talk that deviates from this policy.

At present the Chinese people have to fight for their freedom primarily and chiefly against the Japanese aggressors. But the Kuomintang Government incapacitates the people for the fight by binding their hands and feet. Such a state of affairs prevents the mobilisation and unification of all anti-Japanese forces on a national scale. Many of the demands enumerated in our programme above are aimed at freeing the people from their fetters, so that they may fight the Japanese, unite themselves, and strive for democracy.

The people should fight for their freedom, not wait for it to be bestowed on them. In the liberated areas the people have secured their freedom, and those in other areas can and should secure theirs. The more freedom the Chinese people get, the greater will be their organised democratic forces, and the more probable will be the setting up of a united provisional coalition government. This coalition government will in turn give the people full freedom with which to consolidate the foundation of that government. Then, and only then, after annihilating the Japanese aggressors, will it be possible to conduct free, unrestricted elections all over the country, to produce a democratic National Assembly, and to set up a united regular coalition government. Is it not clear that if the people are without freedom there will be no popularly elected National Assembly or government?

The most important freedom of the people is the freedom of speech, publication, assembly, association, thinking, belief and body. In all China only the people in the liberated areas enjoy this freedom.

In his will, Dr. Sun Yat-sen said in 1925: "I have devoted forty years of my life to the National Revolution, with the aim of securing freedom and equality for China. The experience of these forty years has taught me that to achieve this end it is necessary to awaken the people and ally them to other peoples who treat us as their equals." His worthless inheritors have disobeyed him by oppressing the people instead of awakening them; by completely depriving the people of their freedom of speech, publication, etc. They call the Kungchantang and the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, which really awaken the people and protect their freedom and rights, the "perfidious party" and the "traitorous armies", and the liberated areas the "traitorous areas". We hope such practice of calling black white will soon be discontinued. It will not be tolerated by the Chinese people.

To eliminate the Japanese aggressors, to avoid further wars and to build up a new China, it is the duty of the Chinese people to unify China into a whole.

But what kind of unification? The arbitrary unification by a dictator, or the democratic unification by the people? Northern war-lords, since the days of Yuan Shih-kai, stressed arbitrary unification. But what did they achieve? Contrary to their wishes, they got disunity instead of unity, and finally all of them toppled down. The anti-popular groups in the Kuomintang followed Yuan Shih-kai's course by pursuing arbitrary unity and plunging the nation into ten years of civil war, resulting in the invitation of the Japanese aggressors into China. They retreated to Mount Omei, where they still continue to boast about their theory of arbitrary unification. But who will listen to them? Is there any patriotic, conscientious Chinese willing to listen to them? Sixteen years of autocratic rule by the Northern war-lords and eighteen years of the Kuomintang dictatorship have taught the people to open their eyes and to demand a democratic unification instead of an arbitrary unification by the dictators. We Kungchantang members proposed the anti-Japanese policy of the National United Front in 1935, and have been fighting for it ever since. In 1939 the Kuomintang, by enforcing its reactionary "Measures for the Restriction of Alien-Party Activities", plunged China into the danger of surrender, disunity and retrogression. While the Kuomintang was vaunting its theory of arbitrary unification, we made it clear that unification could not be achieved by surrendering to the enemy, or by splitting the people and retrogressing, but by fighting against the enemy, uniting the people and progressing, and that only a unification by these latter methods is genuine, the unification by all other methods being false. Six years have elapsed since then, but the problem remains unsolved.

Unification can be achieved only if the people have freedom and democracy. The Chinese people, while striving for freedom, democracy and a coalition government, are striving for unity. We name our demands in the specific programme above for the same end. It is common knowledge that if the dictatorship of the anti-popular groups within the Kuomintang is not abolished and the democratic coalition government not set up, it will be impossible to bring about any democratic reform in Kuomintang-controlled areas, to mobilise the people there for the annihilation of the Japanese aggressors, or to avoid another civil war. The reason why so many partisan and non-partisan democratic

elements, including democratic elements in the Kuomintang, are unanimously demanding a coalition government is because they see in it the only means of overcoming the impending crisis and of attaining unity in the war and in post-war reconstruction.

#### THE ARMY OF THE PEOPLE

The Chinese people want freedom, unity, a coalition government, the annihilation of the Japanese aggressors and the building up of a new China. They can't get what they want if there is not an army of the people, like the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies, which are entirely for the people, and which the anti-popular groups in the Kuomintang have been trying to destroy. In 1944 the Kuomintang Government demanded that the Kungchintang disband four-fifths of the armed forces in our liberated areas "within the specified time". In 1945, during the last negotiations, the Kuomintang Government told the Kungchintang that all the armed forces in the liberated areas must be handed over to it before it could give "legal status" to the Kungchintang.

The Kungchintang was told that it would have freedom once it surrendered its troops. It might be inferred, therefore, that unarmed political parties should have freedom. But in 1924-27 the Kungchintang, then directing a small army, enjoyed comparative freedom, which it lost when the Kuomintang Government adopted the policy of "purge and kill." The China Democratic League, as well as democratic elements within the Kuomintang, does not have troops or freedom. The workers, peasants, students, progressive cultural workers, educators and industrialists under the Kuomintang Government's rule have no freedom. Is it because they have an army, carried on "feudalistic partition", set up a "traitorous government", or disobeyed "administrative and military orders"? No, the opposite is true: they have no freedom because they have done none of these things.

"The army belongs to the State." True, an army should belong to the State. But what kind of State? The feudalistic, Fascist dictatorship of the big landowners, big bankers and big compradores? or the New Democratic State of the people? China should be built up only as a New Democratic State with a New Democratic coalition government, to which all armed forces should belong, so that it may safeguard the people's freedom and effectively protect them against foreign aggressors. The armed forces in the liberated areas will be handed over to the New Democratic coalition government and the Joint Supreme Command once these organs are established in China; but at the same time all Kuomintang troops must be handed over to them too.

To defeat the Japanese aggressors and build up a new China, to attain freedom and unity, to prevent further civil wars and safeguard internal peace, the Chinese people cannot shirk the duty of reforming those Kuomintang troops who always flee before a Japanese advance and whom the Kuomintang employs to oppress the people and in preparation for another civil war, so that they may become an army of the people. The rank and file and a great number of the officers of the Kuomintang army are good men, who have fought with courage and are actively anti-Japanese. Unwilling to be opposed to the Kungchintang, the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army or the liberated areas, they have been forced to take an anti-popular stand by the Kuomintang Supreme Command and corrupt generals who, in direct contravention of the democratic tradition of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, have assumed defeatist, Fascist leadership, by taking up reactionary political work and setting up a network of Secret Police organisations. They are placed in a very grave situation; their internal, as well as public, relations are extremely strained; their combat strength is feeble, and they live under painful conditions. Moreover, the Kuomintang's faulty conscription system forbids the people to arm themselves for the defence of their own land. All this has to be reformed and cannot be allowed to continue. This is also the demand not only of the Chinese people, but also of the Allied Press, as well as the rank and file and a great number of officers of the Kuomintang army.

Dr. Sun Yat-sen said in 1924: "Today marks the beginning of a new era in the National Revolution. . . . We must first wed our armed might to the people, and then identify it with the people." The Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, by following this direction, become the armed might of the people, and therefore are often victorious. The Kuomintang army was victorious in the early stages of the Northern Expedition because it was united to the people. Since then it has been put to anti-popular uses, and therefore has been steadily degenerating. It is good at fighting civil wars, but no good at fighting foreign aggressors. Every patriotic, conscientious officer in the Kuomintang army should try to regain Dr. Sun Yat-sen's spirit by reforming the troops under his command.

While reforming the old army, proper education should be given to those officers willing to learn, so that they may learn to correct their old views and to serve in the army of the people.

To create an army of the Chinese people is the responsibility of the whole nation, including all democratic political parties. Without a people's army, nothing popular can be achieved. We must not simply talk about this problem, but should act.

We Kungchantang members are willing to assist in the re-forming of Chinese forces. The Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies should regard all those in favour of national unity and those anti-Japanese troops not hostile to the liberated areas, as friendly forces, and should give them proper assistance.

#### THE LAND PROBLEM

To annihilate the Japanese aggressors and build up a new China it is necessary to effect agrarian reforms and bring about the emancipation of the peasants. Dr. Sun Yat-sen's policy that gives "the tiller his fields" is a correct policy at the present stage of the bourgeois-democratic revolution.

Why do we call the present stage of the revolution "bourgeois-democratic"? Because what the revolution wants to eliminate now is not the capitalist class, but imperialist and feudalist oppression; the revolution does not want generally to abolish private property, but wants to protect private property; the revolution will pave the way for the development of capitalism. "Land for the tiller" means the transfer of land from the hands of feudalist exploiters to the hands of peasants, so that the peasants may be freed from their feudal relationship with the land, agriculture may be advanced from its old backwardness to the modern level, and industry may be furnished with a market, thus creating the possibility of changing the nation's agricultural character into an industrial one. So, "land for the tiller" is a democratic policy of the bourgeoisie class, not a socialist policy of the proletariat. It is the policy of all revolutionary democratic groups, not of the Kungchantang alone. We Kungchantang members act differently from the others, in that we take the policy seriously: we not only talk about it, but also act upon it. But who are the revolutionary democratic groups? The proletariat is of course the most thorough of revolutionary democrats. Besides the proletariat, the peasants form the largest revolutionary democratic group. All peasants, with the exception of those rich farmers unable to shake off their tails of feudalism, are actively demanding "land for the tiller". The petit bourgeoisie in cities and towns are another revolutionary democratic group, because the development of agricultural productivity, made possible by the policy of "land for the tiller", benefits them. The bourgeoisie form a vacillating group: they favour the policy of "land for the tiller" because they, too, want a market; but some of them fear the policy because they own land. Those who are resolutely opposed to the policy are the anti-popular groups within the Kuomintang because they represent the class of big landowners, big banker

and big compradores. As there is no political party in China representing exclusively the peasant class, and as political parties representing the bourgeoisie class lack a solid land programme, the Kungchantang, which has a solid land programme, which really fights for the interests of the peasants and looks upon them as its allies, naturally becomes the leader of the peasants and all other revolutionary democratic groups.

In the years from 1927 to 1936 the Kungchantang carried out Dr. Sun's policy of "land for the tiller". Those worthless followers of Dr. Sun Yat-sen—the anti-popular group in the Kuomintang—revealed their true colours when they began to wage a ten-year anti-popular war, a war against the policy of "land for the tiller".

Since the outbreak of the present war the Kungchantang has made a great concession by replacing the policy of "land for the tiller" with the policy of rent and interest reduction. The concession is right: it precipitated the Kuomintang's participation in the anti-Japanese war and united the landowners in the liberated areas with the peasants in their fight against the Japanese aggressors. If no unusual difficulty arises, we intend to let it stand after the war. We will first carry out the reduction of rent and interest through the entire country, and then gradually realise "land for the tiller" in a suitable way.

But the renegades of Dr. Sun's principles are opposed not only to the policy of "land for the tiller", but also to the reduction of rent and interest. The Kuomintang Government did promulgate such decrees as "25% Reduction of Rent", but they have never been enforced. It labels the liberated areas "traitorous areas", because there these decrees are put into effect.

A fallacious theory made its appearance after the outbreak of the war. It was called the "Theory of Two Stages—the Nationalist Stage and the Democratic Livelihood Stage".

"We should not bring out the problem of democracy and the people's livelihood while the Japanese are still here"—such is the fallacious theory advanced by the anti-popular groups in the Kuomintang, who do not want a complete victory in the war against Japan. Some people are foolish enough to believe in it.

"We cannot drive the Japanese away without first having solved the problems of democracy and the people's livelihood"—such is the correct opinion held by China's revolutionary democratic groups. It has been proved to be right by the whole course of modern Chinese history, especially by the history of the eight years of anti-Japanese war, and by the anti-Fascist struggles of the French, Italian, Polish, Yugoslav, Bulgarian, Rumanian and Hungarian people. In Poland they are distributing "land to the tiller", instead of reducing rent and interest, as we are doing.

The reduction of rent and interest and other democratic reforms are not isolated acts, but are related to the anti-Japanese war, to which everything should be made subservient. To unite all classes in their fight against the common foe, we do not repudiate the landowner's right of possession, but instead, allow him to collect reasonable rent and interest, encourage him to invest his capital in industrial enterprises, and at the same time invite the enlightened gentry and other popular representatives to participate in social and governmental work. The rich farmer we encourage to increase their production. All this is implied in the course of carrying out rural, democratic reforms, and is entirely necessary.

Two courses exist: the determined opposition to the solution of the problems of democracy and livelihood for the peasants, thus rendering the nation powerless against the onslaughts of the Japanese, or assisting the peasants in their solution of the problems of democracy and livelihood, thus raising the nation's anti-Japanese strength by securing the support of 80% of the nation's population. The former is taken by the Kuomintang Government, the latter by the liberated areas.

To vacillate between these two, to profess sympathy with the peasants but abstain from reducing rent and interest, or arming the peasants and setting up democratic institutions in the rural areas, is the course of the opportunists.

With all the forces available to them, the anti-popular groups in the Kuomintang are openly and covertly, politically and militarily assailing the Kungchintang members. The Kuomintang-Kungchintang disputes, as seen in their social character, are basically centred on the peasant problem. We have infuriated the anti-popular groups of the Kuomintang with our approach to this very problem. They, on the other hand, have been applauded and encouraged by the Japanese aggressors, because they have greatly helped the Japanese by their approach to this problem. Such vituperatives as "the Kungchintang members are undermining the war of resistance and jeopardising the nation", "the perfidious party", "the traitorous army", "the traitorous areas", and "disobeying of Government and military orders" are heaped on the Kungchintang because it has been solving this problem to the advantage of our national interests.

The peasants are the potential reinforcements of China's army of workers. Millions of them will go to the cities and into factories. If China wants to build up a powerful national industry and modern cities, then she has to undergo the lengthy process of adapting the rural population to city life.

The peasants are a powerful factor in China's industry. They

alone can supply it with enough food and raw material, and consume the largest part of its products.

The peasants are the source of our armies. Our soldiers are peasants in military uniform. They are the mortal enemies of the Japanese aggressors.

The peasants are the main foundation on which China's democracy rests. Chinese democrats can achieve nothing if they do not depend on the 360,000,000 peasants for help.

The peasants are the main foundation on which rests China's cultural movement. Divorced from the 360,000,000 peasants, all illiteracy-elimination campaigns, the so-called universal education, popular literature and national health campaigns, are devoid of meaning.

I said "main foundation", because I would not ignore the political, economic and cultural importance of the rest of about 90,000,000 people, particularly the working class, politically the most conscious of all classes of the Chinese people and the qualified leader of all democratic movements. This should be made clear.

To understand all this is necessary not only for the Kungchintang members, but for other democratic groups as well.

The peasant's interest in production will be increased once land reforms—even preliminary reforms such as reduction of rent and interest—are carried out. By degrees the peasants will be organised, on a voluntary basis, into agricultural production co-operatives or other co-operatives, so as to develop their production power. Such agricultural production co-operatives at present can only be collective, mutual-aid labour organisations such as labour-exchange corps and mutual-aid groups, built on the peasant's individual economic basis (the peasant's private property), but the development of his productive power and the increase in productive capacity are astonishing. This system, universally adopted in the liberated areas, should be extended to other areas in the future.

It should be pointed out here that co-operative organisations, such as labour-exchange corps, are all institutions among the peasants, but they were the product of the peasant's miserable life. The labour-exchange corps in the liberated areas are now different from the old ones in form as well as in essence. They are an expression of the peasant's effort to develop his own productive power and to strive for better living conditions. The extent of the beneficial effect on the Chinese people of the policy of all Chinese political parties and its practice is largely measured by the degrees of its assistance to the development of the people's productive power. The Chinese people welcome the annihilation

of the Japanese aggressors, the carrying out of agrarian reforms, the emancipation of the peasantry, the development of modern industry, and the building up of a new, independent, free, democratic, unified and prosperous China. These alone can free China's productive power.

It should also be pointed out that educated people, who came from the cities to work in the rural villages, cannot easily understand the characteristics of the backward individual economy in the rural villages and in the liberated areas, the additional characteristics of the enemy's influence and guerrilla warfare. Failure to understand these characteristics has caused them to view rural problems and do rural work by city standards, and as a result they drift away from reality and cannot work in close harmony with the peasants. Such a defect should be corrected through education.

The countless educated Chinese revolutionaries should be aware of the necessity of allying themselves to the peasants, who need them and are waiting for their help. They should go to the rural villages, exchange their students' clothes for the garb of the peasants, condescend to do even the most trivial work, try to understand the peasants' demands, help to arouse the peasants and organise them, and fight for the completion of an important task in China's democratic revolution—the democratic revolution of the rural villages.

After annihilating the Japanese aggressors, landed property belonging to them and to the principal traitors should be confiscated and distributed among these peasants having little or no land.

#### THE INDUSTRIAL PROBLEM

To defeat the Japanese aggressors and build up a new China it is necessary to develop our industry. But as the financial and economic policy of the Kuomintang Government, which depends on foreign Powers for everything, undermines the nation's economic life, the only light industries in the Kuomintang-controlled areas are mostly in a state of bankruptcy. If this policy is allowed to continue, all productive power, industrial and agricultural, will be paralysed.

General speaking, a China without independence, freedom, democracy and unity cannot be an industrial China. Independence can be gained through the annihilation of the Japanese aggressors; freedom, democracy and unity can be attained by abolishing the Kuomintang dictatorship, setting up a democratic coalition government, freeing, unifying and arming the people, instituting land reforms and freeing the peasants. Again, without independence, freedom, democracy and unity there cannot be a

truly large-scale national industry. And without an industry there will be no powerful national defence, no happiness for the people, no prosperity for the nation. This has been proved by the history of the 105 years after the Opium War, particularly the history of the eighteen years of Kuomintang rule. China can be prosperous only if she is not colonial or semi-colonial but independent, not semi-feudal but free and democratic, not torn into pieces but unified. In the past, numerous people had hoped to develop the nation's industry, build up the nation's defence, make the people happy and the nation prosperous in the semi-colonial, semi-feudal and disunited China, but their hopes were invariably frustrated. Many well-intentioned educators, scientists and students, ignorant of politics, had hoped to serve the nation, but their hopes were also dashed. This is good, because this rude awakening from infantile dreams means the starting-point of a prosperous China. The Chinese people have learned a great deal in their war of resistance. They know, for instance, that it is necessary to build up an independent, free, democratic, united, prosperous, New Democratic China after the Japanese aggressors have been annihilated, because the freeing of the Chinese people's productive power and its full development are dependent on the establishment of the New Democratic political conditions in the whole of China. More and more people come to appreciate this truth every day.

Having established the New Democratic political conditions, the Chinese people and their Government should take practical steps to build up light and heavy industries gradually and within a specified number of years, so that China may be raised from the position of an agricultural nation to that of an industrial nation. China's New Democratic independence, freedom, democracy and unity cannot stand firm if they are not built on a solid economic foundation, on the foundation of an agricultural industry far more advanced than it is, on the foundation of large-scale industries that weigh heavily in the nation's economic scale, with corresponding advancement in communication, commercial and financial enterprises.

We Kungchantang members are willing to fight for the objectives mentioned above in co-operation with all anti-Japanese democratic parties and groups, and industrialists. The Chinese labouring class will be a powerful factor in this fight.

Since the first world war the Chinese labouring class has been fighting on its own initiative for the independence and emancipation of China. In 1921 its vanguard, the Kungchantang, was born. Since then the struggle for China's emancipation has entered upon a new phase. The Chinese labouring class and its

vanguard have contributed much to the cause of China's emancipation in the three periods of the Northern Expedition, the Agrarian Revolution and the Anti-Japanese War. In the final elimination of the Japanese aggressors, especially in the recovering of big cities and communication centres, the contribution of the Chinese labouring class will be great. It may be predicted that their effort and contribution after the conclusion of the anti-Japanese war will be much greater. The Chinese labouring class fights not only for China's independence, freedom, democracy and unity, but also for her industrialisation and agricultural modernisation.

The New Democratic system of government will adopt the policy of harmonising the relationship between capital and labour. The interests of workers will be protected. An eight to ten-hour-day system, according to varying circumstances, will be established, as well as suitable relief for the unemployed, social security and the rights of labour unions. On the other hand, the proper profits of State, private and co-operative enterprises will be protected. Thus both labour and capital will work jointly for the development of industrial production.

Large amounts of capital will be needed for the development of our industries. They will come chiefly from the accumulated wealth of the Chinese people, and in a lesser degree from foreign assistance. We welcome foreign investments if such are beneficial to China's economy and are made in observance of China's laws. What is beneficial to both the Chinese people and foreigners is that China, after winning a firm internal and international peace and instituting thorough political and agrarian reforms, will be able to develop her large-scale light and heavy industries and modernised agriculture. On this basis we shall be able to absorb vast amounts of foreign investments. A politically backward and economically impoverished China will be unprofitable not only to the Chinese people, but also to foreigners.

With the annihilation of the Japanese aggressors, the enterprises and property they and the principal traitors now own are to be confiscated and placed at the disposal of the Government.

#### CULTURE, EDUCATION AND THE INTELLIGENTSIA

Among the miseries inflicted upon the Chinese people by imperialistic and feudalistic oppression is the suffering of our national culture, particularly the progressive cultural and educational enterprises, cultural workers and educators. To wipe this out and to build a new democratic China, we need a large number of educators, teachers, scientists, engineers, technicians, doctors

journalists, writers, artists and general cultural workers who will serve the people and mix with them. These intellectuals, if they have done meritorious service to the people, should be respected by their Government and society in general, and be regarded as the precious possession of the nation and society. The intellectuals problem is particularly important in China, because we are culturally backward owing to imperialistic and feudalistic oppression, and because China urgently needs a large number of intellectuals for the fight for her own emancipation. In the past fifty years of the people's fight for emancipation, particularly in the struggles since the "May 4th Movement" and in the eight years of the anti-Japanese war, the vast mass of revolutionary intellectuals have contributed much to the Chinese people's emancipation, and will continue to do so in the coming struggles. The Government should in future systematically train all kinds of intellectuals, and should pay attention to the unification and education of those now available.

To wipe out illiteracy from 80% of the nation's population is a necessary condition for building up a new China.

Suitable and determined measures should be taken to wipe out all slave, feudalistic and Fascist culture and education.

Active reform and relief measures should be taken in dealing with the ignorance of health rules and disease, caused by imperialistic and feudalistic oppression, which has enervated the Chinese people physically and morally, and national health enterprises should be encouraged.

Those cultural and educational workers and physicians of the old school should be properly re-educated, so that they may be taught to see things differently and be made to serve the people.

The aims of China's national culture and education should be New Democratic—that is to say, China should build up her own new, national, scientific and popular culture and educational system.

Towards foreign culture it is wrong to take a hostile attitude. Progressive foreign culture should be absorbed as much as possible for the benefit of China's cultural movement. But it would also be wrong to copy it slavishly. Foreign culture should be critically absorbed on the basis of the practical needs of the Chinese people. Similarly, ancient Chinese culture should neither be repudiated totally nor blindly swallowed, but should be critically accepted for the promotion of China's New Democratic culture.

Under the general policy of fighting for the emancipation of the Chinese people, we Kungchantang members should join hands with all intellectuals irrespective of class, religion or political affiliations.

## RACIAL MINORITIES

The anti-popular groups within the Kuomintang deny the existence of different races in China, and call the Mongolians, the Mohammedans, the Tibetans, the Yis, the Miaos and the Yaos "clans from a common ancestor". They followed the same reactionary policy taken by the Manchu and the Northern militarist Governments by oppressing and exploiting these minorities. The massacre of certain Mongolians in 1943, the use of force against certain Sinkiang tribes since 1944, and the mass killing of Kansu Mohammedans in recent years, are proof of this. The Fascist Pan-Hanism, diametrically opposite to Dr. Sun Yat-sen's principles, comes from false nationalism and a wrong racial policy.

In the Manifesto of the First National Congress of the Kuomintang (1924), Dr. Sun Yat-sen said: "The Nationalism of the Kuomintang has a two-fold meaning: the self-emancipation of the Chinese nation, and the equality of all races in China." Then he said: "The Kuomintang can state with solemnity that it recognises the right of self-determination of all races in China, and that we will organise a freely united Chinese republic (*i.e.*, formed with the voluntary consent of the various races) as soon as the war against imperialism and war-lords is victoriously concluded."

The Kungchintang is in complete accord with Dr. Sun's racial policy indicated above. All the Kungchintang members should actively assist the masses of the various racial minorities in their fight for the realisation of that policy. They should assist the people of the racial minorities, including the popular leaders, in their fight for political, economic, and cultural emancipation and development, as well as for the establishment of their own armed forces to protect their own interests. Their language, custom and religious belief should be respected.

The attitude of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region and North China Liberated Areas Governments towards the Mongolians and Mohammedans has been correct. Their efforts towards these peoples are fruitful.

## FOREIGN RELATIONS

The Kungchintang agrees to the principles of the Atlantic Charter and the resolutions of the Moscow, Cairo, Teheran and Crimea Conferences, because they are helpful to the defeat of the Fascist aggressors and the maintenance of world peace.

The Kungchintang fervently approves in particular the decisions of the Crimea Conference, which calls for the ultimate defeat of Fascist Germany, the extirpation of Fascism and its

causes, the wiping out of the last vestiges of Fascism in liberated Europe, the establishment of internal peace in the various countries, and the setting up of democratic systems chosen by the people of the various nations. Regarding the procedure of setting up these democratic systems, the Crimea Conference decided that provisional governmental authorities, "broadly representative of all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment through free election of governments responsive to the will of the people", should be formed. The Crimea Conference also decided that Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union should stand united for the maintenance of a firm and durable world peace and for the early establishment of a world peace organisation.

We consider the course taken at the Crimea Conference as in conformity with the Kungchintang's fundamental policy towards the solution of Eastern and Chinese problems. Respecting the annihilation of the Japanese aggressors and the solution of Chinese problems, the following points must be achieved: firstly, the Japanese aggressors must be finally defeated and Japanese Fascism, militarism and their causes must be utterly destroyed, but there should be no half-way compromises; secondly, the last vestiges of Fascism in China must be wiped out—none should be permitted to remain; thirdly, China must establish internal peace, there should be no further civil wars; fourthly, the Kuomintang dictatorship must be brought to an end. Two steps, both essential, should be taken after the abolition of the Kuomintang dictatorship: (1) a nationally supported, provisional coalition government, formed by the representatives of all the democratic elements in the Chinese population, should be set up; and (2) after the liberation of all Chinese territory, a regular coalition government, responsive to the will of the people, should be established through free and unrestricted election. We must do this in accordance with the Crimea decisions and our own national demands.

The fundamental principles in the Kungchintang's foreign policy are the establishment and consolidation of friendly relations with foreign nations on the basis of the annihilation of the Japanese aggressors, the maintenance of world peace, mutual respect for each other's independence and equal status, and the mutual promotion of national and popular interests and friendship, as well as the solution of all war-time and post-war problems, such as the co-ordination of action in the war, the peace conference, trade, foreign investments, etc.

Respecting the establishment of an international organisation for the maintenance of world peace and security, the Kungchintang completely agrees to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals and



the Crimea decisions concerning this problem. The Kungchatang welcomes the United Nations Conference in San Francisco. It has sent its own delegate to join the Chinese delegation to San Francisco, as a means of expressing the will of the Chinese people.

We maintain that the Kuomintang Government must desist from taking a hostile attitude towards the Soviet Union and improve the Sino-Soviet relationship. The Soviet Union was the first nation to abrogate the unequal treaties and to sign equal new treaties with China. During the First Kuomintang National Congress, summoned by Dr. Sun Yat-sen himself in 1924, and the subsequent Northern Expedition, the Soviet Union was the only nation that assisted China in her fight for emancipation. In 1937, when the war of resistance broke out, the Soviet Union was again the first to come to the aid of China in her fight against the Japanese aggressors. The Chinese people are grateful to the Soviet Government and its people for their help. We maintain that the final, thorough solution of Pacific problems is impossible without the participation of the Soviet Union.

We are also grateful to Britain and the United States, particularly the latter, for their immense contribution to the common cause—the defeat of the Japanese aggressors, and for their sympathy with the Chinese people and their help.

But we ask the United Nations Governments, principally the British and the United States Government, to pay serious attention to the voice of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people, so that their foreign policy may not run contrary to the hopes of the Chinese people, and so as to avoid impairing our friendship or losing the friendship of the Chinese people. Any foreign Government that helps the Chinese reactionaries to stop the Chinese people's pursuit of democracy will be committing a grave error.

The Chinese people welcome the action of foreign Governments in abrogating their unequal treaties with China, signing new equal treaties with her, and treating her as an equal. But the signing of equal treaties does not mean that China has really attained equality with other Powers. China cannot attain true equality with other Powers by depending on the good-will of foreign Governments and foreign peoples alone; she must build up herself, politically, economically and culturally, a free, independent, united, prosperous, New-Democratic nation, or she can never truly attain equality with other Powers. In other words, the present policy taken by the Kuomintang Government will not give China true independence and equality.

We maintain that to exterminate Japanese Fascism, militarism

and their political, economic and social causes, we must, after beating the Japanese aggressors and forcing them to surrender unconditionally, help all the democratic forces of the Japanese people to set up a popular democratic system, without which Japanese Fascism and militarism cannot be thoroughly exterminated and peace in the Pacific cannot be secured.

We think the decision to restore Korean independence, reached at the Cairo Conference, is correct. The Chinese people should help the Korean people to liberate themselves.

As the United States has promised the Philippines independence, we hope Britain may do the same to India. An independent, democratic India is not only the need of the Indian people, but also necessary to world peace.

We hope that the British, American, French and Dutch Governments, after helping the peoples of Burma, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies and French Indo-China to defeat the Japanese aggressors, will give them the right to build up their own independent, democratic nations, with the same attitude adopted by the Crimea Conference towards liberated Europe. In the case of Thailand, the treatment accorded the Fascist vassal States in Europe should be used.

The late President Roosevelt once said that the world had shrunk. In fact, the American people, once thought by the Chinese people to be living very far away, are now our next-door neighbours. Together with the British, American, Soviet, French and other peoples of the world, the Chinese people will build up a firm and durable world peace.

So much for our specific programme.

Let me reiterate that, without a nationally supported, democratic coalition government, the successful carrying out of this programme in the entire nation is impossible.

In the twenty-four years of its struggle for the emancipation of the Chinese people, the Kungchatang has created for itself such a position that the political party or social group, Chinese or foreign, that ignores or scorns our opinions will be making a grave mistake. There have been such people who, ignoring or scorning our opinion, act obdurately in accordance with their own, but they invariably fail. Why? Because our opinions, our policy and our New Democratic general and specific programmes for the present stage are in conformity with the interests of the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people. We are the most faithful spokesmen for the Chinese people. Those who dare to ignore or scorn us are in reality ignoring or scorning the overwhelming majority of the Chinese people, and will invariably fail.

## THE TASK IN KUOMINTANG-RULED AREAS

I have now fully dealt with the general and specific programmes of our Party. Doubtless, these programmes are to be carried out all over China; the international and internal situation makes this highly probable. But present circumstances force us to adopt different methods of execution in the three different areas—the Kuomintang-ruled areas, the enemy-occupied areas and the liberated areas. Different circumstances in these three areas demand different types of work, some of which I mentioned above, and some of which I will now explain.

In Kuomintang-controlled areas, the people do not have the freedom to engage themselves in patriotic activities. Democratic movements are considered illegal; but the activities of various groups, democratic parties and democratic elements are steadily developing. The China Democratic League issued in January a manifesto demanding the cessation of the Kuomintang one-party rule and the setting up of a coalition government. Similar manifestoes have been issued by numerous other organisations. A considerable number of members, followers and important personages in the Kuomintang are growingly sceptical about, and dissatisfied with, the policy of the directive organs of their own party. They feel the increasing danger of widening the gulf between the majority of the people and their party, and demand suitable democratic reforms. Centering in Chungking, a democratic movement in which certain workers, peasants, government employees, merchants, industrialists, cultural workers, students, teachers, women and even soldiers participate, is developing. All this indicates that the democratic movements of all oppressed classes are gradually converging on the same objective. The fact that lower social layers have not yet been broadly participating in them, and that the very important and miserable peasants, workers, soldiers and lower ranks of Government employees have not yet been organised, reveals the weaknesses of these movements. Another weakness is the lack of definite and determined spirit on the part of many of the democratic participants towards the making of changes in accordance with democratic principles. However, the international and domestic situation is gradually forcing the oppressed classes, parties, groups and individuals to awakening and solidarity, and to claim their right of fighting the Japanese and saving the country. However bitterly it may try, the Kuomintang Government will not be able to arrest the development of these movements.

The democratic movements undertaken by the oppressed classes, parties, groups and individuals in the Kuomintang-con-

trolled areas should be extensively developed; their scattered forces should be united, so that they can fight better for the realisation of national unification and a coalition government, for the defeat of the Japanese aggressors and the building up of a new China. The Kungchintang and the liberated areas should give them all possible aid.

In the Kuomintang-controlled areas, Kungchintang members should continue to carry out the broad policy of the anti-Japanese National United Front. They should join forces with anybody, even those who were hostile to us, but are no longer so, and fight for the common objective. Everything done by the Kungchintang members should be done for the general objective of mobilising and unifying all forces, annihilating the Japanese aggressors, and building up a new China.

## THE TASK IN ENEMY-OCCUPIED AREAS

In enemy-occupied areas, Kungchintang members should rally all anti-Japanese people and organise them, after the fashion of the French and Italian underground armies, into societies and underground forces, so that when the time is ripe they can rise, and, together with the regular armies attacking from outside, annihilate the Japanese aggressors. Our people in enemy-occupied areas, infuriated by the Japanese aggressors and their minions, who rob them, violate their women and humiliate them in every conceivable way, are waiting for the time to avenge themselves. These people, heartened by the victories of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, which have greatly enhanced their anti-Japanese feeling, urgently need to be organised, to be prepared for their own liberation. Therefore we must raise the work in enemy-occupied areas to the same important status as that in the liberated areas. Large numbers of agents must be sent to work in the occupied areas; large numbers of the active elements in the occupied areas must be singled out for training. We should intensify our underground work in the four north-eastern provinces, for they have been under enemy occupation longer than any other area and they form an industrial centre and an important military base for the Japanese aggressors. Exiles from the north-eastern provinces should be unified for the task of recovering their homes.

In all enemy-occupied areas Kungchintang members should carry out the very broad policy of the anti-Japanese National United Front by joining hands with anybody who is opposed to the Japanese aggressors and their minions in the fight against the common enemy.

It is necessary to warn the puppet troops and police, who help

the enemy to oppress their own people, that they should repent of their criminal conduct in time and help the people in their fight against the enemy, if they want to make amends for their crimes, or they will be severely dealt with once the enemy collapses.

Kungchantang members and anti-Japanese elements should persuade all puppet organisations with mass following to stand on the anti-Japanese front. They should also keep a record of all unrepentant traitors who persist in their criminal conduct, so that charges may be preferred against them as soon as the territory is cleared of the Japanese.

Reactionary elements and traitors within the Kuomintang should be warned against their oppression of the people, the Kungchantang, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, and other criminal acts. They should be told to repent their crimes, or they will certainly be severely punished as soon as all lost territory has been recovered.

#### THE TASK IN THE LIBERATED AREAS

Our New Democratic programme has the fervent support of the people in the liberated areas, where the carrying out of this programme has achieved prominent results and has gathered together huge anti-Japanese forces. These forces should be further developed and consolidated.

Under the present conditions the armed forces of the liberated areas should attack all places newly or long occupied by the enemy but weakly defended, so as to extend the liberated areas into enemy-occupied territory.

But at the same time it should be noted that the enemy is still very strong, and will certainly attack the liberated areas if the opportunity presents itself. The armed forces and the people of the liberated areas should hold themselves in readiness for any enemy advance, and should consolidate their positions.

The regular armies, guerrilla units, the militia and the self-defence corps in the liberated areas should be fully expanded; their combat strength should be increased by perfecting their organisation, that they may carry out strategic operations in conjunction with Allied moves.

In the liberated areas members of the armed forces should co-operate with the civil administration and be friendly towards the population, while the governments should lead the people in giving the armed forces support and treating well the families of soldiers, so that the relations between the army and the people may be further improved.

In their work in the popularly elected "One-Third System" governments (regional coalition governments) in the various

liberated areas and in their social work, Kungchantang members should continue to follow their old policy by closely co-operating, on the basis of their New Democratic programme, with all anti-Japanese democratic elements irrespective of class, political affiliation and religion.

Similarly, in their military work Kungchantang members should collaborate with all anti-Japanese democratic elements, in and out of the armed forces, of the liberated areas, in building a powerful people's army for the annihilation of the Japanese aggressors and the defence of the nation.

To strengthen the resistance and productive effort of the workers, peasants and the labouring masses, the policy of a suitable, definite reduction of rent and interest and better treatment of workers and employees should continue to be followed. Government workers in the liberated areas must learn how to do economic work. All available force must be mobilised for the large-scale development of agriculture, industry and trade in the liberated areas, for the improvement of the army's and the people's living conditions, and for the preparation of material conditions necessary to the waging of a protracted war and the annihilation of the Japanese aggressors. Labour contests should be held, and labour heroes and model workers should be rewarded. After annihilating the Japanese aggressors in our cities, our Government workers should learn in a short time to do economic work in the cities.

To increase the degree of awakening of the people in the liberated areas, especially the countless workers, peasants and soldiers, and to train large numbers of Government workers, culture and education should be developed. While engaging in their pursuits, cultural and educational workers should base the contents and the form of their work on the characteristics of today's rural villages, on the needs of the rural populace, and on the people's degree of willingness to learn.

In embarking on our work in the liberated areas, local manpower and material resources must be used as sparingly as possible. We must take the long view and avoid misuse and waste. This is essential in order to defeat the Japanese aggressors and build up a new China.

While embarking on our work, we should pay special attention to encouraging the local populace to handle their own affairs; thus the more capable elements should be singled out for training, to make them into local government workers. The huge task of democratic revolution in the rural villages could not be accomplished if outsiders would not thoroughly mix with the local populace, if they would not help the local government.

workers with ardour and diligence, if they would not love them as they love their brothers and sisters.

The Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and other popular troops should help the people to organise militia units and self-defence corps, as well as regional units and army corps, all led by officers selected from the local populace. In this way regular armies, led by local leaders, may be formed. This is a very important task, and, if it is not accomplished, the establishment of strong anti-Japanese bases and the development of a people's army will be impossible.

Naturally, the local populace should welcome and help Government workers and troops from other places, so that a common cause may be served.

I should call your attention to the problem of dealing with disguised disrupters of national unity. Open enemies and national unity disrupters are easily recognised, and therefore can be dealt with accordingly. But disguised enemies and disrupters are hard to recognise, and therefore difficult to deal with. We should forever be on the look-out for them.

In accordance with the principle of religious freedom, all religions are allowed to exist in the liberated areas. The Government will protect all Protestants, Catholics, Mohammedans, Buddhists and other religious believers, if they observe its laws and decrees. It is forbidden to force people to accept any religion or to discriminate against unbelievers.

This Congress should propose to the people of the various liberated areas to hold at the earliest possible moment a People's Assembly of the Liberated Areas at Yen-an, which will discuss the unification of the actions of the various liberated areas, the intensification of anti-Japanese work in the liberated areas, the assistance to the people's anti-Japanese, democratic movement in the Kuomintang-controlled areas, the assistance to the people's underground army movement in occupied areas, and the promotion of the cause of national unification and the coalition government. The liberated areas have in reality become the centre on which the majority of the people depend for continued resistance and national salvation. The people have pinned their hopes on us, and we must not disappoint them. The convocation of the People's Assembly of the Liberated Areas will be a great propelling force to the cause of the Chinese people's national emancipation.

### **5. All Party Members, Unite and Fight for the Realisation of our Mission!**

Comrades! Our mission is great and our policy is definite and

clear. What attitude should we adopt in carrying out this policy and mission?

Obviously and indubitably, the internal and domestic situation has revealed a bright future for the Chinese people and us. It has created unprecedentedly favourable conditions. But, at the same time, grave difficulties still exist. Those who can see only the bright side will not be able to fight well for the realisation of the Party's mission.

In the twenty-four years of the Party's history and in the eight years of the anti-Japanese war we have created a great force out of the Chinese people. In this respect our accomplishments are obvious and indubitable. Yet certain defects still exist in our work. Those who see only the results and not the defects will not be able to fight well for the realisation of the Party's mission.

Since its birth in 1921 the Kungchantang has experienced three great struggles—the Northern Expedition, the Agrarian revolution, and the still raging Anti-Japanese War. From the very beginning our Party has based itself on the theories of Marxism, because Marxism is the crystallisation of the world proletariat's most impeccable, revolutionary scientific thought. The universal truth of Marxism, once welded to the concrete condition of the Chinese revolution, has changed the appearance of the Chinese revolution and gave birth to the New Democratic stage of history. The Kungchantang, armed with the theories of Marxism, has created for itself a new working style, principally the working style of combining theory with practice, of closely collaborating with the masses, and self-criticism.

The universal truth of Marxism, reflected in the struggles of the proletariat all over the world, becomes a useful weapon to the Chinese people only when it is wedded to the concrete conditions of the revolutionary struggles of the Chinese proletariat and people. The Kungchantang has achieved this union. The development and progress of our Party originated in the determined fight against the dogmatism and empiricism that repudiate the universal truth of Marxism. Dogmatism holds itself aloof from actual practice, while empiricism mistakes local experiences for the universal truth; neither of these opportunist ideas is in conformity with Marxism. In its twenty-four years of struggle our Party has been overcoming such erroneous thinking, greatly consolidating itself in this respect. We have now about 1,210,000 Party members, most of whom joined the Party in the anti-Japanese war. Some of these members, as well as some who joined the Party before the anti-Japanese war, still entertain various erroneous ideas. Years of ideology-remoulding work

have eliminated many of these ideas. But this work should be continued, and the thought-education inside the Party should be intensified. All key Party workers throughout the land should be made to understand that the close union of theory and practice is a salient feature by which the Kungchintang is distinguished from all other political parties. Therefore the mastery of thought-education is the principal factor in consolidating the Party for its great political struggle. Without this mastery the Party's political tasks will not be accomplished.

Another salient feature by which the Kungchintang can be distinguished from all other parties is the very close relationship between it and the great majority of the people. We begin by devoting ourselves to serving the Chinese people, determined not to desert them for a single moment, serving the interests of the people and not the interests of any particular group or individual and holding ourselves responsible to the people as well as to our directing agencies. Kungchintang members must always be ready to uphold truth, because all truth is in conformity with the people's interests. Kungchintang members must always be ready to rectify what is wrong, because what is wrong means what is against the people's interests. The experience of our twenty-four years has taught us that all correct tasks, policies and working style are in conformity with the demands of the people in a particular time and place, and they are never separated from the people. All erroneous tasks, policies and working styles are not conforming to the people's demands and are unconnected with the people. Dogmatism, empiricism, authoritarianism, sectarianism, bureaucracy, militarism and arrogance are undesirable because they alienate the people. Such things should be rectified. This Congress should warn every comrade in every link of the Party work not to allow himself to be estranged from the people. Every comrade should learn to love the people, to listen to them carefully, to mix with them instead of overlooking them, to develop and raise the consciousness of the masses with due consideration to their intelligence, and to help them if they are willing, to organise themselves gradually for all necessary struggles. Authoritarianism is wrong because its impetuosity tends to ignore the people's understanding and their will. Our comrades must not assume that the people understand what they themselves have understood. We must go to the masses if we want to know whether they understand what we have done and whether they are willing to do as they are told. In this way we can avoid authoritarianism. Our comrades must not assume that the people cannot understand what they themselves have not yet understood. Often the people overtake us. They want to go for-

ward, but our comrades, instead of leading them on, keep airing the views of some of the laggards and mistaking these views for the views of the people. In short, every comrade should be made to understand that everything a Kungchintang member says or does is judged by its conformity with the major interests of the majority of the people or its acceptability by the majority of the people. Every comrade should be made to understand that as long as we rely upon the people, have confidence in their inexhaustible creative power, trust them and join forces with them, no difficulty will be too great to be overcome and no enemy will be able to crush us, but, on the contrary, we shall be able to crush our enemies.

Yet another salient feature by which we can be distinguished from members of other parties is our serious self-criticism. We have frequently said that a house should often be cleaned, or dust will gather in it, and that our face should often be washed, or it will get dirty. The ideas of our comrades and the work of our Party can often get dusty, and should also be cleaned. "A running stream does not get putrid; a door-pivot does not get worm-eaten", illustrates the resistance of continual motion to contaminating influence or erosive action. To us, the most effective means of resisting the contaminating influence of political microbes is the constant review of our work, always with a view to widening the democratic practice, the ability to take criticism and self-criticism without flinching, and the putting into practice of the ancient adages, "Say what is in your mind and without reservation," "The speaker is not to be blamed, while the listener should take notice," "Rectify your errors if you made any; strive to excel yourself if you have made none." We have been able to reap the fruits of our ideology-remoulding movement mainly because we launched in that movement a successful campaign of correct and serious criticism and self-criticism. Are we Kungchintang members, who serve the major interests of the majority of the people, who are confident that our case is just and are always ready to sacrifice our own lives for it, unwilling to part company with any erroneous idea, viewpoint, opinion or measure that does not conform to the people's demands? Are we willing to allow our clean appearance and sound bodies to be dirtied by political dust or defiled by political microbes? Countless revolutionary heroes have given up their lives for the interests of the people; cannot we give up our personal interests or erroneous ideas?

Comrades! As soon as this Congress is over we will go to the battlefield, to defeat the Japanese aggressors and build up a new China, in accordance with the resolutions taken by this Congress.

To attain this end we must be united with all the Chinese people. Let me repeat: we must join hands with anyone who favours the defeating of the Japanese aggressors and the building up of a new China, irrespective of his class or political affiliation. To do this well, we must, under the organisation and discipline of democratic centralisation, keep the Party more powerful and united than ever. We must join hands with any comrade who is willing to abide by the Party's platform, statutes and resolutions. In the period of the Northern Expedition our Party had only 50,000 members, most of whom were later killed or dispersed by the then enemy. In the Agrarian Revolution period we had about 300,000 members, a large number of whom were also killed or dispersed later. Now we have over 1,200,000 members and this time we cannot be killed or dispersed by the enemy. We can make good use of our experience of these three periods if, by taking a humble instead of an arrogant attitude, we stand together in greater solidarity and are more closely united with all the Chinese people, then it is certain that we shall not be dispersed by the enemy, but shall instead thoroughly exterminate the Japanese aggressors and their faithful servants, and, after exterminating them, shall build up an independent, free, democratic, united and prosperous China.

The experience of the three revolutions, especially the experience of the anti-Japanese war, has made the Chinese people and us believe that without the efforts of the Kungchintang, without the support given to the Chinese people by the Kungchintang members, China's independence, freedom, democracy and unification, or her industrialisation and agricultural modernisation are impossible.

Comrades! I strongly believe that the Kungchintang, experienced in the three revolutions, can accomplish our gigantic political mission.

Thousands of people and Party heroes have bravely laid down their lives for the interests of the people. Let us, holding the banner high, advance along the path sodden with their blood!

An independent, free, democratic, united and prosperous China will soon be born. Let us welcome the happy day.

Down with the Japanese aggressors!

Long live the emancipation of the Chinese people!

## 2

# JOURNEY IN THE NORTH

By ISRAEL EPSTEIN

*[Israel Epstein, who has lived in China for many years, was one of the most distinguished foreign correspondents who visited the Communist areas in the late spring of 1944. He took a leading part in the demand of correspondents to go to the north and see conditions for themselves. He reported his experiences for the New York Times. These two articles, on the Army and the People, were written for The Statesman, Calcutta, when he left China early this year (1945). They are reprinted here by kind permission of the editor, Mr. Ian Stephens.]*

## I

THE MOST striking thing about the Communist-led areas of China is the extent to which they are mobilised for production and war. The present plight of Kuomintang China shows that, despite the authoritarian form of her government, she has not been able to achieve such mobilisation. The Chinese Communists have achieved it by using almost diametrically opposite methods—a minimum of regulation, elective democracy with the village as its basic unit, reduction of the rent and interest burdens of the peasantry, greater incentive to produce, arising from the peasant's confidence that more work will result in a greater surplus in his own barn, rationalisation of methods and co-operative organisation arising from the heightened desire to produce, and a very pronounced degree of conscious anti-Japanese patriotism, arising from the determination to preserve and give to the peasant greater well-being than he has ever known before.

The Chinese Communists have not eliminated private property—even the property of the landlord. They encourage private industry by exempting all such enterprise from taxation (landlords and peasant proprietors pay taxes). Although they are theoretically opposed to landlordism, they do not eliminate it. They contend that national liberation from Japan comes first, and that to attempt to destroy any class by force or decree is to push it into the arms of the enemy.

Although they are against capitalism, they consider that China today production to support the front is the most important thing, and that every form—State, co-operative and private—must therefore be protected and assisted. This is the policy they want to continue after the war, because they say that Socialism and Communism become the order of the day only when there is an abundance of products. China has no such abundance today, and will not have for many years.

When we entered the Communist area we expected to see the army and people hanging on grimly in the face of the economic and military blockade of their barren borderland, sustained mainly by conviction and determination. We found instead that cultivation was more extensive than in any other part of North-west China, that people were better fed and better dressed, and that a certain amount of industry had developed where there was none before. Five years ago the blockade cut off the importation of cotton cloth, none of which was produced locally. Since then the peasants, encouraged by tax remission and crop insurance, have come to grow 60% of the region's requirements. This is sufficient to provide each inhabitant and soldier with two summer suits and one winter suit (usually cotton padded) each year, and an equivalent amount of yarn is spun, mainly by the women's co-operatives, for weaving by many new mills. The importation of cane sugar from the south has been discontinued. Experiments have been made with sugar beets, which next year (1945) will yield enough for everyone, and in 1946 enough for export.

Blast furnaces and machine-shops were built out of captured Japanese equipment brought across the Yellow River, some with knowledge and much enthusiasm. The people speak of their battle against blockade-strangulation with the same gusto as of the war against Japan and the coming counter-offensive. Alone of all Chinese they show no sign of war-weariness. Yen-an works hard six days a week—ten hours a day for industrial labour, eleven for officials and students. On Saturday night everyone goes to the theatre or a dance (both folk and social dances are popular, and there is no puritanical New Life Movement).

The village election is the foundation of the whole system running up to the Border Region Assembly, which elects the Government. This really represents a revolution in China. In the Kuomintang-administered parts of the country the landlord is not only the economic, but also the political boss of the village, with exclusive contacts with the higher authorities, as well as being its military overlord, by virtue of his private body of armed men or his ability to call on the police and even the army to defend

his extortions. Since there is no representative government, and local courts cannot be relied upon to give a poor illiterate tenant a hearing and justice, very few seek it, and his power is unlimited.

In the Communist-administered areas the landlord is a citizen of the village, like any other citizen, with only one vote. Since the majority of the electors are poor peasants or tenants, the village council and chairman are normally also drawn from these groups (although a popular landlord is sometimes still chosen).

There are no police in the villages, their functions being carried out by the self-defence militia, an armed body of the villagers themselves, with an elected commander. They are subject to the control of the elected village government. Rents in the region have been reduced 25% or more where they were excessive. The maximum legal rent is 37% of the crop. While a similar maximum may be found in the Kuomintang programme and statute books, it is nowhere enforced because of the all-powerful position of the landlord on the spot. In the Communist area, where political power is in the hands of the majority, it is enforced very strictly. The peasant is further protected by a standard rent contract, which he and the landlord sign, and which is witnessed by the Peasant Association. The landlord, on the other hand, has protection for his right to collect the legal rent—from the law and courts of the Border Region or Liberated Area. Government (Yen-an is the centre of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, with 1,500,000 people. The vast majority of the 90,000,000 people under Chinese Communist leadership live in one or other of the fifteen liberated areas behind the Japanese lines in North, Central and South China.)

It may be added here that the Communist Party is not the Government. By and large, two-thirds of the members of representative bodies are not Communists, and the whole structure, while it is of course a creation of the Chinese Communist Party, is by no means its creature. The function of the party, which tries to recruit all the most active elements into its ranks, is to make the system work by propaganda, example and education through mass bodies such as the Peasant Association.

The tax burden of the peasants is reduced because garrison troops, the personnel of the Government institutions, university students and other similar groups have all been given waste land to cultivate, and produce at least a part of their food themselves, lessening dependence on the grain levy. An Eighth Route Army brigade which we visited had reclaimed 25,000 acres and was growing more than twice the amount of food and cotton it required. The surplus was sold to the Government or on the

market, and the proceeds were equally divided among the men in accordance with the number of work-days they had put in.

Eighth Route Army units, from the company upwards, have elected economic committees which supervise rations, the proper expenditure of mess money and so forth. Officers and men sit on these committees on equal terms, and the committees which must produce their accounts on the demand of any soldier see that everyone shares equally from the production of the unit. Some Eighth Route Army men send their production profits home, others invest them in co-operatives, also run by elected committees, whose capital will be used to buy land or machinery which the members can operate after the war, when they are demobilised. Since the main business of the army is not production, but fighting, garrison troops are the only one able to do this, and they, too, are constantly training, working only during the agricultural season. Eighth Route Army troops are rotated whenever possible, and the brigade we saw had returned from three years of warfare behind the enemy lines during which it had penetrated almost to the sea-coast and captured enough enemy arms to equip 60% of its effectives.

The Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region is one of the few areas in China in which there is an excess of land over people. The land is fertile, but subject to flood and drought every three or four years, and under the old social system it was too risky farming for the individual cultivator, harassed by rents and taxes, and without reserves. Generation after generation tried it, only to die of hunger or be forced to migrate with the first crop failure. The Eighth Route Army realised that to exist in such country production in the good years would have to be radically increased, and the peasant would have to be given the opportunity to amass reserves to carry him over the lean periods.

The people were encouraged to form "labour exchange groups"—a form of agricultural co-operative comprising ten or fifteen men and their work-cattle—to rationalise cultivation and economise labour which could be made available for the tillage of waste land. One group of eleven farmers told me that previously each one of them had to drive an ox-cart to his field for manuring and seeding, but now three men took charge of all the carts, while the rest were free for other work. When cooking meals in the fields, each man formerly took almost two hours to build a fire and get his food ready. Now one member does it for the whole group, saving the equivalent of two man-days daily. These examples could be multiplied many times, and the result has been that almost a million acres of previously unused land have been brought under cultivation by the 150,000 members of labour

exchange groups in the Border Region. The slogan in the region is now "Three years' crop every two years", and it has largely been achieved.

The average-peasant has over a year's extra food in storage, and the Government and army have more than this for their own personnel. No wonder the people work hard. Previously they broke their backs for nothing. Now, for the first time in hundreds of years, the North Shensi peasant, through his own efforts, can face a famine year with equanimity.

The "labour-exchange" system has not only introduced co-operative labour on the basis of private property, but has also introduced a new form of co-operative property alongside the private holdings. The waste land cultivated by the group belongs not to the individual, but to the whole organisation, its annual yield being divided by a general meeting according to the labour each man has invested, which is recorded. The possession of common fields consolidates and perpetuates the group and gives a glimpse of the Chinese farming of the future.

One interesting result of the Communist agrarian reforms has been the shifting of landlord capital to industry. Because tenants are richer, and also have ready access to cheap credit from the regional bank, they are always clamouring to be allowed to buy the land they farm. The landlord, whose rent income is less than before, is attracted by industrial investment which, as already stated, is free from taxation.

The new outlook inculcated in the past few years also plays its part. In the Border Region a man speaks proudly of being a soldier, worker, teacher, co-operator or manufacturer, but does not feel too comfortable when he has to admit that he is a landlord—somebody who lives off production without contributing anything to it.

The younger landlords, especially, are beginning to feel that to continue as they are is unpatriotic. One who has just sold his land and started a woollen mill told me, "The land will produce whether I own it or not. Now I can use the money I got for it to increase the sum of production, which the nation needs." He was also making a good profit. The Government and army own arsenals and some uniform factories. Workers, whether in State employment, the army or private factories, are organised into unions and protected by a minimum wage-law. Union representatives are consulted on production schedules, and after this the union is responsible for their fulfilment and for labour discipline.

An interesting feature is that wages are calculated not in money, but in millet—the staple crop—and if they are paid in cash the amount is equivalent to the market price of the respective amount



of millet on the day of payment (there is a free market in millet and the price is not fixed). Inflation and currency fluctuations do not, therefore, affect the real wage.

The workers in the Border Region are interesting people. Among them I met men from all over the world, old sailors and fitters from round-the-world ships, mechanics from Kuomintang arsenals, Chinese workers from Europe who fought in Spain. Many of them are members of the People's Council, the supreme governing body of the Border Region, and I was once measured for a suit by a tailor M.P. Some of the engineers and technical personnel of industry have been educated abroad. Many are not Communists but have come here because they believe it is the region that holds the greatest hope for China.

There are many other things of interest in the political and economic structure of the Border Region. I have not had an opportunity here even to touch on the rich educational and cultural life—universities, music and the theatre. The reason I have devoted the small space available to a consideration of social and economic developments is that the peasant question and the question of the growth of industry, especially in war-time, are basic in China—and the importance of improving livelihood as a preliminary to the mobilisation of the people for national liberation has been proved to the hilt in this war.

Sun Yat-sen, the father of modern China, recognised it when he made "the people's livelihood" one of his "Three Principles" on a level with Nationalism and Democracy. The allegiance of the people will go to those who give them the chance to improve themselves and move forward.

The Communists of China are carrying out the three principles of Sun-Yat-sen, not Socialism or Communism. The Kuomintang, his own party, has strayed from them, pulled back by the persistent heritage of feudalism and corruption that is still so strong in the country. It is difficult to see any other reason why the Kuomintang blockades the Communists and is afraid to meet them in open legal political competition under a democratic constitution. Nothing the Communists have done during the war is in any way contradictory to Kuomintang principles, and there is no real bar to unity on a Three-Principles Programme if the Kuomintang pushes through internal reform.

The actual situation between the two parties, however, is not hopeful. Some of the reasons for this have been pointed out by Mr. Stuart Gelder, and I shall therefore not discuss it, but devote the next article to the military methods and operations of the Eighth Route Army as our group of foreign correspondents saw them during the two months we marched with it.

## II

On the Eighth Route Army front through which we travelled for seven weeks on horseback, spending three of those weeks on a 350-mile march behind the enemy lines, the political economy of the Communist rear appeared in a new version, re-written in letters of fire.

Here the peasants were not only different from those of the Kuomintang areas because of their independent bearing, but also different from those around Yen-an because their arms were not merely a symbol of political power, carried mainly on parades, but means of defence and attack which every able-bodied person seemed to possess (even if it was a single hand-grenade slung from his belt) and had constantly with him.

Here the elected members of governments of various grades, regardless of whether they had come from the ranks of peasants, townspeople or students, wore clothing studiously modelled on that of the average cultivator—and pistols on their hips—ready whenever necessary to lose themselves in the mass which they led. The business of government was not only the increase of the harvest, but its protection from the enemy, not only the well-being of the people, but the problem of removing one part of them (the old, women and children) from the path of Japanese punitive expeditions at a moment's notice, and of training and using another part (the young men of the people's militia) to harass and attack them.

Here the people's militia not only trained on the village commons, but at all times kept sentries posted along the paths and on high places: sentries who let no one—general, private or civilian—into their village without a pass (passes are issued by the Government, the army or the committee of the next village). The men posted on the hilltops kept a look-out for any movement around the Japanese strong-points, and gave notice of danger by such simple signals as pushing down flagpoles by day or lighting brush fires at night. These signals, relayed from high place to high place, set village gongs ringing, and sent the people to prepared hide-outs in mountain gullies, the whole body of militia to their posts, and special squads to lay land-mines of all types along every possible route of enemy advance. The militia's mines, which almost every blacksmith can now make, do more than blow up occasional enemy groups. The knowledge that they are there makes Japanese progress slow and fumbling, giving the Chinese time for evacuation and preparation and opportunities for short, sharp flank attacks.

The Japanese usually time their major campaigns and punitive

forays to coincide with the planting and the harvest, thus hoping to force the people to capitulate not only by terror, but also by seizing or destroying or preventing the growth of the crops on which the anti-Japanese bases depend for sustenance, and creating conflict in the mind of every militiaman as to whether he will go out with his squad to fight or stay behind to try to get in the yield of his own fields.

Here the "labour-exchange" groups—the agricultural worker co-operatives whose workings in the rear I have already described—acquire tremendously important military significance. Previously a north-west Shansi peasant took an average of six weeks to complete his harvest labour—cutting, threshing and storing his crop and building up his haystacks. With the "labour-exchange" group—which at the front includes every man, woman and child in the village during the harvest season—some of the peasants can be engaged in reaping while others thresh and store. By this means the harvest work time has been cut down to between ten days and a fortnight, during which the regular army, and when necessary the militia, are deployed around the borders of the bases to hold off or divert the enemy until the crop can be brought in. If the enemy does not show any activity, the troops add their labour power to that of the peasantry and the crop comes in even faster. The militiamen, too, can go on duty without any other worries, because military protection is just as much a part of "labour exchange" in front-line agriculture as in actual field work, and the rest of the group takes care of their land. "Defend the harvest" is the chief slogan in the bases in the rear of the enemy and the chief aim of organisation. It denies grain to the Japanese army, disrupts the fiscal basis of the puppet governments, which rests on the grain-tax in kind, and creates the only possible basis for the people's resistance.

The "labour-exchange" system not only helps to protect the peasants from the ravages of war, but also helps to repair such ravages as actually occur. There is, for example, the front-line variation of labour exchange, not between individuals, but between three or four neighbouring villages. A Japanese punitive attack may have destroyed some of the man-power of one village and some of the working cattle of another to such an extent that it could not go on farming by itself. The pooling of the labour and livestock resources of several enables them all to plant and harvest.

There are further ramifications. The system not only frees men for temporary militia duty, but if they are killed or join the permanent military forces, makes it easy for the village to take care of their families by continuing their membership in the group.

and giving them their share of agricultural products—spreading the labour contribution for this evenly among the whole working population. The effect of this on the willingness of men to fight is very great.

Finally, the system helps the people to arm themselves. In several places we found that extra waste land cultivated by "labour-exchange" groups had been earmarked as "armament fields"—meaning that their entire proceeds, by common consent, went to finance a permanent workshop in which blacksmiths and others made grenades, mines, daggers and other weapons. The materials for metal canisters and for black powder—sulphur, saltpetre and charcoal—are available in Shansi, and the army has taught the people to make detonators and often supplied them with the ingredients, such as fulminate of mercury or lead oxide.

We saw one arsenal in a small pocket behind the Japanese lines which turned out 10,000 grenades and mines a month. Its production was supplemented by that of many village smiths.

The operations of the regular Communist forces and their successes are inexplicable without a complete understanding of the milieu in which they operated—the armed, organised and self-ruled people. Before talking about the Eighth Route Army, it must be understood that the conditions in its bases stem not from any book or preconceived scheme, but from the cumulative and slowly developed experience of seven years of guerrilla war.

Guerrilla warfare means first of all that the armed forces fight the enemy, and the people take the consequences. The people may be willing to do this out of abstract patriotism, or because the army is considerate and treats them well for a season or two. They cannot, with the best will in the world, bear more unless they are helped to live and produce in the zone of warfare to ensure their food supply and to protect themselves from reprisals, to live better, more fully and more freely by fighting than they could by submission. The present conditions in the various Communist-led bases bear testimony that this has been done.

Now for the different types of armed forces:

The pocket of resistance behind the Japanese lines which we visited (the Eighth Sub-Region of North-West Shansi liberated area, which itself is one of the sixteen larger units in the hands of the Communist forces) was a roughly circular mountainous territory with a radius of 35 or 40 miles and a population of over 200,000.

It was garrisoned by a brigade of regular Eighth Route troops (an Eighth Route brigade is about 5000 men) and three "columns" of guerrillas, totalling about 3000 men. (In Eighth Route Army organisation "regular troops" denotes uniformed,

centrally supplied and centrally commanded forces which can be and often are, moved across enemy lines from base to base. "guerrillas" are also full-time soldiers, but of a local character, who never leave their own district, even if it is occupied, in which case they go into plain clothes and disperse among the people, operating as saboteurs, etc., until such time as they can concentrate again. Guerrillas are distinct from the people's militia, who are farmers with military training.)

The militia numbered 12,000, or more than the army and guerrillas put together—a good index of the army's confidence in the people.

The over-all figure of 20,000 organised armed men, or 10% of the population, represents an amazing degree of mobilisation in a backward small peasant agricultural society, depending for its operation almost exclusively on human labour, and could not have been achieved without the co-operative system the Communists have introduced. As has already been stated, the number of private persons who possess arms of one kind or another is also very great.

The forces oppose a permanent garrison of 6000 Japanese and over 3000 puppets, stationed in two fair-sized towns and over 100 blockhouse forts on its periphery. This is a typical situation. Throughout North China the Japanese are trying to cut the Communist-led pockets into even smaller pockets, and finally to eliminate them, by driving lines of small forts—two or three miles part—through them.

The Eighth Route Army is uniting its small pockets into large ones by eliminating the blockhouse walls. The development of the people's militia has made the task of the army much easier, because it can hand over the duty of containing the separate forts to this force, and is therefore no longer compelled to disperse its own troops into small units to watch each one of them. The result has been that the Japanese, who must continue to be dispersed and are largely tied down, can no longer launch large-scale campaigns into the depth of any base without bringing in additional forces from large garrison points like Peiping and Taiyuan. The Eighth Route regulars, on the other hand, are enabled to concentrate and to be mobile because they are unencumbered by local garrisoning duties. The village organisation gives the Eighth Route Army almost perfect information, while the Japanese are subjected to a new blockade.

In our three weeks in the enemy rear we saw four companies of the Eighth Route Army destroy three blockhouses and attack a town, seizing sufficient arms to equip two more companies, killing a total of seventy or eighty Japanese and 100 puppets and

capturing fifty puppets and two Japanese alive. We also saw scores of Japanese prisoners captured during the preceding month, and convinced ourselves that the Communist forces are equipped to the extent of more than 70% with captured Japanese rifles, machine-guns, mortars, blankets, ammunition belts and other kit.

The operations which the sub-region was then carrying out fell into the category of offensive blockade-smashing, comprising the immobilisation of all enemy blockade units and the selection of some of them to isolate and destroy. The functions of the army and militia when the Japanese launch their great "mopping-up" campaigns, advancing in several heavy columns from the outer circle towards the centre of the attacked region, hoping to find and smash its forces, are of another character. Then the regular forces avoid encirclement by trying to get to the outer lines (the regions the Japanese come from), so that the enemy feelers close in on nothing, while the militia, by evacuating villages of all food and by constant harassment, reverse their usual rôle by keeping the enemy tied down, and instead try to keep him constantly on the move. When the Japanese begin to withdraw to the periphery, the regular Eighth Route forces concentrate again and try to isolate and destroy at least one of their columns.

This is the general scheme of Communist strategy in the present stage, as conditioned by the terrain and their insufficiency of armament. With these tactics they have captured over 300,000 rifles in seven years and turned vast territories back to Chinese control which will be important bases for the final counter-offensive.

As a result, all North and Central China and some of South China behind the Japanese lines are now divided into four parts—regular anti-Japanese bases, guerrilla bases, guerrilla territories and truly occupied territories.

In Eighth Route phraseology these terms have the following meaning:

A "regular base" is an area garrisoned by regular troops with an openly functioning government carrying on administration, economic policy, taxation, education and public services, safe from Japanese penetration unless the enemy mobilises forces from other parts of the country for a major campaign.

A "guerrilla base" also has its garrisons, and is fully organised under Communist political control, with administrative organs devised to function, either openly or underground, as circumstances dictate. It is subject to more frequent Japanese penetration, but the Japanese are generally not able to remain in it.

A "guerrilla area" is one for which Japanese (or puppet) forces

and governments are constantly contending with Communist led forces and governments.

An "occupied area" is one organised politically and militarily under the Japanese and patriots working only underground.

The aim of the Communists now is to change guerrilla bases into regular bases, guerrilla territories into guerrilla bases, and occupied areas into guerrilla territory. They say that over 60% of all Chinese lands behind the Japanese lines, including parts of South Manchuria in the north and Hainan Island in the south, now belong to the first three spheres. Their contentions are backed by the testimony of many foreign eye-witnesses—including such men as Professor Michael Lindsay, former British Press Attaché in Chungking, and son of the Master of Balliol—who came through Eighth Route Army bases all the way from Peiping and is now working in Yen-an.

Throughout the past seven years these bases have grown. It is fair to say that while the attack on major Japanese-held cities must depend on improvement of their armament, the gains already made are indestructible—just as similar movements in similar countries in Europe, such as that of Marshal Tito, have not only proved able to develop under the yoke of a stronger aggressor, but also to take an important part in the final overthrow of the aggressor when the time came.

It must be stressed that the Communist programme of resistance has attracted all types of Chinese. In the Eighth Route Army areas we met many non-Communists—former Central Army officers now commanding Eighth Route regiments and brigades, former professors and graduates of every Chinese university, scholars and writers with little or no Left-wing history previous to the war. The majority of the armed forces of the Communists have also grown during the war, on the basis of the proved effectiveness of the Eighth Route Army's method of waging it.

Under these conditions the importance of unity between the Kuomintang and Communists to the Chinese and Allied cause, the future of Chinese and the future of Far Eastern international relations should be evident to all.

3

## REPORT ON THE GENERAL MILITARY SITUATION OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE WAR OF RESISTANCE

By YEH CHIEN-YING

### MILITARY RETROSPECT

IT WAS in September 1937 when the Eighth Route Army (now the Eighteenth Group Army) marched into North China. Numerous engagements were fought; some in mountainous Shansi, some in the vast plains of central and southern Hopei, on the coast of Shantung, others in the outskirts of the big cities occupied by Japanese troops and along the enemy's lines of communication. New guerrilla tactics have been developed to meet the rising demands of coping with the enemy in unfavourable terrain. The army has achieved much in organising the hatred of the people towards the invader into effective armed resistance; in keeping large tracts of territory under Chinese authority; in recovering lost territories; in exhausting the enemy's strength; in fighting, in concert with other Chinese troops, in the general plan of driving out the Japanese from, and defending the Chinese positions in North China and lastly, in bogging down the Japanese forces, thereby preventing their withdrawal from the North China front to other fronts.

On September 25, 1937, the Eighth Route Army dealt their first effective blow at the Japanese at the Ping Hsing Pass, north-eastern Shansi. General Lin Piao and his troops, although their arms were inferior to those of the enemy, defeated the famous Itagaki Division in mobile and guerrilla warfare combined. Itagaki himself narrowly escaped capture, the Eighth Route Army proudly captured the Sun banner of Itagaki with the handwriting of Premier Konoe wishing him general speedy success and good health. More than 3000 of the enemy were killed. The battle was fought at a time when city after city fell into

Japanese hands, and both the people and the armies in Shansi almost lost confidence in their capability of ever defeating the enemy. The victory was a great encouragement to the Chinese people at large and an inspiration to those in despair. It also set an example of the kind of military tactics to be used in this war against a superiorly armed enemy. The Japanese plan of occupying Shansi with very little resistance was frustrated. The other Chinese troops in this Province were thus afforded time and space to reorganise and move to new positions.

In October the same year an epic battle was fought at the Japanese airfield of Yangmingpao, a town in North Shansi. Twenty-two aeroplanes were burnt, and a whole battalion of guards were killed. For a time Japanese air activities protecting the advance of their infantry in North China were handicapped and supplies by air were temporarily stopped.

In January 1938 the Eighteenth Group Army guerrillas were operating in close co-operation with other local Chinese troops and the people's armed forces in Hopei. On January 10 they recovered seven big cities along the northern section of the Peiping-Hankow Railway, including Chengting, Lianghsian and Wantu; and destroyed several hundred li of railway track. By that time the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar Border Region guerrilla base was being created. Spontaneous guerrilla activities sprang up all over Shansi and Hopei. The main force of the Eighteenth Group Army moved to south-eastern Shansi, one part being sent to north-western Shansi. The Japanese started their mopping up campaigns. In late summer they began a converging attack on the Eighteenth Group Army position in south-eastern Shansi-Taihangshan—from nine directions. After fierce fighting, they were driven back. A temporary lull gave the army time for interior reorganisation work and for the establishment of a firm base in that territory. A guerrilla base in southern Hopei was also formed during this fighting. The situation in Shantung was closely watched. Taking advantage of the relatively inferior strength and thinner disposition of enemy troops in that province the army sent some detachments and political workers there to organise and start guerrilla activities. Thanks to the traditional militant spirit of the Shantung people, these activities spread like fire.

Japanese losses were heavy, if one keeps in mind the fact that these guerrillas were poorly equipped and that guerrilla warfare often presents small results when compared with achievements in positional warfare. On October 28, 1938, an enemy brigade at a town south of Kwangling hsien was completely destroyed and the commander-in-chief, Brigadier-General Tsuneok

Kanshi, was killed. On November 4, 1939, a fierce battle started, and lasted for three days. It was fought south of Laiyuan, in the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar Border Region. An enemy brigade was repulsed. The commander-in-chief, Major-General Abe Kishiu, and 400 officers of lower rank and soldiers were killed.

By 1939 new guerrilla bases had been formed in Shantung. Lungkow had been captured several times. The guerrillas collected customs duties there and owned steamboats, in which they sometimes imported ammunition. The guerrillas entered Tsinan for a short while, but long enough to keep up the spirit of the Chinese in that city and nearby, and to damage military installations. The guerrillas then extended their activities into the province of Suiyuan, and formed a new base which was later incorporated into the North-west Shansi base. West of Peiping, north of Peiping, in southern Jehol, the guerrillas founded their bases. Those which had previously come into existence were more and more consolidated. Much attention was paid to the improvement of people's living conditions, the organisation of local armed forces, political and military education, mobilisation of man and material power, and self-production of ammunition, arms and daily essentials. Even land cultivation was improved, both extensively and intensively. Thus North China was a bulwark against Japanese occupation and exploitation.

Poison-gas, fire, flood, were devised by the Japanese to destroy this armed bulwark. In the summer of 1939, at Tsihuai, Central Hopei, General Holung was gassed while commanding a detachment fighting against the Japanese in the flood created by the enemy in that region during the rainy season. New tactics were adopted by the enemy, who, from experience in fighting against the guerrillas, had acquired much knowledge of their tactics. The plan was started of building more lines of communication, cutting up guerrilla bases into small sections, and then destroying them one by one—the so-called "forming a cage around". The number of Japanese garrison posts and defence works along the lines also increased tremendously.

1940 witnessed North China in the turmoil of fighting for and against the lines of communication.

On August 20, 1940, the Eighteenth Group Army started a general offensive, attacking all the main lines of communication in North China at the same time, with a force of 100 regiments. This was planned to prevent the Japanese crossing the Yellow River to attack Sian, which then seemed a serious danger. The principal object of attack was the Chengtai Railway, as it was the main line for transporting troops southwards and westwards from Shansi. The whole army was mobilised except

that part in Shantung. Fighting lasted three months and five days. Great damage was done to the transportation and communications of the invaders. Even railway communication between Tientsin and Peiping was much affected. Peiping itself was menaced. The Tsingching coal-mine on the Chengtai Railway, on which the Japanese depended as the chief source of the fuel supply, was badly damaged. 20,645 Japanese were killed (including eighteen officers of the rank of and above battalion commander-in-chief); 5,155 puppet troops were killed or wounded. 281 Japanese officers and soldiers were captured (including deputy battalion commander in charge of pacification in Shansi—Commander Tamoto Ishino—and six other officers). 18,400 puppets were captured. 2993 Japanese strong-points were destroyed. Large quantities of arms and ammunition were taken. This battle of the hundred regiments impeded the original plan of the Japanese. They were forced to strengthen, instead of weaken their defence of the lines of communication, and to keep more troops in, instead of withdrawing from, North China. Their attack on Shensi was frustrated.

In revenge, the Japanese launched ruthless offensives against the various guerrilla bases, especially that in south-eastern Shansi. In February 1941 the Eighteenth Group Army was confronting a mopping-up campaign involving more than 300,000 Japanese. The campaign cost the Japanese heavy losses. The army in south-eastern Shansi was again actively engaged against the enemy from March to May, when they attacked the Japanese from the rear, helping to relieve and reinforce other Chinese troops fighting against the enemy in the Chungtiao Shan region.

The outbreak of the Pacific War brought a new task to the Eighteenth Group Army. It was not only to fight in concert with the other Chinese armies, but also to fight in co-ordination with the general plan of the Allies. In spite of its dwindling supplies of ammunition and arms, the army continued a steady drain on the Japanese strength. There was almost no diversion of enemy troops from the North China front to other fields of action, since the Japanese realised that without clearing up the guerrillas in their rear they could hardly rely upon North China as their reservoir of material supplies and man-power to support the fighting in the Pacific.

The Japanese knew that they must intensify their mopping-up campaigns behind their lines, no matter whether they wanted to attack Manchuria or to hold on in the war in the Pacific against Britain and America. From January to July 1942 there were six big offensives in which tens of thousands of troops were used. The Japanese losses were heavy. At a battle in north-western

Shansi, the Eighteenth Group Army recovered five important hsien—namely, Pienkuan, Wuchai, Kolu, Luenhsien and Shench'ih. Japanese Brigadier-General Sakamoto was killed. The 50,000 Japanese troops engaged in the offensive against our Central Hopei forces were repulsed; the mopping-up campaign in the vast plain between Chinchow (Liaoning Province) and Chenteh (Jehol) was frustrated for some time. In south-eastern Shansi, the area west of the northern section of the Peiping-Hankow railway (between Shangyi and Hantan), covering 400 square li, fierce battles were fought. Losses on both sides were heavy. The Japanese retreated. The Deputy Chief of Staff of the Eighteenth Group Army (Tso Chuan) and many others were killed. Early in October mopping-up campaigns began in Shantung, especially southern Shantung (around Nihshue and Mengying hsien); more than 30,000 Japanese and puppet troops were repulsed, and great damage was done to enemy military installations.

In April and May 1943 the Eighteenth Group Army was fighting to relieve the pressure of the Japanese on its fellow Chinese troops at Chungtiaoshan (south-eastern Shansi).

The Eighteenth Group Army, faithful to its task as a national army and as an anti-Fascist vanguard, though handicapped by shortage of military and medical supplies and funds, has contributed much towards the general cause of Chinese independence and world democracy. Up to the present, this army and the New Fourth Army are keeping fourteen and a half divisions of enemy troops constantly in action. That is to say, 44% of the total enemy troops in China are bogged down in North China, unable to set themselves free either to operate on other fronts in China or in the Pacific. The percentage even shows an increase; as in 1941 it was only 25.

## THE REPORT

By GENERAL YEH CHIEN-YING

*Chief of Staff of the Eighteenth Group Army, to the Chinese and Foreign Correspondents on June 22, 1944, at Tenan*

GENTLEMEN OF the North-Western Press Party:

In response to your request, and in order to facilitate your study and understanding of the general military situation of the Chinese Communist Party in the war of resistance, I am making a general report to you on the military situation on the fronts behind the enemy lines.

From the very beginning, China's war of resistance has been

divided into two main fronts—the regular front and the front behind the enemy lines. Since the fall of Hankow in October 1938 the latter has in reality become the Chinese major front but because of the suppression of freedom of speech and the Press, the real situation has not been made clear, not only to foreigners, but even to many Chinese. What I am going to say today is about the situation on the fronts behind the enemy lines.

The Eighth Route Army and New Fourth Army have been holding on in these fronts for seven years. The bitter course of the seven years war of resistance is very cruel, tense, and complicated.

The scope of this statement concentrates on the present situation rather than on history, and on the military situation rather than on the other spheres.

Today's statement is divided as follows:—

1. The enemy situation on the fronts behind their regular lines;
2. The puppet situation on the fronts behind the enemy lines;
3. The situation of friendly armies on the fronts behind the enemy lines;
4. Our own situation.

#### THE ENEMY SITUATION

Our knowledge of the enemy situation is still not satisfactory. On the one hand, it is constantly changing, on the other, our intelligence work is not efficient enough to cope with it. Therefore, it is sometimes impossible to give a definite statement about designations, organisation, equipment and the date and direction of enemy movements. This I want to explain first.

I want to take the enemy situation in March—that is, the situation before the enemy used a part of their troops to attack Honan and Hunan—and then come to the changes that have occurred since then.

There are three fronts behind the enemy lines—namely, North China, Central China and South China. The Eighth Route Army is carrying on the war on the North China front, the New Fourth Army that on the Central China front, and partisan detachments led by the Communist Party on the South China front. Each of these fronts is again divided into several anti-Japanese bases. The enemy situation on these three fronts behind their lines is related with that of the regular fronts held by the friendly armies; therefore it is necessary to consider the

general enemy situation in order to analyse the respective situations facing our own and the friendly armies.

According to the information of March 1944, the Japanese troops in China amounted to thirty-four and a half divisions, with a total of 560,000 men.

The enemy forces in North China amounted to nine divisions, eight independent brigades and two independent cavalry brigades—i.e., a total of fourteen divisions, numbering almost 220,000 men; of which 11.7 divisions (84% of the enemy force in North China) were engaged by the Eighth Route Army, while only 2.25 divisions (16%) were engaged by friendly forces. They were distributed as follows: The 26th Division in Ta-Tung, Kuei-Sui, Ling-Ch'iu and Shuo-Hsien districts; the 55th Division in Hsu-Shui—Ting-Hsien section along the Peiping-Hankow Railway, and Central Hopei; the 59th Division in Tsi-Nan, Hsin-T'ai, T'ai-An, Shou-Chang, Ch'iu-Hsien, P'ing-Yuan, Teh-Chow and Hui-Min districts of Shantung; the 63rd Division in Peiping, Tientsin, Kupeikou, Ting-Hsing and I-Hsien districts; the 62nd Division in Yu-Tze, Yu-Hsien, Yang-Chuan, Yu-She, Hsin-Hsien, Ch'ang-Chih and Tsin-Cheng districts of Shansi; the 110th Division in Hsin-Lo—Hsing-Tai section along the P'ing-Han Railway and the west of the Teh-Shih Railway in Hopei; the 1st Independent Brigade in Sha-Ho, Ch'ih-Hsien and Ta-Ming districts on the borders of Hopei and Honan; the 2nd Independent Brigade in Wan Ch'uan, Yang-Yuan, Ch'ih-Ch'eng and Huai-Lai in Chahar, and Lai-Yuan in Hopei; the 3rd Independent Brigade in Hsin-Hsien, Wu-Tai, Fan-Shih and Ning-Wu districts in Shansi; the 7th Independent Brigade distributed on both sides of the western section of Chiao-Chi Railway and Chin-Ho and Wu-Ch'eng districts; the 8th Independent Brigade in Eastern Hopei districts; the 9th Independent Brigade in Tientsin-Teh-chow section of Tsin-Pu Railway; and lastly the Miyakami Brigade distributed in Tsin-Ning, Teng-Hsien, Lin-I and Lu-Hsien districts in Shantung.

These six divisions and seven independent brigades were entirely engaged by the Eighth Route Army.

Also of the 35th Division, distributed in Kai-Feng, Hwa-Hsien, Hsin-Hsiang and Po-Ai districts, 50% were engaged by the Eighth Route Army and 50% by friendly forces; of the 37th Division in the triangular region of South Shansi, 30% were engaged by the Eighth Route Army and 70% by other friendly armies (calculated according to the regimental distribution and sphere of operation of the enemy forces); of the 69th Division, distributed in Lin-Fen, Hsin-Yuan, Li-Shih and Lan-Hsien in Shansi, 70% were engaged by the Eighth Route Army and 30% by

other friendly forces. Of the 5th Independent Brigade, distributed in Chiao-Tung Peninsula, 90% were engaged by the Eighth Route Army and 10% by friendly forces. Of the 1st Independent Cavalry Brigade, distributed in Pao-Ton and Ku-Yang districts in Suiyuan, 20% were engaged by the Eighth Route Army and 80% by a friendly army. Of the 4th Independent Cavalry Brigade, distributed in Yung Ch'eng, T'ai-K'ang, Min-Ch'uan and Ch'eng-Wu districts on the Honan-Shantung Border, 40% were engaged by the Eighth Route Army and 60% by friendly forces.

You may ask: How is the percentage of the enemy forces engaged by the Eighth Route Army arrived at? It is calculated according to the distribution of enemy forces by regiments. For example, the 37D had altogether seven regiments (three infantry regiments and four special regiments), 70% of which were in Feng-Ling-Tu, Hanch'eng and Yuan-Chu facing friendly troops on the other side of the river, while 30% were in Fu-Shan and I-Ch'eng districts guarding against the Eighth Route Army. But in time of seasonal "mopping-up" against our Tai-Yueh District the strength employed by the 37D exceeded 30%.

This was the basic situation of the enemy forces in North China in March.

In Central China there are sixteen enemy divisions, numbering 262,000 men, of which 59.5% (9.6 divisions, 157,000 men) were engaged by the New Fourth Army, and 40.5% (6.4 divisions, 105,000 men) by friendly forces. The 6D, distributed in Wu-Han District; the 60D, distributed along the Shanghai-Wuchin section of the Shanghai-Nanking Railway and Chia-Hsing and Ch'ang-Hsing in Chekiang; the 64D, distributed in Li-Shui, Li-Yang, Ju-Kao, Fu-Ning and Pao-Ying districts in Kiangsu were entirely engaged by the New Fourth Army.

The 54D, in Nan-Ch'ang, Kiu-Kiang, Shui-Ch'ang and An-I districts, was entirely engaged by friendly forces.

The following twelve divisions were engaged by both the New Fourth and friendly armies: of the 3D, in Hsin-Yang in southern Honan and Hsiao-Kan, Sui-Hsien and Li-Shan in Hupei, 50% were engaged by the New Fourth Army and 50% by friendly troops; of the 13D, in Sha-Shih and Sha-Yang in western Hupei, 30% were engaged by the New Fourth Army and 80% by friendly forces; of the 21D, distributed in Nanking and Ho-Fei and Fang-Fu in Anhui, 80% were engaged by the New Fourth Army, and 20% by friendly forces; of the 22D, in Chin-Hua, Lan-Hsi and Tung-Yang in Chekiang, 10% were engaged by the New Fourth Army and 90% by friendly forces; of the 39D, in I-Chang, Tang-Yang and Chiang-Ling, 30% were engaged by the New Fourth Army and 70% by friendly forces; of the 40D, in Hsien-

Ning and T'ung-Shan in southern Hupei, 60% were engaged by the New Fourth Army and 40% by friendly forces; of the 58D, in Chung-Hsiang, Yun-Meng, Mien-Yang and Chien-Chiang in Central Hupei, 90% were engaged by the New Fourth Army and 10% by friendly forces; of the 61D, along the line of Wu-Hu, Hsuan-Ch'eng and Kwang-Teh in southern Anhui, and along Wu-Hu and Hu-Kou section of the Yangtze River, 60% were engaged by the New Fourth Army and 40% by friendly forces; of the 65D, in Hsu-Chow, Tung-Hai, Hwai-An and Ch'ang-Shan districts, 80% were engaged by the New Fourth Army and 20% by friendly forces; of the 68D, in Yueh-Yang in North Hunan and P'u-Ch'i in southern Hupei and the regions along the Yangtze, 30% were engaged by the New Fourth Army and 70% by friendly forces; of the 70D, along the Hangchow-Ningpo Railway, 40% were engaged by the New Fourth Army and 60% by friendly forces; and of the 116D, along the Yangtze between Wuchang and O'ch'eng, 90% were engaged by the New Fourth Army and 10% by friendly forces.

There were three and a half divisions and two independent brigades in South China, together amounting to four and a half divisions, numbering 80,000 men. One division (22% of the enemy force) was engaged by partisan detachments led by the Communist Party, and three and a half divisions (78%) by friendly forces. One brigade of the 18D and the 56D was distributed in T'eng-Ch'ung in western Yunan; the 19th Independent Brigade was distributed in Chao-Chew and Swatow district of eastern Kwangtung, and the 22nd Independent Brigade was distributed in Leichow peninsula: these two and a half divisions were entirely engaged by friendly forces. Of the 57D, along the Canton-Kowloon Railway, 70% were engaged by Communist partisans and 30% by friendly forces; of the 104D, in Canton, Chunghun and Sansui districts, 30% were engaged by Communist partisans and 70% by friendly forces. In addition, all the enemy force on Hainan Island, which is not included in the above calculation, was entirely engaged by the Communist forces. Because of the interruption in radio communication, the number of the enemy force there is unclear: the lowest estimate is one brigade.

The data given above shows the concrete situation of the armed resistance of the Kuomintang and the Communists in the month of March 1944. We are resisting and attacking 64.5% of the forces of the enemy, while our friendly armies are resisting and attacking only 35.5%.

Since April 1944 the enemy has sent some reinforcements to attack the regular front in China. According to the information we have received, these reinforcements, generally speaking,



amount to no more than ten odd divisions. At the same time, from the total forces of thirty-four and a half divisions which were originally engaged in China, one division (the 35th) has been moved to the South Pacific. Consequently, the total forces of the enemy engaged in China amount to forty-three and a half divisions (including one and a half divisions in West Yunan). Perhaps a little more.

Of the ten divisions of fresh reinforcements sent to China four and a half divisions have been sent to the regular front and five and a half have been used to defend the enemy's rear.

During the same period the enemy troops in North China have also been moved, and three divisions have been transferred to the regular front.

Of the three divisions of the enemy force moved from North China, the 110D, which was originally stationed in Shihchia-chuang district, is now replaced by the newly organised division and the 37D, which was originally stationed in the triangular district of Shansi, is now replaced by the 69D, moved southward from Central Shansi, while the latter's original garrison area in Linfen and Fenyang has been taken over by the 13B and the Special Brigade. After the transfer of the 35D (probably to the South Seas), the Suzuki B and the 4B have taken up position in Hsin-Hsiang, Kai-Feng and the western section of Tou-Tsin Railway. The 15B, in Yang-Chuan, is kept as the mobile force in this district. The K4B, which was originally stationed along the Kaiteng-Ch'angshan section of the Lunghai railway, is now replaced by the puppet troops of Chang Lan-Feng.

Therefore, after moving part of the experienced but wearied forces from the fronts behind the enemy lines in North China, the garrisons have been replaced by newly arrived divisions. Thus, the force engaged by the Communist Party has in reality changed very little, contrary to the opinion of some outside observers, who argued that the enemy forces had been almost entirely evacuated from North China.

It must be pointed out that before the fall of Wuhan in October 1938 the main Japanese forces were directed towards the Kuomintang's regular front. After the fall of Wuhan the Japanese changed their policy, trying to induce the Kuomintang to capitulate, mainly through political measures, using military attacks as supplementary measures, and in the meanwhile moving their main forces to the front behind their lines, savagely attacking the Communist Party. From October 1938 to March 1944—fully five and a half years—the Japanese launched only a few tactical drives against the Kuomintang—no strategical

attacks—and these tactical drives were of extremely short duration—one might almost say starting in the morning and finishing by dark that night. During the same period the Kuomintang's policy was to parry and watch: when the enemy came, to parry a little, when the enemy retreated, to fold their arms and look on. That is the reason why we were defeated in the Honan and Hunan battles. We hope that from now on there will be a change from such a situation, so as to co-ordinate the regular front with operations on the fronts behind the enemy lines, and put an end to the lack of co-ordination that existed in the past.

This is, in general, my statement concerning the enemy's situation on the fronts behind the enemy's line.

Now let us turn to the puppets' situation on the fronts behind the enemy lines. First of all, I feel ashamed to say that in the past seven years of the war of resistance, while the majority of the people and the troops all over the country have been resisting and sacrificing sacredly and seriously, a part—and not a small part—capitulated and shamelessly became puppets. This is the biggest possible insult to our nation, which we must wipe out. But today the puppet troops on the fronts behind the enemy lines already number 780,000 men (not including puppet police and militia)—a serious enemy of the Chinese war of resistance, and one which cannot be neglected, so that it is necessary to introduce this problem to you.

In the winter of 1933, during the battles of resistance around the Great Wall, there already existed the puppet troops of Li Shou-hsin and Wang Ying (Li Shou-hsin was originally the regimental commander of the 9th Cavalry Brigade of the Chinese Army, and Wang Ying was originally commander of the local armed forces of western Suiyuan). These were the old puppet troops before the anti-Japanese war of resistance, and they at present number 20,000 men.

In the early period of the war of resistance, after the fall of Peiping and Tientsin, Ch'i Hsieh-yuan began to organise the Pacification Autonomous Army, starting with only four companies, which grew to five regiments in 1938, and now consist of twelve Group Armies, made up of thirty-six infantry regiments, with a total of 60,000 men.

After the capitulation of Wang Ching-Wei the number of puppet troops in Central China showed a big increase, such as the National Armies under Li Ch'ung-chiang and Yang Chung-hua, numbering 40,000, which have changed their colours and gone over to the Japanese. But the extremely rapid growth of puppet troops took place in the spring of 1942. It can be said to have

begun with the capitulation of Sun Liang-ch'eng. Since the sixty-seven full generals have gone over to the enemy.

You gentlemen may be surprised to learn that there are many puppet troops in China, but these are the actual facts. If one asks why so many troops have capitulated since 1942, the reasons can of course be discovered. In tracing the reasons, one might perhaps be said that the situation in 1942 was as follows:

1. Japan was having her own way in the South Pacific;
2. The Red Army on the Soviet-German Front had not yet turned to the offensive;

3. Japan had adopted the so-called new policy towards China. Being busy in the South Pacific, and feeling her insufficiency in military forces, she began to strengthen the Wang Ching-wei regime to control occupied regions for her, and advocated the amalgamation of the Nanking and North China puppet regimes and an amalgamation between Chungking and Nanking.

It is true that was the situation at that time, but this cannot account for the capitulation of such large Chinese forces. Then what is the real reason? We believe that it is entirely due to disunity, lack of democracy and the topsy-turvy policy of rewarding crime and punishing virtue in internal affairs, which disheartened the people and army all over the country, and shook the faith of a big part of them in victory. If this is not the reason, it is impossible to explain why in the same position in the enemy rear, and faced with the same difficulties, the Communist Party could hold out, without any capitulation, while the Kuomintang could not hold out and contributed so many traitorous troops.

One example alone will make clear the topsy-turvy policy of the Chinese Government and the High Command. The Dare-to-Die Detachment of Shansi and the New Fourth Army of Central China have, from the very beginning, fought heroically in the anti-Japanese war, but these troops were attacked by big forces sent by the High Command; nearly 10,000 officers and men were massacred or captured, and orders given for the arrest and trial of the leaders. Later on it was announced that they were "rebellious" armies. But the Kuomintang troops went over to the enemy by hundreds of thousands, with sixty-seven full generals. Among the better known are Pang Ping-hsun, Sun Tien-ying, Sun Liang-Chen, Hsia Ch'u-Chung, Kung Ping-fan, Chen Hsiao-chiang, Wu Hua-wen, Li Ch'ang-chiang, and Wang Ching-tsai, all either generals or lieutenant-generals. The Government and the High Command did not send any punitive expeditions against them, bring them up for trial or brand them as rebellious armies; on the contrary, connections were kept with them by giving them tasks of attacking the Eighth Route Army,

New Fourth Army, and guerrilla detachments in South China. Just see what kind of topsy-turvy policy, rewarding crime and punishing virtue, was pursued! To fight the Japanese is criminal, to betray the country goes unpunished. Such being the case, how can one expect morale to be raised or anyone to be satisfied?

In the winter of 1943 (October 17) the traitor Wang Ching-wei announced the unification of the Southern and Northern Puppet Army command, reorganised the puppet troops all over the country, and intensified training. After the reorganisation the puppet armies were more or less completely systematised.

Taken as a whole, the puppet armies can be classified as puppet regular troops and puppet local troops. The puppet regular troops number as many as 380,000, the puppet local troops 400,000, making a total of 780,000. The composition of the puppets is made up of 62% coming from National Army betrayals, and 38% coming from forced recruitments and the drawing in of bandits and scoundrels. The above total does not include the numerous puppet militia and police. These, if included, would bring the total to as much as a million.

What is the function of these numerous puppet troops in the enemy rear, or, to put in differently, what are the tasks these puppet armies shoulder for the enemy? Briefly, they are as follows:

1. To co-ordinate with the mopping-up campaigns;
2. To garrison strongholds;
3. To purge the villages;
4. To supply reinforcements to the enemy troops.

The first three points are known to all. On the last point I will give an illustrative example. Since the spring of 1943 the Japanese 37th Division was replenished three times from puppet troops, the first time with 300 men, the second time with 1500 from puppets at Shihchiachuang, and the third time with 3000 from the puppets in Chieh Hsiu hsien (Shansi).

All these tasks are against the Communist Party. It can be seen that the "ex-friendly" troops have now turned their weapons against their own fellow-countrymen.

From our experience in the struggle with the puppets, we have found that those composed of capitulated Government troops are specially determined in fighting against the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. For example, Sung Liang-cheng in Chi-Lu-Yu (Hopei-Honan-Shantung Area), Pang Ping-shun in northern Honan, and Wu Hua-wen in Shantung, have all proved this. Many of the puppet troops have continued to receive orders from the Chinese High Command to intensify their attacks on the Communist Party—for example, Pang

Ping-shun and Sun Tien-ying have constant liaison and connection with agents from the Central Investigation and Statistics Bureau of the Kuomintang and the Investigation and Statistics Bureau of the National Military Council bringing anti-Communist orders. After the betrayal of Pang Ping-shun and publication of his traitorous statement, which was circulated by the Domei News Agency, the Kuomintang General Chief Staff, Ho Ying-Ching, made a statement through the Central News Agency, praising Pang Ping-shun as "sincere and faithful to the nation".

The immense increase in the number of puppet troops in the Japanese rear has become a serious menace to the continuation of our fight behind the enemy lines and to preparations for a counter-offensive, so that to-day I specially give you a brief statement on the puppet situation behind the enemy line, to bring it to your attention.

Nearly the whole weight of the puppet forces is being shouldered by the Communist Party, since the Kuomintang does not fight the puppets. Only a minor part of the puppet troops—the ones around Hangchow and Nanchang—are not to be counted as being engaged by the Communist Party, because there are no Communist forces there; but neither are they to be counted as being engaged by the Kuomintang, because they never fight the puppets.

If we take 100 as representing the whole of the Japanese troops in China and 100 as representing the puppet troops, then up to March 1944 the Communist Party was engaging more than 100 out of the total 200 of Japanese and puppet troops—that is, a little more than three-fourths of the total—while the Kuomintang was engaging less than 50—less than one-fourth of the total. After March 1944, when the enemy reinforced part of their troops in China to make drives on the regular fronts of Honan, Hunan and Kwangtung, the ratio of the number engaged by the two parties changed a little, but the Japanese troops sent as reinforcements to the above-mentioned three provinces for these drives amounted only to some ten divisions, so that the change is not great.

As to the relationship towards our troops of the friendly troops in the enemy rear and on part of the regular fronts, in the early part of the war of resistance there was co-ordination in operations but since 1939 they have concentrated their forces in friction against the Communist Party. There have been three major anti-Communist waves: in 1940, 1941 and 1943; but that of July 1943 (Hu Tsung-nan mobilised the Yellow River Garrison Troops to prepare an attack on the Border Region) did not break into actual warfare because of the intervention of public opinion.

in China and abroad; while the previous two waves broke out into large-scale war, each time nearly 100,000 troops being employed in them. The first wave was the attack on the Dare-to-Die Detachments (troops under Yen Hsi-shan, also known as the New Army) from December 1939 to April 1940. The second wave was the attack on the New Fourth Army in Anhwei in 1941. Small and medium-sized military operations against us, such as those in the Chung Tiao Mountains of Shansi (by troops under General Yen Hsi-shan), in East, West and South Hupeh, Central, East and South Anhwei, eastern Chekiang and along the Canton-Kowloon railway in Kwangtung (by Kuomintang troops) have never really stopped. Our friendly troops were incessantly engaged in active expeditions against the Communist forces. Such civil wars in the anti-Japanese war have been going on for four and a half years in China, starting with the first anti-Communist wave in December 1939. In our fights in self-defence we have captured thousands of documents from different headquarters containing orders and instructions against the Communists and orders for expeditions against the Communist forces. We have not published these documents, because from the very beginning we were expecting our friendly party and friendly armies voluntarily to change their attitudes, to stop civil war and to improve Kuomintang-Communist Party relationships. As everyone knows, if all civil wars (military, political, economic, cultural) are not stopped, it will be extremely difficult or impossible for China to co-ordinate with the Allied nations in the counter-offensive against Japan.

Most of the friendly armies on the regular fronts have lost their fighting power, and are helpless in face of the enemy's attack. For example, in Honan, the several hundred thousand troops under Generals Chiang Ting-wen, Tang En-po and Hu Tsung-nan, in face of an enemy force of no more than 70,000, either collapsed without fighting or crumbled on the first skirmish with the enemy, creating a hopelessly chaotic situation. This *débâcle* was entirely due to their internal policy of opposing the people, opposing democracy and fighting against the Communist Party; in foreign relations relying on friendly nations for supplies and the counter-offensive, at the same time neglecting to rally the morale of the nation and to rely on their own efforts. The policy of our friendly party, the Kuomintang, can be generalised as enforcing autocracy, suppressing democracy, relying on others to fight the Japanese (externally relying on America and England, internally relying on the Communist Party), while preserving their own strength to be ready to wipe out any force other than their own. If these policies remain unchanged,

China cannot take up the counter-offensive, nor will it even be possible to maintain the present situation.

Originally there were no fewer than 1,000,000 Kuomintang troops remaining in the enemy rear in North and Central China (according to statistics, at the time of the Chung Tiao Mountains battle in 1941 North China had 800,000 and Central China 200,000 troops). Because of mistaken policies and inability to withstand hardship, most of them were either annihilated or went over to the enemy; those still remaining in the enemy's rear and those returning make up only a very small number. At the present time only three groups of local troops remain in the enemy rear, and these are using all kinds of methods indiscriminately to preserve their mere existence. This category consists of Chao Pao-yuan and Chang Li-yuan of Shantung, and the 61st Army of General Yen Hsi-shan, which was sent by him three months ago from south-western Shansi to the south-eastern part of the same province to attack the Dare-to-Die Detachment and the Eighth Route Army. These three groups make up at most a total of 20,000 to 30,000.

Lastly, I will deal with the situation of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies.

The Eighth Route Army was originally the Chinese Red Army. In 1935-1936, when the Red Armies came together in North Shensi, they numbered 80,000. When the anti-Japanese war broke out in 1937, the Red Army, under orders from the High Command, was reorganised as part of the National Revolutionary Army, but only 45,000 men were recognised, and designations for only three divisions (115th D, 120th D and 129th D) were given. They then marched to North China to join in the war of resistance.

The New Fourth Army consisted originally of Red Partisan detachments during the civil war period. In 1937, under the orders of the High Command, it assembled in South Anhwei and north of the Yangtze, reorganised as the New Fourth Army of the National Revolutionary Army consisting of four detachments numbering 12,000, and joined the war of resistance in Central China.

Of the Communist-led troops in South China, some were reorganised from the Red Armies (Hai-Nan Island) and others were organised by the people under the leadership of the Communist Party after the war of resistance (Canton).

All the troops led by the Communist Party are carrying on the policies of the Anti-Japanese National United Front advocated by the Communist Party, the Three People's Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, and the "Declaration of Meeting the National

Calamity" issued in September 1937. On the three main fronts behind the enemy lines in North, Central and South China they are unifying the people of all classes, establishing democratically organised anti-Japanese bases, in which each inch of the national territory liberated from the enemy's hands has been put under the anti-Japanese local government elected by the people, and in which the policies of realising the "one-to-three ratio system", reducing rent and interest, developing self-defence armies, people's guards and partisans, raising production and exterminating traitors, have been carried out.

The characteristic of these policies is, by dint of close connection with the people, mutual sincerity between the armies and the people, and unity of the party, Government, army and the people, to wage a fierce fight, both offensive and defensive, against the enemy and the puppets. By reason of this, they were able to defeat several offensives launched by the enemy and the puppets, and with no supplies from outside our areas, and under the hardest conditions, to overcome all difficulties, and to continue the war of resistance for seven years behind the enemy lines. Generally speaking, during the period July 1937 to October 1938—that is, before the fall of Wuhan—the Japanese paid more attention to the Kuomintang and less to the Communists, and as a result used their main forces for attacking the regular front, and used only second-class forces in their own rear for attacking the Communists. But since the fall of Wuhan in October 1938, and owing to the fierce fighting that had been opened by the Communist-led troops behind the enemy lines, the Japanese have changed their war policy so as to pay more attention to the Communists and less attention to the Kuomintang, and to introduce the policy of politically persuading the Kuomintang to surrender as their main measure, and military attack as their subsidiary method. At the same time, they moved their main forces to their own rear for the purpose of mopping-up the Communist-led troops. In the years 1941 and 1942 the offensive of the enemy reached its fiercest stage. That is to say, all the enemy's policies of mopping-up and encroachment and of "triple destruction" reached their height in this period. As a result, the number of our troops and the area of our bases were both reduced, and our population decreased from 100,000,000 to 50,000,000. However, our party, army and people behind the enemy lines have been steeled by the tremendously difficult struggle; and owing to the enforcement of the correct policies of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, such as the "one-to-three ratio system", land policy, efficiency in the army and simplicity in administration, the unity of leadership, "remould-

	1st Year Sept. 1937- May 1938.	2nd Year. June 1938- May 1939.	3rd Year. June 1939- May 1940.	4th Year. June 1940- May 1941.	5th Year. June 1941- May 1942.	6th Year. June 1942- May 1943.	7th Year. June 1943- May 1944.	Total.
Number of engagements	638	2,051	6,936	6,152	12,221	22,735	23,327	74,060
Enemy losses.	Enemy casualties.	34,007	64,355	64,355	50,257	55,673	65,432	351,113
	Puppet casualties.	3,704	15,430	23,473	21,381	33,526	79,831	239,952
	Japanese taken prisoner.	124	385	630	320	284	290	4,407
Enemy losses.	Puppets taken prisoner.	2,094	7,521	15,338	15,355	17,914	59,343	148,726
	Japanese deserters.	—	—	19	12	16	45	115
	Puppet deserters.	1,366	17,935	9,180	5,178	4,308	4,728	49,641
Main arms captured.	Rifles and mausers.	6,699	14,569	37,666	24,017	16,838	38,542	189,028
	Light and heavy machine-guns.	192	291	651	519	302	479	3,120
	Guns of different calibre.	25	61	119	104	29	46	489
Our losses.	Wounded: officers and men.	8,107	31,031	32,175	38,384	40,813	17,976	186,593
	Dead: officers and men.	4,432	15,048	17,012	21,348	23,034	11,378	103,186
Ratio of casualties between the Japanese and puppets and our troops	3 : 1	1 : 1	1.8 : 1	1.2 : 1	1.3 : 1	4 : 1	5 : 1	2 : 1

ing of ideology", "support the Government, love the people", "raise production", "purge the spies" and strengthen the people's guards, we were finally able to defeat all the assaults of the enemy.

From 1943 up to now the situation has improved. Our troops have increased to 470,000 men, and the people's militia to 2,000,000; our base areas have expanded, and the population has increased to 80,000,000; in addition, our experiences have been enriched and the quality has been raised. We have been resisting and attacking three-fourths of the enemy and puppet troops, and though the bitterness and difficulties of our struggle have been so great that they must appear almost incredible to people outside, yet we have never been defeated by the enemy, and have overcome even the greatest difficulty.

The seven years history of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies in the anti-Japanese war behind the enemy lines cannot be recounted in a few hours. I will merely give some of the more important figures relating to the operations of our armies during those years. On page 90 I give a yearly record of operations of the Eighth Route Army.

1. From the above table we note that the number of engagements by the Eighth Route Army in North China has increased yearly.

2. The number of enemy casualties in engagements against Japanese forces is large, while the number captured is small. The opposite is true in engagements with puppet troops: more captives and fewer casualties.

3. In the first two years of the war of resistance there were no Japanese deserters, but desertion started and increased from the third year of the war. It can be seen that our political work among the enemy brings results.

4. By comparing the changes in the ratios of casualties between the enemy and the Eighth Route Army it can be seen that after carrying out our "Efficiency and Training Campaign" in 1942, the fighting power of our troops compared with the opening period of the war was greatly increased. The casualty ratio changed from 3 to 1 to 5 to 1 in our favour.

5. From the number of enemy weapons captured, it can be seen that since the fifth year (latter half of 1941 to first half of 1942) the war has been extremely bitter—i.e., more operations were carried out, but fewer weapons were captured than during the fourth year.

The situation of the New Fourth Army in Central China in the war of resistance is approximately similar to that of the Eighth Route Army.

Here is the yearly record of the New Fourth Army in the seven years of anti-Japanese war:

	1st-4th Year. May 1938- May 1941.	5th Year. June 1941- May 1942.	6th Year. June 1942- May 1943.	7th Year. June 1943- May 1944.	Total.	
No. of engagements.	4,967	2,427	4,822	5,318	17,534	
No. of enemy losses.	Japanese and puppet casualties.	124,252	24,512	39,879	53,107	241,750
	Japanese and puppet prisoners.	5,292	5,458	9,923	13,642	34,415
	Japanese and puppet deserters.		4,825	7,921	11,320	24,066
Main arms captured.	Rifles and mausers.	48,048	13,870	28,574	33,967	124,459
	Light and heavy machine-guns.	1,644	301	330	376	2,651
	Guns of different calibre.	60	8	12	20	100
Our losses.	Wounded: officers and men.	36,637	10,856	8,412	9,015	64,920
	Dead: officers and men.	22,448	6,745	7,617	8,058	44,868
Ratio of casualties between the Japanese and puppets and our troops.	2:1:1	1:4:1	2:5:1	3:1:1	3:2:1	

N.B.—In the number of our dead, there are included 146 cadres of and above the rank of regimental commander.

It should be pointed out that in the seven years' war of resistance, according to incomplete information, fifty-five Japanese officers were killed by our armies, of whom one was a lieutenant-general, eight were major-generals, nineteen were colonels, twenty were lieutenant-colonels and seven were majors.

To sum up. In the past seven years of the war of resistance the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies together captured 320,000 rifles and small arms, partly from the Japanese and a large proportion from the puppet troops. Calculating according to the ratio of five men to three rifles and small arms in our army, we could equip 540,000 men with the weapons captured, not including light and heavy machine-guns and artillery. But many of these weapons are either damaged or incomplete, rendering them useless. The present weapons of the New Fourth Army, the Eighth Route Army and the partisan detachments in South China came from three sources: first, those we originally possessed; second, those captured from the Japanese and puppet troops; and thirdly, those possessed by the population who have been organised voluntarily into partisan detachments or joined the Eighth Route or New Fourth Army. Our armies are still quite deficient in arms and munitions, and from the very beginning of the war of resistance the National Government has never given us necessary supplies. After 1941 we were not even supplied with a single rifle, bullet, a single cent or grain of

rice. We hope that the Allied nations will give us support to facilitate our co-ordination in the war. Because of the lack of good weapons, ammunition and medical equipment, many have unfortunately been sacrificed who might otherwise have been saved.

The experience of the seven years' war behind the enemy lines also shows that if people's militias are not organised, armed and trained to co-ordinate with regular troops in operations, it would be unthinkable to persist in the long period of struggle behind the enemy lines.

In all the anti-Japanese bases of North, Central and South China our armies have put a lot of effort into organising the people's militia. Up to now we have more than 2,000,000 People's Militia organised behind the enemy lines. The distribution of these forces in North and Central China (excluding that of South China, for which no statistics are available), is as follows:

North China.		Central China.	
Chin-Cha-Chi . . . . .	630,000	Central Kiangsu . . . . .	130,000
Chin-Chi-Yu . . . . .	320,000	South of the Hwai River . . . . .	55,000
Chin-Lu-Yu . . . . .	80,000	North Kiangsu . . . . .	85,000
Shantung . . . . .	500,000	North of the Hwai River . . . . .	70,000
Chin-Sui . . . . .	50,000	Hupei-Honan-Anhwei . . . . .	150,000
		South Kiangsu . . . . .	25,000
		Central Anhwei . . . . .	25,000
		East Chekiang . . . . .	10,000
Total . . . . .	1,580,000	Total . . . . .	550,000
GRAND TOTAL . . . . .		2,130,000	

In addition to the People's Militia, the numbers of regular troops of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and their partisan detachments have been growing yearly. The people in the vast areas behind the enemy lines, under the oppression of the Japanese could not but arm themselves and carry out a bitter, fierce fight. They were at first organised into partisan detachments, later on being incorporated into the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, when further new partisan detachments were organised. The system of military organisation on the fronts behind the enemy lines is co-ordination among the regular forces, the partisan detachments and the people's militias. With this mutual co-ordination of all three, no enemy strength can destroy us. Our friendly Party, unwilling to mobilise the people and to organise the militia and partisan detachments, merely relying on the badly disciplined regular troops for the fighting, are as helpless as a fish out of water, so that it is impossible for them to overcome the enemy.

The yearly growth of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies (including both regular and partisan troops) is as follows:

Year.	Eighth Route Army.	New Fourth Army.	Total.
1937 . . . . .	80,000	12,000	92,000
1938 . . . . .	156,700	25,000	181,700
1939 . . . . .	270,000	50,000	320,000
1940 . . . . .	400,000	100,000	500,000
1941 . . . . .	305,000	135,000	440,000
1942 . . . . .	340,000	110,960	450,960
1943 . . . . .	339,000	125,892	464,892
1944 . . . . .	320,800	153,676	474,476

From the above table it will be seen that our armies have grown to 500,000 in 1940, but were reduced during the years 1941-1942; since the latter half of 1942 they have again increased to 470,000; in particular their combat experiences have been enriched and their quality raised. To drive out the national foes and co-ordinate with the Allied nations in the counter-offensive against Japan, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies should be further strengthened. Some Kuomintang friends described our strengthening of anti-Japanese forces as "destructive to the war of resistance and endangering the State". There are no grounds for them to speak in this way. It is really an expression of their lack of national consciousness. They should not weaken the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies or hinder their development; they should support them, give them supplies and strengthen them so that they can carry out their historical mission of co-ordinating with Allied forces to drive out the Japanese bandits from China. Especially during the present serious crisis on the regular fronts, every patriotic Chinese should make such demands.

The number of Japanese prisoners and deserters captured in the seven years of anti-Japanese war by the Eighth Route Army is 2522, and by the New Fourth Army 500. (On April 26, 1939, our partisan detachment in eastern Hopei captured Colonel Akagi, cousin of the Japanese Emperor, and six of his staff (in the Tsun-Hua District.) Our policy towards Japanese war prisoners is as follows: (1) send them back to undermine their troops; (2) send them to the headquarters (Kuomintang—Central Government) in Sian; (3) keep them in our armies and train them to become anti-enemy workers.

Many do not understand the policy of freeing Japanese prisoners to return to their troops; in reality it has a very great effect.

Our policy is not to slaughter the captives, but to give them preferential treatment as brothers, allowing them to remain or to leave as they prefer; at the same time, carrying out untiring anti-Fascist political education among them, releasing them to go back or retaining those who are willing to remain. All this has a great effect in weakening the fighting morale of the enemy.

Under this policy the number of Japanese prisoners, as well as of Japanese coming over, is increasing yearly. It is not accidental that the anti-war and war-wearied movement has been growing. Our Japanese fighting friend, Okano Susumu, the leader of the Japanese people, has given us great help in this work.

Besides the large number of Japanese captives released, a number have been sent from Yen-an to Sian, as follows:—

1939 . . . . .	14
1940 . . . . .	2
1941 . . . . .	3
1942 . . . . .	0
1943 . . . . .	13 (first time) 10 (second time)
	—
Total . . . . .	42
	—

From 1938 to 1942 twenty-eight war prisoners were sent to the rear from Taihang district. Furthermore, some of the prisoners captured by the New Fourth Army who were sent to the rear have not been included here.

The number of prisoners at present among our troops in Central and North China is listed in the table on p. 96 (most of them are now members of the Japanese Emancipation League).

I would like to make special mention of the following members: Sergeant Yamada, who is now working in the medical department of our army, Second-Lieutenant Yamamitsu, who is now working as instructor in the use of grenade-throwers, and Nakazima, who is now a technical instructor. These members have worked in our army with the greatest energy, responsibility and enthusiasm.

I regret that, on account of our poor equipment and being cut off from supplies, we have not been able to capture more enemy prisoners. But in spite of the exaggerations of the High Command, our friendly party with a big army of 3,000,000 and with large sums of money and many weapons supplied by the Allied nations through the whole period of war, has in reality captured fewer prisoners than ourselves. This can be checked by counting the Japanese prisoners. They have no anti-enemy work, and do not free

District.	No. of Japanese.	No. of Members.
Yenan . . . . .	76	75
North-western Shansi . . . . .	7	7
Chin-Cha-Chi:		
Chin-Cha-Chi . . . . .	20	16
Central Hopei . . . . .	9	7
Shansi-Hopei-Honan Region:		
Tai-Hang . . . . .	36	29
Tai-Yo . . . . .	14	11
Hopei-Shantung-Honan:		
Southern Hopei . . . . .	17	15
Hopei-Shantung-Honan . . . . .	15	13
Shantung:		
Pin-Hai (Coastal Region) . . . . .	19	15
Lu-Chung (Central Shantung) . . . . .	11	9
Lü-Nan (Southern Shantung) . . . . .	8	7
Tsing-Ho (Tsing River) . . . . .	8	6
Chiao-Tung (Eastern Chiaochow) . . . . .	16	13
Total in North China . . . . .	256	223
Central China (New Fourth Army):		
In four districts . . . . .	66	66
Total in North and Central China . . . . .	322	289

prisoners to return to Japanese troops. They have also captured fewer enemy weapons. As for educating war prisoners to become anti-enemy workers, they have done practically nothing.

For example, according to news received, in the present Honan battle, with a big army numbering 400,000 (troops under Generals Chiang Ting-wen, Tang-En-po and Hu Tsung-nan, and part of the troops sent from the Fifth War Zone to reinforce Honan) against 70,000 Japanese, throughout the two months' operations (starting on April 17), they have not captured a single prisoner nor a single rifle, nor a piece of cannon. On the contrary, they have lost territories of more than forty hsien, and nearly 300,000 troops (most of whom were dispersed, while some were captured). They have also lost most of their weapons, of which it is said that rifles alone numbered 500,000 (many of them supplied by friendly nations) and all the grain, munitions, rifles and guns reserved in the First War Zone. Yet they still say that the Communist Party has not been fighting the Japanese, but is working solely against the war of resistance and the State. Please judge for yourself who really does not fight the Japanese, and who has really hindered the war of resistance and endangered the State.

Our casualties since the war of resistance amount to 290,000 of the Eighth Route Army and nearly 110,000 of the New Fourth Army—a total of nearly 400,000. Among the cadres of and above

the rank of regimental commander, 398 in the Eighth Route Army and 137 in the New Fourth Army fell in battle. The martyrs sacrificed at the front are not only Chinese, but also international friends. The list of the international friends who died at the front with the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies is as follows:

Surgeon:

Norman Bethune	Canadian
Kotnis	Indian

Members of Japanese Anti-War League:

Terazawa	Nippon
Imano	?
Hudo	Akida
Asano	Yamagata
Kuroda	Saitama
Suzuki	Hiogo
Mazuno	Hiroshima
Oono	Nagano

Korean Volunteer Army:

Sun I-Feng	Ping-An-Dao
Wang Hsien-Shun	Ping-An-Dao
Han Chin-Dao	Chung-Chin-Dao
Pu Chi-Tung	King-Chi-Dao
She-Cheng	Kuang-Son-Tao
Chen Kwan-Hua	Ping-An-Dao
Hu-Wei-Pei	Kuang-Son-Dao
Kim-Hsueh-Wu	Shian-Kin-Dao
Kim-Pa-Lun	Ping-An-Dao
Wen Ming-Tse	King-Lo-Dao
Han Lo-Shan	Chung-Chin-Dao
Tsui-Tze-Nan	Ping-An-Dao
Li Yun-Yin	Ping-An-Dao
Kim Yun-Hsin	Ping-An-Dao
Wu Chun	Chiang-Yuan Dao
Ling Ping	Chung-Chin-Dao
Han Cheng	King-Chi-Dao
Kim Ming-Hua	Ping-An-Dao

Member of Pacific Relations Institute:

Schipper	German
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To these sacrifices should be added the help from our friends of the United Nations, to whom all our armies and people are deeply grateful.



As regards munitions, we do not know how much China has received from the United Nations. But we have received only 120 light machine-guns and six anti-tank guns through the High Command. These were said to have come from the Soviet Union. Except for these, we have received no weapons from the High Command. The supply of cartridges and explosives was stopped in 1940.

As regards medicines and medical materials: altogether we have received a fairly large amount of supplies donated by Allied nations; but among these there are still 101 cases of medicines detained by the friendly troops in Shan-Yuan, which so far we have been unable to obtain. In the last two years we have received a lot of medicines and materials contributed by the China Defence League. Although they are far short of our needs, we are deeply grateful for the help from our international friends and the enthusiasm and sincerity of the China Defence League under the leadership of Madame Sun Yat-sen.

As to transportation, the Eighth Route Army has received one motor-car, four ambulances and four trucks from Chinese and foreign contributors. What has been received by the New Fourth Army from the United Nations is not clear, as its headquarters was surrounded and destroyed, its commander, General Yeh T'ing, captured, and its documents taken away by the troops sent to attack under the instructions of the High Command.

In addition to this, we have also received great help from Dr. Norman Bethune of Canada, Dr. Kotnis and five other Indian doctors of the India Medical Unit, Dr. Ma Hai-Teh of America, Drs. Frey and Rosenthal of Australia, Dr. Atof of the Soviet Union, Professors Michael Lindsay and William Band of England, Mr. Schipper, a German correspondent, and Dr. Muller of Germany. Our Japanese friend, Okano Susumu, and a batch of his cadres have attained great achievements in helping our troops to undermine the enemy armies and appealing to the Japanese people to oppose the aggressive war launched by the Japanese militarists against China. The Korean Independence Union in North China, from Comrade Wu Ting down to his members, have also carried on in this field an extremely bitter and brave struggle.

As regards the army in Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, in order to strengthen the defence line of several hundred li along the north section of the Yellow River, and to consolidate the rear in North-West China, some of our troops, with the approval of the High Command, remained in the Border Region, and established the Rear Garrison Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army. In the middle period of the war of resistance, due

to the bases behind the enemy lines having been cut into big and small parts, and the difficulty of concentrating large forces in one battle, we have carried out the movement of rationalisation of the Army and Administration in order to cope with the war situation and to lighten the burden of the people. A great many of those demobilised from the armies have been transferred to production work behind the enemy lines, and others have been called to this Border Region for studying, joining the Garrison Troops or production. The internal political situation of China has gone from bad to worse; this Border Region has been surrounded and blockaded more seriously than ever before, and the threat of a civil war has on three occasions been extremely critical. Under such conditions we have recalled some troops from North China (such as Wang Chen's Brigade) to this Border Region. We must defend the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, for it is the general rear of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. The function of the garrison troops in this region is to defend the river line and to defend our territory against General Hu Tsung-Nan's big force of 500,000 which has surrounded the general rear of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies. Nevertheless up till now our troops in this Border Region number no more than 50,000. Compared with General Hu Tsung-Nan's troops, this is a proportion of one to ten. Now that the Japanese are attacking Honan and pressing on Shensi, our small garrison troops, except for those defending the river line, are willing to move to the front, together with General Hu Tsung-Nan's troops, to fight against the enemy. We are sure that if the High Command would permit movement of the several tens of thousands of troops in the Border Region to the Honan and Shensi fronts, and give us the power of mobilising the people and fighting in co-ordination without interference, opposition and attacks from friendly armies, we could halt the enemy offensive and recapture the lost territory.

Now I will go on to discuss the bases behind the enemy lines. This is the fundamental problem in the mobile war. If democratically organised areas behind the enemy lines had not been set up, it would have been impossible to continue with this fierce and severe struggle in these areas on such a large scale.

The Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army on the one hand carry on the bloody struggle with the enemy, and on the other hand, in close co-operation with the people of these areas, realise the new democracy—namely, Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Revolutionary Three People's Principles.

The building up of the democratic anti-Japanese base areas requires the hardest work in military, political, economic and

cultural affairs. I will not enlarge on this point, but only give a brief sketch of the base areas.

On the front behind the enemy lines in North China we have set up five large democratically organised anti-Japanese bases, extending from Tsintao and the Chiao-Tung Peninsula, the Yellow Sea, the Gulf of Pohai, Shan-Hai-Kuan and Chin-Chou on the east; Ning-Chen in Jehol, Do-Lun and Shang-Tu in Chahar, and Pai-Ling-Miao in Suiyuan on the north; the Yellow river on the west; and the Lung-Hai Railway on the south. They include seven provinces of North China (Shansi, Hopei, Chahar, Shantung, Suiyuan, Jehol and Liaoning) and extend 2200 li from east to west and 1800 li from north to south. Their governments control more than 50,000,000 people—that is, 51% of the total 100,000,000 population of North China. Of these 50,000,000, 16,000,000 are organised—that is, 32% of the population of the base areas; 1,500,000—that is, 3% of the population of the base areas—are organised as people's militia who continue in production. In this whole area there are five large military regions—namely, the Shansi-Suiyuan Military Region, the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar-Jehol Military Region, Shansi-Hopei-Honan Military Region, Hopei-Shantung-Honan Military Region and the Shantung Military Region. Each of these is divided into several small military areas, which we call military districts.

On the Central China front behind the enemy lines the New Fourth Army has set up eight democratically organised base areas in the six provinces of Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhwei, Hupei, Hunan and Honan. These governments control 30,000,000 people—that is, 50% of the population of the occupied areas in Central China. Five million people are organised—that is, 30% of the population of the base areas—and there are 500,000 in the people's militia who continue with production—that is, 1.75% of the population of these base areas. These eight large military regions are: the Central Kiangsu Military Region, the North Kiangsu Military Region, the North Huai River Military Region, the South Huai River Military Region, the Central Anhwei Military Region, the Hupei-Honan-Anhwei Military Region, the South Kiangsu Military Region, and the East Chekiang Military Region. As in North China, these regions are divided into a number of military districts.

On the South China front behind the enemy lines there are two areas. The first is Hainan Island, where in the civil war period there was a Red Army base, which, after the outbreak of the war, changed to an Anti-Japanese Area, under the leadership of Comrade Feng Pei-Chu. Since the Kuomintang troops with-

drew a long time ago, the struggle against the Japanese has been carried on entirely by our forces. In recent years there has been no direct communication with this island, but according to enemy sources a large part has been recovered by us, and the Japanese have been unable to maintain control. The second area, under the leadership of Comrade Tseng Sheng, is along the Canton-Kowloon Railway and the outskirts of Canton. These troops threaten Kowloon, carry on underground work in Hong Kong, and give a great deal of trouble to the enemy.

The armies of the Chinese Communist Party in the various military regions of North, Central and South China have for seven years carried on the extremely severe struggle, which must appear almost incredible to those who have not witnessed it. It is this struggle which has saved China from annihilation by the Japanese. Without such heroic efforts in the anti-Japanese bases it is impossible to imagine what would become of China. The plan of the Japanese to make North China into a military depot and to exploit the resources of Central and South China has been fundamentally defeated by the determined and widespread resistance of the Chinese Communist Party during the past seven years. The enemy's plan to loot man-power, cotton, coal, iron, and food was seriously smashed. This has not only been of the greatest importance to China, but also to the whole war efforts of our Allies. However, the ruling group of the Kuomintang has slandered the Communist Party, the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and their anti-Japanese bases as "traitor party", "traitor armies" and "traitor areas", and made accusations of "hindering the war of resistance" and "endangering the nation". They have also sent armies to attack, surround and blockade us; and have sent thousands of agents to sabotage our work. They have cut off all supplies, including those sent by our international friends. Finally, they have cut off all news of the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army and the setting up of anti-Japanese bases not only from the people of China, but also from our friends abroad. All this is actually harmful to the war of resistance and to consolidation. We hope that this situation will be ended as soon as possible, and the relations between the Kuomintang and Communist Party be improved so as to open a new era of real consolidation and effective resistance.

The political programme and work, the strategy and tactics, the military training, the economic work, rear services and the cultural and educational work which have enabled the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies and the people behind the enemy lines to win victories over the enemy are rich in content and

adapted to the circumstances. It is really a miraculous achievement, which even the Japanese describe as "almost reaching the superhuman".

These are the facts, without boasting or exaggeration.

Many statements and criticisms have been made by the Japanese and the puppets about the Chinese Communist Party. But only a few of them are given here. They can be regarded as samples of the rest. Although they contain many slanders and lies, yet in some places they have hit upon the truth. The exponents of defeatism in China have said, "The Chinese Communist Party does not fight the Japanese", "The Chinese Communist Party has no wounded soldiers", "The Chinese Communist Party has only 80,000 troops", "The Chinese Communist Party is disrupting the war of resistance and undermining the nation", and described us as "traitor party", "traitor army", "traitor region". All this is belied by the materials captured from the enemy. Furthermore, the figures given in this article relate only to the Japanese Army, while those of the puppets are not included. This should be kept in mind by readers.

YEH CHIEN-YING.

June 18, 1944.

## ARTICLES FROM JAPANESE DAILY PAPERS AND MAGAZINES

(1) *Peiping 13th, "Asahi Sinbun," Tokyo, January 15, 1944:*

A special telegram from Peiping, January 13, appeared in the *Asahi Sinbun*, Tokyo, January 15, describing the general war record of the Japanese North China Army in the year 1943. It runs as follows:

"All the detachments of the North China Army struggling for peace and order in North China have continued their crushing operations against the Communist forces attempting to sovietise North China and the Chungking Army trying to retake North China. At 3 p.m., January 13, the North China Army published the following communique announcing the annual record of operations in 1943.

"The general record of war of the North China Army in the 18th year of Showa, 1943, is given as follows:—

Number of engagements . . . . .	15,238
Enemy force participating in the combats . . . . .	2,054,651
Enemy corpses collected . . . . .	109,862
Number of prisoners captured . . . . .	94,345
Number of capitulators . . . . .	115,721
Number of annihilative measures . . . . .	5,008
Major trophies:	
Mountain cannon . . . . .	6
Flat trajectory guns . . . . .	6
Trench mortars . . . . .	223
Heavy machine-guns . . . . .	131
Light machine-guns . . . . .	1,435
Rifles . . . . .	62,473

and large quantities of other weapons, munitions, outfits and foodstuffs."

Another telegram analysing the 1944 operations ran as follows:

"The general war record of the 18th year of Showa announced by the North China Army has sufficiently explained the fact that instead of Chungking's Army, the Communist Army has become the central object of mopping-up operations.

"*Morale of Chiang's Army Humiliating.*—Since the battle of Chungyuan (Central North China), Chiang's army have been forced to hide themselves south of the Yellow River. The enforcement of the new policy towards China, the formation of the Sino-Japanese Alliance, and the encroachment of our policies in enemy regions have all greatly shaken the enemy. Consequently, the morale of Chiang's armies in regions between the river and the Lunghai railway has been seriously undermined.

"*The Major Enemy has been Communist Forces.*—75% of the 15,000 engagements have been against the Communist forces, and more than half the enemy force were party troops of the Communists; half the corpses collected were also Communists; while among the 74,000 prisoners captured only 35% were Communists.

"This clearly exposes the weakness and abasement of the Chungking Army, and at the same time shows the apparent increase of the morale and fighting will of the Communist forces. The 15,000 engagements means that each day there were more than forty operations. It is clear that the commanders and men have undergone extraordinary hardships; which have been rendered more arduous by the bad natural conditions, with cold freezing winters and hot summers. Furthermore, the enemy facing the North China Army is the force of the Communists who are instigating national consciousness and seeking for decisive battles.

*“Specific Character of the War.*—Unlike those on the South China front, here every man must fight by himself as a combat unit. Because of the untiring efforts of the North China Army in fulfilling their pacification duty, peace and order have been maintained unmolested in North China. At present there are 200,000 Communist regulars in North China. If we add the partisans, they number over 800,000.

“Further, with Eastern Hopei as their centre, the Communists have already extended their forces to Jehol, and are striving incessantly to set up a new border region in that area.

“This has increased the importance of the future tasks of the North China Army. In consequence of the repeated operations against the Communist forces, the North China Army has acquired a deep knowledge of partisan tactics and mass work of 30% of military and 70% of political work boasted by the Communists.

“This is concretely shown by the successive operations against the Communist Army since last autumn. After the Taihang campaign in the spring and summer of the eighteenth year (1943) the Chungking Army has lost its will to fight. However, we must not neglect the group of the Chungking Army with Yu Hsueh-chung as its commander, who is trying to establish a new war region and rallying the morale of his troops. But at present only operations against the Communist army (which is a fatal wound to North China) are the major mission of the North China Army.”

(2) *Peiping 13th, February 14, 1944:*

*“Enemy Camps in the Course of Collapse.*—Since January 9, 1943, when China joined the war, the North China Army has developed the strength of its field armies, launched the Taihang campaign in the spring of the eighteenth year, and delivered annihilating blows at both the Twenty-fourth Group Army of Chiang’s clique and the Eighteenth Group Army of the Communist Party. It further advanced to the southern Taihang region to fight the remnants of Chiang’s Twenty-seventh Army; this was the summer Taihang campaign of the eighteenth year. Since the middle of September it has carried out the autumn expedition against the Communist forces all over North China, meting out severe punishment to Chiang’s and Communist forces who have hindered the construction of that area. Although the number of its engagements has been reduced compared with the preceding year, it has inflicted a loss of 299,900 men on the enemy, including dead, prisoners and capitulators. The number of capitulators has increased by leaps and bounds, from 70,000 in 104

the previous year to 115,000. This also shows the stage of collapse in the camps of the enemy force in North China.

“Throughout last year the Communist forces were the major object of operations for the North China Army. This was proved by the fact that 70% of the engagements were against them. However, only 40% of the total loss were Communists. This also shows how clever the Communist Army were in relying on their guerrilla tactics and political offensive in harassing North China.

“Lastly, the comprehensive war record of the North China Army, from the fourteenth to the eighteenth years of Showa (*i.e.*, 1939–1943), is given below:

Number of engagements	90,939
Enemy force used in combats (accumulative figure)	14,666,221
Enemy corpses collected	899,375
War prisoners	303,805
Major trophies:	
Mountain cannons	106
Trench mortars	1,669
Heavy machine-guns	1,087
Light machine-guns	6,192
Rifles	337,500”

(3) *Telegram from Tsinan, on the General Programme of 1944, Yung Pao, Tientsin, January 7, 1944.*

“At the beginning of the thirty-third year of the Chinese Republic (1944), the administrations of Shantung have advanced into a new stage. Complete plans for this year have already been drawn up. To carry out the Sino-Japanese Alliance Treaty, to accomplish reconstruction, thorough annihilation of the Communist bandits, to increase production, to exploit the resources and to establish the war-time educational system are the major issues of the plan.

*“Thorough Annihilation of the Communist Bandits.*—The Communist Army is the military force of the Chinese Communist Party. The Japanese Army and the forces of the new Government fight them incessantly. Unlike the army, it is very difficult to differentiate the party organisation. The district and higher party committee does not stay in a definite place, but moves with its personnel wherever the work demands. As to the project of work in pacified (Japanese-occupied) regions the party works independently, while in other districts it works in co-operation with the Army and the Government. Therefore in recruiting new members and enlarging party organisations it skilfully utilises the legal positions in the bandit region and the pacified region. In pacified

regions, especially in the big cities, the party works independently underground, but its work is decided on jointly by the higher party and army organs. Communists working in the cities hide themselves skilfully without any exposure; they limit themselves to secret work in gaining new members and enlarging party organisations; and they also carry on intelligence work as well as plotting activities in a very subtle way. Therefore it is extremely difficult to discover the Communist Party organisations.

"In bandit districts the Communist Party is either keeping intimate relations with the army, or they are working together in recruiting new members, enlarging and strengthening the party organisations, as well as that of the army and the Government. The establishment of the administrative organs, mass organisation work and the sovietisation work are outstanding measures. In order to enlarge and broaden its strength and influence, the party must be supported by the strong armed forces of the army, while at the same time the underground force of the party supports the enlargement of the army through its general mobilisation work.

"In Shantung province, under our military and economic offensive, the different Communist bases and their various sub-districts have been seriously partitioned and isolated. The spiritual and material poverty and hardships have grown so acute that the Communist Party is adopting the following measures to meet the situation: (1) moving its central body and main strength to districts where our pressure is weak; (2) making furious efforts to recover and strengthen the connections between the different bases; (3) planning active political offensives to supplement the defects in their military forces. In working for a united front between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the following measures have been adopted to meet the internal situation.

"(i) *Positive Measures.*—Military regions have been reorganised for stronger unification between the Party, the Army and Government organs: the remoulding of the three kinds of ideology (for the Party), the readjustment and training campaign (for the army), the one-to-three ratio system (for the Government), the production movement, reduction of rent and interest (for mass organisation). These measures have been put into effect successively, with the aim of depositing and accumulating strength for the counter-offensive, raising combat power and increasing solidarity with the people.

"(ii) *Passive Measures.*—It strives to break through the difficult situation by realising the policies of efficiency in the army and simplicity in administration, the thrift campaign in food supplies, and the economic counter-blockade.

"The Communist Party is extremely stubborn, especially the leading cadres, which are rich in experience, thorough in reviewing and studying tactics and operations, and quick in reflecting and readjusting faults and weakness. The Communists are enthusiastic in realisation; and in leading the lower party agents and the people, they are always models for them. However, they have the following weakness among themselves:

"(i) Although the Chinese Communist Party gives the people its powerful support, yet in order to continue the prolonged warfare, it has increased the burden of the people, incessant discontent is aroused, and is almost acute in military and economic fields.

"(ii) Believing that ideological struggle can help to bring about unification within their own camp, and using the same method to suppress the people, various differences occur between thought and realities.

"(iii) The Chinese Communists regard Kuomintang-Communist co-operation as a temporary facility, while looking forward to leading the entire Chinese people to overthrow the Kuomintang. Before they can do this, the first step is to intensify the acuteness of the antagonism between the people and the Kuomintang, and furthermore, shake the interior of the Kuomintang. Herein lies their danger.

"(iv) Inside the Communist Party there exists antagonism between those who firmly believe in intimate relations with the Soviet Union and those who are opposed to this. Such antagonisms will certainly be intensified in the future.

"Since we are aware of all the Communist activities and attempts, the aim of Shantung in the present year is to discover the weakness of the Communist Party, and carry out savage expeditions and annihilations. In the expedition, the following rules must be observed:

"(i) To win over the people. This is the basic method used by the Communists in achieving their goal. The Chinese Communists are very clever in using persistent and enthusiastic political measures to forestall our attempts to organise the agrarian population. Due to the recent contradictions between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party, the latter are the more active in striving to win over the people, to strengthen the various mass organisations and to maintain their position. According to the present situation, the key to the victory of the Anti-Communist expedition depends on the results of the work of winning over the people; we should keep this point deeply in





SOLDIERS AND PEASANTS HARVESTING

## ANNUAL REPORT OF THE SHENSI-KANSU-NINGHSIA BORDER REGION GOVERNMENT FOR THE YEAR 1943

(DELIVERED BY CHAIRMAN LIN TSU-HAN AT THE FOURTH MEETING OF THE BORDER REGION GOVERNMENT ON JANUARY 6, 1944.)

MEMBERS OF the Government Committee, Comrades:

The fact that we convene this fourth meeting of the Government Committee immediately after the triumphant adjournment of the First Representative Meeting of the Labour Heroes in the Border Region is highly significant. As we all know, the Labour Heroes Meeting is a true representative meeting of the people. It reveals, in a single place, the whole aspect of the economy and politics of the Border Region. It illustrates with facts that the Government has reaped unprecedented achievements in its various branches of work by carrying on the instruction of the Higher Cadres Conference of 1942—that “production is the material basis of all kinds of work”—and the direction of the third meeting of the Government Committee—that “production ranks first and education second”. It also illustrates with facts that the Border Region is the model democratic anti-Japanese base where the revolutionary San Min Chu I is genuinely practised; that our principle of nationalism is expressed not only in supporting Generalissimo Chiang to persist in the war of resistance, but also in raising the self-confidence of the nation and promoting the morale of the people; that our principle of raising the people’s standard of living is expressed in the development of production and the realisation of the slogan “abundant clothing and sufficient food”; and that our principle of democracy is expressed in the democratic politics practised and in the various kinds of necessary freedoms given to the people. The result of all this is very evident—we have realised firm solidarity between the troops and the people, between the rear and the front.

What did we do last year? What kind of achievements have we attained?

## Production Progress

*Agriculture.*—The area of cultivated land has increased from 11,742,082 mow in 1940 to 13,387,213 mow last year, with a total production of 1,840,000 piculs of foodstuffs. Our primary plan last year was to increase our production of husked foodstuffs by 80,000 piculs, but actually we increased it by 160,000 piculs, of which 145,000 piculs resulted from the reclamation of over 970,000 mow of waste land, and 15,000 piculs from the reconditioning of flooded land. The yearly consumption of foodstuffs in the Border Region is about 1,620,000 piculs, thus there was a surplus of 220,000 piculs there last year to be stored against lean times. The area of cottonfields has increased from 15,177 mow in 1940 to 150,287 mow last year, which was 287 mow more than we primarily planned. The amount of cotton reaped was 1,700,000 to 2,000,000 catties, which fulfils more than half the requirements of the Border Region.

*Salt Production.*—The amount of salt production in last year's plan was 400,000 animal-loads, but the actual production reached 600,000 loads. The amount to be transported in last year's plan was 300,000 to 360,000 loads, but the actual amount transported reached over 350,000 loads at the end of November, which means that the total amount transported in the whole year might reach as high as 380,000 loads. The enormous development of salt transport co-operatives is a progress of great significance. Up to the end of September last year the number of animals used in these transport co-operatives reached 3,700, a number ten times greater than that of 1942. In this field the two hsien—Yenan and Chitan—were the most successful, each having 700 or 800 animals in its transport co-operatives. These co-operatives were conducted either jointly by the Government and the people, or by the people alone. The principle we laid down for the encouragement of these co-operatives was "profits to both the Government and the private participants, especially to the latter" under which principle a great number of peasant-owned animals have been absorbed into the transport co-operatives.

*Co-operative Societies.*—According to incomplete statistics, there are 260 co-operative societies in the Border Region. The principle of "private operation with Government aid and the orientation of the South Section Co-operative of Yenan" has been observed in a wide area. Of these 260 co-operatives, 15% have remodelled themselves on the South Section Co-operative, and 60% are beginning to do so. The co-operative movement is gradually becoming the movement of the people. New creations in the movement are the credit co-operative conducted by the South

Section Co-operative of Yenan, and the "animals insurance co-operative" conducted by the people of Ting Pien hsien, both of which have gained the zealous support of the masses. If co-operatives of this kind are extended to other localities, they will have much to do in the development of finance and stock-raising of the Border Region.

Other lines of production, such as stock-raising, handicrafts and industries, also showed progress. Despite the animal plague and the extremely cold weather last spring, the number of animals in the Border Region was still greater than in 1942. As to the handicrafts, we see progress in every field. In spinning alone, the number of women participating has reached 137,600, most of whom are in one way or another associated with the co-operatives. The Government industries, too, showed great progress, after the Factories Conference and the movement for purging non-Marxist ideology in factories. Every factory achieved more than was planned last year; the amount of production was increased from 100% to 400% (as in the Chemical Factory), the quality was improved, and the cost of production was markedly reduced—between 20% and 30% compared with that of 1942.

From the few figures given above we should be able to see that the people's enthusiasm for production has been universally raised in the Border Region. Even Taoists, blind men and old women were influenced by the tide of production. There was a Taoist named Chang Fung-ming of the Jin Kang Temple of Tsun Yao hsien, who, being influenced by the people's enthusiasm for reclaiming waste land last spring, cut away his long, Taoist-style hair and turned peasant, despite the objection of his master. Then there was a fifty-seven-year-old blind man in Ching Yang hsien, who, being unwilling to lag behind during the reclamation movements, urged his grandson to lead him out, and finally succeeded in reclaiming four and a half mow of waste land. There was the old labour heroine, Hu Lao-po of Chi Tan hsien, who during last autumn's harvest got up every day as soon as the roosters crowed twice, helped her fellow-villagers to get up as early as she did, and went out to the fields when the day just began to dawn. The result was that the harvesting of the village was quickly accomplished. Can you find from our history or from other places in China many examples parallel to these seemingly common but actually very significant stories?

What is the chief factor that determines this great progress in the production of the people? It is nothing other than the active leadership of our Party and our Government.

First, we have promulgated the Tenancy Regulations. In places



where 50% or more of the inhabitants have not been given land, we carried on the rent-reduction movement, which greatly inspired the peasants' enthusiasm for production. In the 8th hsiang of the Yin Tow chu of Mi Chi hsien the people said after rent-reduction, "Now we have an energetic mind to produce", and they organised their brothers and other relatives into forty-nine mutual-aid labour corps, reconditioned their dam, and triumphantly realised their production plan. In like manner, as a result of the thorough execution of the Tenancy Regulation, the peasants in Chia hsien dug out more than 10,000 small reservoirs and reclaimed thousands of mow of waste land above their plan.

Secondly, we have firmly carried out the agricultural loan policy. We have lent the peasants a total of more than \$30,000,000, helped them to solve quickly all difficulties and enabled the poor to increase their production. For instance, the Government lent \$500,000 to 138 peasant families in five villages of the Liu Lin district of Yen-an hsien, which enabled them to purchase 131 oxen for ploughing, and later to reclaim 2,808 extra mow of waste land and reap 330 extra piculs of husked foodstuffs. The Government has also encouraged cotton plantation by exempting three years' tax on cotton-fields and promising to accept cotton as a substitute for grain in the future payment of grain tax. Now the people are well aware of the benefits of planting cotton, although at first they showed unwillingness to change their line of production on account of the ill-minded rumours created by pro-Japanese elements and special agents.

Thirdly, we have thoroughly executed the policy of "preferential treatment to refugee-immigrants", as a result of which we had 8,800 labourers coming to our region. Under the attention of the Government and with the assistance of the masses, these refugee-immigrants engaged in production with easy minds, and were thus able to develop their labour power. For instance, a total amount of 38,774.7 mow of waste land has been reclaimed by the immigrants in Kwan Chung, mostly refugees from Honan, each having the capacity of reclaiming 7.9 mow. With the assistance of our democratic Government they have enjoyed an entirely new life within a year. The labour hero Chen Chang-an, who came to attend the Labour Heroes Meeting here not long ago, moved into the Border Region only last spring. He was given land in the Cha Kow village of Fu hsien, and he has now more than enough to eat and to wear, and his father told everyone he encountered, "I have been in the Border Region for only a little more than nine months, and now I have enough food to satisfy me and enough clothes to keep me warm. I have lived for more than seventy years, but this is the first time I have ever seen such a good

Government." This was also why, when the immigrant labour hero Fung Yun-peng started for Yen-an to attend the Labour Heroes Meeting, the immigrants of Kwan Chung told him to bring the following message for them: "It is only a year since we came to the Border Region, and with the help of the Government we are now as happy as if we were in a paradise. Thank Chairman Mao, Generalissimo Chu, Commander Koa and the Border Region Government for all of us when you are in Yen-an."

Fourthly, we have commenced reforming the idlers. Considering how hard and immense a task it is to reform a society, you will be able to imagine how much harder it is to reform the ideology of men. Nevertheless, we now have the experience of reforming 4,500 idlers. How the production of the Border Region was influenced by this can be illustrated by the case of labour hero Liu Seng-hai, who attended the Labour Heroes Meeting not long ago. Liu was originally an idler in San Pien. He had no rice or wheat before, disgusted everybody, and his wife was contemplating a divorce; but with the assistance of the Government he ploughed 84 mow of land last year, and reaped more than six piculs of husked millet. Now his clothes and bedding are all new, and he is going to enlarge his production plan this year—to plough 120 mow of land. He has turned from a parasite of society into a model producer.

Fifthly, we have promoted the policy of mutual aid in labour, based on individual economy and the principle of voluntary participation. We have organised the people's enthusiasm for production in the form of labour co-operation, and organised the scattered state of production in the form of planned production for each family and mutual-aid labour corps. Without such, the people's enthusiasm for production could not have been raised to the present level, and their condition of living could not have been really changed.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung said: "Among the peasant masses individual economy has been prevailing for thousands of years. Every family was a production unit. This scattered individual production was the economic basis of feudal rule, and it caused the peasants to suffer everlasting poverty and hardship. The only way to overcome such a condition is to change individual labour into collective labour gradually, and the only way to reach collective labour is through the co-operatives. In the Border Region we have organised many co-operatives of the peasants, but they are not the Soviet-style co-operatives known as collective farms. Our economy is New Democratic in character, and our co-operatives are merely collective labour established on the basis of individual economy (on the basis of private property)."

In the Border Region there are altogether 338,760 agricultural labourers, of whom 81,128, or 24%, were organised into collective labour last year. The chief forms of this collective labour are the Pien Kung Tui or Tang Chang Pan Tsu (mutual-aid labour corps). This opens a new epoch in agricultural production. Since the peasants are organised into co-operative or collective labour, human labour, animal labour and agricultural implements are conserved. Production contests, held within and without the co-operatives, will raise the efficiency of labour and give the peasants time and a chance to gather together to think over production problems and improve agricultural technique. All this not only changes production relations among the peasants, but also renders them more politically conscious and enriches their cultural life. Besides the co-operatives for agricultural production, there are three other forms of co-operatives in the Border Region. These are the general co-operatives, like the South Section Co-operative of Yen-an, which operates all kinds (consumptive, transport, and credit) of co-operatives, the transport co-operative and the handicraft co-operative. The Animal Insurance Co-operative is a new invention. All these various forms of co-operative are the concrete realisation of Dr. Sun's principle of livelihood, and they play an important rôle economically, politically and culturally.

Sixthly, we have adopted the policy of encouraging labour heroes, through whom we have raised the people's enthusiasm for production and promoted the co-operative movement and production contests. During last year hundreds of these labour heroes have emerged from among the masses, developed their working intelligence and creative power, and achieved surprising results one after the other. We have labour heroes on farms like Wu Man-yu; in co-operative societies, like Liu Chien-chang; in industries, like Chao Tsan-kwei; from among the disabled ex-servicemen, like Yang Chao-tun; from among the refugee-immigrants, like Fung Yun-peng; in salt transportation, like Liu Yung-chang and Sheh Chi-ming; in salt production, like Lee Wen-huan and Kao Chung-ho; in cotton-planting, like Ko Ping-jen; in stock-raising, like Ho Pao-yuan; in the promotion of public garners, like Chang Ching-yih; in the "support the army and the soldier-families movement", like Sun Wan-fu, and in the fight against spies, like Yang Kai-chung. We have also Ko Fung-ying and Liu Lao-po, the labour heroines, Liu Chang-ching, the youth labour hero, and Liu Song-hai and Ma Yu-erh, the labour heroes who were formerly idlers. All these have done wonderful work. For instance, Liu Chien-chang has established the South Section Co-operative of Yen-an, setting

good example for the other co-operative societies in the Border Region to follow; Chang Ching-yih has invented the method of joint land-reclamation by the village and the establishment of public garners, and has done much in social relief work by helping the poor and needy; Fung Yun-peng has helped single-handed 174 families of refugee immigrants to settle in the Border Region, in which task he busied himself day and night, sometimes even forgetting his meals and giving up his sleep, and turned the once desolate and uninhabited Ta Huong Hill into a prosperous village with stacks of foodstuffs. Wu Man-yu, Chen Teh-fa and Hsih Ming-teh have organised their villages and hsiangs for increased production, besides increasing their own products, and enabled every one to attain the state of "abundant clothing and sufficient food"; the old man Sun Wan-fu has served as head of a "Help the Soldier-Families Troupe" in his village for six years dutifully, led his fellow-villagers to plough 50 mow of land for the soldier-families every year, and has constructed eight bridges to facilitate the traffic of the soldiers and civilians; Yang Kai-tseng has been skilful not only in production, but also in the fight against spies. He linked up his work of production and the fight against spies, looked upon the public work as work of his own, and therefore deserved the title of a good citizen of the Chinese Republic. These labour heroes are the leaders of the people, not only in the production front, but also in a political sense. They have established a great many model villages—like Wu Man-yu's "Wu's Date Orchard", Chen Teh-fa's "Ma Chia Kow", Shih Ming-teh's "Pai Yun Village", Liu Yu-hou's "Ho Chia Chao", Chang Chan-crai's Cheng "Haw Village", Ho Pao-yuan's "Ho's Village", etc.—by which they have led the rural people to change the appearance of their villages and hsiangs.

Co-operative societies, labour heroes and model villages are the most important and most significant marks of the progress in production of the people of the Border Region.

The great progress in the production of the Region is also shown in the struggle for self-supply carried on by the troops, the Government offices, and the schools and institutions. We have learnt production from the people, and by this we reduce their burden and inspire their enthusiasm for production. Our troops, under the "Agriculture First" call, reclaimed 306,000 mow of waste land last year—an area equal to one third of that reclaimed by the people—and exceeded the primary plan by 10% (the lowest, in certain brigades) to 156% (the highest in other brigades). Among the brigades, the 359th Brigade has reclaimed the largest area of waste land—100,000 mow—reaped 20,000 piculs of husked foodstuffs, and attained complete self-sufficiency.

We can get an idea of the production of the troops by enumerating the harvests of a certain small unit, say the 2nd Company of the 7th Regiment. This company have cultivated 1,725 mow of land and reaped 443 piculs of foodstuffs, 30,000 cattles of tomatoes, 43,820 cattles of vegetables and 330,000 cattles of hay. In addition, they have chopped 240,000 cattles of firewood, spun 440 cattles of wool and manufactured or purchased 1,250 pieces of tools of production. Their harvests in cotton, hemp, tobacco, melons and fruits are not included. This enormous amount of agricultural products, which formerly had to be supplied by the people, is now produced by the troops themselves. Besides the agricultural production, our troops also engaged in other lines of production, such as stock-raising, handicraft, transportation and other subsidiary business, through which they have not only reached the goal of "abundant clothing and sufficient food", but have also improved their life in every way. This is why the people unanimously eulogised: "We have never seen in history such an army as the Eighth Route Army, who can fight, produce and live harmoniously with the people".

In production, as in fighting, our troops are very energetic and creative. During the reclamation movement last spring they went up to the hills before dawn, remained there till after dusk, and worked even during the 15 minutes recess allowed them after each meal. This compelled the commanders to lay down a rule—the no one shall be allowed to start work before working time or remain after it.

Comrades! This is a miracle! Those who need this kind of labour rule are not many in number, but our Eighth Route fighters need it. They are not only enthusiastic, but also efficient. This is why many of them have been nicknamed "Bulls", because of their extraordinary physical power. And they are not only efficient, but also skilful, which is a fact well known by those who have had their assistance. The commanders and cadres, too, worked just as hard. Regiment Commander Chen Chung-yuan continued working despite the fact that his hand was injured during the reclamation movement. Political Commissioner T. Chi, who had lost his right arm in battle and thus could not hold a plough, cooked and boiled water for the fighters during the reclamation period. We have such labour heroes as Lee Wu, Chao Tsan-kuei, Chang Chi-kuo, Wu Seng-hua, Hu Ching-shan and Fung Kuo-yu in our garrison forces, and as Chen Min in the families of the fighters. Our army is a fighting army, a labouring army, and one that belongs to the people. This is the characteristic of our army. They are the real sons of the Chinese people.

As to the production of the Government offices and schools

the members of such organisations in Yen-an city alone have planted 35,893 mow of land, reaped 6,011 piculs of foodstuffs and 14,849,000 cattles of vegetables; besides that, they have produced \$86,200,000 worth of private agricultural products. They can now supply 26% to 76% of their needs. The Government offices and schools in other parts of the Yen-an Sub-Region, though established much later than those in Yen-an city, nevertheless supply all their daily necessities except provisions, which are furnished by the Government. The Units under the League of Anti-Japanese Societies in the Border Region can now supply 70% of their needs and will be able to realise complete self-supply (including provisions) in January this year.

The nursery is an organisation where the productive power is low because of the nature of its constituents, yet it produced \$5,200,000 worth of products last year—an amount eight times greater than that in its primary plan. In the production movement heart-moving stories like that of Magistrate Chao of the Yen Chang hsien are numerous. Magistrate Chao carried manure, ploughed land, mowed grass and harvested crops all with his own hands. No wonder the people said, "We have never seen a magistrate carry manure before. Now that we have seen it, we must redouble our efforts in production." Labour heroes of governmental organisations like Huang Li-teh, Cheng Hung-kai and Lee Tai-yuan, of the workers' families like Chao Tzu-chen and Liu Yu-fung, and of the schools like Chang Cheh, are men we should highly value.

Just because we have firmly executed the instruction of Comrade Mao Tse-tung—"to produce with our own hands for self-supply"—we have been successful in supplying by our own production 64% of the total expenditure of the Party, the Government, the Army, the schools and other organisations in the Border Region.

The great progress made in the Border Region last year, which has elevated the standard of living of the fighters and the civilians to the level of "abundant clothing and sufficient food", proves completely the correctness of Comrade Mao's direction "to develop the economy to guarantee the supply", and the mistake of certain comrades who adopted the point of view of spontaneous development towards the problem of production by the fighters and the civilians.

It must be pointed out here that we should by no means be satisfied with the present achievements. The co-operative policy under the call "Organise for Production" is only partly realised, and there are tremendous tasks yet to be done; intensive farming is still a problem that awaits our study and promotion; there are still many serious defects in the management, feeding and plague-

prevention of our stock-raising business; in salt transportation the transporting troupes even suffered losses in the latter part of last year because we had not quickly attended to certain defects in management; there are still Government stores which do not carry out the Government policies and decrees, and Government enterprises which are mismanaged; the systematic organisation of production in Government offices is not sufficient; the necessity of saving and thrift has not received our due attention; and finally, the "defensive" and "isolation" point of view of the Material Resources Bureau has prevented us from winning the maximum result in the problems of balancing imports and exports, stabilising finance and adjusting prices. All these defects must be remedied through our future efforts.

### Army and Civilian Unity

As we know, our Government, our people and our army are carrying on two very significant movements—the "support-the-army" movement, and the "support-the-Government-and-love-the-people" movement.

The development of the "support-the-army" movement has strengthened the understanding and love of the people towards the army. During the "support-the-army month"—the twelfth month of the old calendar—a movement to provide comforts for the army was universally carried on throughout the Border Region. Articles and cash, voluntarily contributed by the masses to be forwarded to the army, amounted in value to no less than \$4,000,000; commanders and soldiers of the Eighth Route Army were invited to feasts by the people; the families of the fighters were visited and complimented with presents and food; and social meetings of the families were held and discount coupons were given them. The poor families were rendered the greatest help, so that the fighters at the front need not worry about their families in the rear.

In the month of June and July last year, when the situation in the Border Region was tense, the support and assistance given by the people to the army were more enthusiastic than ever. They sent firewood and vegetables to the army voluntarily, made shoes and prepared "dry foods" for them. In Fu hsien the people presented 200,000 catties of firewood and 30,000 catties of vegetables in five days; in a certain district of the same hsien the people were mobilised to present 100 catties of firewood to each person, but the result was that 150 catties were presented; and in another district the people presented 30,000 catties of firewood instead of 10,000 catties as was primarily planned. In addition, they offered water, rice and eggs to the troops, and when the troops

bought things from the people the latter usually said, "The Eighth Route Army is our saviour. Never mind paying, just keep the money."

Because the troops had to busy themselves in the defence against the reactionaries (Kuomintang blockading troops) the people organised themselves to mow grass for them. In the Nin Wu district of Fu hsien the people mowed over 300 mow of grass for a certain company stationed there, and the people in Jin Pun Wan spent 700 units of labour in mowing grass for the troops. Conditions in other places were somewhat similar to the above. The people helped the army not only by offering to them materials or actual services, but also by sending brothers and sons to join them. For instance, Liang Hsien-fu, when sending his fourth younger brother to the army, told him once and again, "You must work well for the Communist Party and the Border Region Government, who have liberated us, and whom we must defend."

The development of the "support-the-Government-and-love-the-people" movement has strengthened the understanding and love of the army towards the people. During the twelfth month of the old calendar, which was also designated as the "support-the-Government-and-love-the-people month", the troops stationed in the various localities sent out their cadres and soldiers to call on the people and wish them a happy new year. Upon this, the people said, "In all our life we have never seen soldiers wishing the common people a happy new year". The soldiers and the people held social meetings together, danced the country dances together, invited each other to feasts, and all had a grand time. What is particularly worth mentioning is the movement for "liquidating old cases, recompensing damages and losses and returning borrowed articles to the people", for which movement the troops first organised inquiry groups to visit every peasant family, investigating whether there had been damages or losses caused by the Eighth Route soldiers, or whether there had been anything borrowed from them which had not yet been returned. After these investigations the people's damages or losses were recompensed and the borrowed articles returned or paid for. The people said, "Before the Eighth Route Army arrived, we dared not keep money at home, even if we had any, for fear of being robbed by the bandits and the officers. Now, after the Eighth Route Army is come, we can sleep with our doors open. Why mind paying for one or two pieces of furniture borrowed? Just tell us what you want, and we shall be glad to supply them to you." And of course our Eighth Route soldiers insisted on keeping their promise.

In ordinary times the Eighth Route fighters helped the people

to repair their houses, to chop firewood, to fetch water and to look after the sick. Above all, they developed their own production and helped the people to do the same. I have mentioned elsewhere where the rich results obtained from the development of production among the fighters. Here I will give a brief account of how they helped the people to produce. Our troops, in helping the people to till the soil in spring, to mow grass and to harvest in autumn, observe the following rules: (a) that they shall not accept any payment, not even a bowl of rice, from the people for the service they render; (b) that they shall carry or transport their foodstuffs and vegetables by themselves, without asking for the people's help, (c) that they shall not damage the seedlings in the people's fields and shall not allow grass to grow there, and (d) that they shall use with care the tools of the peasants (some fighters brought their own tools when helping the people). This kind of free service to the people was continued even in critical times. For instance, the 5th Company of the 9th Regiment of the 359th Brigade helped the people to mow 30 mow of grass and harvest 68 mow of wheat near the border front line. The people said to them, "Your army is a good army, and your officers are good officers, we hope that you will be stationed here forever". In addition, our troops helped the people to solve production difficulties in many other ways, in assisting the refugees to settle in the organisation of mutual-aid labour corps under the principle of "more benefits to the people", etc. In order to save the labour of the people, the Eighth Route troops reduced the number of transport mobilisations and tried to transport as much as possible of the army rations themselves. For instance, the foodstuffs and hay of a certain regiment were all transported by the fighters themselves, and by transporting the hay alone they saved the people 280 carts and an expense of more than \$700,000. All this proves that our army is supporting the Government and loving the people not in words, but in practice, not only in trifling matters, but also fundamentally.

If there are now fools who try to split the relations between the fighters and the people (who are living together like brothers on the basis of mutual assistance and mutual concession), and do not unite together, they are merely wasting their energy. It was well said by the people of the 5th hsiang of the 5th district of Chun Yao hsien: "We help the troops on the border defence line to harvest, and the troops in the rear help us to harvest. We help each other, and are just like members of a family."

The above two movements have reaped the anticipated results.

In the Labour Heroes Meeting held on December 6 last year the labour heroes representing the people brought forth the

"support-the-army" proposal, while the labour heroes from the army proposed to do more to "support the Government and love the people" hereafter.

It must be pointed out that in spite of all these there is no reason why we should be satisfied with present achievements. There are still defects in the Government and the people regarding the problem of "preferential treatment of the soldier-families", of helping the retired and disabled soldiers to settle, etc. Towards such defects we must be severely critical, and try our best to correct them.

### Fight Against Spies

As everybody knows, a broad mass movement to fight spies has been developed in the Border Region. The enemy and the reactionaries, wishing to destroy this democratic anti-Japanese base, have sent into the Border Region a great number of special agents, who penetrated into the Government offices, troops and schools, or hid among the common people. But they have failed in their nefarious scheme. Their destructive activities as well as they themselves have been exposed by the people.

The general principle used by these traitors and special agents against our "one-third system" was "to utilise the one-third system to destroy the one-third system", for which purpose they have concocted all kinds of rumours to split the unity between the Communist members and the non-members in the Government—rumours such as that "the vice-chairman of the People's Political Council, An, has been fined \$500,000", that "the vice-chairman of the Border Region Government, Lee Ting-ming, has been deposed", that "vice-chairman Lee is only a puppet", and that "non-Communist members in the Government will be eliminated and the Communists will practise one-party dictatorship", etc. Towards the non-Communist members in the Government the special agents practised the policy of "dealing blows at them and surrounding them". For instance, the discovered special agent Lan Ting-sang confessed, "Towards those people our tactic is to deal blows at them, surround them, so as to make them work like special agents under our influence. This was the method we used towards Magistrate Ho." They tried every means to penetrate into the Government offices, and utilised the one-third system to cover up their secret activities. Ma Chi-an and Wang Shih-cheng, two of the members of the People's Political Council, worked in that way.

In military affairs the general principle they used was to "prepare for riots in ordinary times, and co-ordinate the outside operations in war-time", for which purpose they penetrated into

the military organs and among the troops, established an espionage system therein, stole important secret documents and incited the soldiers to desert. By threats and enticements, they organised among the people "black troops", flying columns, assassin groups, anti-Communist guerrillas, mine-laying groups, incendiary groups, etc., to prepare for riots and assassinations in the Border Region.

On the finance and economic front the general principle they used was to "blockade the Communist, as well as the 2,000,000 people of the Border Region to death", for which purpose they incited the peasants to sabotage production by telling them, "The Government will take away all your surplus produce". They obstructed the organisation of mutual-aid labour corps, saying, "This is only to facilitate the conscription of able-bodied men". They tried to frustrate the Government's scheme of "planned production for each family", saying, "The people know more than you do in farming. Why interfere?" They hindered the plan for mobilising the idlers for production by inducing them to gamble and to indulge in idle talk all day, so that they would forget their task. To the immigrants they said, "Coming to the Border Region means only to be conscripted by the Border Region Government". To the cotton-planters they said, "Every cotton-planter will be required to sew two suits of winter clothes for the Government, and for every catty of cotton produced the Government will take away twelve liangs." To the students who produce they said, "The schools are landlords, the student tenants". They purposely distorted the agricultural loan policy of the Government by spreading the rumour that the loans will have to be repaid with grain. In industry they planned to damage the Government factories. In finance they hindered the collection of grain tax and revenues. In currency and trading they ruined the credit of the Border Region banknotes, created a black market and manipulated the prices. In short, the traitors and special agents considered our finance, economy, currency and trade organisations main objectives for their destruction.

On the cultural and educational front the principle those traitors and special agents used was "to poison the youth with Fascism and to destroy the national education of the Border Region basically", for which purpose they penetrated into the middle and primary schools, intoxicated the students with indecent thoughts, forced them by threats and enticement to sell their souls, occupied such educational organisations as the Popular Educational Clubs, winter schools, etc., as their strongpoints and penetrated into the educational organs of the Government to smuggle their contrabands and carry on their secret service activities.

In the field of justice they distorted the laws and decrees of the Government, purposely wronged the good citizens and liberated the bad ones, so as to destroy the Government's credit among the people.

In short, they are like venomous reptiles, doing all sorts of evil whenever and wherever they can. A certain gentleman in Sui Teh hsien said, "At first I thought there must be some reason in what people do, but seeing how inhuman and unreasonable is the behaviour of the special agents, I can say now that if one assesses the actions of the special agent as one assesses the actions of the common people, one will surely be cheated and will suffer great losses".

We fully understand that the activities of the traitors and the special agents have their international and social backgrounds, therefore we firmly hold to Comrade Mao's policy of leniency towards such people, trying to win them over, to turn the counter-revolutionaries into revolutionaries. We also understand that the struggle against spies is one of the most important tasks of the Government, that we should not rely entirely on the safety-preservation organisations for the solution of the problem, but should mobilise the whole governmental machine to take up such a responsibility, and that there must be co-operation between the safety-preservation organisations and other organisations and between the cadres and the masses before victory can be won in this field. For more than half a year tireless struggles against hidden spies have been carried on by the Party, the Government, the army and the people, and the struggle has now been turned into a "voluntary confession" movement. The result? The intrigues of the traitors and the special agents were crushed, their organisations exposed, many people who had been trapped and forced to work for them were rescued, and, above all, the cadres and the masses were taught a lesson, which greatly sharpened their vision and enabled them to discover hidden spies hereafter. Now anti-spy heroes like Yan Kai-tseng, Fung Kwang-chi and Chang Pi-mu emerged in great number from among the masses, and our fight against spies is taking on a new appearance.

### Achievement

In the "Outline of the 'efficiency and simplicity' Policy", passed by the third meeting of the Committee of the Border Region Government, it was laid down that simplicity, efficiency, unification in administration, thrift and anti-bureaucracy were the five important aims. Through our efforts last year we have achieved much in all these items except that of thrift. The report

on the summary of our works along this line will be given by vice-chairman Lee. What I am going to bring forth for discussion here is the question of our working style. Before last year serious defects existed in the working style of the Government. This was first shown by the lack of cohesion and the tendency to be "independent" in the various departments of the Government, with the result that there was confusion and disorder regarding the issue of orders and decrees, and differences in the system of administration. The lower ranks did not know what to do. Last year we persisted in the democratic-centralised system of administration and realised the principle of unification in leadership.

Second were the various tendencies of copying or following unconditionally the standards and practices of the old society that were not consistent with the actual conditions of the Border Region, or were contrary to its actual needs. They mechanically applied in the Border Region what was being practised in other parts of the country, thus "cutting the toes to fit the shoes". Last year we firmly persisted in creating new ways of our own, based on actual conditions of the Border Region, and have reaped some benefits. The departments most seriously affected by this tendency—the Department of Education and the Department of Justice—began to improve.

Third was the tendency of bureaucracy, which isolates us from the masses and is contrary to their interests. Some responsible members of the Government were even accused of being "like mandarins", and the secretaries "like bosses". However, after we firmly persisted in the policy that "responsible members should work with their own hands" and that "we should start from the masses and return to the masses", the tendency was corrected.

Fourth was the tendency of liberalism, which found its expression in the nominal obedience but actual disobedience of Government policies, in the neglect of discipline, in indifference to the mistakes of fellow-workers, and in the want of alertness against bad elements. Last year this tendency was corrected after the continued movement for purging non-Marxist ideology and for examining cadres. On the other hand, we effected improvements in the mastery and thorough execution of policies. This should be credited first to the ideology-purging movement, then to the struggle against the above-mentioned erroneous tendencies in our working style, and above all to the leadership of Comrade Ma Tse-tung, who acted as our helmsman, and of the North-west Bureau of the Party headed by Comrade Kao Kang.

Remnants of bureaucracy still exist, and tend to grow again any time. In certain departments the adoption of the mass point of view is still insufficient, and their mistakes are not yet truly

corrected. Generally speaking, we have not yet completely mastered the art of investigation, research and summarising our experiences. Likewise, we have not completely mastered the art of organising leadership and solving problems concretely. We need still greater determination and greater effort regarding these points this year.

### Future Tasks

In deciding the tasks of the Government and the direction of our struggle this year, we must take into consideration the environment and conditions within and without the Border Region. As I have already said, through our efforts last year we have brought about an apparent change in the Border Region, the chief marks of which are the high standard of living enjoyed by the soldiers and civilians, and the unprecedented solidarity existing between them. Thus we have consolidated our rear and opened a broader and smoother path for this year's work.

Speaking of external environment, our enemy is, as usual, stationed on the other bank of the Yellow River in the east of the Border Region, and may invade at any time, while on the three other sides we are still surrounded and blockaded by the National Government. Last year was one of great change in the anti-Fascist war of the world, and this year it is possible that Nazi Germany will be overthrown. We must strengthen the preparation of our counter-offensive forces, in the Border Region as well as in all China, to drive the Japanese robbers out of our territory.

In northern Shensi there is a traditional saying, "A poor harvest in every three years and a severe famine in every ten years", therefore the policy of guarding against famines naturally occupies an important place here.

This being so, the general direction of our efforts this year must be to create more favourable conditions for guarding against famines and for preparing the counter-offensive on the basis of last year's achievements.

The most important and urgent tasks in the Border Region will be:

(1) To organise the people for production, to promote the co-operative movement, to develop production to a greater extent, to develop trading with the outside districts, to carry on the thrift movement, and to strengthen the material and financial power to guard against famines and to prepare for the counter-offensive.

(2) To support the army, to train the people's militia, to enforce the "return-to-the-front" movement, to assist the retired soldiers and the soldiers' families to manage their household

affairs, to further strengthen the solidarity between the soldiers and the civilians, and to raise the self-defence power of the people to prepare for the counter-offensive.

(3) To liquidate all traitors and special agents, to persist in the policy of leniency towards them, and to try as much as possible to win over those who are still redeemable, so as to strengthen the democratic Government of the Border Region.

(4) To improve the middle-school education, so that it may suit the requirements for the reconstruction of the Border Region.

(5) To improve the judicial work, so that it will meet the requirements of protecting the Border Region Government and the rights and interests of the people.

Other kinds of works besides the above will be carried out simultaneously.

### Further Development of Economy

It is our fundamental policy to carry on firmly the war of resistance. Under this there are three urgent measures—the continued development of production, the development of import and export and the practice of thrift.

#### TASKS AND MEASURES CONCERNING THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRODUCTION

(1) The first important task is to realise the plan of “producing one-third reserve” in production within two years. For this purpose we must continue enlarging the area of cultivated land. The people and the troops in the Border Region must reclaim 1,000,000 more mow of waste land, and produce 160,000 more piculs of husked millet. Secondly, we must plant 300,000 more mow of potatoes, with a production of 800 to 1,000 catties per mow, which in total will be equal to at least 240,000 piculs of husked millet. Thirdly, we must promote farming technique by practising intensive cultivation, applying more fertilisers, mowing grass more frequently, improving irrigation, getting rid of harmful insects, selecting seeds and so on, in order that each mow will produce more husked food and a total increase of 100,000 piculs can be realised in the whole region. Fourthly, in districts where rent reduction has not yet been carried out thoroughly, the rent must be reduced before this winter according to the Tenancy Regulations, so that the peasants’ enthusiasm for production can be raised. Fifthly, since the trial practice of a progressive agricultural tax has gained the support of all classes, it must be universally applied this year, so that the peasants will be more enthusiastic and active in production.

(2) 200,000 more mow of cotton must be planted, and the

best cotton seeds used, so that we can reap 20 catties of cotton for each mow, and a total of 4,000,000 catties.

(3) We must produce 600,000 animal-loads of high-quality salt, transport 400,000 loads, and improve the management of the wayside inns, so that the transport troupes may have cheap supplies of grass and hay for their animals.

(4) We must promote stock-raising, improve the management and feeding of animals, increase the production of grass for animal food and prevent plagues. We must learn from Hui Chung-chuan, who keenly studies the method of stock-raising, so that most of our young animals may be raised to maturity. Attention must also be given to the development of handicraft (especially spinning) and other auxiliary productions of the people.

(5) The Government factories (excluding those owned by the army) must produce this year 18,000 pi of cotton cloth, 5,000 pi of woollen cloth, 150,000 towels, 7,500 reams of paper and 600,000 bars of soap.

(6) The great part of the troops must realise complete self-sufficiency, and the remaining part partial self-sufficiency (to over 50%). Production in Government offices must be sufficient to meet most of their office expenses and a part of their provision. A small part of the private production of individuals in Government offices and schools may go to the particular office or school, but the greater part must belong to the producer. Government offices and schools are forbidden to use their funds in speculation. The money must be used in actual production, so that a firm economic basis may be established.

(7) In order to accomplish the task, or to achieve more than the tasks require, we must follow the instruction of Comrade Mao Tse-tung—to further organise the people for production and to develop the co-operative movement of the production front. This includes the following measures: (a) to organise more than 50% of the agricultural labourers into mutual-aid labour corps, and to absorb a part of the peasant women into agricultural production; (b) to induce 5,000 or more labourers to immigrate into the Border Region; (c) to encourage the system and movement of “public fields” and “public granaries” so as to lay a foundation for social relief work; (d) to increase the number of animals in the transport co-operatives to 10,000; (e) to remodel 50% of the co-operatives (excluding the mutual-aid labour corps) after the style of the South Section Co-operative of Yen-an, and to have one co-operative in every chu and one general co-operative, like the South Section Co-operative of Yen-an, in every hsien; (f) to promote the organisation of animal-insurance co-operatives; (g) to try to apply the co-operative methods in the Government fac-



tories; (h) to apply co-operative methods, such as the organisation of mutual-aid labour corps, in the production of Government offices and schools; (i) to encourage the soldiers' families, the workers' families, the discharged servicemen and the disabled soldiers to participate in production; and (j) to reform 90% of the remaining idlers into producers.

(8) We must promote production contests, push forward the system of "planned production for each family", and encourage labour heroes. Each hsien must produce one labour hero who is qualified to be the true leader of the people; each labour hero must create a model village; and the present model villages must be enlarged into model hsiangs.

The development of import and export is one of the important works for guaranteeing supplies to the army and the civilians, for supporting finance, stabilising the currency and regulating prices all of which serve to realise one aim—*i.e.*, economic self-sufficiency in the Border Region. Its importance is only next to that of the development of production. Last year's experience tells us that in connection with this question we should correct the erroneous points of view of the past—the absolute *laissez-faire* point of view and the "defensive" and "isolation" points of view (the latter relying wholly on the Government trading offices for the solution of the problem). The *laissez-faire* point of view is to deny the importance of Government leadership and Government regulation, to tolerate anarchical market conditions, and is therefore against the war-time environment in general and the environment of the Border Region in particular; the "defensive" point of view takes the initiative out of our hands, while the "isolation" point of view isolates us, and makes us like an isolated army, fighting by ourselves, without the help of the people. This year we must adopt the following policies:

(1) Under the leadership of the Government, and under the principle of "benefits to both the Government and the private individuals", the trading offices of the Government should cooperate closely with the people, first of all with the productive and transport co-operatives, and use these co-operatives as cells to extend trade with the outside regions.

(2) The Government financial organs should also cooperate with the co-operatives. They should first extend and support the credit co-operatives and make them strong points for regulating and stabilising the currency.

(3) The taxation system must be readjusted, so that the tax on goods in the Border Region and that on goods passing through

the Border Region are subordinated to our trading policy, and the business tax is subordinated to our economic policy. The progressive business tax should be revised, so that the burden borne by the various strata of merchants can be reasonably distributed. An equilibrium should be established between the business and the agricultural tax.

(4) All the trading, financial and taxation organisations should abolish their bureaucratic tendency. The working style of such organisations must be "for the masses" and for the benefit of the people.

(5) The most important point is to respect and rely on the leadership of the local party and government. It is only through relying on such leadership that co-ordination from every side can be attained, that strength can be concentrated, that steps can be unified, and that our task can be accomplished.

As to the practice of thrift, achievement along this line was small last year, while wastefulness was a comparatively common phenomenon. The reason for this is that we have still not understood that thrift is an important auxiliary means to production, to self-sufficiency and to the establishment of "revolutionary homes". We must link production and self-sufficiency with the practice of thrift, and follow these steps:

(1) Under the principle of production for self-sufficiency, the expenditure as well as the Government subsidies of the various offices, schools and army units should be reduced according to circumstances.

(2) An audit office should be established to audit the expenditure of the various organisations.

(3) Regarding the saving of foodstuffs, we must encourage eating more non-cereal foodstuffs and less cereals. Each person in the army, Government offices and schools must save 0.1 to 0.2 picul of cereals each year. The preparation of wine and sugar from foodstuffs must be restricted so that more foodstuffs may be saved to prepare against famines.

(4) Organisations as well as individuals should be economical in office expenses, and in the use of clothes, blankets and other daily necessities. Concrete plans for saving should be drawn up.

(5) A thrift movement should be organised and rules for encouraging thrift laid down.

### Strengthening Anti-Japanese Defence

I shall not deal with the problem of improving and training the regular troops. What I am going to say here is limited only to the work of co-ordinating and helping the regular troops—*i.e.*,

the work of improving and training the people's militia, of "well-treating" the soldiers' families, looking after the discharged disabled soldiers, carrying on the "return-to-the-front" movement and assisting the troops in various other ways. I have said before that in all these works we have still some defects, which we should correct this year according to the following policies and methods.

(1) *To Improve and Train the People's Militia.* We must unify the self-defence forces of the various localities and classify them into two categories—the basic ones and the common ones. Each chu must have a basic self-defence company. Guerrilla units must continue to work in places where their existence is necessary. The magistrate or the chief of a chu shall be the commander of the self-defence forces of the hsien or the chu, and a vice-commander shall be installed to assist him. At the same time we shall strengthen the training of the self-defence forces, politically and militarily, laying stress on the basic units. In military training there must be lessons on grenade-throwing, laying mines, shooting and detection of the enemy. Actual practice must be emphasised and formalism discarded. In political training, emphasis must be laid on the struggle against the enemy and the spies. Dogmatism must be discarded, and numerous facts and examples must be given for illustration.

(2) *To "Well-treat" the Soldiers' Families.* We must understand that because the war is a protracted war, the work of looking after the soldiers' families is therefore also a long-term matter, and we must not be satisfied with the provisional relief work, which is only passive in character, but must actively help the soldiers' families to run their household affairs. (a) The chu administration must calculate, according to the economic and living conditions of the place, how much land or harvest is needed by each of such families, guarantee to each family that necessary amount of land or harvest, and help them to conduct some sideline productions, so that each family can enjoy "abundant clothing and sufficient food", men and women, old and young alike. (b) The local administration must help each family to lay down its production plan as well as the method for its realisation, and encourage each family to produce. Should such families lack the necessary labour, the masses should give them help. (c) Should the families not have enough capital (or means of production) for their production, the local administration and the masses should help them to solve the problem. Rights of priority in obtaining agricultural loans should be given to the soldier's families. (d) The Bureau of Administration of Material Resources, the Government stores and the co-operatives should help the soldier-families to obtain the necessary material for production.

purchase their produce, and give them special discounts when they purchase daily necessities from those organisations. (e) Attention must be paid to increasing the political consciousness of the soldiers' families. Immediate steps must be taken to settle all disputes concerning the question of their marriages and divorces. The "rules governing the divorces of the soldiers' families" must be strictly observed hereafter.

(3) *To "Well-treat" the Discharged Disabled Soldiers.* We must recognise that the discharged disabled soldiers are fighters who have shed their blood for the revolution, and must help them to engage in production and to establish their homes. We must encourage them to carry on the traditional revolutionary spirit of the Eighth Route soldiers, as Yang Chao-ch'eng has done. Cases of injustices to discharged soldiers must be reconsidered.

(4) *To Carry on the "Return-to-the-Front" Movement.* We must utilise the occasion of improving the people's militia in the winter and the support-the-army movement at the end of the year to mobilise those who have deserted from the army or direct those whose vacations are over to return to the front. The various hsien governments must direct their chu and hsiang administrations to investigate the number of those who should return to the front, study why they remain in the rear; and mobilise the local masses and local leaders (like labour heroes) to persuade them, and must make the "return-to-the-front" movement a broad mass movement. Government offices of various grades and the mass organisations must not employ those who should be at the front, and the cadres must not give shelter to such relatives of theirs.

(5) During the "support-the-army month" at the end of the old-calendar year we must publish and explain the "Support-the-Army pledge", as well as the various resolutions of the Border Region Government concerning the work of supporting the army, immediately inspect the work, carry on self-criticism, and make resolutions for improvement. The governments of various grades must inspect the work seriously, pay visits to troops, soldiers' families and discharged soldiers, listen to their opinions, find out defects and mistakes in the movement, and correct them.

### Liquidation of Traitors and Special Agents

Because the anti-spy struggle is a universal and long-term struggle, we must not be over-satisfied with the achievements of last year, but must continue our struggle based on past experiences and actual conditions.

(1) We must carry on the leniency policy, and try to win over those who commit the offence only by mistakes.

(2) The whole Government—the Government offices of various grades, the members of the Government committees and the chiefs of the various departments—must be conscious of their responsibility in the work of safety-preservation, and the safety-preservation offices must co-operate with other Government offices.

(3) We must persist in collaboration between the leaders and the masses, educate the cadres and the masses, unite together the active elements and the anti-spy heroes of the various Government offices, schools and troops, and make them the nuclei of our anti-spy work.

(4) We must investigate and study all cases carefully, distinguish the right from the wrong, minor offences from serious ones, revolutionaries from counter-revolutionaries, and real traitors and special agents from those who only commit mistakes of one kind or another incidentally. We must know that even among the traitors and the special agents there is the difference of important ones and unimportant ones, and of those who repent and wish to mend their mistakes and those who do not. Measures must be taken to prevent revenge and foul play of the bad elements. Do not cover the bad to protect the good.

(5) We must pass some Acts for the punishment of traitors and counter-revolutionaries, and publish the anti-spy regulation, so that the judicial organs, as well as the people, may have some rules to follow.

(6) If real traitors and special agents are discovered among the members of the People's Political Councils and Government committees of the regional and the hsien rank, the standing committee of the regional or hsien council or government should handle the affair and announce it to the voters. If traitors and special agents are found in organisations of the hsiang rank, the hsiang council shall assemble the voters to vote for their expulsion and elect substitutes.

(7) Some people, seeing that certain bad elements discovered are intellectuals coming to the Border Region from outside, think that our policy of absorbing outside intellectuals to participate in the work of the Border Region may be changed, or at least that we should "have the door closed tightly" hereafter. Others, seeing that certain bad elements discovered are non-Communists elected or gaining their way into the Government through the one-third system, think that we may have our one-third system revised. These people misunderstand and worry too much. We solemnly declare that the one-third system is a fixed policy, as is our policy of winning over outside intellectuals. To liquidate the hidden evil elements is only to strengthen the one-third-system Government

and encourage better co-operation with the people, and with intellectuals coming from outside to work in the Border Region. Moreover, according to past experiences, most of these intellectuals are good people. Only a small number of them has gone astray, and most of these can be converted through proper education.

### Improvement of Education

In the past, severe dogmatism existed in middle-school education and the national education of the Border Region. The school authorities mechanically followed the old educational standard and system, which are widely apart from, and even contrary to, the requirements of the people of the Border Region. In the Conference of the Higher Cadres of 1942 and the third meeting of the Government committee last spring it was definitely pointed out that in order to serve the interests of the war of resistance, and the people of the Border Region, the education of cadres should rank first, and national education second. This is to say that those phenomena which are not suitable to the prosecution of the war of resistance, or to the requirements of the Border Region and its people, must be changed, so that they may be in accord with the spirit of the revolutionary San Min Chu I (or New Democracy) and be fit for the requirements of the present reconstruction of the Border Region. The educational conference held by the various middle schools in the first half of last year, and the movement for purging incorrect views carried on by the same schools in the latter half of last year, in which dogmatism and the mechanical application of the old educational standard and system were severely criticised, marked great progress and formed a turning-point in the middle-school education of the Border Region.

From now on we shall carry out the following reforms according to the following principles:

(1) The various middle schools and normal schools must be assigned the dual task of raising the standard of the present cadres and preparing the future cadres. Such schools must admit cadres now working in the chus and hsiangs, primary school teachers and other kinds of cadres, as well as graduates from primary schools, and educate them according to their particular needs.

(2) The school systems should not be unconditionally the same in all places, but should be fixed according to the task of the school and other conditions of the locality.

(3) General education shall be the main content of the curriculum, although at the same time the students must be trained to understand the revolutionary, labour and mass points of view,

and be given some political and production education, based on the politics and economy of the Border Region, as well as some current-event education. The general education, too, must be given according to the requirement of the Border Region and the standard of the students, so that the cultural level of the students may be gradually raised. Lessons beyond the understanding of the students and not urgently needed should not be taught. Professional education must be given to students to be trained for a particular purpose.

(4) The schools must co-operate with the nearby hsiang and village administrations and production organisations, so that education may be closely united with the actual conditions of the Border Region.

(5) We must completely change our style of working in the schools, maintain the practical spirit, oppose subjectivism and dogmatism, maintain the democratic-centralised system in administration, oppose both the punitive and *laissez-faire* attitudes, persist in the mass point of view, oppose bureaucracy and increase political consciousness.

(6) The cadres in the educational field must be readjusted and given the necessary training.

(7) The various schools should be directed by the various local administrations. The Department of Education of the Border Region Government must attend only to the summarising of experiences, to the issue of general directions and to the supply of general educational materials.

In the field of primary education, we achieved only two things last year—the simplicity and efficiency policy, and the movement for purging incorrect views. Meetings of all primary school teachers and staffs to discuss and correct defects have taken place in many hsiens and have yielded some result. This year the Department of Education must pay great attention in its inspecting work, sum up the experiences of primary school education, draw some conclusions and propose some concrete reforms, so that they can be universally carried out next year.

In the field of social education a new style of working has been created in Yen-an, and is gradually being extended to other places. The “go-to-the-village” movement, now being carried out by the Yen-an University, the Writers’ Association and other cultural organisations, is deserving of applause. We should support it. The educational offices should closely collaborate with those organisations, observe their experience and use them as the starting-point for the improvement of social education in the Border Region.

### Improvement of Judicial Work

In the judicial field, because of the mechanical application of the working style of the old judicial organs by some people, we have for some time past departed from the requirement of the Border Region and its people, with the result that the rights and interests of the people were sometimes trespassed on, while the unlawful destructive elements escaped punishment. In the third meeting of the government committee last year it was emphatically pointed out: “Since the government of the Border Region is the people’s own government, the separation of the judicial from the executive organs is entirely meaningless here. The judicial work should be carried out under the unified direction of the government of various grades.” This is to say that the judicial work is a constituent part of the people’s government, and the task of the judicial organs should be to give protection to the country, to the Government and to the people. The people and the Government of the Border Region are the people and the government of the revolutionary San Min Chu I, therefore the old judicial system and laws should not be unconditionally applied here without regard to actual conditions. Last year we brought about some changes in the judicial system—such as making the special commissioner concurrently the head of a branch supreme court, and the magistrate concurrently the head of a local court—and these changes were applauded by the people because of their convenience. Meanwhile, we have carried out preliminary inspections of our judicial work, and have corrected the “judicial independence” tendency in general. Some of the hidden destructive elements have been discovered, and the bad working style exposed.

The task hereafter is to correct the bad working style in our judicial work, and meanwhile to develop and create a new working style, so that our judicial work may fulfil the requirement of guarding the interests of the war of resistance and of protecting the democratic Border Region Government and the people.

(1) We must encourage the people to settle all disputes voluntarily and peacefully outside the court, so as to reduce the number of suits to the minimum. This principle should be applied not only to civil cases, but also to a greater part of the criminal cases, with the exception only of those concerning the destructive activities of traitors and counter-revolutionaries. The chu and the hsiang administrations should extend the work of mediation among the masses through such popular people as labour heroes and respectable elders. The Border Region Government must

investigate to what degree the "regulations governing the mediation of civil and criminal cases" have been executed, and sum up the experiences therefrom.

(2) Before the regular relation of the Border Region Government and the National Government is established, we shall practise a "two-grade" judicial system in the Border Region. The local courts, in which the preliminary trial of cases takes place, shall be responsible to the hsien or the municipal government, and the supreme court and its branch courts, which are the ultimate authority in judicial affairs, shall be responsible to the Border Region Government.

(3) In the trial of cases, the judicial organs should pass sentence based on the "Political Programme of the Border Region" and other Acts and decrees issued by the Border Region Government. If the above are found to be insufficient, the judicial organs must study on the one hand some illustrative cases of the past, draw experience and principles therefrom, and distribute these examples to the various courts for reference; and on the other hand must draft civil and criminal codes as well as codes for legal procedures according to the spirit of the revolutionary San Min Chu I or New Democracy and the actual conditions of the Border Region.

(4) In the trial, the courts must pay attention to the actual living condition of the people, must investigate the minute details of all cases, and distinguish the right from the wrong, the serious offences from the minor ones. The judges must adopt the people's standpoint and must consider the suppression of traitors and counter-revolutionaries as their main task and the protection of the masses as their sacred duty.

(5) Legal procedures must be simple and easy. The method of trial invented by Ma Hsih-wu should be promoted to educate the people. The verdict must be written in simple, popular language, not in the same old way as used by the old courts.

(6) In civil cases the defendant should never be detained unless absolutely necessary. In minor criminal cases the defendant should be granted bail or the execution of his penalty be postponed, according to circumstances. Idlers should not be detained, but be entrusted to the hsiang or town administration or to the masses to be reformed. The prisoners of various places should be examined, and those who can be reformed should be released on bail. Illegal arrest or forced labour should be prohibited.

(7) Cases tried and sentenced by hidden special agents in the past should be re-examined. Bad elements who have been set free should be punished and good people who have been wronged liberated.

(8) The management of prisons should be improved under the principle of "equal attention to both labour and education".

(9) The cadres in the judicial fields, especially the leading ones and the judges, must be selected from those who are faithful to the revolutionary. San Min Chu I, willing to unite with the people, and just and impartial. Their political and legal education must be strengthened, so that they can become judicial experts of a New Democratic society.

These tasks are the most urgent that the Border Region is carrying out to-day. While struggling for their accomplishment we must connect them with other policies, such as the policy of simplicity and efficiency, the unification of leadership, the movement for purging incorrect views, the examination of cadres, the current-event education, the policy of reduction in rent and interest, and the one-third system.

With our policies and tasks fixed, the important point now is our working attitude—whether we shall adopt the bureaucratic style or the practical democratic style, whether our chiefs of the offices are to be like mandarins, and thus isolated from the people, or whether they shall be responsible persons closely united with the people; whether our attitude shall be one of self-complacency or that of self-criticism. Doubtless we want the latter attitude. If we see only achievements but not defects, know only self-complacency but not self-criticism, and do not unite with and study from the people, but let the remnants of bureaucracy revive and grow, we shall not be able to advance and accomplish our tasks.

## CHINA'S RESISTANCE IN ITS SIXTH YEAR

[MANIFESTO OF THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY ON THE OCCASION OF THE SIXTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE WAR OF RESISTANCE; JULY 7, 1943.]

**M**ORE THAN six years have elapsed since the Chinese nation rose up in the united holy war against the criminal Japanese Fascist imperialism. On the occasion of the great festival of the sixth anniversary of the resistance, just when the correlation of forces between the world anti-Fascist alliance and the Fascist alliance of aggression is undergoing a great change, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party would like to set their views before all the people and commanders and soldiers of the country.

Since the notorious Fascist Powers commenced their war of aggression, China and all anti-Fascist countries all over the world have long experienced severe battles fought from an inferior position. But such an unfavourable situation has already changed fundamentally. This is a change of decisive significance in the international sphere, and resulted from the victory of the second winter offensive launched by the Soviet Union, the victory secured by the British and American troops in North Africa and the blows delivered by China in the sixth year of resistance, and by Britain and the United States in the Pacific during the past year. Among these, the victory won by the Red Army at Stalingrad has played the main decisive role in altering the whole war situation. These victories have brought about a world situation extremely favourable to the anti-Fascist Allies and extremely unfavourable to the Fascist aggressors.

(1) The unity between the Soviet Union, Great Britain, and the United States has been further consolidated by the first planned joint campaign of the battle of Stalingrad and the battle of Britain and the United States in North Africa. The

Fascist aggressors have failed completely in their attempt to disrupt the unity between the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States with peace intrigues. This has historical significance.

(2) The decisive battle in which China, the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States will defeat German and Italian Fascists will be developed in the forthcoming year. Originally this might have been realised in the past year. But as Britain and the United States were unable to carry into practice the decision to open a second front in Europe, it was postponed for one year. At present, however, when the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States have secured a great success in their first joint operation, when the land and air forces of the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States, and the navies of Britain and the United States, have been developed into unmatched strength, the moment has become ripe for the Soviet Union from the eastern front and Britain and the United States from the western front to wage the second and third greater joint battle, in order to inflict a final decisive blow on the German and Italian Fascists. Only if the second front in Europe is quickly opened is it certain that the German and Italian Fascists will be defeated in the coming year. All the prerequisites for defeating them have been established during the past year.

(3) The consolidation of the unity between the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States and the realisation of the decisive battle against the German and Italian Fascists will result in the defeat not only of the German and Italian Fascists, but also of the Japanese Fascists, because Hitler is the leader of the aggressor countries, and Hitler's failure means the failure of all the Fascists. Some do not hope to defeat Hitler first, either because their heads are not clear enough or because of their unwillingness to see the defeat of the Hitlerite Fascist system, which also means the defeat of the Japanese Fascists. Otherwise their attitude can hardly be explained.

(4) The situation in the Pacific has also changed favourably for the Allies and unfavourably for the Japanese Fascists as a result of the strengthening of American forces, the victories of Anglo-American Allied troops and China's stubborn resistance. The strength of the United States is growing rapidly. The Japanese Fascists are trying to run a race with the United States with their short legs, but their defeat is certain. It is natural that the Japanese Fascists are greatly frightened by the American production plan, according to which the United States will, in the course of one year, build 125,000 planes, 120,000 tanks, 2,000 big and small warships and vessels with a displacement of 20,000,000 tons.

On the part of the Fascist aggressors, the following changes are dominant:

(1) They have fallen into complete isolation in the international arena in the past year. Because of the first successful joint blow dealt by the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States against the German-Italian bandits, because of the increase of the American military strength threatening Japan because of the blows delivered by the Chinese, British and American forces in the Pacific and on the China front and their encirclement of the Japanese bandits, all the Fascist countries are feeling the threat of death. Therefore they have resorted to peace intrigues in an attempt to disrupt the alliance between Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. Their hope is that one side of the Allies might conclude a dishonourable peace with them, and thus enable them to crush the other side first in order to save themselves and to fulfil their aim of ruining the whole world. But the trick has met the common resolute blows of Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union. Henceforth the only course left for either the German and Italian Fascists or the Japanese Fascists is "unconditional surrender." The Fascist countries also attempt to trap the neutral countries which are not yet engaged in this war. Nevertheless, the neutral countries which were formerly expected by Hitler to join the aggressor bloc have seen the fading prospect of the aggressor and do not want to join it. Those neutrals who were formerly pro-Allies but hesitated and wavered for fear of the aggressors, are putting or have already put this hesitation and instability to an end. Peace intrigue has been destroyed. Tricks for trapping the neutral countries proved fruitless.

(2) The internal unity within the camp of Fascist aggressor countries is experiencing a crisis. Under the successful military and diplomatic blows of the Allies, growing internal dissension has occurred among them. This crisis has come into being not only between Germany and Italy or between Germany and her vassal States, but also between Germany and Japan. Owing to Hitler's military and diplomatic failures, his prestige for keeping Italy, Japan and all the vassal States with him has suddenly dwindled. Inside Italy there exists a growing force demanding withdrawal from the war, and inside Japan the extremely pro-German clique has been rejected by other groups. If Hitler meets one or two further blows like those at Stalingrad and in North Africa, no clique in the Japanese ruling camp will any longer dare to rely upon him and the Fascist alliance. Then they will be in a completely isolated position both externally and internally. The men

ace of falling into a position of complete isolation internationally compelled Tojo, the head of the Japanese Fascist bandits, to bring forth in the past year a shameless trick—the so-called "New Policy" to the national traitors in the occupied areas of China and the South Seas. Tojo fits a mask of "independence" on the faces of these traitors in order to raise his own prestige and to deceive the Chinese and Indian people who are determined to fight against Japan. The so-called "New Policy" of the chieftain Tojo reflects nothing favourable to the Japanese Fascists. It signifies only a situation of complete isolation of himself and his friends in the international arena.

(3) The great victories won by the Allies in the past year have created a military crisis among the Fascist aggressors. In spite of the fact that there are still persons on Hitler's general staff who are unwilling to abandon the adventurous plan of launching another offensive against the Soviet Union, in spite of the fact that there are still some members of the Japanese general staff who are unwilling to abandon the adventurous plan for attacking the Soviet Union or striking in other directions, the feeling that the situation is no longer favourable is common among all Fascist troops and peoples. The general initiative has passed to the hands of the Allies. The material strength forming the basis of war—the resources of man-power, munitions and means of living—was already mobilised on a very large scale in the past year by the Allies. In this connection they have won superiority. As for the aggressor countries, however, the resources of Germany and Italy are on the verge of exhaustion, while Japan's production has almost reached its peak. These conditions have further accentuated the military crisis for all our enemies.

(4) Political crisis has taken shape in all Fascist countries and their occupied areas on account of their international isolation, their internal dissension, their military crisis and, in addition to all these, their cruel and inhuman rule. The gap between the rulers and the people, between the generals and privates of all the aggressor countries is daily extending, brewing a tremendous explosion like the eruption of a volcano. This political crisis is a big army which will blow up the Fascists under their own feet. No doubt it will explode all at once when the internal and external crises of the Fascists reach a climax. One will believe this if one remembers the position of the German and Austrian imperialists in 1918. Moreover, if one has an eye to the changes that have taken place in the past year in public opinion in occupied China and in the morale of Japanese soldiers, one will have no hesitation in predicting that if these changes continue, the political crisis of the Japanese robbers will ripen quickly.

The people in Japan itself are like a volcano. The people in China, in the South Seas, in Korea and Formosa under Japanese rule are like many other volcanoes. These volcanoes will explode only if the anti-Fascist allies, including China, deal a few heavy military blows to Japan.

Brother countrymen! officers and soldiers! China's war of resistance has been waged for six years. It has been carried on under extremely difficult conditions. Unlike the Soviet Union, Great Britain or the United States, all industrially advanced, our country is a backward, agricultural one. Nevertheless, we have carried on our resistance with hardships for six years, which is longer than the period of war of resistance of any other country. This has been achieved by the efforts of all our countrymen, commanders and soldiers. In the course of these six years of armed resistance we have faced a situation in which a decisive change has occurred in the correlation of forces between the Allies and aggressor countries, resulting in a position extremely favourable to us and to our Allies, and extremely unfavourable to the aggressors. We shall meet a further favourable change in the seventh year. All the Fascists will be defeated, and the liberation of the major part of the world's peoples will be achieved when the final decisive blow against the Western Fascists is dealt by the Allies. Then the defeat of the Fascists in the east and the liberation of the Eastern nations will follow.

Doubtless still greater effort is necessary for winning the victory and liberation both in the West and in the East. Being one of the anti-Fascist allies, how should we exert our energy when we are in such extremely favourable international circumstances? We have the advantage of a vast territory and a big population. Furthermore, our people are persistent in struggle. The six years' war of resistance is an evident proof of this. In the course of six years we have accumulated many experiences. What are these experiences? How should we make use of them to overcome many existing difficulties and to prepare our strength for the future counter-offensive against the enemy?

The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party considers:

The fighters must be strengthened. The China theatre of war during these six years has been divided actually into two battle fields: a frontal theatre of war, and a theatre of war behind the enemy front. They mutually assist each other. Lacking either of them we should be unable to check the rushing Fascist beasts at present and to drive them out of China in the future. For this reason it is necessary to strengthen the function of mutual assistance in these two war theatres.

Our troops and people behind the enemy's lines are resisting and attacking more than half the total number of the Japanese bandit troops, and their position is a hundred times more difficult than that on the frontal war theatre. To increase aid to them is a necessity that cannot be neglected. We believe that the concrete measure of strengthening the fighters of the China front as a whole lies only in the strengthening of the mutual assistance of these two war theatres.

In the past few years there has been hardly any help for the overwhelming majority of the fighting troops and people behind the enemy front, while the vigour of the fighting in the frontal war theatre is also insufficient. We hope that the Government will improve it.

Being affected by the intrigues of the Japanese robbers and the traitor Wang Ching-wei, thirty-three officers of high rank have already surrendered to the enemy with their troops and betrayed our fatherland in the last few years. Yet we have never heard that our Government issued any order for an expedition against them. As a consequence the number of puppet troops is rapidly increasing, and the so-called "new policy"—a deceit propaganda used by the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei—is in free circulation. For the purpose of strengthening the fighters, the reform of the conscription system should no longer be delayed. There are many serious shortcomings in the existing conscription system, such as bribery to avoid service and the absolute negligence of political mobilisation. These shortcomings greatly handicap the demand for the mobilisation of the broad masses for the front. We hope the Government will take immediate measures to remove them.

Unity must be strengthened. We do not intend to relate here in detail the old undesirable phenomena of frictions, conflicts, hindrances and restrictions which should never have existed, but which have existed inside China's anti-Japanese camp during the past few years, and in recent times as well. We only hope the Government will be able to remove those things hereafter. We Communists are always persistently upholding the anti-Japanese national united front and supporting the Government's war effort. In order to overcome the greater difficulties in the future and to prepare the counter-offensive against the enemy in collaboration with the Allied countries, we are ready to continue negotiation with the Kuomintang and other parties and groups for the solution of existing problems and the improvement of relations between parties and groups. The anti-Japanese war should begin with unity and end with unity. Unity is the foundation of resistance against the Japanese by the people of the whole nation; it is also the foundation of resistance against Fascism by



the people all over the world. The most important task is to strengthen and consolidate this foundation for the benefit of war against the Japanese, for the benefit of collaboration with the Allied countries in order to defeat Fascism as a whole.

Political improvement must be achieved. We Communists have frequently expressed our views as to how the political situation in China could be improved in order to meet the requirements of resistance against the Japanese. As before, we believe that the only policy is the execution of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People Principles.

The total number of the Japanese invasion army is no more than thirty divisions; then why cannot such a big country as ours, possessing 450,000,000 people, defeat the invaders or score greater victories? Is it only the undeveloped state of industry that accounts for this? No, that is not the only reason, nor the principal one. The main reason is that there is no democracy in China, and the full capacity of the Chinese for resistance has not yet been developed. China is different from the Soviet Union, Britain and the United States, in which countries the longer the war lasts, the higher becomes the fighting spirit. In China, on the contrary, the people's fighting spirit in most places has been greatly depressed owing to entirely unnecessary blows and restrictions. The optimism of the first two years of war gradually disappeared during the following four years. If there is no necessary reform to remove political repressions and restrictions, then they will become an immeasurable hindrance to the war effort. They bring about many dissensions between classes, political parties and groups and people in this country, but amity is an absolute necessity for successful war. We hope the Government in the seventh year of our struggle will be able to effect some necessary reform in accordance with the doctrine of the Three People Principles, in order to bring about more friendly relations among different classes, political parties and groups and to stimulate the people for a counter-offensive.

Production must be developed. We have frequently dealt with this problem. Serious economic difficulty has already come into being. Without timely and appropriate reform it will be impossible to cope with the ever-increasing difficulties of the war and prepare attack. We are of the opinion that the fundamental measure for economic reform should be the practice of a democratic and centralised economic policy which should aim at the development of production and the adjustment of the economic interests of different classes.

All troops of this country should be mobilised to wage armed resistance on the one hand and do production work on the other

All institutions and schools should be mobilised to do production work while working and studying. All the farmers of the country should be mobilised to increase production, and at the same time the policy of reducing rent and interest should be resolutely carried out. All the workers of the country should be mobilised to increase production, and at the same time the wages of the workers should be raised. The medium and small industries should be protected from the blows dealt by bureaucratic capital and speculative business. While effecting these new economic policies it is necessary first to cancel all the obstructions to public and private production existing in the present financial and economic policies.

Many other things should be reformed for the sake of winning the war. At present we point out the above-mentioned items for the Government to consider.

The nearer our victory in the war of resistance, the graver will be the difficulties and eventually the heavier will be the responsibilities of the Government, the people, as well as the members of the Communist Party, especially those Communists who are fighting behind the enemy lines.

During the past six years the immense faith of the Chinese Communist Party in the holy war in defence of our fatherland has been proved. The hard struggle of the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the people behind the enemy lines is an example unprecedented in our history. It is they who for six years have opposed one-half of the enemy invasion troops, and will continue to oppose them until they are driven out of China. They have had no aid of ammunition and rations from abroad; they achieved such a miracle entirely through their own faith and creative power. They have retaken vast territories from the enemy, established democratic anti-Japanese bases, resolutely practised the Three People Principles. In anti-Japanese bases behind the enemy lines the policy of the Chinese Communists is purely democratic. The officials of the local governments are as a rule composed of one-third Kuomintang members, one-third non-party patriots and not more than one-third Communists. This triple policy was prompted by Comrade Mao Tse-tung and strictly brought into practice in places where Communists have overwhelming influence. They have realised the land policy of rent-reduction and interest-reduction and at the same time of rent-payment and interest-payment, executed a labour policy of encouraging production and at the same time of protecting the workers, and brought into effect the cultural policy of inspiring the people's patriotism and developing their fighting spirit. For this reason they have aroused the burning hatred of the people for Japanese

and traitors, including Wang Ching-wei. The ceaseless and ruthless "mopping-up" campaign, the venomous encroachment, the many forts and fortresses, the lengthy blockade ditches and walls, the ceaseless practise of the "killing, looting and burning policy" and the universal establishment of "Anti-Communist Committees" are all aimed at their extermination. There are still some countrymen in the rear who perhaps do not yet know how cruel is the struggle behind the enemy lines.

Members of the Communist Party! Commanders and fighters of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army! Men and women behind the enemy line! strengthen your unity, unite yourselves as one man! The brutal war can only forge your extraordinary boldness and fortitude. It is impossible for the enemy to force your surrender.

Members of the Communist Party should stand closely together with the people. Protect the people as you protect your own eyes, trust the people as you trust your own parents, brothers and sisters. Genuinely carry out the policy of acquiring soldiers of the best quality, of simplifying administrative affairs, of supporting the Government, of loving the people and of supporting the army in order to thoroughly attain the aim of concord between the troops and Government institutions.

Organise better fighting collaboration of all the main forces, partisan units and militia groups. Strengthen the blows against the enemy, crush the mopping-up campaigns of the enemy and develop the armed work.

Strengthen the counter-encroachment struggle. Enable all the military and political cadres to learn how to co-ordinate their fighting experiences so as to bring the art of anti-mopping-up and anti-encroachment to a higher standard. You are experts in partisan and guerrilla warfare. You have a record of admirable achievements in the course of six years of patriotic war. All people of this country feel concerned about you and place their hopes in you. Hence you have to make greater efforts to improve your military art and the art of political work.

Pay sufficient attention to winning the Japanese soldiers and puppet troops to our side. Launch the work of demoralisation against the enemy and puppet troops in conjunction with the Japanese Communist Party. Strengthen this work to a greater extent. Organise the Japanese Workers', Peasants' and Soldiers' Academies. Develop the Japanese Anti-War League. Develop the anti-Japanese armed forces and anti-Japanese groups of the Korean people. Turn all these forces into strong friendly armies of the Chinese people against the Japanese Fascists!

Develop public production. Under the condition of not inter-

fering with the war, all troops and institutions should take part in the self-sufficient production movement, in order to better their own life and to lighten the burden on the shoulders of the masses with their own hands. Develop private enterprise. The party members must go deep into the villages, learn to help farmers in making agricultural plans, in organising mutual-aid groups of labour, in organising co-operatives in order to improve the life of the masses. The prominent public and private production movement in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region and in many anti-Japanese bases behind the enemy lines should be untiringly and persistently carried on. Encourage the labour heroes, oppose corruption and waste, punish idle persons, overcome bureaucracy that keeps aloof from the masses.

Members of the Communist Party should still humbly learn culture, business, politics and theories, continue the study movement for purging non-Marxism ideology, develop self-criticism and overcome the subjectivism, sectionalism and dogmatic formalism in their own camp resolutely, thoroughly, frankly and strictly. Your study should not be relaxed, no matter how cruel the war or how heavy the work you are doing. You should learn super-human ability in the course of a hard and protracted war.

The enemy is always attempting to destroy you and annihilate you from outside and inside by every possible means. You should increase your alertness ten times, a hundred times and even a thousand times. You should learn all new methods of struggle against the enemy's special service organs. The sixth anniversary of the war of resistance coincides with the twenty-second anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party. At its birth the Party immediately and unprecedentedly in history brought forth an anti-imperialism and anti-feudalism programme for the Chinese people. In the course of these twenty-two years members of this party have sacrificed their blood and lives one following the other, waging, together with the masses of people, the brilliant, heroic and stubborn struggle for the purpose of realising their programme and policies, for the purpose of opposing imperialism and its lackeys in China, and for the sake of national salvation and social emancipation. No matter how powerful the enemy or how difficult the road, they have always marched forward resolutely, without the least hesitation or fear, and finally enabled all the Chinese people to find brightness out of darkness and a road to life from the road to death. The historical facts in the course of twenty-two years have proved that the way of our struggle is the right way of resuscitating the Chinese nation. It will continue hereafter until the advent of complete victory. The Communists are a special kind of men: they do not work for

personal interest, they work only for the welfare of the nation and the people. They are rooted in the people. They are the sons of the people, and also their teachers. They are always of the alert, so that they will not desert the masses. They always take the interest of the masses as the starting-point of consideration of any question. Therefore they have the faithful support of the broad masses of the people.

Long live the liberation of the Chinese nation!

THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE  
COMMUNIST PARTY.

### REPORT OF COMRADE MAO TSE-TUNG

ON THE OCCASION OF THE SIXTH ANNIVERSARY OF THE WAR OF RESISTANCE AND THE TWENTY-SECOND ANNIVERSARY OF THE CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY, JULY 1, 1943, YENAN.

IN AN evening meeting held on July 1, 1943, in Yen-an participated in by the Central Executive Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, some party and non-party functionaries, Comrade Okano of the Japanese Communist Party, and a few friends from the United States of America and the Soviet Union, Comrade Mao Tse-tung made a report, recounting the experiences of the six years of war of resistance in China and the twenty-two years' existence of the Chinese Communist Party. Comrade Mao's report was permeated with confidence in victory in the Chinese war and in the bright future of a new China and a new world. Comrade Lee Fu-ch'un was chairman of the meeting. Comrade Mao spoke amid the applause of the audience:

"To-day we celebrate the twenty-second anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party and the sixth anniversary of our war of resistance. There is only one task to perform to-day for the anti-Fascist forces in China and in the world, and for the Communists in China and in the world—that is, to defeat the common enemy of mankind, the Fascist aggressors—Germany, Italy and Japan.

"In the past we Communists have always pointed out the tendencies of the situation and its possible developments, because we want the people to see the bright future in the midst of difficulties. Now that the initiative of the war has fallen to the Allies, the possibilities we pointed out in the past are no longer mere possibilities, but something to be realised very quickly. Although there is as yet no second front in Europe, it will be quickly realised. This is the aim of mankind.

"As regards the China war theatre, we must understand that

if Hitler, the leader of the world Fascist gang, is overthrown, there will be no question of the defeat of the Japanese Fascists, who are merely the accomplices of Hitler. The world anti-Fascist front is a whole and inseparable one, and no country is fighting in isolation, therefore in deciding our strategy we should not base it on the temporary interest of any single country, but rather should see which is the most beneficial way for the anti-Fascist front as a whole. It will be easy to defeat Japan after the downfall of Hitler."

Comrade Mao compared the two world wars, pointed out that their outbreak within three decades was the inevitable result of the development of world economy.

"It was Stalin", Comrade Mao said, "who first foresaw the second world war. His correct foresight proves that Marxism-Leninism is really a scientific truth.

"The first world war", Comrade Mao continued, "was an unjust war, an imperialistic war. At that time only the Bolsheviks of Russia and a small number of revolutionaries in other countries were real Communists, while the democratic parties of the various countries were all war-supporters, and the majority of their members had not awakened. Such was the condition of the first world war.

"It is entirely different now. On the side of the Allies there are socialist States, capitalistic countries, colonies and semi-colonies, and the Communist parties of all the countries that participate in this war. It is a war of justice. It was only in the third year of the first world war that the Bolsheviks of Russia established the first Socialist State—the Soviet Union. Now, after a period of only twenty years, the Soviet Union becomes the chief force in the anti-Fascist struggle of mankind. The destiny of mankind would still be an unknown factor were it not for the existence of the Soviet Union, its Red Army, its people, its leader, Stalin, and its decisive battle of Stalingrad. With the existence of the Bolshevik Party led by Lenin-Stalin the old Russia has been changed into the Socialist Soviet Union; with the existence of such a Socialist nation the destiny of the world is much influenced.

"Let us turn to the topic of the world Communist movement. Since the victory of the October Revolution in 1917 and the inauguration of the Communist International in 1919, in the East we see the establishment in 1921 of the Chinese Communist Party, in 1922 that of the Japanese Communist Party, and in 1933 that of the Communist Party of India. There were only twelve people present at the first representative congress of the Chinese Communist Party twenty-two years ago, but now it has grown into a great and powerful political movement.

"In the twenty-two years of its existence the Chinese Communist Party has carried on three great revolutionary movements, and is at present, with the co-operation of the people of the whole country, organising the united front and concentrating its force to fight against the Japanese robbers. What we have now is not an isolated party. We have the people of the whole country and the people of the world together with us in fighting against the Fascists, and the Japanese Communist Party and the Indian Communist Party together with us in fighting against Japanese imperialism."

Comrade Mao ridiculed Tojo's favourite remark of "Japan 1,000,000,000 people", saying: "All these 1,000,000,000 people are against Japanese Fascism. The 450,000,000 people of China, 400,000,000 people of India, 100,000,000 people of the South Seas are all anti-Japanese and anti-Fascist."

Comrade Mao gave a warm welcome to Comrade Okano, the Japanese Communist leader and the representative of the Japanese people, saying, "We have long been dwelling in a mountainous region, and we hope Comrade Okano will bestow upon us valuable directions and instructions, for concordant action is necessary to overthrow Japanese Fascism at present and establish a new China and a new Japan in the future."

Then Comrade Mao turned to compare China to-day with the old China in the days of the first world war. He said:

"At that time there was no Communist Party in China, and the people were so ignorant that they could not even distinguish the good foreigners from the bad. Marxism was not yet known though it had existed for seventy years by that time. The teaching of philosophy, economics or sociology in schools did not even know the name of Karl Marx. True, there was some culture of the old democracy type, but arts, literature and culture of the new democracy were absent. China at that time was a participant in the first world war, but by being so she merely served the benefits of the imperialists, not only being unable to improve her semi-colonial status, but making it worse.

"Now China is a country of resistance. Her people joined the world anti-Fascist front because they are waking up. Her culture has improved because of the existence of a Communist Party. The progressiveness we see and consider so common to-day is an epoch-making change if compared with the old conditions."

"Hence, not only in the war of resistance do we find a fundamental change during these six years; entirely different conditions also arose in China and in the whole world during these three decades. Such changes are world-shaking progress created by the hands of mankind. The present anti-Fascist war will

certainly produce a more progressive world and a more progressive China. The Fascists' wish to drag the world backward is unattainable. To advance is our aim.

"Besides a general direction, we must have policies, which may be divided into two kinds: those for the whole nation and those for the Border Regions and the anti-Japanese bases in the enemy's rear. Regarding the former, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, in its manifesto in commemoration of the sixth anniversary of the war of resistance, has proposed four items for the Central Government to consider.

These four items are: to strengthen the fighting, to achieve unity, to improve politics and to develop production. As to what we should do after victory, we made this clear in last year's manifesto—*i.e.*, we hope to continue our co-operation with other parties and cliques—for the joint reconstruction of our country."

Regarding the policies of the Border Regions and anti-Japanese bases in the enemy's rear, Comrade Mao said:

"In our war of resistance we have two war theatres, the frontal theatre and that behind the enemy lines. Struggles are particularly cruel in the latter. We Communists have achieved much there and have created many new movements, such as anti-mopping-up campaigns, anti-encroachment campaigns, the policy of a smaller but stronger army, the policy of a simpler but more efficient government, the 'supporting-the-Government', 'loving-the-people' and 'supporting-the-army' movements, the production-increasing campaigns, the study movement for purging non-Marxist ideology, etc. Seeing defects in other places, we can only put out proposals; but it is different in the Border Regions and in the enemy rear, where we can correct them by our own efforts. Therefore we should have done our work much better."

Comrade Mao, in conclusion, divided the party's policies in the Border Regions and in the enemy rear during these six years into two periods, the first covering four and a half years up to the end of 1941, the second covering the remaining one and a half years.

"In the first period," he said, "the attention of the party was devoted mainly to the following questions—namely, how to accomplish the national anti-Japanese united front, how to mobilise the masses, how, together with the friendly troops, to resist the enemy's strategic offensive, how to create the anti-Japanese bases in the enemy's rear, and how to plan the various policies, such as the agrarian policy, the labour policy, the "one-third-ratio" policy, etc. All these were questions the solutions of which were badly needed at that time. In the latter one and

a half years we have been twice forced to face the great conflict started by the anti-Communist elements.

"In the second period—i.e., the last one and a half years—besides carrying on the above policies, we have further carried on the study movement for purging non-Marxist ideology, the policy of a smaller but stronger army, a simpler but more efficient Government, and the 'supporting-the-Government', 'loving-the-people' and 'supporting-the-army' movements."

Comrade Mao explained in a particularly detailed way the study movement for purging non-Marxist ideology, saying that this movement guarantees the unanimity of the party ideologically and politically and the purity of its ingredients, and that these works have to be carried on ceaselessly and uninterruptedly, so as to guarantee the victory of our war of resistance.

"All for the defeat of the enemy, for the overcoming of the present difficulties and for the arrival of the future brightness," Comrade Mao concluded, amid the thundering applause of the audience.

## WE KNOW HOW TO HOLD ON THE WAR UNTIL VICTORY IS WON

[*In Commemoration of the Sixth Anniversary of the War of Resistance.*]

BY GENERAL CHU TEH

(*Commander-in-Chief of the Communist Armies*)

### I. A Review of the War of Resistance in these Six Years

THE PAST sacrifice has prepared the way for the future victory. In these six years, in spite of the handicap of lack of arms and the insufficiency of preparations, our soldiers and civilians have stood on their feet, fighting single-handed to resist the aggression of the Japanese Fascist robbers. The early victory of Pinghsing Pass and the later victory of Taierhchwang inflicted blows on the fierceness of the enemy's mad offensive, and their strategic campaign was stopped after we had fought for a little more than a year. Accompanying the later change of international situations and the increase of internal difficulties within Japan, the war finally arrived at its stalemate stage, during which, in spite of a tenfold increase in tactical offensives and a thousand-fold increase in cruel mopping-up campaigns staged by the enemy, our soldiers and civilians have been able to crush their attempts and hold on. Summarising the magnificent achievements in these six years of resistance, we can point out the following:

(1) The enemy's plan of devouring China in three months through the so-called "quick-decision" tactics has become bankrupt. This "three months" was later changed to three years, to ten years, and finally the war is designated as "a hundred years' war" by the Tojo Cabinet. This means that the more prolonged the time, the more deeply embedded will be the enemy's feet of clay.

(2) Due to the six years of our resistance, especially of the guerrilla wars in the enemy's rear, and the endeavours of the Allies in these past nineteen months, the front lines of the enemy have been stretched, on land from the Mongolian desert and Paotow in the north to the Bay of Bengal in the south, and in the sea from the Aleutian Islands in the north to New Guinea in the south—a length of thousands of miles each. This means that the more enemies our enemy makes, the longer will be his front lines, the more scattered will be his forces, and the more numerous will be his vulnerable points.

(3) The enemy has to fight in the South Seas, in Attu and the hundreds of thousands of square miles of land in North and Central China, where he has to encounter our troops, guerrilla forces and the people's militia. In this vast region he is forced to fight anywhere any time. In the enemy's rear alone the average number of engagements during the past year was sixty daily. This means that the more frequently the enemy has to fight, the greater will be his exhaustion of man-power and material resources, with the result that his fighting power decreases, the soldiers' morale is lowered, pessimism prevails, suicides due to abhorrence of war occur daily, and the wavering and desertion of the puppet armies increase.

(4) Because of our persistence to the sixth year, the international status of our country has been greatly increased. The unequal treaties which we have fought to abolish for the past hundred years have been in general abolished. We have gained an equal footing among the Allies, while our enemy is internationally isolated.

## II. The Contributions to the Nation by the Chinese Communist Party, the Eighteenth Group and the New Fourth Armies in these Six Years.

(4) In fighting against the enemy, the Eighteenth Group Army and the New Fourth Army, under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, have held on in the enemy's rear, caused great losses to his man-power and arms, and deprived him of his chances of respite. In these years we have fought 66,000 engagements with the enemy and inflicted on him a loss of 300,000 men, including killed, wounded and captured, and withstood 50% of his troops stationed in China. This means that the Eighteenth Group Army and the New Fourth Army are fighting against half the enemy's forces. In holding on the war in the rear of the enemy, we ourselves have suffered great losses. Our casualties, including missing, number 137,000 and, if the number of wounded were included, the figure would rise to 380,000. Due to our continuous attacks from the rear, the so-called "Operation Base of the Great East Asiatic War" of the enemy is perpetually harassed, and by this we have made a great contribution to the Allies' fight against the enemy. We have carried on numerous political offensives, rousing the war-abhorring feeling among the Japanese, and have won over from the battlefields many Japanese youths who were forced to fight, to join our Anti-War League, and Communist League of the Japanese Workers and Peasants School, thus helping

the Japanese revolutionaries to train these youths. We have also achieved much in the winning over of the puppet armies.

(2) As regards lost lands and the uniting of the people in the enemy's rear, we have recovered from the hands of the enemy a large number of territories, in which we have set up anti-Japanese governments of the Chinese people. These are democratic in character, and people of all classes there receive protection to fully enjoy their three freedoms (speech, press, and association) and three kinds of rights (human, property and political). These democratic powers are in vivid contrast to the puppet governments in the enemy's rear, who merely serve as hunting dogs for the enemy, suppress the people's anti-Japanese activities, conscript able-bodied men and women and commandeer properties for the enemy. This contrast arouses the patriotic feeling of the people in the occupied territories, and upon this we are able to unite all of them, strengthen their determination to fight and increase their confidence that our war must be won and the construction of a new China achieved. It is also upon this that we can turn those regions into stabilised anti-Japanese bases, to support the protracted warfare in the enemy's rear.

(3) Besides fighting, we are carrying on economic construction in our bases, and increasing public and private production by working personally. We have mobilised all the troops, schools and Government organisations to participate in the production campaign, so far as it does not hinder the prosecution of the war, to fight for self-supply and self-sufficiency. The Government, the troops and the party organisations all enthusiastically help the workers and peasants to increase production, to carry on production contests, to encourage labour heroes and production heroes, to reduce rent and interest, and to increase the enthusiasm of the peasants for production, so that the economy of our bases may have a new appearance. Together with these we carry on economic struggles against the enemy—*i.e.*, to oppose his intrigue of economic blockade and economic destruction.

## III. The Difficulties we Encounter and how we Overcome Them.

The cruel struggle in the enemy's rear has entered its seventh year and we are approaching nearer to victory. Meanwhile our difficulties are proportionally greater. The concrete facts are:

(1) The enemy has advanced one step farther by changing his former "fortress policy" into the so-called "cage policy". He increases the number of supporting points, blockade houses, "road-protecting ditches", "road-protecting walls", etc., to break

up our bases (especially in the plain of Hopeh and Shantung), and strengthens the blockade against us, thus compelling us to scatter our forces, which increases the difficulties of our mobile warfare.

(2) Our enemy's fighting tactics changed from the "siege" and the "mopping-up" to the "continuous mopping-up", "repeated mopping-up" and "blitz attacks", in order that our troops might be annihilated and our strongholds gradually diminished. Though we have always smashed these plans of the enemy, our exhaustion inevitably becomes greater and our trophies smaller.

(3) In accordance with their "annihilation policy" (*i.e.*, the policy of killing all, burning all and looting all), the enemy slaughter and arrest wholesale the people living in our bases in order to diminish our man-power; they burn our houses, food-stuffs, utensils and other materials and articles of value, destroying our material and economic power. This inevitably creates much difficulty in the economic construction work of the bases, although as a counter-policy we have carried on the work of strengthening our fortifications and evacuating our material resources and men when necessary.

(4) For three or four years we have received no replenishment of ammunition, clothing, medicines and food from the Central Government. It may seem strange to the world how an army of hundreds of thousands of men can continue fighting for several years under the most difficult conditions without ammunition, without sufficient food, without medicine and clothing. But these are facts, or rather miracles, in our war of resistance. We have overcome the above difficulties because we have foreseen the unfavourable conditions in the enemy's rear, firmly persisted in the anti-Japanese war, adopted the policy of "a simpler but better army and a simpler but more efficient Government", carried on scattered fights to oppose the "cage policy" of the enemy, and finally united closely with the masses. By the above means we have held on for six years, held the chief bases, trained an unconquerable anti-Japanese army and guaranteed our victory.

How can we overcome such difficulties, and not be overcome by them, and hold on in the enemy's rear? Because—

(1) We are determined to fight for our nation, for our country and for our existence. We prefer death rather than surrender. We hold to the end. We see clearly the national and international situation, and believe that we must win the war and that our national reconstruction must be achieved. We are unanimous, whether the upper or the lower, soldiers or civilians; all bracing ourselves to endure the hardships, prepared to sacrifice all for

one aim—our victory. It is certain that if we had permitted pessimism and wavering feelings to exist within our ranks, or had retreated before the difficulties, we should long since have been unable to continue our resistance in the enemy's rear.

(2) We persist in advocating progress, a united national front, close unity with the other armies and the people of the various circles, the complete realisation of the "triple system", the consideration of the benefits of all classes, and the thorough practice of democracy, so that all the anti-Japanese peoples may have freedom of speech, publication, meeting, organisation and armed defence, as well as Government protection for their human, political, property and land rights. It is upon these that we gain the sympathy and assistance of the people of various classes. Obviously had we not done as we did, or had we practised the dictatorship of a single party, our bases in the enemy's rear would long since have been lost.

(3) We promote production with our own hands. For all the time we believe that our resuscitation should primarily depend on our own effort, and that outside assistance ranks as of only secondary importance. Although we do not receive any arms, ammunition, medicine, clothing or funds, or any material assistance from the outside, we have increased production by our own hands, soldiers and civilians alike, by promoting a production movement. In this movement the various local governments assist the people to increase their production and improve their living conditions. The troops love the people, while the people support the troops. They mutually assist each other, all endeavouring to increase production, in order to fulfil the task of "constructive economy and guaranteed supply". At the same time we encourage saving, develop the struggle against avarice and corruption and severely punish the avaricious elements in order to reduce expenditure. In this way we have solved the clothing and food problems of our troops and civilians, and produced a certain amount of medicine and ammunition which has enabled us to hold on up to this moment. The enemy, the traitors and the pro-Japanese elements all expect us to perish owing to lack of ammunition and funds; but, against their wishes, we stand on our own legs.

If our bases in the enemy's rear, so cruelly attacked and so heavily blockaded, are still able to achieve self-supply and self-sufficiency entirely through our own efforts, it is apparent that there are no difficulties that our nation—so numerous in population, so rich in material resources and so vast in area—cannot overcome. Of course there are still numerous difficulties in our bases which make outside assistance seem the more necessary, and

we believe if such assistance could be rendered—as we deserve—we should be able to strike more and bigger blows at the enemy. In the seventh year of the war we hope that the operations in the front and rear of the enemy will have better and closer co-ordination and co-operation and that necessary appropriate assistance will be given to our troops. On a broader scale, our nation likewise is facing numerous difficulties, and urgently needs the help of friendly countries. If we could have greater help from them we would be able to carry on the strategic counter-offensive, and to co-ordinate our operations with the Allies to defeat the Japanese Fascists. Therefore we also hope that our Allies—the United States of America, Great Britain and the Soviet Union—will increase their assistance to China, so that blows dealt at the Japanese bandits may be effective.

(4) We practise the policy of a smaller, better army because we see clearly the situation of the war, as well as the conditions in the enemy's rear. We believe that a smaller number of better workers in the party, the Government, the army or the civilian organisations will co-ordinate better with the military operations of to-day in the enemy's rear, will improve the working efficiency and will lessen the burden of the people. Thanks to this policy we can draw more men to be used at the front and in production work in the rear, and make the distribution and application of man-power more reasonable. It is evident that if we had not carried on such a policy our troops would have suffered greater losses and our economy would be harder to maintain.

(5) We rely on the masses. All our forces and powers come from the masses, and all our ways and means are created by them. Relying on the power of the masses, of our troops and of the civilians, we have defeated our enemy and overcome all difficulties. We have no other secret weapon but close contact with the masses. It is evident that if we were isolated from them we should long since have failed.

#### IV. The Project.

At present, in the seventh year of our war of resistance, we see on the side of the Allies a better and closer unity, a higher productivity of arms and ammunition that surpasses that of the Axis Powers, a richer experience in the war, co-ordination of strategy and operations, the magnificent victories of Stalingrad, North Africa, Guadalcanal and the Attu Islands, and the beginning of the strategic counter-offensive. While on the side of the Axis Powers we see quite a different picture—that of the isolation of the Axis internationally, the increase of their internal difficulties, the mass movements of armed resistance, strikes and

sabotage by the people of the occupied European countries, the decrease of the production of arms and ammunition due to the raids of the Allies, pessimism instead of confidence in victory among the Axis people, and increased conflicts between Germany and Italy and among their vassals. As to Japan, we see still more difficulties, the chief of which are as follows:

(1) The extension of the front lines and the vastness of the occupied territories inevitably induce the scattering of forces on land and difficulties of transportation by sea. This, plus the fact that the enemy's shipbuilding enterprises are not as developed as those of Great Britain or the United States and that their steel production is much below the level of their needs, creates immense difficulty in transportation and warship replenishment.

(2) The six years of fighting in China and the year and a half of fighting with the Allies have decreased the fighting power of the enemy, not only in the land forces, but also in the sea and air forces.

(3) The six years of war with China have also created difficulty in the enemy's national economy.

(4) Due to the strengthening of the Allied forces in the Pacific, and their victories, the Japanese are more isolated than ever.

We have only to study and absorb the experiences of the past, to unite the whole nation in this holy, patriotic war, and to try our best to win foreign assistance, and our war of resistance will surely bring its final victory. The war in the enemy's rear will of course be carried on under more and greater difficulties than ever, but we know how to overcome them, as we have shown above. Our ways of overcoming difficulties can be practised on a nation-wide scale. This is the critical life-and-death moment of our nation. We must persist, using our utmost efforts, and hold on until final victory.



## HOW WE FOUGHT FOR SIX YEARS IN NORTH CHINA

By GENERAL PENG TEH-HUAI

EVERY MOMENT of the past six years the Japanese have been dreaming of the "conquest" of North China. For this purpose, ten divisions and more than ten brigades of Japanese troops, together with at least 160,000 puppets, have been incessantly carrying on campaigns here. But the plans have always met the merciless blows of the North China people. So the Japanese were forced to change their commanders-in-chief four times, for no other reason than that none of them could make their dream a reality.

In the beginning of 1938 Terauchi Juichi was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Japanese troops in place of Kazuki Kiyoshi, but he was removed in August, and Sugiyama Gen was sent to take his place. This was at a time when guerrilla warfare was at its height, and anti-Japanese bases and democratic governments were widely established in the enemy's rear. These were considered great obstacles by the Japanese to the overthrow of "Chiang's regime", so they moved their armies to North China as soon as they had captured Hankow. The enemy forces then stationed in North China numbered some ten divisions, being over half their total forces in China. But Sugiyama proved to be no better a commander than his two predecessors, and he, too, had to be removed in September, 1939.

Tada Toshi succeeded him. Not long after his arrival he invented the so-called "cage policy". Deep ditches were dug and high walls built along the sides of the railways and highways in order to blockade and break up the anti-Japanese bases, against which the enemy frequently launched their attacks. Engagements were tense at that time. Taking advantage of the enemy's unpreparedness, the Eighth Route Army on one occasion concentrated a force of 100 regiments for a sudden attack on all the important railways in North China, smashed their blockade-houses, destroyed their walls and ditches, burnt their stations and depots, and blew up their railways and bridges. The "cage policy" of Tada was completely crushed, and Tientsin and Peiping were for a time in imminent danger. This offensive was later known as the "hundred regiments' offensive", and it took the enemy six months to restore the communication of the North China railways. After this failure Tada had to resort to other tactics—for example, the "butcher-knife tactics", as he called them. He concentrated an overwhelming force to attack a certain point suddenly, but these assaults were likewise crushed by us.

Tada had to retire in July 1941. His post was taken by Okamura Neiji, known to be one of the three ablest men in the Japanese army, a devil whose bloody hands have murdered countless Korean and Manchurian people. Okamura again strengthened the "fortress tactics" by digging more ditches and building more walls, and in the autumn of 1941 he directed an army of more than 100,000 men to attack our Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region, but was defeated by our brave defenders. Later, in May 1942, he launched other offensives against our bases in the Taihang mountains in Central Hopeh and in Shantung, but again all were defeated.

This bloody Osamura is also the inventor of the venomous, heartless "annihilation policy" or the "three-all policy" (*i.e.*, kill all, burn all and loot all). However, the beastly actions of the enemy only intensify the hatred of the people. Yasudachi, Okamura's Chief of Staff, boasts that there are more than 11,100 kilometres of blockading ditches (six times the length of the Great Wall, or one-fourth the circumference of the earth) and nearly 10,000 fortresses in North China. But what can these do to the Eighth Route Army or the people in North China?

Facts have proved that ever since 1939 the Yellow River has been blockaded by the Kuomintang, and our troops have been isolated from the "Great Rear". The fact that we have held on for six years is by no means incidental, but the result of innumerable heroic struggles and sacrifices. I will give a few examples of the heroic deeds of the sons and daughters of the Chinese nation.

On September 25, 1941, when the enemy was attacking Langyashan from six directions, a file commander of the Eighth Route Army was ordered to defend a point of strategic importance with his file, to enable the main force to retreat safely. The defenders were bombarded by cannon and rushed by thousands of enemy soldiers. After a hard struggle only six men were left, yet they held on until the last bullet was fired and the last grenade thrown. Then they smashed their guns, jumped off the cliff and died for their country, after inflicting upon the enemy casualties ten times as many as their own.

Another example occurred on March 3, 1942, in the Macheng village of the Hopeh-Shantung-Honan Border Region, when more than 1,000 enemy troops, with the help of tanks and armoured cars, surrounded and attacked a platoon of the Eighth Route fighters who were defending the village. Severe fighting took place for half a day, several of the enemy tanks were destroyed and the casualties on both sides were heavy. Only a few men of the platoon were left with no ammunition and unable to

break the enemy's encirclement. Led by their commander, the doomed men shouted, "We shall hold on to the end, we prefer death rather than to be captives", and died as the enemy closed in. Their bravery so encouraged the villagers that the number of them who subsequently voluntarily joined the Eighth Route Army was double that of the sacrificed fighters.

Again, in January 1942, a portion of the Guards Regiment of the Eighth Route Army created the brilliant record of inflicting upon the enemy six times as many casualties as they suffered themselves in defence of the Huang Yen Tung factory in Taihang mountains. In this battle twelve Communist members fought on a cliff against hundreds of enemy soldiers for three days and nights in hard winter weather. Finally only one man was left, and he retreated only by order.

Still another example is the raid on the enemy aerodrome in Yangmingpao. This happened not long after the victory of the Pinghsing Pass in 1937, when the enemy was fighting with our Central troops in Shinkow. Our friendly troops were heavily bombarded from the air because the enemy had an aerodrome near Yangmingpao. To relieve our friends from this situation, the Headquarters of the Eighth Route Army ordered its 129th Division to destroy the enemy planes at any price, and this order came to the 769th Regiment of the division. Comrade Chiao Chi-yen, a battalion commander, was to take charge of the raid. Before he left he took out the last three dollars he had and handed them to one of his comrades, saying, "So that this will not fall into the hands of the enemy after I die". He then led his men out in the evening, and rushed the enemy aerodrome with hand-grenades, with the result that all twenty-four planes were burnt, and comrade Chiao himself died a hero's death.

Remarkable patriotism is also shown among the masses mobilised and organised by the Communist Party, as was the case of the mother of comrade Ma Pun-chi, commander of a Mohammedan column of the Eighth Route Army, which had inflicted many losses upon the enemy in Central Hopeh. Swearing to get "Mamma Ma", as the mother of Comrade Ma was called by the local people, so that she might persuade her son to capitulate, the enemy suddenly surrounded the village in Ho-Kien Hsien, Hopeh, where Mamma Ma was living, and putting all the villagers under arrest, endeavoured to force them to tell the whereabouts of the mother. The villagers all refused to talk, so several of them were at once publicly beheaded, while the rest were tortured. Seeing the intolerable scene, Mamma Ma came out to give herself up to save the lives of her fellow-villagers. She was taken to the district city and subjected to all kinds of

temptations and tortures, to which the heroic mother replied: "I am a daughter of China. My two sons participate in the Eighth Route Army. We do not know the word 'surrender'. Go and fight with my sons if you dare to." She died of a hunger strike afterwards, glorifying not only the Mohammedan women, but the Chinese nation as a whole.

Countless other heroic deeds have occurred during these years of war. Liu Chan-fang, treasurer of the Hou Chai Cheng village of Liao Hsien, Shansi, died without telling the enemy the location of the Government stores even when his whole body was burnt by boiling water; Wang Mu-yung, of the Shang Nan Hui village, died without disclosing the hiding-place of the co-workers or the whereabouts of the Government stores, even when pins were driven beneath his finger-nails, his eyes gouged out, and his head smashed; Lee Fu-chuen, Lee Pei-sien and Chiao Kwang-li, of the Peasants' Association of the Ta Lin Kow village, all died for their country without talking even under the most inhuman torture.

An interesting story illustrating the remarkable patriotism of the North China people and showing how they organised their armed defences is that of Liu Yi-tang, one of the best snipers in Taihang mountains. So accurate was Liu's shooting that in each of the mopping-up campaigns he accounted for several enemy commanders. In the big-scale mopping-up campaign last year the enemy captured Liu's brother, who professed to be Liu Yi-tang himself, and was consequently killed. The people's militia of Liao Hsien rose for the revenge of Liu, and some new organisers of militia also called themselves Liu Yi-tang. The enemy was astonished at seeing so many Liu Yi-tangs at one time, after having killed one of them.

The people of Shiao Ka Chang village, composed of no more than forty families, in the south of the I-River, Shantung, fought for three days and nights with hundreds of enemy troops, who, being unable to advance, shamelessly resorted to the use of poison gas, against which the villagers continued to fight, with wetted towels around their mouths. Many children were poisoned; the mothers continued to help the defenders. They succeeded in retreating at night after their ammunition was exhausted.

The people's militia units in the bases have now learnt the use of mines. In the mopping-up campaign in Taihangshan last year 3,000 mines were laid voluntarily by the people's militia under enemy houses, barns and lavatories.

I cannot relate here all the numerous heart-moving epics of the struggles of our anonymous heroes, who know nothing but the continuing of the war and sacrifice for victory.

It is due to the practice of democracy that the various strata

of the people, especially the toiling masses, can be mobilised to participate in Government affairs, thus being made to understand that the holy anti-Japanese work is a work of their own responsibility. Meanwhile the betterment of the living conditions of the toiling people, the protection of the property and land rights of the rich, and the encouragement of production have comparatively reduced the unreasonable phenomenon of "fighting the Japanese with an empty stomach", and have consolidated the unity of all classes. Therefore we have not only carried on the "Three People's Principles" of Dr. Sun, but also the united-front policy of the Chinese Communist Party in the enemy's rear in North China. Certain past failures of our friendly armies in North China were not due solely to military reasons, but to political ones—*i.e.*, they have not practised Dr. Sun's "Three People's Principles" nor have they carried on the policy of a united front between the Communists and the Kuomintang and between the troops and the people.

## IN MEMORY OF THE PARTY DAY

By CHU TEH

THE REASON why China can produce such a strong party as the Chinese Communist Party is because of the development of the workers' movement, of the people's democratic revolution, and of the association of the above two with scientific socialism—*i.e.* Marxism-Leninism.

In the political phase, not only during the monarchy stage of China, democracy was suppressed. It has, in fact, never been realised even after the establishment of the republic. Some people say, "The Chinese people are so ignorant that they cannot be given democratic rights", while others add, "China was democratic even during the monarchy. There has been too much democratic freedom already, and now it should be restricted." To get to the root of the matter, they are simply unwilling to realise the Three People's Principles or to return the political rights to the people. The Chinese Communist Party goes in exactly the opposite direction. Not only in the rear—in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region—have they established model democratic politics, but also in places of direct tense warfare—in the bases of North and Central China. Facts have proved that people long for democracy as ardently as the thirsty long for drinks or the hungry for food, and we have never heard of one case of democracy being refused by the people. Facts have also proved that under the direction of the Communist Party, and through the practice

and utilisation of democratic rights to a high degree by the people, countless political geniuses have appeared, disproving the theory that people are ignorant and cannot be entrusted with political power. This is also a miracle unprecedented in the history of China. We believe that the anti-Japanese forces can be surprisingly and freely developed only if democracy is practised on a national scale.

In the economic field, we do not need to mention here the hellish condition of the people in the occupied territories, where they are exploited and squeezed by the enemy and the traitors as if being drowned in the deep sea or being burnt in hot flames; but we must point out that even in free China to-day, due to the difficulty of material production, the spread of natural calamities and the mismanagement of some people, the people's living conditions still constitute a considerable problem.

The regions under the direction of the Communists are the most backward economically in the whole country, but through painstaking constructive work of the Communists and the people we have been able to derive therefrom experiences that could be advantageously utilised by the whole nation. All the people in the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, military and civil, increase production with their own hands, and all the troops, Government institutions and schools are mobilised to participate in production campaigns, to cultivate waste land, to improve irrigation, and to produce and transport salt. Even the idlers are caught up in the high surge of production. In the industrial sphere, we produce our own machines, establish our factories and develop some light industries, such as weaving and spinning, with the result that the living conditions of the people are reaching a state of growing prosperity, and we have sufficient food and clothing. In the various bases in Central and North China, in spite of the cruel suppressions of the enemy, we have been able, through fighting on the one hand and production on the other, and by rent and interest reductions, to raise the working enthusiasm of the broad peasant masses, and to improve step by step the standard of living of the people.

Regarding the cultural phase, the great majority of the Chinese people, the peasants and the workers, due to their low standing in the old society, are unable to read or write, but to them we have paid our greatest attention in educational work.

What is mentioned above about the military, political, economic and cultural achievements, far from being the whole, is only a portion of the actual harvest. Can this be explained merely by the word "miracle"? Of course not. In actuality

the so-called miracle is merely the expression of the unanimous efforts of our comrades.

"The world belongs to the public" is a traditional thought inherited from our ancients, and has been utilised by many people as a propaganda slogan, although the number of those who really desire to see it put into practice can be counted on one's fingers. However, this traditional spirit is highly developed by the Communist Party, as shown in the speech of Comrade Mao Tse-tung before the political council of the Border Region, which partly read: "National affairs are public affairs of the country, and not of a single party or clique, therefore the Communist members have only the duty to realise democratic co-operation with the outside people, but not the right to repel others or to monopolise everything. The Communist Party is a party fighting for the benefits of the nation and the people, and there is no such thing as private benefit to the Communist." Following this direction, the Communist members have been able to correct consciously the narrow-minded thought of sectarianism and successfully carried out the triple-system government.

Again, there is another famous Chinese motto, "Civil officers should not love money, and military officers should not fear to die", but how many of our civil and military officers of past and present times put this motto into practice? However, we Communists have thoroughly developed this traditional spirit, as shown by the fact that the hundreds of thousands of fighters and commanders of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are facing death every day in the fight against the strong enemy, without taking their lives into consideration, while the other comrades working outside the military circle are all venerable and law-abiding. They eradicate consciously all base, selfish, corrupting thoughts, and carry on under strict discipline the various constructive works.

Yet another good tradition of the Chinese people for thousands of years is the spirit to endure hardship and toil and to struggle under the greatest difficulties, which is something those who dress well and eat well are unwilling and unable to do. This is accepted and developed by the Communists. In addition, we have other high ethical thoughts from China's history, such as "The action must follow the speech, and it must be resolute", "Promises must be kept", etc. Only those who fatten on breach of promise are afraid of being checked on sayings and achievements.

I hope that our comrades can today review the history of the party, and thoroughly understand that it is one of the proletariat, sharing sorrows and happiness, prosperity and calamity with the Chinese nation and the people. The party and the people

forever live and exist together, and cannot be divided by hardships, obstacles, oppressions and intrigues. Comrades! "A Communist member" is a most glorious and progressive title. You must train yourselves to be worthy of this title, to be the real proletariat fighter and the real heir to the noble traditions of the nation, and endeavour to accomplish the magnificent task of the war of resistance and the reconstruction of the country under the leadership of the Central Committee of the Party.

## ON THE DISBANDMENT OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

By COMRADE MAO TSE-TUNG

THE CENTRAL Committee of the Chinese Communist Party called a meeting of party staff members on the evening of May 26, 1943, to present to them two historic documents regarding the disbandment of the Communist International, one from the Praesidium of the Executive Committee of the Communist International and the other from the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.

Comrade Mao first pointed out that the disbandment of the Comintern was a historical dividing point. This was proved by the fact that it had aroused the attention of the whole world, of both the anti-Fascist and Fascist camps and all parties and groups.

Comrade Mao asked why the Comintern should be disbanded. Was it not an organisation for the emancipation of the international working class and for the war against Fascism? Then he answered his own question. He said that that approach was not correct. The Communist International was created by Lenin, and during the whole history of its existence it helped to organise genuine revolutionary working-class parties throughout the world. It helped also to organise the great task of struggle against Fascism. Comrade Mao pointed out especially the great services of the Comintern in assisting the Chinese Revolution. It had a wide influence among the Chinese people. The reason was that, although China is economically a very backward country, it had undergone three great revolutionary movements in the past twenty-two years, and the Comintern had given much help to all these. These movements were the Northern Expedition, the Land Revolution and the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance. Comrade Mao told how in 1924, on the very eve of the Northern Expedition, the Comintern helped Dr. Sun Yat-sen to reorganise the Kuomintang, which he then led, and concluded an agree-

ment for the co-operation of the Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Party. Comrade Mao mentioned two historical facts: that Mr. Chiang Kai-shek went, on Dr. Sun's orders, to Moscow, and that a representative of the Kuomintang had participated in one of the meetings of the Communist International. He said this was enough to prove how much the Communist International had helped the Chinese Revolution, and how great its influence had been on the Chinese people. It was scarcely necessary to mention the subsequent Land Revolution and the anti-Japanese war of recent years. Comrade Mao also pointed out that revolutionary movements can be neither exported nor imported. Although there had been help from the Communist International, the creation and development of the Chinese Communist Party were a result of the fact that there is a conscious working class in China itself. The Chinese working class had itself created its own party.

If the Communist International had rendered such great services to China and various other countries, why should it be necessary to disband it? Comrade Mao answered that the principle of Marxism-Leninism is that the organisational form of revolution should be subject to the necessities of revolutionary struggle. If an organisational form became unsuited to the necessities of the struggle, this organisational form should be abolished. Comrade Mao pointed out that the present revolutionary organisational form of the Communist International had already become unsuited to the necessities of the struggle. To continue to preserve this organisational form would be to hinder the revolutionary struggle in various countries. It is not necessary, at the present time, to have an international leading centre. What is needed now is the strengthening of the Communist Parties in the various countries. There are three reasons for this.

Firstly, the internal situations of the various countries, as well as relations between different countries, are more complex than in the past, and change more speedily. There is no way for an international organisation to fit these rapidly changing and unusually complex circumstances. Correct leadership must therefore stem from a most careful study of these circumstances. That is why it is all the more necessary for the Communist Parties of the various countries to carry out this task themselves. When circumstances were comparatively simple, and the rate of change was comparatively slow, the Communist International, situated at a great distance from the practical struggle, could still function, but now it cannot.

Secondly, the Fascist robbers have drawn a very clear line

between the Fascist and anti-Fascist groups of nations. Among the latter there are Socialist countries, capitalist countries, semi-colonies, colonies and countries of all types. Among the Fascist States and their vassals there are also great differences. In addition, there are still neutral countries in different situations. A central organisation of an international nature is felt to be unsuitable for this combination of circumstances, and this has become especially obvious recently.

Thirdly, the leading cadres of the Communist Parties in various countries have already grown up and become politically mature.

Comrade Mao gave the Chinese Communist Party as an example to explain this point. He pointed out that the Chinese Communist Party has gone through three successive revolutionary movements which were extremely complex in nature—even more complex than the revolution in Russia. Through these movements it acquired both practical experience and excellent cadres. Since its Seventh Congress in 1935 the Communist International has not once intervened in internal questions of the Chinese Party, and during this time the Chinese Communists have done very well in the work of waging the Anti-Japanese War of National Liberation.

Comrade Mao then summarised the expressions of opinion in the foreign Press during the four days since the announcement of the proposal to disband the Communist International. He said that all well-meaning people in the anti-Fascist countries praised this action very much, but that the reaction in the Fascist countries was very different. The bloodstained aggressors who in the past have concluded "Anti-Comintern" treaties now seem very unwilling to see the Communist International disbanded. Is not this strange? Now the aggressors are in extreme confusion and doing their best to denounce the disbandment. In London, and also in Stockholm, the die-hard Social Democrats who had used the pretext that the Communist Parties in their countries took orders from the Communist International to deny them affiliation with their own parties, now do not welcome the disbandment of the Comintern. This is also somewhat strange.

The task in all anti-Fascist countries at the present time is to unify the workers' movement so that it can strongly and speedily destroy Fascism. With the disbandment of the Comintern the die-hard cliques in the workers' movement in these countries have lost their main pretext, and hence are very displeased. They even say that the Communist International should not have been disbanded.

Comrade Mao pointed out that such senseless arguments may appear even in China. Let us wait and see. But he believed that the majority of people of goodwill would not agree with

talk lacking the most elementary common sense. He added that the disbandment of the Comintern does not weaken the Communist Parties of the various countries, but, on the other hand, strengthens them, making them more national and more suited to the necessities of the war against Fascism.

The study movement in the Chinese Communist Party against subjectivism, sectionalism and dogmatic formalism has as its aim to make the Chinese Communist Party more national and more suited to the needs of the war of resistance and national reconstruction.

Comrade Mao then said that now that the Communist International is no more, the responsibility of the Chinese Communist Party is increased. Every comrade should understand that he has assumed a very great load of responsibility. Arising from this sense of responsibility we must demonstrate that we possess creative power. We are now in the midst of an extremely difficult war of national liberation. The Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army are holding off an extremely strong enemy in the rear of the Japanese lines. Our environment is very hard, and the war will still last for a very long time. But such hard and prolonged struggle is just what is needed to give us the correct training, to teach us to think things out carefully and not to act carelessly and roughly, always considering ourselves in the right. It enables us to get rid of subjectivism, sectionalism and dogmatic formalism, to eliminate these incorrect methods of action and achieve a thoroughly responsible attitude and high creative ability.

Comrade Mao emphasised two absolutely necessary factors for unification. One is unity within the party, and the other is unity with the people. These two unities are the priceless treasures with which we can conquer the difficult environment. All should cherish them most deeply. With regard to the first, all party comrades should unite around the Central Committee. Any action harmful to this unity is a crime. If the Chinese Communists are unified as one, with one heart and one idea, then no matter how strong the enemy and how difficult the environment, they will be conquered. With regard to the second, all party comrades should work effectively to unify the mass of the people. Comrade Mao asked all comrades to follow the example of Comrade Chen Tsung-yao, whose deeds were reported in the Liberation Daily. Comrade Chen Tsung-yao is a regimental commander of the Eighth Route Army. He led his whole regiment in an expedition of several hundred miles to get rice, and throughout the expedition he did not once mount his horse, but let it carry rice, and himself carried a full load all the time, so that every

member of his regiment was much moved and cheered by his spirit, and nobody asked for leave.

Comrade Mao called on all party staff members to emulate the spirit of this comrade—to mix with the masses and overcome all bureaucracy that keeps them separate. He said that we Communists do not want to be officials. What we want is to revolutionise. Every one of us should have a thorough revolutionary spirit. Not for a single hour or a single second do we want to be away from the masses. If we do not separate ourselves from the masses we shall surely be victorious.

## ADDRESS OF CHOU EN-LAI TO A RECEPTION PARTY AT YENAN, AUGUST 1, 1943

COMRADES,

I thank you for the warm welcome. I have done too little while away from you. However, during these three years the changes, both international and national, and the progress of our party have been great and many. This is especially clear to us who stayed outside.

On the international side we have seen the disaster of Europe brought by the Fascists since the surrender of France; the perfidious and mad attack of Hitlerite Germany on the U.S.S.R., once, twice, a third time; the blitzkrieg of the Japanese pirates on Britain and America in the Pacific. At the same time we have seen the rise of the Soviet Red Army and people under the leadership of Stalin to resist and attack, and their heroic military achievements and enthusiasm in production. From the defence of Leningrad and Moscow to the defence of Stalingrad; from the winter offensives of the past two years to the summer offensive of this year—they have won the world's admiration. We have also seen the formation and development of the anti-Fascist front among the Allies, from the declaration of the Atlantic Charter of Churchill and Roosevelt to the conclusion of the Anglo-Soviet alliance and the Soviet-American agreement, to the signing of the twenty-six countries pact in Washington; from the success of the British and American armies' counter-offensive in North Africa to the landing on Sicily. We have also seen the rise and growth of the struggle against Fascist domination throughout the world; from the development of guerrilla fighting in the occupied nations, to the rise of anti-Fascist demonstrations, strikes within Germany and Italy; from the co-operation within the French national emancipation committee to the establishment of the Free Germany national committee; from

the recognition or the acknowledgement of the legal status of the Communist Party in Britain and U.S.A. to the arrival of Comrade Okano, leader of the Japanese Communist Party, at Yen-an. During these three years the anti-Fascist national emancipation war of the Allies has emerged from danger to safety, from defeat to victory, from passive operations to active attacks. These changes mainly resulted from the three counter-offensives and the fighting of the past two years of the Soviet Red Army and people, also from the victory of the British and American Allies in North Africa and their active operations in the South Pacific; from America's great production and the war mobilisation of the Allies. They were also due to the firm resistance of the Chinese nation, especially the development of guerrilla fighting behind the Japanese lines.

Now that Mussolini has fallen, and the Italian Fascist Party has dissolved, the weakest spot of world Fascist domination begins to crumble. World Fascism is marching towards death. The victory of world anti-Fascist fighting is dawning. The doomsday of the once-active Fascist members and their fifth columnists comes nearer and nearer every day. Do you not see the end of the Italian Fascists? the flight of German fifth columnists in Italy? This is a living example to all disciples of Fascism throughout the world, a living example to the Chinese disciples of Fascism.

From the national side, for three years we have remained in a stalemate in the war against Japan. In these three years some have thought that since the Soviet-German war and the Pacific war broke out in succession, the Japanese would either attack India or the U.S.S.R. and have no time to fight in China. Thus they try to sabotage fighting against the Japanese to give the latter the hint not to attack China; at the same time they work actively against the Communists to encourage Japan to withdraw troops to attack the U.S.S.R. Although this trick has been cleverly concocted, the Japanese have not accepted the counsel entirely. Japan has her own national policy. She may approve of their passive fighting, but since they have not capitulated and disarmed, she will take whatever chance there is to attack China. She may approve their active anti-Communist actions, but they are unable to exterminate the Communists; thus Japan still has to keep more than half her forces in China for the consolidation of a peace-maintaining movement behind her lines and to mop up the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army.

In these three years some have thought that either Britain and the U.S.A. would defeat Japan in a short time, or they must give ample help to China; thus China might sit and reap the fruit of war. Britain and the U.S.A. cannot defeat Japan in a short

time; this has already been proved by facts. It is everybody's hope that Great Britain and the U.S.A. will send help to China, but their production is not easy and they want first to help those troops directly engaged in fighting. They will carefully consider those who falter in fighting and those guilty of double-dealing. Moreover, from the arrival of Wu K'ai-hsien at Chungking from Nanking up to the present, the flirtation of secret agents from both sides has been going on, and the Japanese wireless openly stated terms for negotiation to induce capitulation.

In these three years some have thought that if only we could drag on the war, we could drag on until final victory. However, you may want to drag, but the enemy will not let you, The enemy wants to solve the Chinese problem before Hitler's fall, and before the decisive fighting in the Pacific. This is evident. The recent open announcement of terms for capitulation was caused by the fall of Mussolini. Not only will the enemy not let you drag on, but internal conditions also will not allow you to drag.

Can the morale of the army be raised if many of the troops are not despatched to the front to engage in active fighting? Can the fighting strength be increased if the conscription system is not reformed, the armies not replenished? Can bankruptcy, financial and economical, be avoided if financial and economic policies remain unchanged, bureaucratic capital is not overthrown, graft and corruption not punished, hoarding not exterminated? Can the rear of the war of resistance be peaceful and stable if people have no freedom, people's livelihood is not improved, labour productivity not raised, bureaucratic politics not wiped out, the oppressive policy to alienate those who do not belong to the same group not abolished? If these phenomena do not change, or are not wiped out of existence, can China's war of resistance drag till the final victory? Our answer is: to attain victory, the way is not to fight passively, but, actively; to attain victory is not to have a split within the country, but to have unity between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party; to attain victory is not to have political oppression, but political democracy.

In these three years some have thought that the interior political situation has been inefficient, and that if only the control of secret police is strengthened, the resistance war may be maintained until victory. However, the war is fought for national emancipation and democracy, not for the victory of a Fascist system of secret service agents.

Thus, for the past three years such thinking of the Kuomintang authorities has been wrong. Is there any way still to fight for the

victory of the resistance war of China? We reply, yes. The way comes from the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghesia Border Region, comes from the Eighth Route Army, the New Fourth Army and the anti-Japanese strategic bases behind the enemy lines, the way comes from the Chinese people, from the really anti-Japanese parties and troops, from the Chinese Communist Party, especially from Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

Speaking of the war against Japan, even the enemy cannot deny the military achievements of the Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, and recognises them as the most formidable and strongest anti-Japanese force. Shall not such a force be prized as an example to all troops willing to fight against the Japanese? Are not those who want to wipe out such a force pro-Japanese fifth columnists?

Speaking of democracy, in these three years our party has promulgated a programme for administration in the Border Region and the anti-Japanese bases; carried into practice the popular election on the one-third system; the law protecting the rights of individuals and property rights; the policy of reducing rent and interest, but at the same time making the payment of rents and interest obligatory; payment of a reasonable share of war contribution; the labour policy of ten hours work improving the life of the workers and at the same time increasing the efficiency of production; the system of voluntary recruits and militia; correct financial and economic policies; cultural and educational policies; permission to anybody to engage in anti-Japanese work of all kinds; industrial, cultural and religious activities in the Border Region, under the principle of respecting its law. Thus, the party is working for self-sufficiency and plenty of food, plenty of clothing. Cannot such Border Regions be models to those places earnestly wishing to realise the Three People's Principles of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and democracy? Are not those who wanted to attack and abolish the Border Regions Fascists opposing democracy and the Three People's Principles? Therefore those genuine anti-Japanese parties, cliques and troops, and all patriotic people, certainly will not accept the present wavering policy of the Kuomintang towards the war of resistance, its misguided internal policy, especially the double-dealing policy of fighting against the Communists and against the Japanese at the same time. They will be willing to be friends with the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, to conclude an alliance with them, taking lessons from the experience of the Border Regions in democracy, to establish a real united front with the Chinese Communist Party.

Therefore, in these three years it has been clear to everybody

which is the actively fighting army and which is the passive army; where in China is the region of democracy and where is the region opposing democracy. It is expressed in public opinions abroad and inside the country.

Now we must mention the great progress our party has made during these three years. For the whole country, our party has twice averted the crisis of civil war, maintained difficult guerrilla fighting, strengthened the leadership of the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army and support of the various anti-Japanese bases, and thereby has stabilised the anti-Japanese sentiment and determination of the people in the occupied areas and the confidence and hope of the future success of the war against Japan in the rear. On the international side, our party has not only foreseen the international changes within these three years—that world Fascism will inevitably die, that the democracies will inevitably emerge victorious—but has also given the Allies to understand that the Eighth Route Army and the Chinese Communist Party and their anti-Japanese bases behind the Japanese lines are the real force and bases in the heart of the continent for a counter-offensive against the Japanese. From the reformation movement under the leadership of our party the Border Regions have reaped unprecedented fruits in ideological transformation, and in the consolidation of strength through “efficiency in the army and the simplicity in administration” movement. Unity of leadership has achieved political unity. “To support the Government on the one side and to love the people from the other side” has achieved the unity of army, government, people and party into one body. In developing production, the model for self-sufficiency has been established. How did we achieve these successes? We achieved them by relying on the strength of the people, on the unity of the party under the leadership of the Party Central Committee and Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

With Comrade Mao Tse-tung's leadership and instructions, within these three years, in times of crisis and important decision our party has not been misled in the least, nor lost its direction.

Nothing can be clearer than the developments of facts during these three years. Those who formerly opposed Comrade Mao Tse-tung's leadership are now proved to be completely on the wrong track.

Comrades, shall we not be proud of such a party? Shall we not be proud of such a good leader? However, there are anti-Communist elements inside the country who dare to shout shamelessly for the dissolution of the Chinese Communist Party. Are they not the Japanese fifth columnists? They did not raise the outcry before, but at a time after the dissolution of the Com-



munist International. They claim that after the dissolution of the Comintern, Communism is no longer fit for China, the Chinese Communist Party has lost its backing, the Chinese Communist Party will split from within. Will there be any one to believe their slanders?

Is Communism unfit for China? The general truth of Marxism and Leninism can be applied to the whole of mankind. Why should China be an exception? The anti-Communist elements speak thus irresponsibly because they are most afraid of us using Marxism and Leninism as mirrors to reflect their fifth-columnist forms before the Chinese people. The anti-Communist elements speak so irresponsibly because they are most afraid of us using the philosophy of Marxism and Leninism to explain the various phenomena of Chinese political, economic and social life, and to point out the truth of the Chinese revolution to the people. We dare tell the anti-Communist elements openly that Communism not only fits China but, owing to the achievements of our party leader Comrade Mao Tse-tung, has already closely united with the Chinese national emancipation movement and the actual interests of the Chinese people, and become rooted in Chinese soil. Those who want to shake it will kill themselves.

Has the Chinese Communist Party lost its backing? Yes, the birth and development of the Chinese Communist Party received much help and instruction from the Comintern; but the backing of the Chinese Communist Party is not the Comintern, but the Chinese people. The Chinese Communist Party grows and develops among the toiling masses of China, it lives among the people. Our party is a party of the masses. Now it has 800,000 party members, 500,000 troops and has united with over a hundred million of people in blood and flesh through actual fighting. The Chinese nation needs it; the Chinese people need it. Who can abolish it or dissolve it? Let us formally tell those anti-Communist elements that the Chinese Communist Party not only will not be abolished, but will live forever. While world Fascism is walking towards destruction, what should be dissolved is not the Communist Party, but the Fascist Chinese special secret police organisations.

Is the Chinese Communist Party split internally? Day and night the anti-Communist elements dream of our party having the same numerous branches and sects as theirs. Thus they manufacture rumours, attempting to slander us. However, they do not understand that our party is united, is based on belief in Communism and class consciousness and revolutionary training. There is the voluntary discipline to consolidate it. It differs

entirely from the Kuomintang, which allows sects and branches to exist and is not unified at all. Our party has made many mistakes, and it contains many who have made mistakes; but it grows and develops from the struggle, and finally rectifies the mistakes. Thus it attains unity of ideas in the party and the consolidation of party organisation. Those who have made mistakes but wish to be corrected will naturally again walk along the correct party line; those who repeatedly make mistakes and refuse to be corrected will naturally be spat upon and forsaken by the party. Were not Ch'en Tu-hsiu and Chang Kuo-tao the initiators of the Chinese Communist Party? However, when they had repeatedly made mistakes and stuck to them obstinately, they were driven out from the party. They had not been able to split the party, but, on the contrary, had strengthened and consolidated it. In these three years, while our party, united under the leadership of Comrade Mao Tse-tung, has undergone the ideological reformation movement and carried out the work of understanding and examining cadres, it has also reached the highest degree of consolidation. We dare to formally tell the anti-Communist elements that the Chinese Communist Party will not split because of their slander, but being aware of their intrigues and slanders, will be more alert and united. We think that while the war with Japan is becoming more and more difficult, the revolution spreading farther and farther, what will split is not the Communist Party, but something else. Examples have already occurred in history.

After the dissolution of the Comintern, one thing should be made clear—that is, that the Chinese Communist Party will be more responsible and independent to solve the problem of the Chinese revolution.

We shall support the war against Japan to the last. We think that only with our own forces can we drive the Japanese from Chinese territory. Passive fighting and double-dealing policy will inevitably fail, and there is the danger of capitulation and compromise. Besides, it is only by active fighting that we can be qualified to ask for foreign assistance, that we can co-operate with the Allies in the struggle for victory.

We firmly support national unity. We are still prepared to work with the Kuomintang, to discuss how to remove the danger of civil war and solve existing problems. However, the negotiation must be sincere, based on equal status and mutual concessions. It must not be negotiation on one hand, conflicts and clashes on the other; letters and liaison, going back and forth on the one hand, massing of troops on the other; talking of unity and at the same time talking about dissolution of the Communist Party.

If there are people in the Kuomintang who believe that co-operation between Kuomintang and the Communist Party means the incorporation of the Communist Party into the Kuomintang, that one must use force to compel the Communist Party to come under control, it will be unfortunate for the cause of unity. For it is the motive of civil war, not the way to unity.

We shall firmly maintain democracy and progress. We still hope that the authorities will correct their misguided internal policy and really carry out Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Three People's Principles. We also hope to co-operate with all the other anti-Japanese parties, cliques and forces on the basis of democracy, in order to prosecute the war firmly, and to forward progress.

This is our direction.

## 6

### ORGANISE FOR PRODUCTION

By MAO TSE-TUNG

*(An Address given at the Welcome-Reception of the Labour Heroes of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, on November 29, 1943)*

TODAY WE, the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, are giving a welcome-reception to the labour heroes and model workers of the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region—heroes and workers elected from farms, factories, troops, schools, Government organisations and other branches of production. I am speaking here for the Central Committee. The content of my speech can be summarised in a few words—"Organise for production". Following the resolution made at the Conference of the Higher Cadres summoned by the North-West Bureau of the Party last winter, the masses of the peasantry, the troops, the Government organisations and the schools of the Border Region have carried on the production campaign for a whole year, during which we have seen achievements and progress in every branch of production, and as a result the appearance of the Border Region is transformed. This proves that the direction of the Conference of the Higher Cadres is correct. Their purpose is to organise the masses, the power of the people, the power of the troops, organisations and schools. No matter whether they are men or women, old or young, whole-time or part-time labourers, so long as conditions permit, they are mobilised and organised into a labour army without exception. Thus, besides the army for fighting, we have an army for production. In fighting, we have the Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, which serve dual purposes—fighting on the one hand and producing on the other.

In the Border Region this year every land-possessing fighter is cultivating eighteen mows of land on the average. Foods like vegetables, meat and oil, clothing, buildings like caves, houses and assembly halls, daily-used articles like tables, chairs, benches

and paper, and fuels like firewood, charcoal and coal, practically all of them can be produced by ourselves. With our own hands we have realised the aim of "plenty of food and clothing". Every fighter or commander has only to spend three months in production, and the remaining nine months of the year he can spend in training and fighting. Our troops do not rely on funds from the National Government, or from the Border Region Government, or from the people. They supply and maintain themselves. How significant this method is to the work of national liberation! For these six and a half years the Japanese have been pursuing their "three-annihilation policy" (killing all, looting all and burning all) in the anti-Japanese bases, while our Border Region is suffering from the heavy blockade of the Kuomintang, which puts us in a very difficult position financially and economically. In such conditions, if our fighters limit themselves to fighting only, we shall not be able to solve our difficulties. But our troops in the rear have now learned the method of production, so have some of our troops at the front, while the remainder are beginning to learn it. If every fighter of our brave, veteran Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies knows not only how to work among the masses but also how to produce, we shall not be afraid of whatever difficulties may arise, and shall be, as Mencius said, "unconquerable under Heaven".

Our Government organs and schools, too, have advanced a big step. The subsidies they receive from the Government constitute only a small percentage of their expenditure, while the greater part of their needs they produce themselves. Last year they produced only 50% of the vegetables consumed, but this year they have produced the full amount. Hog and sheep-raising increase the amount of meat for food, and the establishment of many mills and manufactories solves the problem of daily necessities. Since the troops, organisations and schools have solved, wholly or partly, the material problem themselves, the part of production that the Government draws from the people in the form of taxation is greatly reduced, and the share the people keep for themselves is greatly increased. Both the fighters and the people develop their production, both enjoy "plenty of food and clothing", and both are happy. In addition, the production of the factories is developed, hidden espionage liquidated, and their production efficiency greatly increased. The result is that we have such labour heroes as Wu Man-yu in the farms, Chao Tsan-kwei in the industries, and Huang Li-teh in the Government organisations and schools, and other labour heroes in the army. The production of the Border Region may be said now to be "on the right track".

All this is the result of the practice of organising the power of

the masses. Is there any other way? Yes, there is. It is the way of disregarding the point of view of the masses, not relying on the masses, not organising the broad masses of the villages, troops, organisations, schools or factories, but only laying stress on the organisation of financial, supply or trading organisations. The minority advocating this way do not take the economic work as a broad movement or a broad front, but only consider it as a provisional means to make up financial deficits. This way is a wrong one. It was followed in the Border Region formerly, but after the corrections of the past years, especially after the Conference of the Higher Cadres last year and the mass movement of this year, the number of people still following it is probably not great. The mass-production movement in the Central and North China bases has not been greatly developed because of the tension of war and the lack of attention paid by some of the leading organisations there, but now they are preparing to start the movement for next year. The conditions at the front are more difficult than those of the Border Region, not only because there is constant fighting, but also because serious famine prevails in many places. However, for the sake of maintaining the war, of overcoming the annihilation policy of the enemy, and of relieving famine, we have to mobilise all the party, the Government, the troops and the people to fight on the one hand and to produce on the other. There has already been some experience in production at the front, and after this winter's preparations in thought, in organisation and in materials, we may and must form a great movement next year. We may not have "plenty of food and clothing" at the front, because of its particular environment, but it is completely feasible to overcome the economic difficulties with our own hands.

The most important factor in the organisation of the people economically is the co-operative society. The present form of mass production among our troops, organs and schools may not necessarily be called co-operatives, but such a type of production activity of the masses—mutual-assisting, joint labour under a centralised leadership—does possess the characteristic of co-operatives.

No matter what they are called, or of how many persons (a few, tens, or hundreds) each unit is composed; or whether the participants are whole-time or part-time labourers; or whether they assist one another only in man-power, material power and tools, or actually dine and live together during the busy farming season; or whether the organisations are temporary or permanent in character—so far as they are collective mutual-assisting organisations voluntarily participated in by the masses (who should never be compelled to participate), we welcome them.

This collective, mutual-assisting method is invented by the masses themselves. The experience we obtained in Kiangsi formerly and summarised in the Border Region later was greatly systematised and made universal after the promotion of the Conference of Higher Cadres last year and practice this year. We have in the Border Region this year many groups, who work collectively in ploughing, mowing and harvesting, and reap a harvest double in amount compared with that of last year. With the advantage of this method seen, the practice will surely be followed by a greater number of people next year. We do not expect that within the next year we shall be able to organise into co-operatives all the hundreds of thousands of labourers or part-time labourers, but this aim can undoubtedly be realised after a few years. The women masses must participate to a certain degree in the production. So must all the idlers, so that they may become good citizens. We must organise this kind of collective, mutual-assisting, productive co-operative in all the bases of North and Central China.

Besides the above-mentioned collective, mutual-assisting, agricultural, productive co-operatives, there are three other kinds of co-operatives—*i.e.*, the comprehensive co-operatives, like the South District Co-operative of Yen-an (which includes the productive co-operative, the consumers' co-operative, the transport co-operative, and the credit co-operative), the transport co-operatives (for salt transport) and the handicraft co-operatives.

By these four kinds of co-operatives of the people and the collective co-operatives of our troops, organisations and schools, we can organise all the labour power of the people into a great labour army. This is the road the people must travel before they can gain liberation, before they can rise from the state of poverty to the state of wealth, and before they can win the war of resistance. Every member of the Communist Party must learn how to organise the labour power of the masses. Members coming from the intelligentsia class should also learn this. It requires only half or one year to master it, provided we have the resolution to do so. Having this knowledge, they can then help the people to organise their production and to summarise their experiences. Many of our people had the same shortcoming as Confucius. Confucius could not answer his pupil when the latter asked him about agronomy and horticulture. But our comrades have mastered the art, and can answer it now. In this they are cleverer than Confucius. If our comrades have learned how to organise the labour power of the masses, to help the farmers to draw up their production plans, to organise collective groups, the salt-transport troupe, the comprehensive co-operatives, and the pro-

duction of the troops, organisations, schools and factories, to hold production contests and exhibitions, and to increase the creative power and enthusiasm of the people, and other capacities, we shall be able to drive out the Japanese, and, with the assistance of the people, to create a new country.

No matter in whatever capacity, we Communist members should be able to associate ourselves with the people. If we merely confine ourselves in our rooms and never go out to weather any storm, or even to come in contact with society, what good is there in such members to the Chinese people? Not a bit of good, and we do not need such members. We Communists must face storms and come in contact with society. The storm I mention here is the storm of people's struggles, and the society, the society of people's struggles.

The maxim "Three common men will make a genius" tells us that there is great creative power among the people, and that there are thousands and thousands of geniuses among them. There are geniuses in every village, every town and every city. We must penetrate into the masses, learn from them, organise their experiences into systematic principles and methods, and then tell them these principles and methods (propaganda) and urge them to practise them to solve their own problems so that they can have freedom and felicity. If we comrades working in the various localities isolate ourselves from the masses, do not understand their feelings, cannot help them to organise their production or to better their living conditions, but only demand from them the "national salvation public grain tax", we shall not realise the fact that if we spend 90% of our energy to help the masses to solve the problem of their "private grains", then we can easily solve the problem of the "public grain tax" with the remaining 10% of our energy. If we are like that, we have fallen victims to the Kuomintang style, and are stained by the dirt of bureaucracy. The Kuomintang is the party which knows only how to take from the people, but not to give anything to the people. They need to be cleansed with a basin of hot water. I have the feeling that this bureaucratic style exists in the work of many of us, and that there must be some comrades who do not see as the masses do, and thus isolate themselves from the people. We must firmly overcome this style before we can unite closely with the masses.

Besides, in our army work there exists the war-lord style, which is also a style of the Kuomintang, because the Kuomintang armies are isolated from the masses. But our armies must act according to correct principles in their relations with the people, the Government and the party, and in the relation between the com-

manders and the soldiers, between the military work and the political work and among the various cadres, and should not follow the style of the war-lords. The commanders must love the soldiers, should never disregard the latter's benefits, and must not inflict physical punishments. The troops must love the people, and should never injure their interests. The armies must respect the Government and the party, and should never try to be "independent". Our Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies are the armies of the people, have won and are still winning a good reputation, and are the best armies in the country. However, in recent years there have existed some defects of militarism. Some comrades working in the army are self-assertive, do not listen to reason when dealing with the soldiers, the people, the Government or the Party, know only how to find fault with the local organisations, but not how to criticise themselves, see only the achievements but not the shortcomings, and love to listen to flatteries but not genuine criticisms. The Border Region is one place where such phenomena existed before, but they were overcome after the Conference of the High Cadres and the Conference of the Military Cadres last year, and the "Support the Government", "Love the People" and "Support the Army" movements this year. There are still remnants of defects, but they can be overcome in time. Such defects exist, too, in the bases of Central and North China, and the Party and the Army there should give attention to overcoming them. No matter whether it is local or army work, or whether the defect is bureaucracy or militarism, the characteristic of the defect is the same—*i.e.*, isolation from the masses. The majority of our comrades are good-natured people, and those who make mistakes are always ready to correct them after the mistakes are exposed and criticism developed. But we must develop self-criticism, never conceal our mistakes and really try hard to correct them. If we do not criticise the tendency of bureaucracy in our local work or the tendency of militarism in our army work, it will mean that we are willing to see the Kuomintang style remain. If so, we are not good Communist members. If we do away with the tendency of bureaucracy in our local work and the tendency of militarism in our army work, all our works will be developed smoothly. This is also true of the development of the production movement.

Our productions have made great progress, in farms, Government organisations, schools, armies and factories. The appearance of the Border Region is entirely different now from that of former times. All this is the sign of our comrades' improvement in adopting the masses' point of view and in associating with the masses. We should not feel content ourselves, but must continue

our self-criticism and seek progress, in production as well as in other kinds of works. When we have dirt on our faces, we wash it off every day. In spite of the fact that bureaucracy in our local work and militarism in our army work have been overcome fundamentally, these bad tendencies may grow up any time again, because we are surrounded tightly by Japanese imperialism, by the reactionary forces of China, and by the loose character of the petit-bourgeoisie class, and the dirt of bureaucracy and militarism is constantly blown upon our faces; therefore we must not feel over-satisfied as soon as we see some achievements. We must conquer such ideas, always criticise ourselves, as we daily clean our faces or sweep the ground to get rid of dirt.

Our labour heroes and model workers! You are the leaders of the people. You have achieved great works. I hope you will not feel content yourselves, but go back to Kwan Chung, to Lung Tung, to San Bien, to Sun Teh, or to the various Government organisations, schools, armies and factories to lead the people and the masses to advance one step further in your work. First, organise the masses into co-operatives, organise them in greater numbers and in better ways. Lenin said: "We proletariat do not have other powers, but the power of organisation." Then there is the saying: "We are mighty, because we unite tightly." This saying is correct. We are not afraid of anything, and nobody can harm us if we only know well how to organise the masses and unite closely with them. I hope you will go back to practise and preach his principle, so that in the reception meeting of our labour heroes next year we can see greater achievements than this year's.

## ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION

(I)

### FOREWORD

THE ECONOMIC inheritance in the Shensi-Kansu-Ningshia Border Region and other anti-Japanese bases behind the enemy's lines is extremely meagre. Weighty feudal exploitation, grave imperialistic invasion and natural calamities, one after another, have resulted in the bankruptcy of the rural districts and the decline of the great towns and cities. During the years of the resistance they are further suffering under constant destruction by the enemy. Notwithstanding the fact that no battles are being waged in this district, it is tightly blockaded by Japanese and Kuomintang forces and its difficulties are beyond description.

Despite such difficulties, we have been able to open a road

leading to better living conditions. We have succeeded in cultivating lands in the wild regions, establishing factories and mills on waste land, and have thereby increased industrial and rural output in various districts. These are small successes, but should not be under-estimated if general conditions are taken into consideration. There is no production of unnecessary luxuries, but the most essential daily necessities are being produced; there are no heavy industries, but we are developing labour efficiency with all our might; there are no densely populated cities, but there is also no speculation, no bureaucratic capital, no beggary and no hunger. These facts serve to prove that if we are determined to put forth our best endeavours, if we have a sound economic policy, obstacles arising from the backwardness of the environment will never be able to limit our improvement.

The foundation of our economic policy is to develop all kinds of production. Without the development of rural and industrial production, we have no way of supplying the needs of both the front lines and the rear, of proceeding on the wide road of "self-supply and self-sufficiency", of coping with the blockades, and laying a firm foundation for the forthcoming counter-offensive. With regard to the promotion of labour efficiency, two things are worth consideration—namely, the strict enforcement of thrift and the abolition of luxuries. Consequently all functionaries of the various army units, Government institutions and schools are encouraged to participate in the production campaign, apart from studying and working, and these organisations are thereby enabled to attain self-support or half self-support. Thus the expenditure of the Government and the burdens of the people are much lightened, and the living conditions of those organisations are greatly improved.

For the development of production two principles should be taken into consideration—namely, the democratic and centralised economic policy and the democratic "one-third-ratio" system. What does this mean? It means enforcement of rent reduction and interest on the one hand and guarantee of the payment of rent and interest on the other; raising the wages of the workers and not opposing the legitimate increase in wealth of the capitalists. The standard of living of the peasants and workers should be raised, but meanwhile the full property rights of the landlords and capitalists should likewise be maintained. In the manifesto of the Chinese Communist Party on the occasion of the sixth anniversary of the war of liberation, it was pointed out that "all the farmers of this country should be mobilised to increase production, and at the same time the policy of reducing rent and interest should be resolutely carried out. All the workers of this

country should be mobilised to increase production, and at the same time wages of the workers should be raised. The medium and small industries should be protected from the blows dealt by bureaucratic capital and speculative business."

What is meant by democratic and centralised economic policy? It means that besides the development of public business, private undertakings are also encouraged, that both private and public capital have equal chances to expand. In addition, in the field of financial policy we follow the principle "The rich offer their money and the labourers their strength", so that the people of various classes can offer what they possess to their country. This is called democracy. Nevertheless, democracy is never absolute. Bureaucratic capital should not be allowed to exist, the hoarding of goods should be drastically restricted, and monopoly by rich merchants and landlords should not be allowed. It is also unreasonable to permit the common people to offer both their money and their labour, while the rich offer little, or even seek gains from the poor. That is to say, bureaucratic capital, commercial capital, bank capital, as well as the land capital of the rich landlords, should be controlled. In financial policy centralisation should be practised in order to enforce the principle of "the rich offer more", and in taxation a uniform progressive system should be carried out. These measures are quite different from those which are being enforced by the National (Kuomintang) Government, which, on the contrary, lays emphasis on national capital, reduces the capital of the common people, helps bureaucratic capital and places heavy financial burdens on the population. We have achieved satisfactory success because this timely and reasonable economic policy is being resolutely carried out in our region.

This economic policy should be put into practice whenever any party is going to develop a drive for increasing production. Besides, political leadership is also necessary to guarantee its realisation. Without enforcement of the "one-third-ratio" system, without the mobilisation of the masses, without broad and intense popular organisation, and without close co-operation between the Government and the people, such a production drive with the active participation of the peasants and workers could never be developed.

Here we are going to tell something about our struggle in North China in most difficult conditions, and about our work towards attaining sufficiency in clothing and foodstuffs. This will give an outline of our economic reconstruction. [Achievements of the Shensi-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region Government appear in the Annual Report, page 111.]

## ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION IN CHIN-CHACHI BORDER REGION

By SOONG SHOU-WEN

*(Condensed from his Report in the First Session of the People's Political Council of Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region)*

### (i) Environments, Conditions and Directions

IN ORDER to understand the development of the economic reconstruction in the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region, it is necessary to say something first about the environment and conditions of this district:

(1) Far flung behind the enemy's lines, it is encircled on every side by the enemy and isolated from the great rear and the big cities. It is constantly mopped-up, encroached and savagely looted by the enemy, and therefore anti-mopping-up, anti-encroachment and anti-plunder campaigns become the daily life of the people.

(2) This is a region limited in area but comparatively thickly populated, and with insufficient rainfall. The agricultural products, though not scanty in quantity, are generally ruined by the unfavourable climate. The industry is backward, with only a few factories in the cities. 98% of the population is engaged in farming, and only 1% in industry and business. Household subsidiary handicraft work and peddling are the main forms of industry and business.

(3) In the plains of Central and Eastern Hopei production is relatively developed, but even in the pre-war days it was cruelly exploited by the Japanese imperialists and under the slogan "Industrial Japan, Agricultural China", it became practically vassal. After the outbreak of hostilities the Japanese extended their occupation, and under another slogan, "To ensure the preservation of agricultural products", they colonised the neighbourhood of the cities of this region. In the mountainous regions of the San Yo district, where the people are poor and the land rather centralised, the standard of rural livelihood is low and chaff of rice and leaves of trees are common foods.

(4) This region is composed of districts originally belonging to three different provinces. The districts had no close economic relations before and there was no unified currency. There was therefore little interchange of goods.

The directions of economic reconstruction are thus as follows:

to resist stubbornly the enemy, to overcome natural calamities, to ensure military supplies, to enrich the popular livelihood, to develop agricultural products, handicrafts, small business and co-operatives, to vitalise the local economy, so as to attain self-sufficiency and to pave a way for the economic development of a San Min Chu I New China. Under these directions we have achieved much in the following works.

### (ii) Agriculture

We reaped rich crops in 1937. After the outbreak of hostilities, our reverses in the early period somewhat demoralised the spirit of the people, and our tillage and preservation of fertilisers programme did not succeed. In 1938-39, under the call of the Border Region Government, the Pei Yo district was inspired with a fervent zeal for the reclamation of waste land, and in nine hsiens (including Ping-san and Fuo-ping) alone reclamation amounted to 15,000 mow and opium-planting was prohibited.

In spring 1939 the "regulations for the encouragement of production" were published. In that summer we brought forth the slogan of "restoring the old amount of tilled land and agricultural production" to start the soldiers and the civilians in the production campaign. That autumn the regulations governing the reclamation of waste land and alluviums were published, and in the next spring the alluvium-reconstruction movement was greatly developed. A loan of three million dollars was issued by the Government to cope with rural difficulties. The results of this movement may be seen in the following incomplete figures from the Pei Yo district:

There were 170,427 mow of alluvial land in twenty-one hsiens before the flood. 147,626 mow had been inundated, but 139,495 mow were restored to the original state later.

One-third of the inundated land on the banks of the rivers Tang and Sa were restored; in seven hsiens, including Yi hsiens, 32,801 mow of inundated land were restored; and 344,229 pieces of agricultural implements were replenished in twenty-two hsiens.

In twenty hsiens of the district the loaned seeds amounted to 4,764 piculs.

The replenishment of ploughing animals numbered 6,921 oxen (in fourteen hsiens), 2,902 donkeys (in eight hsiens) and 1,127 mules (in nine hsiens).

This campaign owed its success to the work of the People's Militia. In spring 1940 they helped to rebuild 110,000 mow of alluvial land and to plough 181,278 mow during the spring tillage. They also helped to dig 150 water-channels and 160

wells and to reclaim 100,000 mow of irrigable land. It is not surprising that the people of Pei Yo district said: "The People's Militia have completed a work that we cannot accomplish in thirty years".

In 1939 the enemy broke the dams in 185 places on the banks of the Yellow River in Central Hopei, with the result that large territories were inundated. Since then the central task of agricultural reconstruction has been the restoration of the dams and the relief of the flood. In 1939 twelve emergency repairs were completed and 105 dam-openings repaired; in 1940 fifty-nine emergency repair works were carried out, thirty-three embankments of a total length of 528 li thrown up, 197 openings repaired, and nine water-courses of a total length of 165 li deepened; in 1941, 70 li of the River Hu To embankment and 8 li of the River Chu Long were thrown up; in 1942, 45 li of embankment were thrown up. Under this campaign, undertaken by both soldiers and civilians, not only was the flood in 1939 in Central Hopei overcome, but in 1940 a rich harvest was reaped. In the campaign 70 li of embankment of the River Hu To were built and 165 li of river deepened, an achievement unprecedented in the era of the Republic of China. Without the closest co-operation between the troops and the people, how can this reconstruction be completed under the most difficult conditions behind the enemy's lines?

Ever since 1938 we have taken, and are still taking, great notice of the fact that the increase of agricultural production in the hilly region greatly depends on the construction of irrigation work. Thus in 1939 we propagated the slogan "Change the dry fields into water fields" and in 1941 promoted the "Dig more channels" campaign, in order to achieve universal improvement. Many irrigation experts and technical workers were engaging in investigation work and in the construction of embankments and the discharge of dead water in the swamps. The results of the irrigation work in the Pei Yo district during these several years are as follows:

1939: 123 old water-courses repaired, with 92,264 mow of land irrigated (thirteen hsiens); seventy-four new water-courses opened, with 30,620 mow of land irrigated (eleven hsiens); 245 wells sunk, with 1,842 mow of land irrigated (three hsiens).

1940: 211 old water-courses repaired, with 198,759 mow of land irrigated (thirteen hsiens); 1,210 new water-courses opened, with 19,900 mow of land irrigated (twenty-five hsiens); 1,843 wells sunk, with 17,053 mow of land irrigated (twelve hsiens); 132,886 mow of alluvium restored (eighteen hsiens).

1941: 701 new water-courses built, with 60,700 mow of land

irrigated (eleven hsiens); twenty-three water-courses constructed through Government loans, with 91,780 mow of land irrigated.

1942: Sixty-four old water-courses repaired, with 13,123 mow of land irrigated (nine hsiens); 265 new water-courses opened, with 20,844 mow of land irrigated (fifteen hsiens); 1,026 wells sunk, with 3,183 mow of land irrigated (twelve hsiens); 13,733 mow of alluvial land ploughed (eleven hsiens); dykes were repaired in 100 places, safeguarding 13,462 mow of land (six hsiens).

From 1939 to 1942, according to the statistics of the Pei Yo district, 2,272 water-courses were repaired, with 4,181,364 mow of land irrigated; 160,349 mow of alluvial land were ploughed (twenty-two hsiens); 3,114 wells were sunk with 222,128 mow of land irrigated (seventeen hsiens); 175 embankments were thrown up, protecting 40,911 mow (five hsiens). The success of the engineering work in Pei Yo district was splendid, because all the embankments and wells, where possible, have either been built or sunk during the war. In days to come stress should be laid on construction of small canals, because they are easy to make and hard to destroy. The alluviums have been universally restored to their original state. The work of protecting the alluviums is important, and should be the goal of our present endeavour.

The reason why agricultural production in this region can achieve such success under war conditions is because all work is jointly undertaken by the Government, Party Troops and People. Our crops come not only from the sweat of the anti-Japanese soldiers and civilians, but from their blood, because the autumn harvests of these years were completed amidst anti-mopping-up campaigns. In the spring tillage of 1942 we sowed near the so-called "no man's land" and the blockade ditches, with tools in our hands and weapons by our sides.

The People's Militia helped to cultivate and reap 49,205 mow of land in the autumn of 1941, and in 1942 helped to plough 51,189 mow and to reap 73,135 mow, plus 3,851 labour days' work. In addition, they spent 113,724 labour days carrying manure and reclaiming lands.

Our work in forestry and stock-raising has sustained great losses during these five years as a result of the enemy's repeated destruction. In spring 1939 the Government called the people to complete "a hen per head, a pig per family" campaign, to which there was enthusiastic response. But in the anti-mopping-up campaign of that autumn the majority of the animals were seized by the enemy, and despite the later efforts of the people little was achieved. In 1942 there was a slight increase in the number of sheep and hogs, but it has still not reached the level of pre-war days.

As for agricultural experiments, the Forestry and Stockbreeding



Bureau has done much during these three years to improve species of corn and storage methods.

### (iii) Industry

"To develop rural handicraft industries, to promote household subsidiary works, to encourage the running of handicraft industries on a larger scale and to develop the national defence industry are tasks outlined in the resolution of the meeting of representatives chosen from the troops, the Government and the people of this region. Thus the centre of industrial development is the handicraft and household subsidiary works, only a part of the military industry being run on factory scale. The development of those industries producing daily necessities like cotton, linen, oil, salt, etc., has been given great attention by the Government since its inauguration. But, in a place which was often attacked by the enemy, and where the production tools, such as looms and grinding machines, were repeatedly destroyed by the enemy, the people were afraid of engaging in those industries. However, after continuous encouragement and help by the Government, some successes have been achieved.

Along the line of the Peiping-Hankow Railway in Central Hopei, household spinning and weaving industries were very prosperous before the war. In 1937, as a result of the war, a great part of this industry ceased to run, but after the Government was inaugurated in 1938, and the social order was restored, the Government called for the revival of the industry, and it gradually came to life again. In 1939 the Government called for the substitution of imported threads by hand-spun threads. In 1940 an improvised forty-four-thread spinning machine was put into use, but could not be developed satisfactorily. In 1941 the old-fashioned spinning machines in Central Hopei were redesigned to improve efficiency and the production was increased. They were also introduced to other parts of the Region.

As for woollen goods, the Government had carried on some experiments since 1941, and woollen carpets, yarns and shirts were made in that year. Now there are two woollen mills in Hsing-tang, three in Ling-shou, three in Ping-shan and two in Fan-shih, the products of which include woollen yarns, waistcoats, shirts, carpets, etc.

With a view to solving the difficulties of paper supply, the Government had not only encouraged the former paper-mills to reopen since 1939, but also encouraged the merchants to engage in paper-manufacturing business. In 1941 methods of making paper from rice straws, wheat stems and a kind of white grass were invented, one after the other, and are now being utilised

in the ten paper-mills of the Pei Yo district, which produce an abundant amount of paper every month. After the slogan of "self-sufficiency in paper" was raised in Central Hopei district, the people managed twenty-nine paper-producing units through co-operatives, and the number increased to forty-three in 1942, with a total production of 2,800,000 sheets per month. Many problems were thus solved.

After the outbreak of the Pacific War kerosene was extremely scarce and the native oil enterprises gradually thrived. At present there are twelve public oil workshops and 183 private ones in Pei Yo district, and forty-four in Central Hopei district. In addition, there are many water-mills built in the various hsiens of Pei Yo district. To make straw-hat braids has become a common household subsidiary business in the district of West Hopei. Since the Government encouraged decocting nitric salts in Central Hopei in 1940, the product has been greatly increased, and is now sufficient for the supply of the district.

After the outbreak of hostilities the handicraft works and household subsidiary works gradually declined. To encourage their development, the Government decreed in 1942 that all products from household subsidiaries were exempted from taxes, and the taxes levied on handicraft products were much reduced, which fact played a very important role in the development of those productions. Under constant destruction of the Japanese a great part of the people in the guerrilla regions removed their looms to the safety centres, where they received assistance from the Government in the form of loans. Even the grinding-mills, paper-mills and oil workshops in the safe regions have always to be prepared for the attack of the enemy. It is noteworthy that all these handicraft mills and workshops have been flourishing under constant gunfire.

With the exception of a few experimental ones, all the public factories in the region are military factories, and are controlled and managed by military authorities. The industrial experiments are by the Industry and Mineralogy Administrative Bureau, and have reaped rich fruits during the last two years. The achievements may be enumerated as follows—to manufacture light oil from plant oils, to work up leather from plant acids, to make paper from new kinds of grasses, to dye leathers and furs, to spin woollen yarns and weave woollen goods, to make alcohol from dates, to make glass, printing ink, electric cells, porcelain, tools, etc., from native materials. But because of inability to produce on a large scale in war conditions they play no significant role in industry as a whole.

#### (iv) Co-operatives

The economy of this region is mainly an economy of petty farmers. Production and consumption are small in scale, and the purchasing power of the majority is very low. It is not economical for the peasants to bring their small quantities of foodstuffs to the remote regions to sell, nor for the consumers to buy commodities from the far-off markets. This condition is especially true in war-time, when such daily necessities as cloth, oil and salt are often in great demand and short supply, while rural products cannot be sold at favourable prices. For the purpose of improving the living conditions of the people, struggling against the enemy in the economic field, suppressing the speculation of treacherous merchants and regulating local economy, the organisation of co-operatives proves most effective. A co-operative can be organised in a village if each person contributes one or two dollars, and when these villages are linked together, an organisational force is formed.

After its inauguration in 1938 the Government encouraged the establishment of co-operatives, and everybody, whether old or young, rich or poor, was urged to join by buying shares of fifty cents each. The old-fashioned co-operatives in Central and West Hopei were reorganised, and many new ones established in Ping-shan, Hsing-tang, Ling-shou, Ching-shin, Fuo-ping in 1938. A great number of women joined the co-operatives by buying shares with the money they earned from making military shoes. In spring 1939 the Government promulgated temporary regulations regarding the organisation of co-operatives, calling all the popular organisations to arouse the masses to establish consumption, transport, productive and credit co-operatives. In 1940 a loan of three million dollars was issued by the Government for the co-operatives, and 300 cadres were trained for co-operative work. Between 1940 and 1941 co-operatives in Pei Yo and Central Hopei districts developed on an unprecedented scale.

The co-operatives in Central Hopei had become great mass organisations before May 1942, with nearly half the population of the region participating in the movement. In the grave flood of 1939 the co-operatives played the role of regulating the people's foodstuffs by selling 100,000 piculs of grains at prices one-fifth below those of the market. Thus 250,000 people were relieved. From 1941 on, they achieved victorious economic struggles against the enemy by preventing all essential materials (such as grains, cotton, etc.) from falling into his hands; thus the phenomenon of being squeezed by the enemy through unfair

exchange was prevented. By regulating the prices of pigs, eggs, mats, pears, etc., they benefited the masses and overcame the monopoly of treacherous merchants. For example, in the collection of progressive taxes in 1941, a shortage of banknotes occurred in a certain hsein and the grain prices dropped. This opportunity was used by unscrupulous merchants, but the co-operatives bought in large quantities of grain and supplied the market with banknotes. Other co-operatives gave cotton to their shareholders to be spun and woven and paid them suitable wages. Through such measures the people could avoid buying at high prices and selling at low ones, and speculation was checked.

The co-operatives in the Pei Yo district did develop to a considerable degree in 1941, but had not become a mass movement, and were utilised for speculation by some people. Being disunited with the broad masses, they were opposed by the shareholders. After a thorough readjustment in 1942 the number of co-operatives was reduced to one half, but their quality was improved. The banks in the Border Region raised a relief fund of 1,600,000 dollars to help the co-operatives to increase their business, and it is expected that greater success can be achieved this year.

#### (v) Grain-Price Control

In the neighbourhood of West Hopei a famine usually occurred between spring and summer every year. After the big flood of 1939 the conditions in 1940 were graver than ever. It was only through the joint efforts of the Party, the Government and the military authorities that the difficulty was eventually overcome. However, the spring famine of the next year could be foreseen. Having perceived the seriousness of the situation, the Government called the people in 1941 to establish a Grain-price Control Bureau to be jointly managed by the Government and the people. The Government, having its financial difficulties by that time, ordered the banks to issue some promissory notes as a part of the inauguration fund of the Bureau. In the three months from January to March 1941 the promissory notes issued amounted to 3,435,350 dollars and the shares contributed by the people to 2,478,390 dollars, a total capital of 5,913,740 dollars. With this sum the Bureau bought in 60,101 piculs of grain. This was a magnificent result. This control bought in over 30,000 piculs of grain next year, with 5,170,000 dollars from the original capital, which inflicted a timely blow to the enemy's intrigue of plundering grains. When prices of grain rose around May 1942, they were stabilised by the Bureau.

### (vi) Banknotes and Currency

This region is composed of districts originally belonging to three different provinces, each of which had its own local notes, the circulation of which was pretty large. On the contrary, in the two provinces of Shansi and Chahar the legal tender in circulation was never so large. Since the formation of this region the people have been unified into a single economic unit, which fact has necessitated the use of a common note. The amount of legal tender in circulation was small, and failed to meet the requirements of the three provinces, especially in the case of Shansi and Hopei, where inter-provincial trading was common but the exchange of the two kinds of banknotes was prohibited. Moreover, after the occupation of Peiping, Tientsin, Paoting, Shihchachuan and Taiyuan, the enemy controlled the Shansi and Hopei Provincial Banks, and issued large quantities of bogus notes, which naturally filtered into our region. For the purpose of accelerating the economic activities of this region and carrying out economic reconstruction step by step, the Representative Assembly of the local army, Government and people decided that a bank should be organised and local notes issued.

On March 20, 1938, the Border Region Bank was formally inaugurated, and, with the legal tender as foundation fund, it issued its local notes. Ten days before that the puppet United-Reserve Bank was established and issued its puppet notes. The people saw a distinct difference between these two kinds of notes, because the former were anti-Japanese, and the latter Japanese. They welcomed the former and boycotted the latter. Seeing the failure of his intrigues, the enemy printed a large amount of subsidiary notes of the Hopei Provincial Bank and the Peiping Municipality Currency Bureau to rob us of materials, and tried to flood our region with Peiping and Tientsin notes. But we had sufficient reserve money to meet every attack of this kind. After the anti-mopping-up victory in the autumn of 1938 the people's confidence in the local notes was much strengthened. Since May 1938 the Government has step by step unified the currency of this region, discredited puppet notes, and resisted the exploitation of the enemy. Here are some of the works in this field:

- (1) In May 1938 the circulation of the five-dollar notes of Hopei Provincial Bank was prohibited.
- (2) In January 1939 the circulation of the notes of Pao Shang Bank in this region was prohibited (they were also prohibited in the occupied areas at that time).
- (3) In May 1939 the use of the miscellaneous notes of Peiping and Tientsin was declared illegal.

(4) In May 1939 the Hopei Provincial Bank notes were gradually depreciated so that the people might not suffer sudden losses. By the end of August their circulation was entirely prohibited.

(5) In the period from the end of 1939 to the beginning of 1940, when a considerable sum in the local subsidiary notes had been issued, the people were ordered to return their former local notes to exchange for the new ones, so that the old notes might gradually disappear from the market.

(6) In 1940 the value of the Shansi notes greatly decreased and the people in North-east Shansi refused to accept them. As a result the Shansi notes flowed gradually out of our region.

(7) In February 1940, to prevent the enemy from absorbing legal tender for foreign exchange uses, the Government proclaimed that the Fapi (Japanese occupation currency) should be returned and exchanged for the local notes, and later stopped its circulation in the market. By the summer of 1940 the currency of our region was entirely unified and stabilised, which fact was applauded by the people. Since the enemy failed to plunder our materials by the use of miscellaneous notes, and the puppet notes were under our constant attack, they used other circulating media, puppet bills and certificates to be sent into our market to purchase our goods and materials. In the autumn of the same year, however, those bills and certificates were completely eliminated from our market. From the end of 1940 to the beginning of 1941 the enemy shipped large quantities of consumable goods into our region to exchange for necessities, against which we readjusted the import and export regulations and tightened up the taxation system. The enemy once again failed in their trick. Immediately after the anti-mopping-up campaign in the autumn of 1941 the Pacific War broke out, and the enemy changed the former dumping policy into the blockade policy and plundered material resources more cruelly and thoroughly than ever. Our territory, though somewhat diminished in area as a result of the enemy's encroachment campaign, still stood firmly as an anti-Japanese base, as did our currency front and financial position.

The bank of our region belongs to the people and serves the people. By developing the policy of giving loans, receiving deposits, remittances, etc., the bank has played an important role in the acceleration of economic activities of the region and in the bettering of the people's living conditions. Since 1939 the bank has lent more than 18,000,000 dollars for the relief of flood, the extension of co-operatives, the development of industry and commerce, the solution of problems during spring tillage, and the furtherance of transportation and sales. Because of the extensiveness and the extremely low interest of its loans, the bank

materially helped to solve many problems of the people—a fact unparalleled in the history of this part of China.

The above are the results achieved in the field of economic reconstruction during the past five years. From them we can see that we have reaped some successes in the work of guaranteeing the supply of military and civilian necessities and promoting the economic activities of the three provinces. The present grave tasks are to further the economic struggles against the enemy, to mobilise the people to participate in the fight against cruel lootings, to accelerate transportation and sales and to make thoroughly effective the prohibition of exports or smuggling of grain out of our region.

## ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION IN THE TAI-HANG REGION

By TENG HSIAO PING

*(Political Commissioner of the 129th Division of the Eighth Route Army)*

THE MILITARY and political offensive of the enemy is always accompanied by an economic offensive. His exploitation of manpower and economic resources in the occupied territory is so intense that the economic burden of the people is usually two or three times heavier than they can bear. It is a common phenomenon that the people in the occupied territory have to sell their furniture, etc., to meet their obligations. Poor harvests and famines, natural results of the conscription of a great number of able-bodied men, have been utilised by the enemy as pretexts to incite the people in the occupied territories to steal foodstuffs from the anti-Japanese bases, and so create antagonism between the people in the bases and the people in the occupied territories. Thus the anti-Japanese base is on the one hand being blockaded and on the other being ransacked. In every mopping-up campaign the enemy has savagely massacred the people, arrested the able-bodied men, set fire to houses, damaged agricultural implements, stolen animals, and destroyed even the immature crops in the fields. Their aim is to destroy the vital power of the people, necessary for maintaining the war of resistance.

The economic front in the enemy's rear has two tasks: first, to carry on the economic struggle against the enemy, and secondly, to carry on economic reconstruction in the bases. They are two inseparable tasks. At the beginning of the war we brought forth

the slogan "self-supply, self-sufficiency, and self-resuscitation", and towards such an aim we reconstructed our economy. We have been "reconstructing amidst the enemy's destruction" all these years, and now have found the right path that will not only guarantee the economic requirements for the war of resistance, protect the benefits of the people, nullify the enemy's plan of exploitation, but also lay the foundation for the future counter-offensive and post-war reconstruction of China.

First, we firmly believe that "to develop production" is the basis of our economic reconstruction, the basis for breaking up the enemy's blockade and establishing the self-supplying and self-sufficient economy, and that to develop agricultural production and handicraft industries is the centre of our plan of developing production. Experience has taught us that whoever has sufficiency in foodstuffs will have everything. If we have the foodstuffs, we can continue fighting against the enemy and obtain all the necessities, through the means of exchange. It is only through the development of agricultural production that the raw materials for the handicraft industries can be guaranteed and the basis for the development of the industries be won, while the development of the industries serves in turn as a propelling force for the development of agriculture and as a means of resisting the dumping of enemy goods.

The development of production is not an empty slogan. It requires a correct policy and some strict organisational work. Our policy of reducing rents and interest and meanwhile making the payment of rents and interest an obligation has opened a wide path for the development of production. Wherever this policy is executed, the people show great enthusiasm in production as well as in resistance to the enemy. In order to elevate the economy of the anti-Japanese base from the state of self-sufficiency to that of plenty of clothing and food, the Government has passed many Acts, decreeing that the stored foodstuffs and savings of the people, half the wages of employed workers, and flocks of sheep shall be exempted from taxation; that the people shall be taxed according to the average production of recent years, and any amount exceeding that average production shall entirely belong to the producer. This encourages the labour heroes and participants in all kinds of production contests. In a word, the principle of the economic policy in the base is to restrict to a certain degree the savage exploitation of the past, and to adopt a policy that will stimulate capitalistic production which at present is beneficial to the development of national economy. This is the road that Dr. Sun pointed out to us. Our policy of encouraging the development of industries and commerce has greatly stimulated the

growth of agriculture and handicraft industries. Handicraft industries, especially household spinning and weaving, have developed rapidly, because they carry the smallest taxation.

In organising and leading production the anti-Japanese Government and the mass organisations of the Region have done much in arousing the people's enthusiasm for production, opposing the idlers, organising mutual assistance, improving seeds, solving problems for the people, especially in connection with ploughing animals and agricultural implements, mobilising the children to gather manure, calling the women to participate in production, regulating the relations between tenants and landlords and between employers and employees, and in other miscellaneous works, such as planting trees, repairing ditches, sinking wells, etc. The Government has also given millions of dollars in loans to the people at low interest or without interest. The slogan "increase the production, better the livelihood and prepare for the counter-offensive" is heard everywhere in the Tai-hang Region. Our troops here, besides producing to pay a part of their expenditure, help the people to work in the fields. This is why the relations of the Eighth Route Army with the people are so harmonious.

The development of handicraft industries is of course still inadequate, but what we can produce now has greatly reduced the amount of imported goods from the occupied territories. We have produced enough soap and cigarettes for our own use (there is even a surplus of these for export) and a greater part of the cloths, towels, and woven cotton goods. We also have a surplus of woollen goods to be sold to the occupied territories. What we want at present are salt and matches, but the latter problem can be solved by use of a substitute.

Last winter and this spring drought prevailed in one-fifth of the area of the base, and in addition a great number of refugees was coming in from occupied territories. We organised a great Calamity Salvation and Spring Cultivation Movement, to cope with the situation. The method we adopted was to promote production besides encouraging mutual aid among the people. The Government set apart an enormous sum for loans to the people. Some were weaving loans. In Wu An hsien 20,000 women have been mobilised to participate in the spinning movement, and each of them can earn enough to feed 1.5 to 2 persons. Others were irrigation loans, which amounted to no less than \$4,000,000 to \$5,000,000. The workers employed for such work, all refugees, can earn three catties of millet each per day—an amount sufficient to feed one or two members of a family. The Government also imported foodstuffs from the occupied terri-

tries and sold them to the refugees at a price one-third or one-half lower than the current market price. Co-operatives have been universally established. The troops and the Government cadres have become the main force of production in the famine area. The High Commissioner, the magistrates, the commanders, the political commissioners all personally led their cadres and fighters to help the refugees to cultivate their land.

Our principle in taxation is "to let the rich pay more and the poor pay less". We make our budget according to our revenue and tax the people according to the needs of the war of resistance. The most important point is that our taxation system must be in accord with the necessity of encouraging production. To lighten the burden of the people, the Government, besides starting a movement to encourage thrift, oppose extravagance and punish avarice (death penalty to those who embezzle \$500 and over), carried on the policy of "efficiency in the army and simplicity in the Government", with the result that the "public ration" collected from the people in the fiscal year 1943 was 16-17% less than that collected in 1942. An old defect in the financial policy was that in the past village administrations were allowed to raise funds for local purposes from the people, but this defect has been corrected, since it was decided that only the hsien Government has the right to levy funds from the people. The system of progressive taxation which has been passed in the provisional People's Political Council of the Border Region will be put into force in the Tai Hang Region this year.

The principle of our trading and customs policy is "management for foreign trade but freedom for domestic trade". Our aim is to realise an even balance in import and export. To facilitate the struggle against the enemy, we have put the two administrations of trade and customs under the unified control of the Industry and Commerce Administration Bureau, and have imposed a protective tariff to safeguard the economy of the base. We prohibit the importation of luxuries, restrict the importation of non-essentials and encourage the importation of necessities. At the same time we plan the exportation of such non-essentials produced in the base as herbal drugs, straw hats, etc., to exchange for needed materials. To realise this purpose, we organise the masses for reconnaissance work to stop smuggling, giving high rewards to those who seize smuggled goods, and severely punish those who practise trickery. It is very important to organise the merchants to join in the economic struggle against the enemy, so we should not actually "control" the foreign trade, but only "manage" it. It is particularly inadvisable to monopolise the domestic market. To counteract the speculation activity of the

merchants, we use the power of the Government stores and co-operatives. The prices in the Tai-hang Region have been lower than those in other places for a long period.

The principle of our currency policy is to "give blows to the puppet banknotes and protect the national legal tender". Against the enemy's policy of issuing a large quantity of puppet banknotes to absorb the national legal tender and steal materials from the people the anti-Japanese Government issued its own local banknotes. This crushed the enemy's intrigue, minimised the market in puppet notes, strengthened the economic front against the enemy, and protected the economic reconstruction of the base. To safeguard the credit of the local currency, the quantity issued is strictly limited, and an enormous sum is loaned to the people for production purposes. Now the credit of our local currency is quite stabilised, although we still should not under-estimate the power of the puppet banknotes. One lesson we must learn regarding this is that the issue of the local notes in this region came too late.

In the occupied territories and guerrilla districts our principle is "to reduce the burden of the people and to protect their interests". If the enemy tries to steal the foodstuffs from the people, we help them to organise struggles in one form or another to defeat the enemy's plan; if the enemy tries to conscript the able-bodied men, we help them to escape and to disperse those conscripts who have been mustered by the enemy. Struggles of such character have never ceased for a moment.

From the above we have derived the following experiences. First, every achievement in the rear of the enemy comes only from bitter struggles, and even the smallest achievement in economic reconstruction is paid for by the people's blood; secondly, without a correct policy we cannot talk about economic reconstruction, and the establishment of such a policy must be based on the benefit of the people and the requirements of the war; thirdly, no economic reconstruction will succeed without the voluntary participation of the broad masses of people; and finally we must assign a great number of cadres to the economic front and help them to accumulate experience before economic reconstruction can be guaranteed.

Comrade Mao Tse-tung has told us that war, production and education are the three main tasks in the fight behind the enemy's lines. It is the victory of the resistance for which we are fighting. Production is the safeguard of victory, while education is serving production. To closely unite the three will mean the creation of an unconquerable force.

## ECONOMIC RECONSTRUCTION IN NORTH-WEST SHANSI

BY CHANG CHAO

THE NORTH-WEST Shansi Region suffered severe destruction in the four battles fought between 1937 and 1940, during which period the agriculture and handicraft industries of the region were on the decline. For example, in agriculture there was a decrease of 33% in man-power, 60% in cattle, 80-90% in donkeys and mules, 60% in sheep, 80% in hogs, 60% in cultivated land, 33% in the production of the hilly land, and 97% in cotton production. In industries the 2,000 odd native looms and the 200 odd improved looms in Lin hsien on one occasion had stopped working entirely, with the result that the value of foreign cloths imported to the region provided 60% of its total imports. It was difficult to maintain protracted warfare in such conditions.

Against this adversity the Government of the region brought forth the tasks of production and reconstruction, with agricultural development as the central task. Many measures for encouraging production were carried out. Through these the Government has been successful in raising the enthusiasm of the people, developing agricultural and industrial production, and improving the people's living conditions.

(1) The Government carried on the policy of reducing rent and interest and at the same time enforcing the payment of rent and interest. By this policy enthusiasm in production was raised not only among the middle and the poor peasants, but also among the rich peasants and the landlords. For example, in Hsing hsien a group of nine landlords cultivated 342 hsiangs of land (one hsiang equal to three mow) in 1940, but in 1941 it was increased to 779 hsiangs; and many rich peasants and landlords who had left the region because of misapprehension of the Communists' policy returned home. There were even cases in which the landlords financed the digging of wells by tenants, or the landlords personally cultivated their own land.

(2) The Government has from time to time improved the grain-tax system, which is collected on a progressive-rate basis, and laid down rules to encourage production. It has been decided that the financial burden of the region should be borne by more than 80% of the population, and that the heaviest burden borne by each family should not exceed 30% of its production. Because the grain tax is collected only once a year, fairly and reasonably, and the amount to be taxed is fixed, the people are enthusiastic in reclaiming waste land and increasing their production, which guarantees the improvement of their standard of living.

(3) There are rules for encouraging the reclamation of waste land and the promotion of irrigation, cotton-planting and stock-raising, and rules for encouraging labour heroes and technical inventions of various kinds. Large-scaled "production exhibitions" and "labour heroes meetings" have been held. Labour is now something respectable in the eyes of the people of the region.

(4) The amount and efficiency of labour power have been increased by various means. The system of "service for the resistance", by which the people are required to work for a few days a year for the Government, has been constantly improved, and the people are now exempted from this kind of service during the busy farming season. There are fixed rules for the conscription of service men, so the people can concentrate on production. Since the policy of "efficiency in the Army and simplicity in the Government" was inaugurated, many able-bodied men have been removed from the Army to the fields, with the result that there has been a great increase of labour power in the villages. Old men, women, children and even the idlers have been mobilised to participate in production by the mass organisations, and all the workers in the Party, the Government and the Army do their best to help the people to produce. Magistrate Wang of the Ning-wu hsien even helped the people to manure their land personally. It has been decided this year that every man in Government organisations and the troops and every animal owned by them should help the people to cultivate their land for three to five days. The Government employees and the troops are also required to organise themselves into ploughing teams to plough fields for the families of the anti-Japanese soldiers, and into mutual assistance corps to increase their labour efficiency. In districts where there is fighting, a new form of mutual assistance is organised in which the people's militia help the people by giving them armed protection, while the people in turn help the militia in production.

(5) The Government has solved the difficulties of the people during spring cultivation by giving them loans—up to \$15,000,000 and 3,000 odd piculs of grain in 1943. During the planting season the Peasants National Salvation Societies mobilised the masses to give financial aid to the families of the soldiers and to the poor peasants. "Mule Fairs" have been held in various districts to encourage stock-raising and to regulate the supply of animal power. Government attention has also been given to the improvement and manufacture of agricultural implements and to the purchase and distribution of seeds.

(6) The Government has strengthened its leadership in

agricultural production. Spring Cultivation Committees, composed chiefly of members of the mass organisations, were formed to mobilise the people in spring cultivation and to organise assistance to them.

The following is the condition of agricultural and industrial developments of the region, based on incomplete statistics.

### (i) Agriculture

(1) The area of cultivated land has been enlarged. In 1941 the area of reclaimed waste land in twenty-five hsien was 305,000 mow; in 1942 that in thirteen hsien was 200,000 mow; and in 1943 one small village in Hsing hsien alone reclaimed 150 hsiangs of waste land (the same village reclaimed only fifty-four hsiangs in 1942). This shows that the people's enthusiasm for production has been increased.

(2) Irrigation has been developed. Statistics show that 13,000 more mow of fields were irrigated in twelve hsien in 1941, and 16,000 more mow were irrigated in eight hsien in 1942, while the total area of irrigated fields in fourteen hsien in the same year was 72,000 mow—an area greater than that of pre-war days. More small canals and ditches have been opened and more wells dug in 1943.

(3) Cotton-plantation developed quickly. The area of cotton-fields was 32,000 mow in 1941, 56,000 mow in 1942, and 71,000 mow in 1943. New cotton-fields were opened in regions where cotton had never before been planted.

(4) The number of animals has been greatly increased. There was an increase of 3,600 heads of cattle in nine hsien in 1941; and an increase of 7,000 heads in fifteen hsien in 1942; and in 1943 the Government issued \$3,900,000 loans to the peasants to buy oxen. The number of sheep has been doubled in the past three years, and the number of hogs and chickens increased three or four times in the same period.

Besides the production of the people, there is the production of the Government organisations and the troops. Owing to the economic backwardness of the region, and for the sake of lightening the burden of the people, the Government employees and the troops are trying hard to realise self-supply and self-sufficiency. They engage in agricultural production, vegetable-planting and hog-raising. For example, the fighters of a certain brigade, besides engaging in cloth-weaving, paper-manufacturing, oil-pressing and flour-grinding, reclaimed 2,200 mow of waste land in 1943, raised some hogs (one for every eight persons) and sheep (twenty for every mass unit), and produced enough vegetables

for their own consumption. The amount of production by the Government organs and the troops in the whole region must be very large. The 120th Division alone produced more than \$20,000,000 in 1942.

### (ii) Industries

(1) The Government is trying to promote the spinning and weaving industries. Private enterprises are encouraged and their capital exempted from tax. So are the products of household spinning and weaving. In 1941 the number of looms running in a certain district was 900, but it increased to 3,800 in 1942—an increase of 300%. The weaving industry is developed not only in the districts where there was already such an industry, but also in new districts. In the hsiens of Ko Lan, Ho Chu and Ching Lo, where wool is produced, a great quantity of woollen clothes, socks and gloves were woven in substitution for cotton goods. At present the products of the private enterprises and the Government factories are quite sufficient for local consumption.

(2) The amount of paper production in the region was equal to 90% of the pre-war level in 1941, but surpassed the pre-war level in 1942. The quality of the product has also been improved. We can now produce paper for newspapers, banknotes, cards, book covers, etc. Other industries, like mining, oil-pressing and flour-grinding, have developed.

(3) The Government enterprises occupy an important place in the industries of the region. Since 1940 factories of various kinds have been established by the Government, such as machine shops, iron, chemical and printing works, match, tobacco, tools, medical, shoe, clothing and printing-ink factories, etc. Their products are chiefly for the use of the Government organisations and the troops. The most successful products are printing inks, red and blue dyes, certain medical supplies, iron looms, spinning-wheels and some printing accessories.

### (iii) Lines of Communication

The increase of Border District highways during the past few years has been very impressive. Under the auspices of the Government we have built a system of highways which connect up the important centres of this region. The four main highways—Fuhsien-Michih, Tingbien-Yenan, Tingbien-Kingyang and Tsingkien-Chingbien—have been completed, thus making an aggregate total length of 2,400 li or 1,200 kilometres of highways serviceable for trucks and motors.

During 1942-43 we mobilised 45,400 labourers, and a sum of \$800,000 was spent on construction work, not including ex-

penditure on wages, meals and lodging. Along the Fuhsien-Michih highway all the slopes and bridges were renovated; a section of the Tingbien-Yenan highway—from Sunke'ai to the Chitan (formerly Pao'an)—will be renovated and completed; Tingbien-Kingyang and Tsingkien-Chingbien highways are also under repair. Details may be summarised as follows:

*Fuhsien-Michih Highway.* Extending from Giaotou town, Fuhsien, via Kanchuan, Yenan, Yunping (Yechuan), Tsingkien and Suiteh, to Michih, a distance of 770 li (385 kilometres), this highway is part of the earth road linking up Sian and Yuling. This highway is accessible to motor traffic. It was opened to traffic in 1937. In the previous year a part of the section from Fuhsien to Kanchuan was improved from a 20 to a 9 degree slope. Five great bridges were constructed in Yenan; whereas in Yechuan a change of route was made in order to shorten the distance. Yunting bridge in Suiteh, which was destroyed in the summer of 1942 by flood, was repaired by winter and reopened to traffic. For the purpose of constructing this trunk line, linking up the north-west border provinces with the rear, 12,800 labourers were mobilised, including 5,200 for improving the Yunting bridge, at a cost of about \$300,000 (two-thirds of the sum was spent on repairing Yungting bridge). The completion of this work provides facilities for shipping such necessities as foodstuffs, coal, etc., as well as other commodities, in and out of the Border District.

*Ting-bien-Yenan Highway.* Extending from Tingbien, via Wuchih-sien and Chidan (Pao'an), to Yenan, a distance of some 650 li (325 kilometres), this highway stretches to the north-west of Yenan. Construction was started in 1940. The Tingbien-Sungke'ai and Chidan-Yenan sections were completed in 1941; the remaining Sunke'ai-Chidang section of 340 li (170 kilometres) was started in 1942, and the surfacing work and part of the rock excavation have been completed. Alteration of the route at a point west of Sihokow on the Chidan-Yenan section has also been completed, and was open to traffic in 1943. For the construction of this highway over 83,300 men were mobilised according to statistics, and over \$400,000 was allotted to it by the Government. The completion of this line is of importance for developing the economy of the Border District because Yenchih and Tingbien are the main salt-producing region. The opening of this line presages a bright future for the export of this product, as the former obstacles due to mountainous terrain have all been overcome.

*Tingbien-Kingyang Highway.* Extending from Tingbien, via Yenchih, Huanhsien and Chotse, to Kingyang, a distance of 660 li (330 kilometres), this highway borders the western boundary



of this district. The repairing of the Yenchi-Huanhsien section, an earth road, which was started in 1940, was completed in 1942, 2,800 labourers being mobilised and the cost being \$14,000.

*Tsingkien-Chingbien Highway.* This road extends from Tsingkien, via Wajoubao in Tsechang, to Changchiapan and Chingbien, a distance of 320 li (165 kilometres). The work was commenced in April 1941 and was completed in 1942, the labourers mobilised being 36,000 and the cost over \$7,000. The completion of these last two trunk lines is of vital importance for the exchange of foodstuffs, raw materials and salt.

As a result of our endeavours during the past few years the rapid strides made by the Government in road construction have transformed the original features of this Border District—formerly an uninhabited, rugged land: It is now a lively and thriving world.

## THE UNIFORM PROGRESSIVE TAX SYSTEM IN THE SHANSI-CHAHAR-HOPEI BORDER REGION

### I

THE UNIFORM progressive tax system is rational. It unifies the various categories of taxes formerly in use. It likewise puts an end to expensive and defective administration, as well as all the indirect commodity taxes which burden consumers of goods. The system which is being put into force in the Border Region is one which is levied directly according to amount of property and revenue, and is therefore called a direct-tax system. It is levied on the owners of property and the earners of income; furthermore, its rate is increased according to the amount of property and income, and it is therefore a progressive tax system. It is a revolution in taxation history that is in complete accordance with the principle: "Those who have little pay little."

A uniform progressive tax system has been the aim of the Chinese Communist Party since May 1922. Further, in the Sixth National Representative Congress of the Party a "Platform for the Present Stage of the Chinese Revolution" was passed in which it was likewise ordained that "All taxes charged by various former Governments, militarists and localities should be abrogated and a uniform progressive tax system should be enforced instead." Since the outbreak of hostilities, on the occasion of the Sixth Enlarged Plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party it was clearly pointed out by Comrade Mao Tse-tung in *The New Stage* that "a progressive tax system upon incomes based upon the ability to pay must be the new method

of collection, and the old corrupt ways of taxing the people must be abolished in order that revenue may be collected without placing the entire burden upon the shoulders of the poor".

Doubtless, when such a system of taxation is in force throughout the whole country, Chinese finances can be put on a new basis which is at the same time healthy and lasting, regular and rational, and the final outcome of our resistance and the establishment of a new China will be accelerated and assured.

### II

The Chin-Chia-Chi (Shansi-Chahar-Hopei) Border Region has accomplished a great work, the inauguration of the uniform progressive tax system, a thing that is worthy of the congratulations and appreciation of all anti-Japanese people throughout the country.

In the Programme of Administration of the Chin-Chia-Chi Border Region, published during August 1940, it was outlined that such a system must be put into force. Since then mobilisation work has been initiated. With a view to gaining the good opinion of the people, before the "Regulations Governing the Practice of the Progressive Tax System in the Chin-Chia-Chi Border Region" was published in March 1941 the Government took the necessary measures to make it as fruitful as possible. Out of these regulations four points can be summarised, as follows:

(1) According to the regulations, *revenues of the Border Region should be collected from owners of property and earners of income.* As to what should be taxed, there are two categories, including the property tax and the income tax. In agriculture taxes are collected on property and income estimated as a whole; in the industrial and commercial fields and on other property and income they are estimated by property and income separately. In addition, it is still further ordained whether a thing should be taxed or not.

As living and economic conditions are different in different districts, the tax-free starting point may be changed in different village administrations following the rule that the percentage of the people who pay taxes should not be less than 70 nor exceed 90.

In computing taxation each person, whether man or woman, young or old, is regarded as one man, industries and co-operatives will be counted as one family; temples, the land of families, the public property of villages, etc., will be counted as one man in one family.

### III

What are the merits of the enforcement of the progressive tax system?

First, the burdens are shared more rationally among various classes and ranks, and such defects as the duties being shared by a few people are quickly corrected and unity thereby much strengthened.

Secondly, a suitable tax-free point is fixed to safeguard the standard of living for the poorest, to lower burdens of rich peasants and landlords, and thereby to further guarantee the land and property rights of the anti-Japanese elements of the population.

Thirdly, all other taxes except the uniform progressive tax, the import and export duties and the land and rent taxes are abolished.

Fourthly, the development of industry, commerce and other enterprises in the villages is being encouraged by the Government.

Fifthly, the financial problems confronting every village are gradually being solved, thus resulting in bringing the financial system a further step along the road to regularity.

The brilliant achievements of the progressive tax system in the Chin-Chia-Chi Border Region may be summarised as follows, as pointed out by Mr. Sung Sou-weng, Chief Commissioner of the Border Region Government:

(1) That united front principles are applied to the taxation system is a thing worthwhile. It further puts into practice the slogan: "Those who have money contribute money, those who have much contribute much, those who have little contribute little." The interests of the people of various social classes and ranks are safeguarded. The people are the stronger for carrying on resistance, and as many as 80% of the whole population share the burdens.

(2) The amount a person should pay is determined by the surest method—investigation. It is naturally a just and rational taxation system levied according to one's revenue. In addition, uniform measures are applied throughout the Region, thus levelling the duties of every hsien. Annual taxation is also put into practice; and the regulations governing the land and property rights are further guaranteed.

### IV

Despite all these merits, however, many drawbacks remain uncorrected. People had little experience, and encountered a number of problems in carrying out the programme.

## RELATIONS BETWEEN LANDLORDS AND TENANTS

### AN EXAMPLE

BEFORE THE anti-Japanese war, three systems of tenancy existed between the landlords and the tenants in the Taiyo District of the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region. These are: (1) the fixed-rent system; (2) the sharing system A—tenants being supplied with land only, (3) the sharing system B—tenants being supplied with land and production capital.

(1) *The Fixed-Rent System.* By this system the landlord only supplies the land and collects a fixed amount of rent from the tenant. The land may be leased by a single tenant or by a group of tenants collectively. This system of tenancy was the dominant form in the Taiyo District before the anti-Japanese war, but has shown a gradually decreasing tendency since, while the amount of rent charged has been generally raised—e.g., a tenant in Sh'in-hsien pays a yearly rent of 3.87 piculs, while the actual total production of his leased land is only 3 piculs; another tenant pays 3 piculs, while the land yields only 1.8 piculs; still another tenant in Sh'in-yuen hsien pays 7.4 piculs out of the 9.6 piculs produced by his eight mow of land. The amount of rent paid usually exceeds the amount produced if the rent is high, and in cases where rent is low it still amounts to over 70% of the production. Even in places where the 25% rent reduction has been realised, the rent paid usually also amounts to more than 60% of the production—e.g., a tenant in Tun-liu hsien pays 30 piculs to the landlord after rent reduction, while his actual production is 46.9 piculs; another tenant pays 16.12 piculs and his actual production is 24 piculs. This exceedingly high rent not only influences the livelihood of the peasants, but also the construction work of the anti-Japanese base.

(2) *The Sharing System A—Tenant being Supplied with Land Only.* By this system the landlord supplies only the land, as in the first system, but does not collect a fixed amount of rent, and takes only a certain proportion of the tenant's production. One characteristic of this system is that the lease period is not fixed and the landlord has the right to take back the land whenever he pleases; consequently this is the most unreasonable and most exploiting system. In Sh'in-hsien the landlord usually takes 50%, and only in a few cases (about one in ten) is the tenant allowed to take 60% of his production. This system shows a gradually increasing tendency, especially in places where rent reduction has not been effected.

There also exists a second form of this system, in which, besides the land, the landlord supplies a portion of the animals, implements, seeds and fertilisers, while other conditions remain the same. In a case like this the landlord also takes about 50% of the tenant's products, but some take only 40-45%. In certain districts both forms of this system have prevailed during the war—e.g., in a certain village in Sh'in-hsien all the tenants lease their lands under these forms, while in another village twenty out of forty-four tenants do likewise. The following are the objective reasons for the speedy development of this system:

(a) Due to the destruction of the war, a number of the rich peasants, medium peasants and landlords cannot cultivate the lands themselves. Meanwhile they are afraid of the rent-reduction movement, so the only way out is to put out their lands for lease under this system. Similarly, some dependants of the anti-Japanese soldiers and revolutionaries, as well as the widows and orphans of the dead, are unable to cultivate the lands themselves, and have to lease their lands to tenants.

(b) Individual landlords change their terms from the fixed-rent to the sharing system, so as to avoid rent reduction and "reasonable burdens".

(c) Some peasants change their occupations, to engage in business, etc.

Needless to say, this system of tenancy has many shortcomings, because, owing to the uncertainty of the lease period, the tenants usually evince little ardour for the improvement of the soil, with the result that the quality of the soil deteriorates and its productivity decreases, which badly affects the people's livelihood, the Government revenue, as well as the economic development of the bases.

(3) *The Sharing System B—Tenant being Supplied with Both Land and Production Capital.* The characteristic of this system is that the land as well as the other necessities for cultivation are all supplied by the landlord, and the status of the tenant is somewhat like that of an employee, the only difference being that, unlike the employee, the tenant receives no fixed wages and is not supplied with meals and lodging. This is a more progressive form, but affects only a very small percentage (about 2%) of the tenants.

The anti-Japanese Government of the district proceeds to regulate the relations between the landlords and tenants on the following principle—that the sufferings of the peasants must be relieved and the rights of the landlords meanwhile protected. To realise this it is decided that sharing system A must be changed

into the fixed-rent system, the second form of sharing system A into sharing system B, while the development of sharing system B must be greatly promoted. Such of course cannot be achieved by the mere order of the Government; rather it depends chiefly on the political consciousness and organisation of the rural masses to negotiate with the landlords for a just and reasonable settlement.

The following are a few typical examples of how the regulation of tenancy relation is carried on in the anti-Japanese base. In Mienshang hsien the rent-reduction movement was started by the Peasants' National Salvation Association of the district, which called an informal meeting of the tenants and landlords, attended by Government representatives. Here the disputes between landlords and tenants were peaceably and satisfactorily settled. In a sub-district of the Sh'in-yuen hsien the regulation was achieved by a representative meeting of the tenants, in which five unified demands were formulated. They were:

(a) A rent reduction of 25%, based on actual production. In sharing-rent cases, after the 25% reduction the landlord should change it into fixed-rent payment, charging from 37.5% of the production in good lands to 30% or less in bad lands, and in hilly lands the year's rent will be exempted if production does not cover its cost.

(b) Landlords are not permitted to take back the land after the reduction for periods of five or more years.

(c) Landlords should not force labour services upon the tenants. Abolish the system of leasing lands from those who make profit by leasing lands from landlords and re-leasing them to the tenants. Lease only directly from landowners.

(d) Of the overdue unpaid rents, tenants should first repay that portion owed within the last two years; the rest will be repaid within five years' time, one-fifth for each year. Landlords are not permitted to take back the land under the pretext of overdue debts.

(e) To clear the old debts and to redeem mortgaged lands.

The above five demands are in accordance with the principle of rent reduction and rent payment. For the realisation of such demands the representative meeting of the tenants decided to form a permanent association which functions to mobilise the peasants to effect the regulation between the landlords and the tenants.

The following two examples illustrate the success of such regulations.

The first example is in Weng-Cheng Shan of Sh'in-hsien, where twenty-four tenants lease their lands from a landlord who had

never reduced the rent since the war, and who usually raised the amount of rent at his own will. A tenant had to pay 34 piculs, while his production was only 14 piculs, and his land was taken back as a result of his inability to meet the obligation. Twenty-four tenants organised themselves to negotiate with the landlord and appealed to the Government. The result was that the landlord promised to return the land to the tenant, giving a three years' lease and charging only 28% of actual production, while for the rest of the tenants a rent reduction of 25% was realised. Another case happened in Ma-shan Kow of An-tze hsien, where the landlords and tenants held a joint meeting and a reduction of rent amounting to 77.625 piculs was realised, and both tenants and landlords were on better terms with each other after the negotiation. From the above two examples it can be concluded that a reasonable regulation of the relation between the landlords and the tenants not only protects the livelihood of the peasants and raises their enthusiasm for production, but also confers benefits on the landlords. Meanwhile it plays a very important role in the consolidation of the unity of the people and in increasing resistance to the enemy.

#### FIGHTERS OF THE BUSINESS FRONT

IN RURAL districts business is chiefly carried on through the "market", held at intervals of two to five days by the people of a certain locality. Without the market there would be no business, and the importation of daily necessities to, or the exportation of surplus products from the anti-Japanese bases would be impossible. A struggle for the "market" against the enemy is therefore a struggle of finance, business and revenue against the enemy's economic blockade.

##### (i) An Example in Chu-Yang hsien

In the city of this district the enemy has established some companies for the purchase of leather, furs and other articles of military value. These companies are given the right to order enemy soldiers to steal the goods of the people. In addition, the enemy utilises some intellectuals to carry on business between Chu-yang and Peiping, importing goods from the latter. By this method the enemy has at times benefited from some markets in the district. On one market-day it is said that the enemy and the puppet Government actually collected a revenue of over five thousand dollars.

In mid-April 1942 the enemy prohibited the circulation of the local banknotes, which are mostly possessed by the people of the locality. We helped the people to start a legal struggle against

this, and meanwhile persuaded them not to go to the enemy's market. To co-operate, our guerrilla forces came out to blockade the market area and were a constant source of annoyance. The result was that in a very short time the enemy market became dull. The wholesalers and brokers began to lose interest in it. They all came over to the market held in our anti-Japanese base, after some propaganda and persuasive work had been done to convince them that the anti-Japanese Government was always ready to welcome and protect the business men who came over from the occupied territories to trade.

In a struggle of this kind the revenue of the enemy is also affected—*e.g.*, on one occasion when the puppet Government had collected a revenue of five thousand dollars from a market, we dispatched our local armed force to seize the money. Since then they have not dared to again collect revenue in that market.

In contrast to the collapse of the enemy markets, our markets become more and more prosperous—*e.g.*, in a certain locality there were originally three gatherings in ten days, each gathering being attended by about a thousand people; now the market is being held every other day, and each time is attended by two thousand people. The credit of the local banknotes is raised, and our revenue increases accordingly. Calculating on statistics from two sub-districts of the Chu-yang hsien, the following articles have been imported, or rather smuggled, from the occupied territories within a month: foodstuffs, over 700 piculs; salt, 5,800 catties; cotton, 1,500 catties; native cloths, over 7,800 pi, and saltpetre, over 200 catties. People can get their daily necessities in our market at prices cheaper than those in the market of the occupied territories.

##### (ii) The Line that Cannot be Broken

On the road to Pao-ting there is a market of medium size where the goods of four or five nearby hsien are concentrated and change hands. This market is held every five days, and considerable quantities of goods are sold there. Usually for each gathering about 20,000 catties of salt, 600 catties of saltpetre, 500–600 parcels of matches and sometimes articles of military value are imported, while the exports consist of native products, hogs, etc. The crowds are so great that they seem to forget that the blockade ditches of the enemy lie only a short distance away.

Every means is resorted to by the enemy to crush this market, such as employment of special agents to spread rumours that the market will be bombed, to seize goods on their way to the market, to order traitorous merchants to raise the prices, and even to raid the market with armed force. But we are well-organised, and

have our information carriers, watchers on the hills, signals, anti-raid and evacuation preparations, etc., to meet the situation.

As a counter-policy and a precautionary measure, in lieu of one big market held every five days we now hold several small markets every other day in secluded places, each at a distance of half a li, and frequently change locations.

In like manner we have discovered that some peddlers have been bought by the enemy to find out the routes by which we import, so that the enemy can send soldiers to attack the merchants and seize their goods on the way. As a counter-policy, we frequently change our routes and establish small-scale exchange-stations along them. Sellers and purchasers do not come in direct contact with each other, so that in case one station is discovered by the enemy, the others will not be discovered. Methods of stealing through the blockade ditches are at the same time improved. Armed protection is arranged if a considerable amount of goods have to be moved.

Credit for breaking through the enemy blockade line to import great quantities of materials for our markets must go to the numerous brave and skilful peddlers, goods-carriers and small merchants who risk their goods as well as their lives to enrich and prosper our markets. These fighters of the business front firmly unite themselves around our markets. They know very well the habits and rules of the enemy and the puppet troops, and have many ways of their own to cope with the situation—*e.g.*, in the occupied areas they establish some "secret markets", scattered and without fixed gathering-places or time, to purchase goods and transport them into the anti-Japanese bases. They have their own stations between two enemy points, so that they can hide themselves and their goods when necessary. They each drive one or two animals, sometimes also carrying goods themselves, seek out the weak points of the enemy, and journey between the bases and the occupied territories day and night. They can earn about \$450 for each trip, which usually takes three days, assuming that one animal can carry 150 catties of goods and the freight for each catty is \$1.5. If the carrier manages his own business as well he earns more.

The anti-Japanese Government of the bases gives these fighters of the business front every possible assistance and protection. The Government stores and co-operatives welcome them to join as shareholders, frequently lend them money as capital, provide meals and lodging, sell, purchase or store goods for them, prepare passports and exchange money for them, and so on. No interest on small loans is charged to them, only a small percentage being taken out of their profit after it has been made.

Throughout the Government organisations and mass organisations the "one-third" system (not more than one-third of offices to be held by Communists) has been successfully carried out. For instance, among the 134 members of the provisional people's political council in the Shansi-Hopei-Shantung-Honan Border Region there are only forty-six Communists—about one-third of the total number. Among the administrative staff of the Border Region Government in Shansi-Hopei-Chahar, other members comprise three-tenths of the total number, while the Communist members amount to only one-tenth. Similar conditions exist in the other regions. Many of the patriotic landlords, well-known gentry and scholars have been elected to Government offices, and are happily doing their best for the people. For instance, the head of the Government administration in North-west Shansi is Mr. Shu Fan-t'ing, an old member of the Tung Meng Huai. The head of the Shansi-Shantung-Hopei-Honan Border Region administration, Mr. Yang Hsiu-feng, was formerly a well-known University professor. The head of the Government administration of the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar Border Region, Mr. Sung Shao-wen, is a member of the Sacrifice Association, and the vice-chairman, Mr. Hu Jen-kuei, is a Kuomintang member.

Universal suffrage is practised throughout the various guerrilla bases. Those who attain the age of eighteen, excluding criminals, traitors and insane persons, have the right to vote and to be voted for in secret ballots without distinction of party affiliation, profession, religion, property or education. The various grades of people's political councils are democratically elected, and not only serve as institutions for discussion and advice, but function like parliaments in the Western democracies. At present, hsien and village people's political councils have been elected and are working in all the guerrilla bases. In some places even provisional border regional People's Political Councils have been working for some time, as in the case of Shansi-Honan-Hopei-Shantung Border Region, Shantung and East Anwhui. The North-west Shansi area and the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar Border Region are planning to call such a meeting. The people are thoroughly mobilised in the election campaigns. It is a great thing for the peasants, who, from time immemorial, have been oppressed by unknown officials coming from elsewhere, to acquire the right to choose the men they want to manage their affairs. Their enthusiasm is shown by the following figures: in the Tingnan, Anping, Shen-chi, Yao-yang, Po-yeh, Yi and Tsing-yuan hsiens of the Shansi-Hopei-Chahar Border Region 78.3% of the total number of citizens participated in the hsien

elections; 81.4% in the district election; and 83.9% in the village election. 81% of all women citizens voted. Many of those who did not attend the elections did not do so only because they were absent on war service.

The policies of the local government are all based on the principle of uniting all Chinese in harmonious co-operation for the common cause of fighting Japan and reconstructing China. The agrarian policy has been to decrease taxes and reduce rents so as to lighten the burden of the peasants, on the one hand; and making it obligatory for the peasants to pay their rent, so that the landlords' interest will be safeguarded, on the other. In labour policy the improvement of workers' living conditions is stressed, but industrial profit is also permitted. All overlapping duties have been abolished. A single progressive tax with a fixed minimum has been established. Social policy promotes equality of the sexes. Voluntary marriage and monogamy are strictly enforced. In regard to the minority nations, equality between Chinese, Mongolians and Moslems is established by law. National customs and religions are respected.

The new Governments are elected by the people, and hence are for the people. Bureaucracy, red tape and corruption are condemned. The officials keep in constant touch with the masses, and stay with the people for better or for worse. Their life is just as simple as that of the people. They are highly respected and loved by the people. On one occasion Ting Hsien, scene of the well-known Rural Mass Education experiment before the war, was suddenly attacked by the Japanese. All the people were driven into a large compound. The Japanese pulled one young man out and asked him who was the district chairman. "I don't know," was the reply. The young man was decapitated then and there. The Japanese then asked a woman, and got the same reply, "I don't know". They bayoneted her through the breast. They asked a boy of eleven and got the same answer. The boy was cut to pieces. When they were about to bully an old man, someone cried out, "I am the district chairman". The whole crowd echoed him, crying, "I am the district chairman". The Japanese finally found the chairman and dragged him away. In the night—the best time for guerrilla activities—the people found the place where he was held and rescued him. The deeply moved district chairman said only one thing, "Democracy has saved me."

It is the people's support that enables the armies to hold on in the war against Japan in the most difficult circumstances, with little or no replenishment of food, arms and money from the outside. Democratic government is the key to the mobilisation of the people's enthusiasm in the war effort.

## 7

### THE LABOUR MOVEMENT AND GENERAL LABOUR UNION OF THE SHEN-KAN-NING BORDER REGION

THE FOLLOWING is a rough sketch of the Labour movement in the Shen-Kansu-Ningsia Border Region and of the activities of the General Labour Union there. As everyone knows, this area was very backward until a short time ago.

The Border Region General Labour Union was formed in 1940. It includes industrial workers, official workers and agricultural labourers. At the time of its formation it had 55,694 members, of whom 63% were employed in agriculture, 22% in handicrafts and 15% in industry. The drive for increased production since that time has increased the number of workers. In 1941-42 the number of textile workers increased by 83%, that of clothing workers (needle trades) by 6%, paper-makers by 5%, printers by 4%, chemical workers by 4%, machine-shop workers by 41%, and other industrial workers by 18%.

Ownership of industry in the Border Region is distributed as follows: Government ownership, 78%; co-operative, 20%; private, only 2%.

The Border Region General Labour Union is a true mass organisation. It has four regional unions, thirty district (hsien), 196 sections (chu) and 1,223 village (hsiang) branches, as well as four special unions for agricultural labourers. It is a strong and solidly founded body.

The development and strength of the union owe much to the war of resistance, which stimulates the political consciousness of the toilers, awakening them nationally and imbuing them with the idea of organisation. Under the democratic Border Region Government, which permits full freedom of assembly and association, the workers are free to organise themselves and to unite together. The Border Region Government has rendered the union all possible aid, assisting it to expand and grow strong.

The union is an organisation of the workers themselves. Its duty and aim is to concentrate and safeguard the powers of the workers in order to achieve both national emancipation and

the emancipation of labour; to enforce the labour policy of the Government; to conclude, readjust or cancel contracts between factories and workers' bodies; to increase the discipline and productivity of labour in order to guarantee victory in the war of resistance; to stabilise and improve living conditions; to educate the workers and raise their political, cultural and technical level.

The central activity of the union is therefore to organise all the workers of the Border Region and mobilise them for active participation and initiative in the war of resistance and national reconstruction; to adjust relations between employers and workers, represent the workers in disputes and negotiations with employers as well as on Government arbitration tribunals, to carry on inspection to determine whether Government orders are being carried out, and to enforce the directives of the Social Department and Social Administration of the Government with regard to labour.

In order to educate the workers, night schools and study classes are established, their first aim being to destroy illiteracy. The establishment of libraries, clubs, technical and political study groups, the publication of small newspapers and magazines, the organisation of producers' and consumers' co-operatives, encouragement of mutual help, establishment of stores to sell cheaply to the workers and lighten their difficulties in supporting themselves and to mediate in disputes between workers—these are some of the union's tasks.

The Border Region General Labour Union is a mass organisation, organised in accordance with the principle of democratic centralism. This is to say, responsible workers and officers are elected freely by the members themselves, who chose the men they trust most. If officers so elected are found unworthy of the confidence reposed in them, the members have the right to recall them immediately and elect others in their place. All important problems are thoroughly discussed, and every member has the right freely to express his opinion. Once the decision has been taken, however, lower organisations must follow the leadership of higher ones and carry out their executive orders.

The duties of the union are many and heavy. Its administration structure is based on a scientific division of labour. It contains the following elements:

1. The Secretariat, which carries on correspondence and keeps the Union's accounts;

2. The Organisation Department, which registers members, carries out investigations and inspections and organises new locals;

3. The Department of Culture and Education, which operates classes and study groups, has charge of propaganda activity, and runs union publications, clubs, libraries, etc.;

4. The Production Department, which is charged with heightening of working enthusiasm, enforcement of labour discipline, study of means of improving production techniques and organisation of work-brigades;

5. The Labour Protection Department, which concludes collective contracts, organises co-operatives and has charge of all that concerns the workers' interests;

6. The Youth Department, which organises the education of young workers, takes care of their health, and generally looks after all things affecting their lives.

7. The Women's Department, which concerns itself with the health, working and living conditions of women.

The procedure of joining labour unions in the Border Region is very simple. To become a member, the workers must agree to abide by union rules and pay dues. There is no distinction of age, sex, nationality, party or group affiliation or religion—all have the same rights. Workers in the Border Region have the right not only to join unions, but to withdraw from membership if they wish.

The reason why the Border Region Union is successful is that it really stands for the interests of the workers, and is not merely a dues-collecting organisation. Because of this the workers support their union spontaneously, and consider membership in it as natural as membership in their own families. This attitude was shown in their active and enthusiastic participation in all union projects, such as helping the families of fighters at the front, organisation of work brigades, conservation of materials, improvements in production technique, inventions and improvisation of substitute materials for those in short supply.

The administrative staff of the union is composed entirely of the workers' own representatives, of leaders whom they like and support. Their democratic spirit and attitude to work are models for all members. No matter how difficult the conditions, they work with the same energy and sense of responsibility to their electors, for the interests of the war of resistance, of national reconstruction and of society.

Relations between the union and the Border Region Government are very close. As soon as a local is registered, the authorities give it every protection and assistance, not only the legal status it needs for full development, but also concrete support, such as the collection from each unionised factory of a sum equivalent to 6%

of the total wages it pays to its workers, to be spent on workers' educational and cultural activities and for the administrative expenses of the union. This sum is collected not from the workers, but from the enterprise.

Under the leadership of their unions, workers in the Border Region have overcome many difficult problems by exercising initiative in devising new working tools and methods and substitutes for materials. In the past the Border Region depended for most of its industrial raw materials on importations from outside. Since the economic blockade, however, it has had to depend entirely on itself. To meet this situation the General Labour Union has made a great effort to organise classes and technical research groups in every enterprise. The classes train skilled workers and have graduated many thousands of enthusiastic young people. The research groups mobilise the inventive spirit of the workers. Their greatest achievement so far has been in the printing trade. A new raw material was discovered for paper, and the technique of paper-making improved. The printing-ink problem has been solved. This has been of tremendous importance to cultural development in the region.

Ever since the Government promulgated its order to conquer the crisis and move on to victory, the union has been calling on all workers in the Border Region to bring a new attitude to their tasks. Working enthusiasm has consequently risen. The workers not only support this policy, but have proved their support in action by increasing their output and technical efficiency. For instance, in agricultural production, a farm hand formerly normally cultivated land yielding about 1 ton of food crops. Now each agricultural labourer produces  $1\frac{1}{2}$  tons of food. In coal production, miners formerly worked twelve hours and dug twenty-eight baskets of coal a day. Now they work only eight hours but cut twenty-four baskets plus 100 lb.—using improved technique. Typesetters, working an eight-hour day, set 12,000 characters in this period instead of 8,000 as formerly. One arsenal improved its output of artillery ammunition 285%, and an ordnance repair depot by 200%. In one refugee textile factory the workers' enthusiasm ran particularly high. Blanket-makers who used to weave four units a day now turn out eight. Cloth-weavers whose output was 160 feet now produce 180 feet. Yarn-spinners have increased production from 7 to 10 catties per capita. Paper factories produce 2,000 instead of 1,800 sheets per day per man, and have improved the quality of their product as well. These facts provide good proof of the active and self-denying spirit of workers in the Border Region.

At the present time each factory is carrying on "work-championship" campaigns, which constantly produce new heroes of labour. Both in agriculture and industry all these developments are the result of mobilisation and drive by the unions.

The following is an outline of the Border Region Labour policy:

1. The aim of the policy is to safeguard and, where necessary, improve the workers' standard of living, to increase production and strengthen the war of resistance.
2. There is a floor and ceiling for wages. On the one hand, over-exploitation of the workers is not permitted. On the other, the Government does not wish to deprive employers of all profit.
3. The eight-hour day is an ideal for the future. In the war situation a ten-hour day is permissible.
4. Workers are expected to respect their contracts and to observe labour discipline so that production can be maintained.
5. The number of workers in the Border Region must be increased.
6. It is recognised that the wages of industrial and agricultural workers cannot be entirely the same.
7. Workers' organisations must be strengthened and their education improved, so as to enable them to recognise their duty to their own class and to become the backbone and mainstay of the anti-Japanese democratic political structure.

The Border Region General Labour Union supports the newly-proclaimed labour policy of the Government and has called upon all locals immediately to begin thorough discussion of its provisions. The workers of the Eighth Route Army Printing Plant were not only the first to suggest changing to the ten-hour day, but volunteered to do an extra hour of unpaid work in addition to the ten hours, until victory is attained. These workers published a proclamation calling upon all other workers in the Border Region to follow their example.



## 8

ANTI-JAPANESE BASES IN NORTH  
CHINA AS SEEN BY WESTERNERS

## FOREWORD

RISKING MANY dangers, several foreign friends have recently succeeded in escaping from Peiping and have now safely arrived at Yen-an. From their own reports we know that the reason for their escape, even at the risk of their lives, was their determination to participate in the fight against Fascism and not to submit to the alternative of being prisoners of war under the Japanese. So they had tried to get in touch with the partisan detachments operating in the vicinity of Peiping, and, having established contact with our army, they finally reached Free China with the assistance of our army. We Communists have frequently expressed our willingness to co-operate with all our foreign friends. In May 1941 the Border Region Government published the following regulation: "Every foreigner is permitted to travel freely in the Border Region and to engage in any kind of anti-Japanese economic or cultural activity, under the condition that the laws and rights of the Chinese Republic are respected."

After the outbreak of the Pacific war the Central Committee of our Party gave the following instruction: "Chinese Communists must work together with the British and the Americans in sincere and honest co-operation." Today, when the cause of the United Nations binds us all together, the fate of our allies is our own fate, their difficulties are our difficulties, and it is our duty to help our foreign friends to escape from the enemy's clutches. The fact that these foreign friends have sought the assistance of our army shows that they recognise our programme of national and international unity, based on firm resistance in the areas behind the enemy's lines, and that they regard the Chinese Communists as their sincere friends.

In the past few years foreign friends have constantly given us encouragement and help, have shared our fight in the war of resistance and our work for the construction of a new China. Here again we take the opportunity to express our deep appreciation and gratitude to them, and as an illustration of this spirit

of friendship and international co-operation we wish to give a few examples of their work.

First, we wish to thank those foreign journalists who, in spite of all obstacles, managed to get into the Border Region and who through the vivid descriptions of their brilliant pens put before an international public the true picture of China's North-west, reporting the ideas and suggestions of the Chinese Communists, their bitter struggle and their achievements. They have therefore played a very important role in the promotion of international understanding and unity.

Second, we wish to thank all the foreign doctors and nurses who have come to help us. These scientifically backward regions around Yen-an and the anti-Japanese bases behind the enemy's lines were in these times of bloodshed and devastation deprived of any kind of medical organisation, and were all the more dependent on the help of foreign friends. Therefore we are most grateful for all the magnificent work that has already been achieved by them in this field. We remember the Canadian Dr. Bethune, who gave his life for his work. He died of blood-poisoning after operating on a wounded soldier. "He struggled his whole life for the relief of others, and now amidst this struggle he died!" said a foreign friend during Dr. Bethune's Memorial Service. We further appreciate the help of those foreign friends who made possible the establishment of the Bethune Memorial Hospital. We wish to thank the Indian Medical Unit, and Dr. Gogov of the U.S.S.R. All of them have braved the hardest living conditions and constant dangers to give the people and the armed forces of North China necessary medical attention. Their noble spirit, their love of mankind, their international fellowship, are worthy of our sincere admiration and praise.

Also in the field of reconstruction foreign friends are participating in our work. Professor Michael Lindsay and Professor William Band have remained in the Hopei-Chahar-Shansi Border Region after their escape from Peiping in order to help in its construction, in addition to Mr. Frey, an Austrian doctor. This shows their deep sympathy with the cause of Chinese national liberation. In Chingyang there are some Spanish priests who have expressed their intention of buying bonds of construction of the Border Region.

"Yen-an has guaranteed the freedom of preaching and religious belief. The Border Region is poor, it needs money to undertake constructive work, so we must help. If it were not for the war in Europe we would have given more."

These few examples clearly show the spirit of goodwill and the sympathy of our foreign friends for the Border Region.

We wish to mention the patriotic spirit and the resolute anti-Fascist determination of our French friends, Rene d'Anjou and George Uhlmann, our Dutch friend Brondgeest, and Mr. Grey Martell Hall. They have written accounts of their recent escapes from Peiping expressing their irreconcilable hatred of the Japanese, and other articles.

"We know now," said our friend d'Anjou, "union makes strength." For the development of the international anti-Fascist front this spirit of international co-operation must be further strengthened, so that it takes root in the hearts of all our comrades-in-arms in the common struggle.

## REMINISCENCES OF DR. BETHUNE

By MICHAEL LINDSAY

I FIRST met Dr. Bethune in January 1938 on the ship which took both of us to China for the first time. During the ten days of the voyage we became good friends and had long discussions on philosophy, politics and life. We disagreed on many points, but got along together very well. Dr. Bethune was interested in literature and art, but had the worst opinion of music, which he was hardly willing to consider an art at all. His belief in Communism came not so much from a study of Marxist theory as from an admiration for what he had seen of Communist work. On a visit to the U.S.S.R. he was deeply impressed by the anti-tuberculosis work, which was a subject in which he was specially interested. In Spain he found the Communists had better organisation and discipline than any of the other parties. His work in Spain had been to organise a blood-transfusion service. Using a new process for preserving blood, his unit had built up a large "bank" of preserved blood which could be rushed by motor to any part of the front.

My next meeting with Dr. Bethune was near Wutaishan in the summer of 1938. He was very busy operating at the base hospital and working out a plan for reorganising the medical service. Here, as always, his first care was for the wounded, and he could become extremely angry with anyone who did not appear to put them first.

He was much concerned by the fact that most of the seriously wounded died during the long journey to hospital and even light wounds became infected and took a long time to heal.

When I met him again in the summer of 1939 he had just come back from his mobile operating unit in Central Hopei under

General Ho Lung. By working within a few miles of the fighting he saved many cases who would otherwise have died, and by giving immediate treatment he was able to prevent wounds becoming infected and greatly lessen the time required for complete recovery.

The unit had to be extremely mobile. On one occasion they had only fifteen minutes' notice of the advance of a Japanese column, but they were able to hide all wounded, pack all their equipment, and move out of one end of the village as the Japanese marched into the other. This mobile unit was a new development in medical work, and the principles worked out by Dr. Bethune must have many applications in modern mobile warfare.

His health suffered from his hard work, and he feared there might be some return of his tuberculosis. He wished, therefore, to make a trip to Hongkong, or perhaps to America, partly for his health and partly to collect more money and buy more equipment, but finally decided he must stay to finish the publication of his book on mobile operating units and to make a round of inspection of the base hospitals.

As we all know, that trip was never finished. In his devotion to the wounded Dr. Bethune caught an infection which developed into blood poisoning, from which he died. All who know him must mourn the loss of a true friend and feel that the world lost a remarkable man. But his spirit and work live on in Bien Chu and prove an inspiration to others; and the fine memorial, only partly destroyed by the Japanese, remains to show how highly his work was valued.

## IN THE STEPS OF DR. BETHUNE

*Medical Work in the Chin-Ch'a-Chi Border District*

By PROFESSOR WILLIAM BAND

AS ALL friends of the late Dr. Bethune know, besides his arduous practical work with the fighting forces of the Eighth Route Army, he started training classes for medical workers in the Border Districts during 1938; there were eighteen students in the first group. The formal opening of the School of Hygiene took place on the eighth anniversary of the Mukden Incident, September 18, 1939. Less than two months later Dr. Bethune passed away—on the first Armistice Day after the opening of World War II.

Early in 1940 were founded in his memory the International Peace Hospital and the Bethune Medical College. On our visit, February 12, 1942, we met the staff and students of these twin institutions; there were more than a thousand present at the

meeting. President of the College is Dr. Chang I-chen, a former associate of Dr. Bethune. President Chang had been several years with the Chinese Red Army Medical School in the Kiangsi Soviet. He was one of the "long marchers" to Yen-an, and came to this Border District in 1938. He is, we might say, a Bethune product, a good practical surgeon and a great enthusiast. Head of the Hospital is Dr. D. S. Kotnis (died in December 1942) from Bombay University. With four other medical men sent by the Indian National Congress to help China's war of resistance, Kotnis came over in 1938, bringing much equipment and supplies. The China Red Cross Society at first assigned them work, under Dr. Robert Lim, with the National Government at Wuhan, and they worked there till within three days of the fall of those cities to the Japanese. They then came to Chungking via Ichang to wait for more ambulances from India. The changing theatres of the war decided the Red Cross Society to move the party to Yen-an, and from that base they worked with the troops through South Shansi, South Hopei, Central Hopei and Ping Hsi. The other four men then returned to Yen-an, three of them going back to India. Dr. Kotnis was assigned the task of continuing Dr. Bethune's work in this area, and he has been here since the end of 1939. He has impressed us with his quiet modesty; he is a master in his field, and thoroughly adapted to the local conditions.

There were at the time of our visit fifteen teachers at the Bethune College with good medical training, and nearly 1,000 students, 30% of whom were girls. At the beginning the urgent need for nurses in the field prompted the College to graduate its first class with only eight months' training. The second class was given one and a half years, and the present class will have received three years' training before being sent out. The students are largely drawn from the local peasant population, being accepted from the primary schools and given intensely practical training. Every student attends four hours instruction daily, the remainder of the time being spent on review and practical work in the hospital. Because life behind the enemy's lines is unpredictable, each day's lessons have to be thoroughly digested before the next day's work begins. Already 700 medical workers have been sent out from the College to army units throughout the Border Districts. There is now hardly a valley that has not its medical office. To be sure, the medical officers are often little more than nurses, but they know how to care for wounds and they know the standard treatments for the most common maladies affecting fighting men; and they can recognise when a thing is too serious for them, requiring hospital treatment further back.

There are branch military hospitals in every subdivision of the Border Districts with at least one qualified doctor in charge, either with outside training or from the Bethune College.

We have visited several of these hospitals, and were amazed at the ingenuity with which the crudest facilities were effectively employed. Beds were doors from ruined houses, supported on bricks and covered with straw. Drugs, where possible, were in powder form kept in canvas pockets on a sheet hanging on the wall. Bottles were kept in folding boxes so designed as to be ready for mounting on mule-back as soon as the lid was closed. Everything was designed for instant departure and rapid mobility. The central hospital under Dr. Kotnis was similar, but on a larger scale. It had nearly 200 beds and two operating theatres. These latter were plain rooms with floors of a local plaster substitute for cement, each containing an excellent folding operating-table brought by Dr. Bethune. One was for general surgery, the other for eye operations. During the year 1941, 450 surgical and over 800 eye operations were performed; these represented only the more difficult cases that could not be handled in the branch hospitals, and came from all over this Border District. The staff also run an out-patients' department in the afternoons to which the local peasants are free to come.

Experiments are being continued in the use of local drugs and in the local manufacture of standard medicines. Many good substitutes can now be produced locally, although at some considerable cost and inconvenience. For the all-important quinine and iodine there is no local substitute whatever.

About twenty miles away, in a safe place high up in the mountains, is the portable X-ray equipment originally brought in by Dr. Bethune. Every medical student spends a period up there getting acquainted with the principles of diagnosis and therapy. Dr. Bethune's large supply of film and developers had not yet been used up when we were there.

This brief statement can give but a very inadequate idea of the enthusiasm and devotion with which Dr. Bethune's followers are carrying on his good work in an ever-widening field. If he could see their work at this time he would surely feel that his life had not been in vain.

My wife and I were the first westerners to visit his tomb since its desecration by the Japanese in the autumn of 1940. This, together with the Border District War Memorial to 25,000 heroes, occupies a small valley which is being landscaped to harmonise with the architecture. On the north side, facing south, is the war memorial, on the west, facing east down the valley, is Dr. Bethune's tomb, and on the south an

open-air auditorium. In erecting these constructions the standard techniques were no use: there was no cement; there were no skilled labourers. The marble tablets bearing the names of the dead were carried by willing peasants a distance of thirty miles, working at night, across a Japanese blockade communication line. It took them several months to complete the tomb and more than a year to finish the War Memorial. Within one month of the formal dedication ceremony the Japanese came into the neighbourhood, and stayed a whole month in three villages round the mouth of the valley. Previously these villages had been fairly prosperous, their fertile river-bed permitting the cultivation of rice. The Japs destroyed the entire crop, cut down trees, burned houses and hidden stores. Daily excursions were made to surrounding villages to capture eatable animals, young men for slave labour and young women for the officers' lust. As a final act of heroism, they used the memorial for field-gun practice for half a day, and what was left after that was blown up with dynamite. That was on October 15, according to the local peasants. General Nieh (founder and leader of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Anti-Japanese Base) was so upset by the news that he swore never to see the place again until both the memorial and the tomb could be restored.

On February 17, when we visited the scene, Dr. Bethune's tomb fortunately had only superficial scars. The statue had been hidden away for safety. In the centre of an octagonal enclosure was a large globe representing Dr. Bethune's Internationalist Spirit. Inscriptions on the four sides of its base were in English and in Chinese, with gilded lettering. On the east as we enter: "*This Internationalist Spirit of Comrade Norman Bethune is worthy to be learned by all Chinese Communists, and respected by all Chinese people. The Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party.*" On the south: "*The Scientist and Revolutionary of the Masses. Nieh Jung-chen.*" And west: "*The Eternal Brilliancy. Shu Tung.*" And north: "*The most valorous fighter on the front of the emancipation of mankind, Lu Tseng-tsao.*" The whole conception left upon us a vivid impression of the great esteem in which the people of this area must have held the Canadian doctor.

The war memorial was a completely unrecognisable ruin. Most of the marble slabs bearing the names of the 25,000 martyrs to the cause of national freedom were smashed to smithereens, and so mixed up with plaster and brickbats that their original inscriptions were indecipherable. What type of intelligence do Japanese army officers possess? Do they think that by ruining a memorial they can obliterate a people's memory?

From June 10 to 14 of this year the Border District held its first

Natural Science Congress. More than 100 workers attended, representing the science teachers, radio and medical workers, agricultural and engineering groups. The Border District Natural Science Association was formed; research reports were read by the various members, and plans for the year's work were formulated and agreed upon. Attending the Congress from the Bethune College and Hospital, besides Dr. Kotnis and President Chang, was a young Vienna-trained man, Dr. Frey. He came out from Peking in January this year, and is now doing practical work in the hospital and teaching hygiene in the College.

Since the Congress the Bethune College staff have established a Medical Advisory Board; its function is to give advice on technical matters to various health departments and individual doctors, to carry on research in locally difficult problems, and to publish a Journal to educate medical workers throughout the Border Districts.

The Bethune College and Hospital are doing a magnificent work. They are supported almost entirely by the Communist Party, the Eighth Route Army and friends outside through the China Defence League; there is practically nothing coming in from outside. The little consignments brought in by individual foreigners are almost negligible in comparison with the need. The most serious lack now is quinine.

The spirit of these men and boys in fighting a war on two fronts—the Japanese on the one hand and sickness on the other—both with utterly inadequate equipment, is beyond praise. Cut off from outside help on the one hand by geographical limitations, on the other by the Japanese blockade, and again by the misunderstanding and prejudice of some people outside who are theoretically their allies, they have no one to whom to turn for material support. Ingenuity and resourcefulness, courage and cheerful patience are almost their only weapon. Theirs is the true patriotism—love of the common people of the country—upon which alone true international peace can be built.

WE SHALL MAINTAIN!

By CAREL BRONDGEEST

I was born in Holland, where I was brought up and received my education as a mechanical engineer. After the completion of my studies I travelled all over the world, visiting many countries, to gain practical experience and knowledge.

When I finally arrived in China I decided that this was the country I like best. I became engaged in the Peking Electric

Light Company, where for the last eight years I was chief engineer.

I was very happy and made many friends, Chinese as well as foreign. I saw and watched with great interest the rising of a New China. The sleeping giant was shaken awake in no gentle manner by the Foreign Powers. She stretched herself and was annoyed. She did not care a rap what happened in the world, but she wanted to be left alone to rule her own country as she knew and thought best. But her tormentors would not let her. China then decided that since she was forced to play a hand in this great game of international politics, she might just as well play it according to the accepted rules and with all the innate skill befitting a nation of her size and dignity.

It seemed to be the only way to keep at bay these rapacious nations who kept annoying her with their constant and unreasonable demands, who wrested from her concessions and large pieces of territory which had been hers for centuries. How was she to appease their ever-growing appetite! China sent her sons abroad to visit, study and become better acquainted with these Powers of whom she had been so often the victim. They were keen-eyed, intelligent young men, who were not always slow in absorbing all there was to know of this great game in which China decided to take her part. They returned to tell their fathers and all those who were willing to listen that it was really very simple. All they had to do was to stop their own internal quarrelling and fighting and to unite their divided forces to face the common enemy. But their own home had to be put in order first, so as to be able to rally all her resources in man-power and material.

This was a gigantic undertaking in a country of such immense size, with very poor communications, where many of her officials in power were quite content to go on in the old way as long as their personal interest was not in danger. Luckily for China, there were men to be found of great foresight, of unselfish devotion to patriotism and duty who with tenacious determination decided to lead China to a position of dignity and honour.

Japan was watching with growing anxiety. She had gone through a similar transition many years ago, and understood that from now on China would be no longer the weak nation she had been so long. She wanted China to keep on buying her cheap products, but it did not suit her at all that the Chinese might want to manufacture their own products, or even become competitors. This had to be stopped before it was too late.

She dealt China a staggering blow through the invasion of one of her richest provinces, Manchuria, and China, still weak, had once more to submit. Her appeal for justice to foreign Powers

was in vain, except in the form of hypocritical conferences, protests and speeches of sympathy.

Presumptuous Japan went farther. Under lying pretences, and with deliberate intention, she created the Lu Kou Chiao incident and started the war. She made a fatal mistake.

This time China was determined to fight or perish, and the Japanese militarists know today that they have practically lost the war, and that it is only a question of time before they will be swept away.

So here the world witnesses once more the struggle between might and right; between oppression and freedom. But all those who love freedom above all can breathe freely, as they know that the ultimate outcome is certain. As far as China is concerned, the peak of her difficulties has been reached, and she is now marching downhill.

A year or so ago I personally became convinced that a war between Japan and the foreign Powers was inevitable through the constantly increasing aggression of Japan. The A, B, D group had made it perfectly clear this time that they stood irrevocably on the side of China and that there could be no compromise until Japan ceased her aggressive action in this country.

Japan replied by marching into Indo-China and concentrating there large numbers of naval and army forces for "defence purposes". I will not describe here in detail all the events that followed in quick succession, with which you are no doubt familiar, but shall only deal with some of the occurrences and conditions in Peking.

Even from what I saw in Peking it was clear that the Pacific war as well as the war with China was long premeditated and prepared. The Japanese population in the city had increased rapidly during the last two years, and amounted to approximately 800,000 at the end of 1941. To cope with the demand for lodgings, thousands of Chinese tenants and shopkeepers were simply told to clear out and make room for the Japanese. West of Peking and just outside the gates a "new town" was hurriedly built to house thousands of Japanese. New roads leading there led straight through Chinese-owned land, houses and property. A nominal compensation was arranged, but never paid.

Market prices were soaring and approximately 600% higher than in 1937. Often for days at a time there were no meat, vegetables and eggs—a thing formerly unheard of in Peking. The price of flour—the Chinese staple food—increased to \$30-40 per bag. Fascist companies and subjects were allowed to buy flour through the Japanese military authorities at approximately

\$16 per bag. There was always a serious shortage of coal, as most of it was shipped straight through to Japan. Even coal which is mined only a few miles outside Peking and of such inferior quality that in former days it was bought only by the poor, now sold at \$40 per ton. My company, being British, constantly had great difficulties in keeping the Electric Station going. We were only allowed to buy through a Japanese transportation company (the Kokassi), who did not permit us to weigh the coal, with the result that we always suffered a 20% loss in weight. Protest was useless. Chinese employees were systematically arrested and interrogated, and many were forced to leave their work. Thousands of young Chinese of the working class were picked up from the streets and against their will sent to Manchuria.

One of our Directors, a Chinese, Chu Sing, who also served in the puppet Chinese Government, was accompanied to company meetings by a strong bodyguard, who stood at the door with drawn mauser pistols and permitted nobody in as long as he was there.

Every morning thousands of Japanese carried out military exercises on the Legation Quarter square. Parades and demonstrations were arranged frequently, in which thousands of Chinese and white Russians in Chinese military uniform were forced to participate. Large world maps were painted on wooden boards in many parts of the city, on which were indicated where the Japanese had penetrated. According to these maps the Japanese were already in Australia and California.

The Chinese population in general took it all laconically, being powerless to resist and afraid of severe punishment upon the slightest sign of "disloyalty". Many of my Chinese friends never left their houses, but quietly waited for the turning of the tide. It hurt me, though, to see that large numbers of young Chinese, many of them doctors and students, frequently visited cabarets and other places of amusement where they seemed to be on good terms with their oppressors. On the other hand, the newspapers reported daily large numbers of suicides and deaths by starvation.

Personally I had made up my mind to make my escape to free China. For that purpose I had made certain preparations. I took the most necessary things, such as clothes, etc., to a friendly Chinese farmer in the Pa Ta Chu hills to hide there until the time came for me to use them.

When, on the 8th of December, the war suddenly broke out, Japanese gendarmes came to my company and put me under arrest in my house. Within a few hours large printed placards were pasted all over the Legation Quarter informing American, British and Dutch subjects of certain regulations concerning them.

To my company came two Japanese engineers to "assist" me in my work. These men, as they told me themselves, were sent from Kalgan a week before not knowing why, and were only informed of their duty a few hours before they arrived. They came to live and sleep in my house, no doubt with instructions to watch me. I was powerless for the time being, but determined to escape at the first possible opportunity, because I refused to work or have anything to do with the Japanese, for three reasons: first, I had been too long in China and had too many Chinese friends to do anything against their interest; secondly, I would never work for the enemies of my country; and thirdly, I want to be a free man, and refuse dictation by any Fascist country.

So I waited. I knew that I was closely watched. We were forbidden to go farther than five kilometres from our houses. The Peking gates through which I had to escape were closely guarded by Chinese soldiers and Japanese gendarmes, who stopped and questioned anyone who tried to pass. A French friend, Mr. R. D'Anjou, who wanted to join the Free French Army, also wished to go, and together we made our last preparations. On Saturday, January 31, we decided to make the attempt. I told the Japanese I wanted to play cards with some friends that evening, so that I would have more time before they became suspicious of my absence during the night. In the evening a foreign friend of a neutral country brought me outside the Peking gates in a motor-car. He had the flag of his country on the bonnet, so I suppose the gendarmes thought I must belong to that country. Once outside the gates we went quickly to Pa Ta Chu and the Chinese farmer for my things. And so started our long, difficult and often dangerous journey. Frequently hungry and cold, and very tired through constant and long marching, on several occasions we found our road blocked by the Japanese, but by clever, intelligent and courageous tactics by Communist guerrillas, after thirty-three days we were brought in safety at the Headquarters of General Nieh Yung-tsun, where we were received with the greatest kindness and consideration. My original intention was to go to Chungking and from there to Java, where my family lives, and there offer my services to my country, but through the occupation of Singapore and Java by the Japanese, this became impossible, so now, especially since I know and have seen so much of the Communists, and feel their aims and purposes are so much in harmony with mine, I have decided that I would like to stay, and I shall be proud to co-operate in defeating our common Fascist enemy.

I lived in the West Hopei district for about three months and there came into still closer contact with the Communists. I admire

their unselfish devotion to their country; their quiet, unpretentious, but determined bearing; their cheerful attitude in all circumstances.

After my long stay in West Hopeh I started once more on a long and difficult journey. Again I saw how with quiet efficiency a difficult undertaking was carried out, through smooth and close co-operation between the different Communist groups on the way. With a minimum of discomfort we were brought through three provinces in perfect safety here in Shensi, to reach the heart of the Communist activities in Yen-an, where I hope to stay and make myself useful until the final victory.

Personally I have not the slightest doubt that with combined strength, and under the very able leadership that commands us, we shall win the war and free once for all the people of the world from tyranny, so that we may all live in liberty, happiness and equality.

To achieve this great aim we shall all have to do our respective duties in the best way we can, in close harmony, co-operation and friendship, without a thought of our personal interest or convenience.

*Yen-an, July 23, 1942.*

## PREFACE TO THE CHIN-CHA-CHI PICTORIAL

*In which the following article by PROFESSOR WILLIAM BAND appears*

TO APPRECIATE the difficulties attendant on the production of this magazine the foreigner must imagine himself placed in some isolated rocky mountain area and surrounded by a hostile army in command of all roads, means of communication and centres of industry. All materials used have therefore had to be smuggled through several sets of hostile lines, and production carried out by previously inexperienced youths working in a foreign language.

No pictorial could give an adequate picture of the barbarities committed by the Japanese, for there are few villages that they have not visited, and their visit is worse than either flood or pestilence. Pigs and chickens—the main source of meat—have been slaughtered, houses burnt, utensils smashed and all metal, even nails, taken away for war purposes. Growing crops have been systematically destroyed, and every attempt made to reduce the entire area to a desert, since they have not been able to subdue it.

## REMEMBER THE PEASANTS AFTER THE WAR!

*Some reflections after attending the Border District Science Congress*

SINCE ATTENDING the first Science Congress in the Border District June 10–14, 1942, there is one thing that has been driven home to me more forcibly than ever before: China's intellectuals, especially her scientists, have in the past taken far too little interest in the ordinary people of their country. We have lived in our own world, an artificial world, cut off completely from the real life of the nation.

But at last here we have discovered, in this Border District, true intellectuals without class feeling, without false pride or intellectual snobbery, with the courage to face life along with the peasants, not only under the inconveniences of normal times, but with the hardship of war, even the dangers of life behind the enemy's lines. It has made us proud of our colleges and universities to see their graduates and students here, and proud of our science to find so many scientists among them.

We are all confident of victory very soon, perhaps even in 1943! What of the future after victory? We are all going back to Peking, of course! But are we going back to our old ways, to our old scramble for Ph.D. and professorships, to our old ignorance and fear of the hardship of village life and our neglect of Chinese peasants. No! A thousand times no! You have suffered for them, and they have suffered with you during these past five years, and you cannot forget them! We must see to it that future generations of students learn and realise in their turn the social responsibility of the scientist to the ordinary people of the country.

The New China will need all the scientists she can produce, and they must realise their social responsibility towards the millions of peasants who are the real backbone of Chinese ancient and modern culture.

WILLIAM BAND.

## ESCAPE FROM PEKING

By WILLIAM BAND

*(Retranslated from Sinxua Rhabao, New China Daily, August 22, 1942.)*

ON DECEMBER 8, 1941, at eight o'clock in the morning, there was a banging on the front door. The night before I had gone to bed very late, so I had just shaved, and was putting on my trousers.

"The Japanese-American war has broken out. Can you be ready in twenty minutes?" Michael Lindsay was shouting at the door.

"Of course!"

"I have brought you a pistol. Won't you carry it?"

Indeed I can shoot an air-gun very exactly, but I had never used a real pistol. However, in case there were Japanese soldiers patrolling by the front gate, or some armed policemen on the road should stop us, we would make use of it, as both our wives, who fled with us, agreed.

Lindsay had arranged for an automobile, and so we rushed out of the school gate. Seeing no soldiers by the gate, the car turned right, and the school policeman managed to direct it with his hands as usual.

We had to stop at a place where the Japanese soldiers were at target practice. We left the car and, watched carefully by the Japanese patrolling soldier, we climbed a hill. We were in a hurry, but the Japs knew nothing about us, because they had not yet learned the news that the Pacific war had already broken out. The enemy's liaison work was rather slow.

Next day we were in contact with the guerrilla units of the Eighth Route Army. At midnight December 9 to 10 we began to walk on in a hurry. We arrived at the guerrilla base at five o'clock in the morning of the 10th. During the climbing we felt tired and were panting. After a pause of several minutes on a heap of stones, from where we could see whether there were any Japanese or not, we climbed again with all our strength. The morning we arrived at the base we experienced, for the first time in our lives, the comfort of a brick bed warmed by fire, together with several tired soldiers. During the meal we ate bowls of fresh millet gruel, and it tasted as delicious as Peking duck. We regretted that we couldn't stay there longer. At five o'clock in the afternoon we started again. In the dark night we passed several villages silently, so that we might not be found by the villagers. After midnight we had walked 50 li. When we came to a house in one place we shouted for the inhabitants, hoping we might get a bed. The whole village was awakened by us and the men climbed up to a hill with their weapons, for they thought the Japanese soldiers had come. We slept on a cold brick bed for a little while, and set off the next morning before dawn. We passed several villages which had been burned down by the enemy, a proof of Japanese brutal behaviour.

Next morning we found a family living on a hillock, where we stayed for two weeks, getting ready to trudge again every day. During this period the people in the village fled three times, for

they heard that the enemy was passing by the neighbouring village, or it was reported that they had come to the other end of the village. But they did not come. In the two weeks we ate millet and walnuts every day, but our kind host often brought us some cabbage and mutton from the market. On the 25th of December came the good news that the Eighth Route Army was prepared to convoy us through the blockade lines to headquarters of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Army District (Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Border Region). On the 26th we passed a blockade line of the enemy which lay only 300 metres from an enemy fort. They were fast asleep then. We trudged from seven o'clock in the morning till eleven o'clock at night. At seven o'clock the next morning we set off again, climbing over a very high mountain—it took us an hour and a half to go down the other side. An icicle about three inches long was hanging from Lindsay's beard. It was very cold, and I had blisters on one of my heels.

We had to pass a dangerous blockade line the next day, and got up very early in the morning. When we passed the line, we saw a dark flame about 10 li from us in a certain village, and thought the enemy had just passed. We climbed hurriedly, and dared not stop even after we had crossed the line. When we came to a village, the people were frightened and some were running away, because the enemy had come there the day before. After we told them who we were, they were reassured. But when we asked them to give us some water, they urged us to go away: "You should not stop here, the enemy will come here any time." We had no alternative but to climb again. Having traversed several ravines, we arrived at a village. We drank some water there. As we asked for more, they also hastened us: "Hurry up, the enemy will probably come!", and we had to start again. After half an hour we arrived at a camp of the Eighth Route Army. It was now one o'clock in the afternoon.

That night a man from the village we had just passed came running to us and said that ten minutes after we had left, the Japanese had arrived. They forced the people to attend a meeting. Afterwards several men were arrested and one was shot. That night we slept rather uncomfortably. Though we had scarcely recovered, we set off again next morning, and by four o'clock in the afternoon had completed 60 li with empty stomachs. As the day before, we slept well that night.

We prepared to start at half-past eight in the morning, but learned that the enemy was across one route. So we decided to go through at midnight. The families along the way were reminded to have their dogs bound with cords beforehand and to stop them from barking, in order not to awaken the enemy.



When we were climbing a hill, we heard "barks", but soon the sound stopped. Thus we safely passed.

That night we slept in a village that had just been burned by the enemy. At two o'clock the next morning we took our breakfast and then slept for two hours. At five we started again. Before evening we passed another blockade line, and then we arrived at another place quartered by the Eighth Route Army. At eight o'clock next morning we set off again. It was only 50 li from this place to the base of the Shansi-Chahar-Hopei Army District. We arrived there on New Year's Eve. We ate so much that we could scarcely move the next day.

We remained for four weeks, and heard much news of Yen-ching University after we had left Peiping. We were told the enemy entered the school ten minutes after we left. Headquarters had winter clothes made for us. Lindsay worked in the radio station of the Eighth Route Army and I gave several lectures on the principles of Radio in the Radio School. I finished my work quickly and we left there soon after.

From headquarters to the Border Region we had to traverse one blockade line of the enemy and cross a great mountain range about 90 li long. We completed this section between one o'clock in the morning of the first day and half-past one in the morning of the next day. At every station we were welcomed by a reception—a chorus was sung or an anti-Fascist meeting held in our honour. It was only a five-day journey, but we took four weeks. We visited every place along the road. In one army sub-district we stayed for five days. We attended two drama performances and admired the excellent acting. During this week we visited the Branch Hospital of the Army District, Bethune's Hygienic College (it is called Yen-an Medical University of China now) and the headquarters of the Special Commissioner of the sub-district. The Cultural Working Corps of the Union of Universities performed Gogol's "Government Inspector" to welcome us. Their achievements in the fields of education and hygienic work greatly surprised us.

We stayed at the Engineering and Metallurgical Bureau for one or two days, and I was moved by their work.

Foundations for the construction of a new democratic China are being laid by these new scientists working here in this Army District. In the Anti-Japanese University we visited the Military Middle School and the University Department. All the organisations at the University received us warmly. I was greatly interested in the teaching programme of the various fields of science and I hope to co-operate with them so that work can be improved.

We have seen great heroes ourselves. We have also seen them

sing merrily by the side of their burnt houses or by their loved ones who were killed by the enemy. They will never stoop. Their spirit is unconquerable.

In a short time the Border Region Government has carried out thorough social and political reforms, replaced feudalism by democracy. Equality of the sexes is established. Popular education is abolishing illiteracy. We can repay our rescuers only by serving them.

## STORIES OF THE RESISTANCE

### PEOPLE'S MILITIA IN CENTRAL HOPEI

IT WAS a warm autumn night in the triangular region of Wan-hsien, Tang-hsien and Wang-tu, a station on the Ping-han Railway about 150 li north of Shihchachuang. Stretching for miles were long lines of lights from the swinging hurricane lamps hanging on the telegraph wire on both sides of the motor-road. Far away came the whistle of a train, and nearby was the sound of barking dogs mingling with the noise produced by the clanging of spades and shovels. In the small open space outside a hamlet 3,000 people's soldiers were gathered, ready to dig up the motor-road and fill the ditches on both sides of it.

Standing there in the dim moonlight, they looked like a group of people starting out for a picnic. They joked and laughed and were treating each other to peanuts and sweets bought from the busy hawkers. Spades, shovels and hoes were strapped round their shoulders like rifles, and knives, scissors and axes were stuck in their belts. Then the signal came for the march, and like a long snake they moved towards the motor-road, the blood-vessel of the Japanese aggressors.

The sound of digging and shovelling went on until the moon had travelled to the western horizon, when the long snake glided slowly homewards, singing in high spirits. Empty-handed they went, but now they returned with hurricane lamps, wires and telegraph posts. As they reached the place from which they started, they volleyed forth their songs in high tone, which were answered by loud cheers accompanied by bugle-calls. A few rifle-shots from the Japanese stronghold could be heard amidst the shouting and singing, as if to indicate that the Japanese and puppet soldiers were by no means unaware of what was being done. Having piled up their trophies and ascertained that none was missing, they dispersed to their homes. The sun appeared, shining on the empty open space which a moment ago was so full of noise and laughter.

Such is what one repeatedly witnesses in the guerrilla regions, the enemy's rear in North China. It symbolises what the people have done and are doing for the liberation of their country.

The war is approaching its fifth anniversary, and following in the wake of havoc and destruction, the economic strain on the people is becoming more and more heavy. To improve the life of the people, and to carry on the war of resistance (since the Eighth Route Army receives no subsidy of any kind from the Central Government, and consequently has to depend on what the impoverished people can contribute to the war chest), a way out must be found. The slogan "Efficiency in the army, and simplicity in administration" was raised. This means that a great number of departments in the Government are amalgamated to reduce the number of staff and functionaries, and side by side with this, the army is regrouped, releasing a great number of fighting members for productive occupations. The result of this is a reduction in quantity, but an improvement in quality, for those who are sick, weak and have special talent in other fields will be otherwise occupied than remaining in the forces. At the same time the manoeuvrability of the army and mobility of the Government departments are greatly improved to suit the conditions of guerrilla warfare. The most important point, however, is that all this lightens the burden of the people considerably.

But war in North China does not relax because of temporary Japanese successes in the southern Pacific, so in order to make up for the reduction in the number of regular troops, a movement for extensive organisation of People's Militia units was put into force. Committees of People's Armed Forces sprang up in every village.

These People's Militia units are composed of small guerrilla units, model self-defence corps and anti-Japanese vanguards of youth and women. Anyone above sixteen and under fifty years of age is eligible to join, without racial, class, sex or religious limitations. One joins of one's own will, under no compulsion or coercion. But in consequence of the excellent political mobilisation work of the Eighth Route Army, members of the Militia units comprise one-fifth of the population in North-west Shansi Border Region. The essential difference between the People's Militia and the Regular troops lies in two facts. Whereas the latter are constantly dispatched from one sector to another in time of need, the former never leave their own village or hsien, and, in fact, to remain there is their duty. Whereas the Regulars devote their time entirely to fighting and drilling, the Militia devote only one-fifth of their time to military action, while the rest is taken up by other productive work.

The main task of the Militia is to establish planned co-ordination in fighting with the regular army, and sometimes to fight independently. Then they are to harass and surround the enemy, intercept and destroy communication lines, check the activities of Japanese, puppets and traitors, arrest or annihilate small and isolated groups of enemy troops, and when there is a Japanese "mopping-up" drive, to act as rearguard in covering the retreat. They also spy on spies, act as sentries and guards, mislead the enemy by camouflaging the main forces of the regular army, and protect our own line of communications. For instance, when the majority of the Japanese soldiers in a nearby pillbox have gone out on a "mopping-up" drive, the members of the Militia will attack and occupy this pill-box. When the Japanese capture a batch of Chinese youth and lock them up in a fort, they will storm the fort. And what happens most frequently is that they will throw a hand-grenade or two at a pill-box in the darkness of the night just to instil fear and demoralise the Japanese and puppet soldiers.

By experience the People's Militia have discovered many new guerrilla tactics. In addition to "When the enemy advances we retreat, when the enemy escapes we harass, when he retreats we pursue, and when he gets tired we attack," they have invented, "when he sets fire we extinguish, when he plunders we attack, when he pursues we hide, and when he goes back we return". They have likewise invented many ways of giving signals and communicating amongst themselves and the regular army, as for instance the firing of the blunderbuss, beating of gongs, thrashing up of earth and placing a coat at the roadside.

Members of the Militia units receive special training. Besides the necessary political education with main emphasis on "the National United Front" and current news, they are taught the handling of arms, the technique of fighting at night, fighting in squads and platoons, throwing of hand-grenades and use of explosives. They are also trained for "break-road warfare", taught the art of iron-casting and iron-founding and the manufacturing of gunpowder and mines. The unit leaders are in addition instructed in village warfare. Thus we find that under every village Committee of People's Armed Forces there is a small factory which manufactures hand-grenades, gunpowder and mines.

Their equipment is inadequate and crude, though they have succeeded in providing every one of their members with one weapon. They are armed with blunderbusses which in time of peace were used to shoot pheasants, and other old-fashioned guns, which were introduced to China at the time of the Opium

War. The only modern weapons they have are hand-grenades. But the majority of them are armed with agricultural implements, which are both useful for killing and for digging up motor-roads and telegraph posts. Yet it is not at all surprising to find among their firearms, side by side with those mentioned above, some up-to-date rifles, machine-guns and bomb-throwers which were captured from the Japanese.

In Central Hopei from January to May, 600,000 people joined the Militia, and they succeeded in destroying 4,200 kilometres of motor-road. Communications between Tanghsien, Wan-hsien and Wang-tu were frequently interrupted and traffic on the motor-road between these three hsiens was held up for weeks at a time. As one Japanese officer in that region once, pointing at his stronghold, told a peasant, "That is our grave." Another was reported to have said, "Prizes will be awarded if our telegraph wires are not cut during the night—just to-night." The Japanese try to cut the Anti-Japanese bases into small segments and isolate the Chinese army. In return they are counter-isolated by the Chinese guerrillas.

In North-west Shansi the Militia units in two months fought with the enemy independently sixty-five times, killing seventy Japanese and puppet soldiers and capturing the same number, together with much war material. On one occasion two unit members were sent to get information of Japanese movements and met a party of Japanese soldiers on the road. The party was guided by a traitor and was pursuing a crowd of peasants fleeing helter-skelter to the hills. Instead of turning back, our guerrillas concealed themselves by the roadside and threw two hand-grenades at the party. This caused the Japanese to think they had been led into a trap by the traitor; so, instead of continuing the pursuit of the frightened peasants, they killed their guide on the spot and retreated as fast as they could the way they had come.

The influence of the People's Militia is so great that even small boys take part in anti-Japanese activities. In Hsing-hsien, North-west Shansi, for instance, a party of Japanese soldiers met a small boy of eight years on the road and asked him the whereabouts of the Eighth Route Army Headquarters. Without showing a hint of hesitation this clever boy directed them to a place where the Chinese army was lying in ambush. Taken unawares, the whole party was completely annihilated.

## THE MINERS

IF ONE recalls the thrilling news of the bombing of the famous Kailan coal-mines at Kuyeh, Hopei, by our allied American Army Air Force, one will be interested to know that ever since the war broke out the workers of these mines have been active in their struggle against Japanese enslavement. In the spring of 1938 the miners went out on a strike which lasted over a month. Altogether 60,000 from five different mines walked out for higher wages. During the stoppage they kept in close touch with the Communist guerrillas, who were already within the territory of the bogus "autonomous zone" of East Hopei (established by the Japanese as early as 1935). They were close to the outskirts of Tangshan, where the main mines are situated. As a result five or six new guerrilla detachments, including 5,000 miners, were formed spontaneously. Their leaders were also coal-miners. These worker guerrillas co-operated closely with the local peasant guerrilla groups which sprang up sporadically as a result of Japanese oppression. The worker guerrillas served as intelligence workers inside the city, as messengers, and as active fighters in the field. They contributed very much to the military activities of the Chinese troops by their intimate knowledge of the locality, their engineering skill, their courage and their experience of disciplined life. When the strike was over, 2,000 men left their work and remained with the guerrillas.

In the autumn of 1940, when the "hundred regiments" battle gave the Eighteenth Group Army possession of the biggest coal-mine in North China—the Tsingching mine on the Ch'eng-tai Railway—the workers strongly supported and co-operated with the troops. The army did not plan to occupy the mine permanently, but to destroy it, so as to handicap Japanese production. For three days the miners used the tools with which they had formerly been forced to work for the Japanese oppressors to damage equipment of vital importance. It rained heavily all the time. Water coming down from the hills flooded the damaged mine so thoroughly that it took the Japanese half a year to start work again. Many of the miners joined the guerrillas, taking their families. Many bodies of workers with these guerrilla units were formed under the auspices of the Workers' National Salvation Association. This was especially true among the railway workers, who had a tradition of fighting against their oppressors long before the present war. It began to be common to find highly skilled workers speaking perfect Peiping dialect in the remotest villages of Shansi, working in some small foundry, paper manufactory or hand-grenade plant.

K (Chinese Com.)

## THE WOMEN

BEFORE THE war with Japan the fertile plain of South Hopei annually yielded a large part of the total raw cotton production of North China. During the war the Japanese wanted to convert the land into one great cotton plantation. The Chinese peasants refused. And the Japanese control the cities only. The country is in the hands of Chinese guerrillas.

The Chinese have not given up cotton-planting. But they plant not for the Japanese, but for themselves and their soldiers. Cotton textile co-operatives have been organised throughout the area, under the leadership of the Regional Women's Association. Every village has several small co-operative units forming one or two co-operatives. Sometimes a co-operative unit is based on the family unit. In this way it is much easier to get common implements and better co-operation. Weaving and spinning are done by the women at home. When the Japanese come, they do not realise that these women are working for co-operatives under an anti-Japanese organisation.

The co-operatives were first sponsored by the local government, which lent the local Worker Association certain sums of money. The Worker Association bought a large quantity of raw cotton and distributed it to members to be spun and woven. When the cloth was sold, the women got half the price. The women found this profitable, and quickly joined the work. The men who found their wives bringing money home to lighten, no matter how little, their heavy burdens, were glad to let them work. Even the most conservative men did not oppose it, for their wives and daughters did not have to go out, but stayed at home to produce. Actually the main object in starting the movement was to elevate women's position in village society. By sharing a part of the economic burden of the family, they would acquire a voice in the house. This aim was achieved. Another consequence was the contribution of these co-operatives to economic reconstruction in the guerrilla bases behind the enemy lines.

The cotton textile movement has been enthusiastically supported by all kinds of people. Production has increased. Before 1939 most of the cloth for this region had to be imported from the occupied cities. But by the autumn of 1940 the local product became sufficient to meet the demand. The regional Government adopted a protective tariff for the homespun cloth as against the imported, which encouraged its development. In 1941 the co-operatives in South Hopei had surplus products to export to guerrilla areas which were not producing cotton. Now in the Border Region comprising South Hopei-south-eastern

Shansi-northern Honan, the soldiers and the peasants are wearing clothing produced by their proud sisters in South Hopei.

## FORCED LABOUR

DURING THE last few years the number of men captured by the Japanese in North China for forced labour has been surprisingly large. The *Yung Pao*, a Japanese-owned Chinese newspaper in Tientsin, has published the following figures showing how many able-bodied men were sent to Manchuria: 1939, 1,000,000; 1940, 1,500,000; 1941, 1,100,000.

After the outbreak of the Pacific War, the Japanese were confronted with labour scarcity. In North China they issued an order to draft labourers "by all possible means and as quickly as possible". Beginning in February 1942 they impressed several tens of thousands of men in south-eastern Shansi for this purpose. In May they arrested about 1,000 men within a single hsien. In Shantung in the Border Region between Hopei, Honan and Shantung, the puppet Government drafted ten men from every hsien to assemble at Tsinan for training. The bulletin of the Japanese Labour Association stated that in March 120,000 men had already been sent to Manchuria.

The impressment and drafting of men in North China are part of a well-conceived plan. In January 1942 the Puppet Sin Min Labour Association published an article entitled "To Build up a Policy Regarding the Demand and Supply of Labour this Year". It mapped out a plan, "to meet the demand for 2,000,000 labourers, Manchuria should be responsible for 1,500,000; Mongolia and the Border for 150,000; North China for 250,000; and Japan proper for 100,000". Throughout North China, in the occupied territories, the Japanese established various organisations and stations to draft labourers. They devoted much time and attention to propaganda.

When propaganda failed, they took off their masks and used a more direct way: capture or arrest. Along the main lines of communication and in the big occupied cities they established control posts. Any passer-by who was considered "suspicious" would be sent for forced labour. Along the various highways and railroads the Japanese called mass meetings of the people every three to five days. Every ten days to two weeks they sent drama groups to the villages to entertain the people. Before the meetings adjourned or before the show was over the entire audience was often driven to the trains for a free trip to "Manchukuo". The Japanese often called people together for training or for short-term work like building a specific road, or digging a

special trench. But when the people finished their work, they were detained and sent to Manchuria.

Even these ways did not entirely satisfy the Samurai, so they took one more step forward. They attacked villages in the guerrilla areas with large forces. They took away or exterminated every single person left in the villages or whom they met. From August 1941 they launched several big mopping-up campaigns. In these they created a no man's land in our guerrilla territories by carrying away the able-bodied men and killing the weak, the old and the women.

The more scattered and smaller villages are combined into larger units so that their residents can easily be transported to Manchuria *en masse*.

In North China trucks and trains loaded with Chinese going to Manchuria formed caravans on the various railways and motor roads. Most of the forced labourers were first concentrated in Linfeng, and taken later *via* the Tientsin-Pukow railroad to farther north. To prevent their escape, the Japanese stamped their faces or arms with indelible black seals. They were tied together with strong rope or wire. Sometimes during their "trip" the Japanese stopped to rob some of the near-by villages, and the captives had a chance to take a rest. They would crawl to near-by streams to get a drink. When the peasants around saw them and offered them help, they would wave their hands and say, "Get away quickly, or you yourself will be captured."

It was not only to meet the demand for labour that the Japanese carried away the people of North China *en masse*. A more important reason is their resolution to destroy our guerrilla bases behind their lines. They want to exterminate the Eighteenth Group Army and the peasant self-defence corps by taking all the able-bodied men away from the territory.

The Eighteenth Group Army and the local self-defence corps launched many campaigns to organise more guerrilla units from people who were unwilling to work under the Japanese. Thus more people were armed. To-day one could scarcely find a man, or even a woman, without some weapon to defend him or herself.

The Eighteenth Group Army and the guerrillas also attacked and ambushed the trucks and trains carrying their fellow-countrymen to Manchuria. Many were liberated, and later joined the guerrillas.

The local governments of the guerrilla areas gave the escaped people shelter and work. In their treasuries special sums were earmarked for the relief of those who had escaped from forced labour.

The puppet Government of Manchuria recently declared that

the problem of labour scarcity could be satisfactorily solved by the supply of man-power from North China.

## FIRE

ON JANUARY 25, 1941, the old Chinese New Year's Eve, a most horrible massacre took place in the so-called "land of peace and happiness". It happened in eastern Hopei, in a small village called the Pan Family Hill, in the Fengjun hsien. Here the Japanese killed 1,035 people, of whom 658 were women and children; eighty-four were wounded. More than thirty families perished without a single survivor. More than 1,100 houses were burnt.

On the day of the massacre the Japanese sent troops from Ch'ien-an, Luen-hsien, Lulung, Tsunhua and Fengjun hsiens to take over the village. Before dawn they had already completed their encirclement. They wanted to give proof of the invincibility of the Imperial army and to cow any anti-Japanese feeling among the people. They had decided that the proof must be the most relentless and bestial possible.

The whole family of the village head was first killed. The rest of the people were driven with lashes to the western end of the village.

Here there was a big empty basin which had formerly been used as a reservoir. The people crowded in it, wondering what their fate would be. Separating them from landlord Hui's courtyard there was a stone wall. Inside the wall, in the open courtyard, logs, dry twigs, pine branches, dry hay and other fuel was gradually being piled up. Japanese soldiers with rifles, hand grenades and two light machine-guns stood on the flat roof of the house.

The leader of the Japanese gang began to bark. He made several accusations against the village head. Spittle sprang from his mouth. He tapped the ground with his sword. The gang of Japanese and puppet beasts took his order and drove the people to the house inside the stone wall. The machine-guns opened fire. The people fell in swathes. Their incendiary grenades set the courtyard and house on fire. Until seven o'clock in the evening every house in the village burned. The sound of falling walls and the weeping and cries of the people could be heard miles away.

When the local Chinese Government of the guerrilla areas in the neighbouring hsiens sent its representatives to investigate, they met a few survivors. One was a wounded woman. She told them what had happened to her, "My elder son got two

shots in his left arm. While the Japanese continued to throw incendiary matter into the courtyard, my son caught sight of a pile of dry twigs, not yet on fire, climbed on to it, jumped over the wall and escaped. I held my younger son close to me. We were hidden in the pigsty. Not till I saw stars twinkling in the sky did I dare to come out with my half-suffocated son."

The people, unarmed as they were, were not docile. Children picked up stones to beat the enemy. An old man, Pan Kuo-sheng, holding his child to his breast, rushed towards the Japanese attempting to strike at them. He ran right in the front of the machine-gun, was shot down, but stood up again with clenched fists until he fell dead.

While the Japanese were riding on the mules of the people and eating the delicious grapes which they had laboured to plant and tend, men and women from the neighbouring villages were helping to put out the flames. The smell of burnt and charred bodies and houses was thick in the air. A seven-year-old girl was found the next day, still living, under the corpse of her father.

To avenge these atrocities, the Eighteenth Group Army launched several fierce attacks against the Japanese along the Luen River. Its Political Department sent 3,000 dollars to provide medical aid for the suffering people. Two doctors and a few nurses were sent to take care of the wounded.

When those who had escaped returned to their homes they found the village dead. In deep sorrow, but more with hatred and rage, they dug two graves on a slope. One was for the women, and the other for the men. Thus they buried their children, their parents, their brothers and sisters, their husbands and their wives. The public memorial meeting was held at midnight. There was no formal service or ceremony. The people stood in the roaring north-west wind. The deepest feelings express themselves best in silence.

A few days later many men joined the guerrillas.

### THE RICH LANDLORD

AN EMBROIDERED yellow flag with bright scarlet characters was flying from the top of a tall pine tree in front of old Mr. Wang's courtyard. People crowded below the bare, outstretched arms of the tree. Women giggled, children chased each other, old men sighed with satisfaction while smoking their pipes. The young men talked with each other about current events in the town, in China, and even in the world. Old Mr. Wang was busy; he mixed with the group, nodding, responding to every congratulation with "Ha, ha, thank you".

Old Mr. Wang owned 1,500 mow of land on the lower slope of the south-east Shansi mountains. He was regarded as the biggest landlord within 500 li. When the war started he was at Tai-yuan on some business engagement connected with his estate. He had stayed there for a year and witnessed the fall of the city into enemy hands. At first he could not decide whether to stay on in the enemy-occupied territory or return to his land in the guerrilla area of the Eighteenth Group Army, whom the Japanese depicted as worse than devils. It was a difficult problem, but when he thought of his land, he could not control himself. He started back home, telling his friends, "Good or bad, I'll die in my own land".

He found that his land was not deserted. People were cultivating it. He went to the local government, claiming ownership. He got the answer, "It will always be yours, since you have not been working for the Japanese. We welcome you home, to co-operate with us for the further development of agriculture. As for your land, we could not afford to let it lie idle. The people are now cultivating it. They will now pay rent to you instead of to the Government. You will not lose your property. Only the rents have been reduced. But that is for the common good of all."

This was entirely unexpected. Old Mr. Wang retained his position as the number one landlord. He supported the Government in all measures. He frequently appeared at public meetings. In the early summer of 1941, when the crop in the area was bad, the Government faced shortage of food for its staff and for relief work in the neighbouring districts. Old Mr. Wang presented 100 tan of millet and 200 tan of cereals to the Government as "his due".

The *Hsin Hua Jih Pao* north China edition published the news, applauding this patriotic and progressive landlord. The district Government sent him a flag with the bright scarlet characters, "Loyal to the nation, hospitable to the needy".

Looking through the lunar calendar, old Mr. Wang chose the fifteenth day of the second moon to hoist the flag in front of his house. He gave a big dinner-party, inviting all who would come, the local government officials and the Eighteenth Group Army representatives, to witness the ceremony and then enjoy themselves with "badly prepared" food, as the old man put it.

### RELIGION

IT WAS only by proving themselves democratic in action that the governments in North China could rally the full support of the people. Freedom of religious beliefs was a practical question

in North China, where more than in any other place in the country a great diversity of religious beliefs is to be found. In the Wutai area and near Suiyuan, the lamas are very important in the social life of the people. In Hopei, Mohammedanism is deeply rooted. In the centres of communication are both Protestant and Catholic missions—the latter extending far into the more remote villages of the interior—with their hospitals and churches. People believing in Buddhism and Taoism are even more common. To-day all these groups live harmoniously under the leadership of the Government in the common fight against Japan.

It is clearly stated in the programmes of the regional governments that the religious beliefs of the people must be respected.

In 1937, when the Eighth Route Army was operating in the Wutai area, the lamas gave it food and shelter. In 1938 a monastery with 500 monks in Kaoping hsien, south-eastern Shansi, was burnt down by the Japanese. The monks were killed, without a single survivor. The temple and its Buddhas were covered with blood. The monks of other near-by temples and monasteries asked the Eighth Route Army for advice. Our soldiers armed them, and they served as a part-time self-defence corps. The Eighth Route Army also sent political workers to help them to organise. Their religious ceremony remained. Wherever the army goes, it abides by its rule not to interfere with worship or violate the images of the Buddhas in the temples.

In Central Hopei there is a famous armed detachment called the Mohammedan detachment. When the Japanese occupied Ting hsien and Mohammedan centres along the upper section of the Peiping-Hankow Railway, they aroused the militant Moslems to fury. They came out in the dark night to kill the few Japanese sentinels, and, with nothing but their muscles to lift trucks and artillery, carried them into hiding. The Japanese had great trouble in managing the people. Exasperated, they subjected them to bloody slaughter. The Mohammedans found that without experience and knowledge, individual strength without organisation was insufficient to cope with the relentless, well-equipped Japanese troops. Groups of them joined the Eighteenth Group Army. They came with swords and arms taken from the Japanese. To respect their religion, they were organised into a special detachment. Instead of a political director, as in other detachments, they elected an ahung (mullah) to look after their daily life. Instead of a pork ration on feast days they got beef. While the soldiers listened to speeches or reports by their political directors they held religious services. It was only after three months that they themselves asked to have the same organisation

as their comrades in other units, that they began to have a political director instead of the ahung.

In the spring of 1938 General Chu Teh and his wife attended a Sunday service in a Catholic church in south-eastern Shansi. In the end he was invited to speak. He stressed freedom of religion, and appealed to all Catholics to participate in the fight against Japanese Fascism.

The Eighteenth Group Army is proud of the assistance it received from some Catholic sisters in getting medicines from the occupied cities. It was only after the outbreak of the war in the Pacific, when the Japanese burnt and closed down the monasteries, foreign and Chinese, that this help stopped.

Protestant missions have contributed to relief work for the refugees from the Japanese-occupied territories, and to medical aid to the soldiers and peasants, more often than can be told.

Thus, our troops, though very poorly equipped, are able to carry on the war against the much better-armed enemy, because they have the support of all.

## CHIANG KAI-SHEK'S "CHINA'S DESTINY"

*Keynote of China's Destiny by Chiang Kai-shek is its narrow nationalism and anti-foreignism. After its appearance in China it was severely criticised by scholars and historians on this account. Its arguments in defence of China's backwardness are reminiscent of those used by Hitler in defending Nazi nationalism. It was pointed out that its publication abroad would be undesirable. The first edition was suppressed in China, and it was announced that a second was being prepared. Translation into any foreign language was forbidden. This is a Chinese Communist criticism of the work.*

CRITICISM BY CHEN PAI-TA

SINCE THE publication of *China's Destiny* in the name of Chiang Kai-shek, Director-General of the Kuomintang, it has been suspected by many people in Chungking that the book was really written by Tao Hsi-sheng. Many people wonder why Mr. Chiang, as the leader of the Kuomintang, should allow his work to be written by a person so widely infamous for his association with the Nanking traitors, his constant advocacy of Fascism, opposition to the United Nations, and his still-continuing ideological links with Wang Ching-wei. They wonder if the Kuomintang is really so lacking in learned men that it could find no one else for this task.

Only a few days after the publication of *China's Destiny*, Tao Hsi-sheng wrote an article singing its praises, which was published by the *Central Weekly* on its first page. This again was strange. Why should the *Central Weekly* esteem Tao's articles so highly? Was it impossible to promote Mr. Chiang's book without Tao's commendation? It is no wonder that people were astonished.

Since *China's Destiny* was published over the name of Mr. Chiang, it attracted the attention of the people for his sake. They thought at first that since Mr. Chiang had published such a book, at such a critical moment of the war of resistance, it would contribute much toward the questions of how to prepare the counter-offensive against the enemy, or how to co-ordinate the

operations of the Allies to win final victory, because, as everybody knows, the factor that determines China's destiny to-day is the war of resistance, and nothing else. But after having read it, they were greatly disappointed, because the questions brought out in the book were entirely unexpected. Of the 213 pages, only twelve and a half deal with the war problem, while the bulk of it deals with internal problems—opposition to Liberalism and Communism and advocacy of comprador-feudalist Fascism or the New Absolutism (formally still wearing the mask of the Three People's Principles).

We Marxists usually despise those who try to conceal their political opinions, but Mr. Chiang does not conceal his opinions in this book—and this we welcome. However, we cannot agree with what Mr. Chiang says, and we deem it our duty to make public our opinions for the consideration and examination of our compatriots. Once Mr. Chiang said himself: "Anyone who sees mistakes in the actions and attitudes of the Kuomintang should correct and mend them". So it is a matter of necessity for us to bring forth our views and to discuss this work with its author and readers. Since Mr. Chiang's book concerns China's destiny and questions of life or death, existence or destruction, for 450 million Chinese people, not only all Communists, but indeed every patriotic citizen of China should give it his full attention and by no means neglect it.

At present the Kuomintang is plotting to dissolve the Communist Party and to abolish the Border Region. The official Central News Agency actually broadcast such news. It may be said now that we are approaching a period characterised by a wealth of peculiar opinions, to which, of course, we Communists cannot remain indifferent, especially when those peculiar opinions really play a part in events, as can be seen by reading this book. The criticisms here limit themselves to a few fundamental propositions of the book.

We hope that the author, the readers or any patriotic Chinese citizens who see differently from us on these questions will express their views also, as truth is not afraid of controversy, and that which is afraid of controversy is not truth. Countless Kuomintang publications have severely criticised Comrade Mao Tse-tung's *New Democracy*, while we have not yet given them any reply. So now, taking Mr. Chiang's book as a starting-point, let us publish some of our own opinions.

### (i) On the Chinese Nation

What Mr. Chiang says in his book regarding the question of the Chinese nation does not agree with the facts of history. For



example, the book says: "Our Chinese nation was formed through the amalgamation of many tribes of the same descent" and is composed of "big and small branches of the same blood". As we know, the theory of national blood relationship is in its origin a shallow idea of the German, Italian and Japanese Fascists, who have utilised it as an instrument to further their aggressions upon the world. It is really surprising and unexpected for us that Mr. Chiang should base his ideas on such a theory, which can never serve to explain the history of the formation of the Chinese nation. The term "Chinese nation" commonly used by us means, in fact, the various nationalities in China, which beyond argument is inhabited by more than one nation. The anti-Manchu movement carried on by the revolutionaries of the Tung Meng Hui headed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen at the end of the Ching dynasty was launched under the banner of nationalism, and in the declaration of the First Congress of the Kuomintang, personally edited by Dr. Sun, the phrase "the various nations within China's territory" was clearly written down. To deny this is to deny Dr. Sun and his principles.

The author of the book has always styled himself a true disciple of Dr. Sun, and now, having an idea of his own, he insists that there is only one nation in China! If it is correct, then there was no reason for Dr. Sun Yat-sen to call the 1911 Revolution a national revolution, and the words written in the solemn declaration of the First Congress of the Kuomintang—that "the right of self-determination of the various nations within China is recognised, and a free united China, by the free association of the nations, will be organised after the victory of the anti-imperialist and anti-warlord revolution"—had no meaning. Is it not clear that Mr. Chiang's idea is contrary to that of Dr. Sun?

Let us examine the question more closely. Are the Chinese nation and the Mongolian nation really "big and small branches of the same blood"? Is this also true of the Chinese and the Tibetans? Of the Mohammedans who came from the west? Of the Miaos, the Yaos, the Lolos, the Yis? Whence come the proofs for such statements?

The author has quoted a sentence from the Book of Odes, which reads: "The offspring of the Wen Emperor branched out to a hundred generations". But can we say that all the nations now in China were generated from the Wen Emperor? It requires only common sense, not profound knowledge, to prove that it is not so, and the author, lacking this common sense, has filled his book with errors.

Another attempt to prove the point of the book was the theory of the influence of "inter-marriage". But let us remind our-

selves that the marriage of an Emperor's concubine, Wang Chao Chun, in the Han dynasty to a Hun king (and we should not forget that this was a historic tragedy for a Chinese ruler who presented his beautiful concubine to another to seek a shameful peace) did not transform the Huns into a branch of the Chinese, nor did the marriage of a princess, Wen Cheng, in the Tang dynasty to a ruler of Tibet produce the same effect. Had it done so, the Chinese nation would have become a branch of the Japanese nation, because many Chinese, including many prominent Kuomintang leaders, have taken Japanese women to be their wives.

If the nations within China are to be characterised in this way, all Chinese history would become a tangle of incomprehensible and insoluble riddles. Thus war between the Chinese and the Huns in the Han dynasty could not be considered as a national war, but a civil war within the same nation (or should we say a conflict between the big and small clans?); the same would be true of the aggressions of the five barbarian tribes against China, the war between the Chinese and foreign nations in the period of Northern and Southern Dynasties, and the war between the Chinese, the Ougurs, the Tibetans, and the Sha To (Tadjik) tribes in the Tang dynasty. For the same reason, the struggles of the Chinese against the Khitans during the Five Short Dynasties, or that against the Khitans, Nurchen (Manchurians), Tartars and the Mongols during the Sung dynasty, or those against the Mongols and Manchus in the Ming dynasty, and even the struggle of the Tai-ping Revolution and the Tung Meng Hui against the Manchus, could not be considered national struggles, but internal struggles within a single nation. If such were the case, it would inevitably follow that such historical figures as Yueh Fei, Wen Tien-hsiang, Lu Hsiu-fu, Chu Yuan-chang, Hsu Ta, Yuan Chung-huan, Shih Ko-fa, Cheng Cheng-kung, Li Ting-kuo, Hung Hsiu-chuan, Li Hsiu-chang, the seventy-two heroes of the Yellow Flower Hill and Dr. Sun Yat-sen, who have added lustre to their nation and country and written pages in our history which have won many songs of praise as well as tears from the people, were a group of fools who sacrificed their lives for nothing significant. And the hateful and unpardonable traitors of Chinese history, such as Hsih Chin-tang, Chang Pang-chang, Liu Yu, Chin Kuei, Hung Cheng-chou, Tseng Kuo-fan and Chang Hsun, could then be "honoured in the temple halls" or "worshipped with bowls and censers for a thousand autumns". The whole of Chinese history would have to be rewritten, and our nation would have no historical background to distinguish it, if the author's interpretations were accepted.

Mr. Chiang says: "As to how the common destiny of the various clans was realised in history, we must give credit to the original moral qualities of our nation, which maintained the inward affection of the various clans and influenced the morality they already possessed".

Let us examine this question. The facts listed in the foregoing paragraph reveal that in history the struggles of the Chinese nation waged against the outside aggressors had been extremely cruel and merciless. How can Mr. Chiang account for such facts if what he says here is true? Doubtless there existed a fundamental difference between two kinds of people during the struggles of the Chinese nation against the invasions of foreign aggressors. The first kind were the broad Chinese masses who shed their blood and sacrificed their lives to resist aggression and were the fundamental motive power in the defence of their mother country and the recovery of what had been lost. The second kind were the corrupt rulers, who, in facing aggression, adopted the attitude of "preferring to give things to foreign nations rather than let them fall into the hands of their own slaves", or sacrificed even the honour of Sons of Heaven "to swallow the humiliation of calling themselves servants, sons, nephews or grandsons of the invaders; or offered gold and silks as tributes to the enemy; or tried to please him by executing the patriotic generals who insisted on resistance (refer to the history of the Five Short Dynasties and of the Ming dynasty). It was these emperors and premiers who used to rule their people by such magic spells as "loyalty, filial duty, benevolence, love, faith, righteousness, harmony and peace" or "filial duty, fraternity, loyalty, faith, propriety, righteousness, purity and modesty". Perhaps the way they kowtowed to the invaders was their practice of the above virtues, but what is there in their virtues that is worth of our pride?

Speaking scientifically, a nation is characterised by its common language, common territory, its common economic life and the common psychological expressions of its life revealed by its common culture. National struggles are merely the historical results of the differentiation of societies into classes. They did not exist at the time of the emergence of human beings, nor will they continue to exist forever in the future. The war we are carrying on now, as described by comrade Mao Tse-tung, is "to fight for the permanent peace of mankind". Not only that, but even before the realisation of a permanent harmony in mankind, nations originally antagonistic to one another may be assimilated into one nation due to concrete historical conditions, as was the case with certain nations which settled down in the

inland of China and were assimilated by the Chinese. The Manchus, in fact, have been assimilated by the Chinese to-day, yet this is certainly not due to the so-called "original virtues" of the Chinese, but to the fact that the Manchus, dispersing themselves through the country, came among a people far more advanced than they were and far superior to them economically, culturally and politically, to say nothing of their overwhelming superiority in numbers. Thus, after long, cruel struggles, they were assimilated by the Chinese.

To-day's world is a world of science. The history of the nations in the world should therefore be approached scientifically. The trick of distorting, altering and fabricating the history of nations, as practised by Fascists, cannot be our example, and to teach the people in such a way is to fool them. The reason why the big landlords and big capitalists of China have had to fabricate such a chauvinistic theory is to propagate the Tai Han Chu Chuyi (Pan-Sinoism) and to oppress the weak minorities within China. Since we Chinese are a weak people ourselves, we should unite with the minorities within our country, democratically and on an equal footing, so that we can resist the invaders together. If we resist the invaders on one hand, and oppress the national minorities on the other, we are leaving a loophole for the enemy to destroy our work of national liberation. Every clear-minded Chinese citizen should understand this.

The big landlords and the big capitalists of China, and everywhere else, consider the nation their own property. "I am the nation and the nation is I" is what they always think. But let us see what constitutes a nation? Does not the overwhelming majority of our nation consist of workers and peasants? Without our 90% or more of labouring people whence would come our clothing, foodstuffs and dwelling-places? Where would we get our troops for the war of resistance? And whence comes our culture? Is it not clear that the peasants and the workers are the main body of our nation, that their benefits are entirely identical with the benefit of the whole nation, and that it is only they who are qualified to represent the nation? And is it not theft for others, especially for those who oppress the workers and the peasants, to call themselves the representatives of the nation? Since the labouring people are the main body of the nation, is it not evident that the slogan "The nation is supreme", "The country is supreme" can only mean that the labouring people are supreme? And is it not clear that to consider the labouring people as the lowest means to consider the nation and the country as the lowest?

Who constitutes the main body of the nation? Only a correct answer to this question can enable us to explain the question of the nation, of its force, of its constitution, or why the Chinese nation could revive from the decadence and destruction of the past, or how to prepare the counter-offensive and win the final victory in the war (*i.e.*, the question of mobilising or not mobilising the masses, practising or not practising democracy), or who should be the master in the post-war China. Comrade Mao Tse-tung's *New Democracy* and many other documents of the Chinese Communist Party answered this question several years ago, but the author of *China's Destiny* now considers "a minority of the people" and the "virtues" to be the decisive factors of the nation. This is where our opinion and that of the big landlords and the big capitalists' diverge regarding the question of China's destiny.

### (ii) On Chinese History

Now let us turn to the question of Chinese history, particularly of modern Chinese history. In past struggles of the Chinese nation against natural forces, backward systems and foreign invasions, the main force lay in the labouring masses. They are the chief motive power of our history. They have created all the achievements of the past and the present, but have not enjoyed any of them. They have struggled amid greatest hardship and bitterness, but the fruits of their struggles have been stolen by the ruling few, while they themselves were left with hardship and bitterness as usual. Each time when the labouring people of China were most cruelly exploited and oppressed by the rulers, to the extent that they could not breathe freely, foreign invasions inevitably followed. And then the same labouring people would again rise and become the force to recover what was lost.

Mr. Chiang says: "After the Manchus entered the gates of the Great Wall, the national consciousness of the Chinese people gradually disappeared". This is untrue. The fact is that after the Manchus came to rule China, those who lost their national consciousness were limited only to a few rulers and the upper circle of scholars and officials, while the broad masses of the Chinese people were forever rich in national thoughts, and continually carried on their national struggles. The closer history moved towards modern times, the greater was the conscious strength of the people, and the national thought of the Chinese people, after the Manchus came to China, became broader, more penetrating and more lasting than in any previous period of subjugation. The far-stretching organisation of the Hung

Society and its ability to survive for a long period without being eradicated is the best illustration of this fact. Dr. Sun, who recognised this, said: "While the scholars and officials were indulging themselves in titles, incomes, and ranks, the so-called low-born society organised themselves into the Hung Society, preserving in it the thought of opposing the Ching dynasty and restoring the Ming dynasty."

This was one phase of the development. The other phase was the development of slave ideology, which found its most prominent representative in Tseng Kuo-fan (or Tseng Wen-cheng), whom the author of *China's Destiny* continually praises. (Let us not forget that the name Wen-cheng was a posthumous title bestowed after Tseng's death for his services in eradicating the Tai-ping Revolution against the Manchus.) And see what the author writes about the Manchu dynasty! He says: "In the Ching dynasty the scale of national reconstruction was so magnificent and far-sighted, and the political structures and codes were so well and precisely planned, that it could actually compare with the traditions of the Han and the Tang dynasties, and surpassed those of the Sung and Ming dynasties, not to say the Yuan. . . . If only the Manchus could have done away with the boundaries that separated the Chinese, Manchus, Mongols, Mohammedans and the Tibetans, treated them all alike on an equal basis, and recognised that our five branches are in fact one unified body. . . . But they were limited by the time and thought. We cannot expect that the Manchus should have put such policies into practice, and we should not find fault too caustically. . . ." Not a trace of national consciousness is to be found in what Mr. Chiang says here.

In the middle of the Ching dynasty the Chinese nation met a new kind of invader, different from those of the past. They were the capitalist and imperialist countries, which came along with their superior economic forces and broke through the "Great Wall of China". The Chinese people were not so powerless in resisting new aggressors against our nation. The weakness in China's power to resist was due on one hand to the "prison of nations" created by the Manchus, and on the other hand to the "prison of absolutism" in which they kept the people.

The author of *China's Destiny*, on the contrary, says: "The decline of our national standing and the subsidence of the people's spirit in the past hundred years were generally caused by the unequal treaties." An interpretation of this kind is to turn everything upside down—to take the effect for the cause. Why was the Chinese nation fettered by the unequal treaties? Was it not the result of the dark political despotism of the Manchurians

which suppressed the Chinese people and prevented them from rising against the invaders? If what the author says is true, then China must have been a prosperous and strong country, and the Chinese people all high-spirited before the existence of the unequal treaties. But if China was such a country, how, then, could so many unequal treaties be imposed on her?

However, the author admits at the same time that "As regards the cause of national humiliations, we must trace them to the corruption of the Manchus, to the deterioration of politics, and especially to the decline of learning and society". Here the author has pointed out the "cause" at last! But if this be really the "cause", what of the other idea which we have quoted above? Are not the two ideas of the author mutually contradictory? What logic!

Now let us turn to something else. First, the author says that there was "a deterioration in politics" (the author is not willing to mention absolutism. We shall have something further to say regarding this point later). This remark contradicts what he says in another place when he praises the Ching dynasty in the following terms: "The scale of national reconstruction was so magnificent and far-sighted and the political structures and codes were so well and precisely planned."

Secondly, according to the author, national humiliations were caused "especially by the decline of learning and society", but did not the author also say: "Between the reign of the Emperor Tao Kuang and Hsien Feng, such people as Tseng Kuo-fan, Hu lin-yi, Tso Tsung-tang, and Li Hung-chang all considered it their responsibility to change the social customs. Tseng Kuo-fan advocated firmness in the execution of law, and valued manliness and character in employing personnel. In the cultural sphere, he absorbed the thoughts of the Han and the Sung dynasties, with faith as the basis. In conducting himself and his affairs, he followed the spirit of 'being careful when alone, emphasising respect, seeking for benevolence and practising labour'. So the success of the Hunan troops and the Anhwei Militia was not something accidental"?

If so, it seems that we should have had fewer national humiliations, and yet our national humiliations were as plentiful as blackberries. The teaching of history is evidently contrary to what the author has said here. The reason why China was overwhelmed by national humiliations was precisely "the success of the Hunan troops and the Anhwei Militia" under Tseng Kuo-fan and Li Hung-chang. A reading of history will at once tell us so. The Tai-ping Movement had ruled many provinces for more than ten years and had come into contact with foreigners, but it had never

concluded any unequal treaty with them. It was just because of that that they aroused the indignation of imperialists who organised "Gordon's Ever-Victorious Army" to attack them from the outside, collaborating with the Manchu troops, and caused the failure of this revolution. If the Taiping Revolution had been successful in crushing "such people as Tseng, Hu, Tso and Li", overthrowing the Ching dynasty, establishing the new regime, arousing the people's spirit, and organising the national defence, the imperialists would never have been able to bestow so many national humiliations upon us. This is why we say the success of the Hunan and Anhwei troops was the failure of the people and the victory of imperialism. National humiliations naturally piled up when the people had failed and the imperialists won.

Two sayings of Dr. Sun should be recommended here: First, "The former weakness and decline of China was due to the harsh oppressions of absolutism". Second, "Thirty years ago our revolutionary comrades resolutely decided that it was impossible to make China strong and prosperous unless by promoting the principle of democracy". Dr. Sun's words are concise and right to the point. Is it not lamentable that his bequeathed teachings should be discarded by his disciples?

To save China, the people's rights must be developed, and old China must be reformed. This is an iron law. Why do we have to reform the old China? Is it not because the regime in old China was too dark, too cruel, too backward and too hypocritical? Is it not because the economic system of China mercilessly squeezes the broad masses, drinks, first of all, the blood and sweat of the peasants, makes them suffer hunger and renders the development of national economy impossible? Is it not because the methods of government of old China, from the Pao Chia system to the central power, stifled the life and the political activities of the people? Is it not because the cultural and educational systems and policies of old China were systems and policies for deceiving the people? How can we stand on our own feet and resist aggression if the old China is not reformed? How can we achieve our final victory if we do not seek for progress, but go backward always, in the anti-Japanese war to-day? Unfortunately, the author of *China's Destiny* describes this old China as a "golden world", the economic system of old China before she opened her doors to the West as ideal, her politics, her social customs and her ethics as ideal also. In a word, all these things were the best in the world. What we want to know is if everything was so perfect, why did not China resist the imperialists, but instead had to surrender and sign so many unequal treaties? This is only one of the self-contradictions in the book.

To let the readers see how the author has described the "golden world" of old China, I shall quote from the book. One glance alone will show how exquisite is the writing.

Regarding "economy": "The foundation of our country lay originally in agriculture. The distribution of agriculture in the whole country was even and balanced, except in some border provinces and districts, so the density of the population in the country did not vary much. The Government paid equal and universal attention to all parts in planning communications, and this tradition was carried down for generations and generations. Though economic development began from the rivers, and later spread to sea coasts, yet the progress of national construction did not show any sign of partiality and unevenness" (p. 59, Chinese edition).

Regarding the "social organisation": "The original social organisation of China, according to blood relationship, proceeded from the individual, to the family, and then to the clan. According to regions, it proceeded from the family, to the Pao Chia, and then to the village, etc. The two systems were quite distinct, and the education and training in both systems was the object of endeavour by the ancient virtuous men and philosophers. There were mottoes and rules of self-restraint for the individual to observe in his daily life; the family propriety and family instructions for the families; and pedigrees and clan rules for the clans. This was also true of the Pao Chia, the village and rural communities, all of which had their own rules and regulations to observe. This spirit of self-government brought about the actual effect of modelling individuals and the families, without waiting for the interference of the law, and the morality of mutual assistance led to the public benefit, without requiring the supervision of the Government. There were also village schools for educational purposes, and public fields and public lodging-houses for relief purposes. For storing grain against famine, we had public barns. For prevention and capture of robbers and outlaws, we had the binding mutual-guarantees of the Pao Chia system. Even the repair and construction of dams and roads, and the deepening of rivers and ditches were all done by village social labour. This is what Mencius described as 'mutual friendship when going out and coming in, mutual assistance when guarding and watching the village, and mutual support when in trouble'. This is the 'strict observance of the instructions of schools and colleges to teach the meaning of filial duty and fraternity', or what the book *Li Yun* described thus: 'The elders can pass the remainder of their lives fittingly; adults can be used fittingly; the young can be brought up fittingly; and the

old bachelors, widows, orphans, elders without sons, and the maimed can be taken care of fittingly.' The above ideals were always active in the old society of China" (pp. 61-62).

Regarding "social customs": "For the past five thousand years the ancient sages and the virtuous men of China have devoted their lives tirelessly to promoting social customs . . . so we are still able to maintain in our social customs the elements of faith, honesty, hard work, plain life, esteem of propriety and righteousness, and comprehension of purity and modesty. This is the fundamental reason why the Chinese nation could survive in the world for a long time" (pp. 62-63).

Regarding "ethics": "Ancient Chinese philosophy and ethics revealed deeply and in detail how the relationships of mankind and society were maintained. Though social organisation is constantly evolving, the following are the unchangeable universal rules of social life, i.e., the way of fathers and sons, husbands and wives, brothers and friends, and the order of the upper and the lower, superiors and inferiors, men and women, elders and juveniles, as well as the principle of mutual assistance among neighbours and in adversity" (p. 67). "The original philosophy of life of China, created by Confucius, developed by Mencius, and explained by the Confucian school of the Han dynasty, formed a lofty system of its own, and is superior to any other philosophy in the world. Despite this, however, the Chinese nation still humbly accepted foreign religions, absorbed their deep philosophical ideas and let them be mutually developed with the original philosophy of life of China" (p. 69).

How splendid! We have stepped into a paradise here! But if the feudal agricultural economy of China was so ideal for us, why do the Japanese Fascist robbers propose "an agricultural China and an industrial Japan"? And why should our enemies be so anxious to preserve the feudal agricultural economy of China? Since the Pao Chia system of old China was so ideal and so beneficial to our people, why should the Japanese imperialist robbers impose such a system in the occupied territories? Since the social customs and ethical thoughts of old China were so ideal, and so superior to those of the rest of the world, why should the Japanese robbers promote every day in their occupied territories this same so-called "original culture" and the "original virtues of the Orient"? Is it because the Japanese robbers have really fallen in love with the Chinese nation, and consequently want the Chinese people to preserve and develop such "ideal" things so that they can destroy the aggression of the Japanese robbers?

Certain historical truths need to be discovered by thoughtful

and meditative thinkers. Others are easily understood even by the most ordinary men and women. The reason why the Japanese imperialist robbers particularly want the Chinese people to preserve and develop all these rotten, old backward things is because these "virtues" are the instruments with which they want to strangle the development of China's history, to strangle the resistance and self-consciousness of the Chinese people.

Why then should Mr. Chiang do his utmost to praise these things? What is liked by Mr. Chiang is also liked by the Japanese Fascists. Is it because "all mouths prefer the same flavours and all ears prefer the same sounds"? The idealist interpretation of history adopted by Mr. Chiang is something with which we absolutely cannot agree, though we cannot discuss it here on account of lack of space.

### (iii) On the Modern Thought of China

As we know, in their aggressions against China, the imperialists have wanted the Chinese people to preserve all the old things, and have not wished them to be modernised economically, politically, or in their ways of thinking. That is to say, they have not wanted the Chinese people to accept the advanced development of the West, or to have science, democracy and self-consciousness, because the advanced development of the West, science, democracy and self-consciousness would turn China into a strong modern nation, which would be disadvantageous to the aggressors. Therefore the unequal treaties became fetters on Chinese people to prevent them from accepting and developing the advanced ideas of the West. However, the idea of the author of *China's Destiny* is the opposite of this. It seems to him that it was only through the unequal treaties that the Chinese people became able to receive the advanced thoughts of Europe and America, and that for this reason the unequal treaties were bad. The author has tried his utmost to curse and scorn all the new culture that came after the May Fourth Movement of 1919, and his talk of the "deepening of the influence of unequal treaties" is aimed mostly at this point.

What was the May Fourth Movement? Let us quote a paragraph from the *New Democracy*, by Comrade Mao Tse-tung.

"The May Fourth Movement was an anti-imperialist as well as an anti-feudal movement. The outstanding historical significance of the May Fourth Movement lies in the fact that it possessed a feature that was not present in the 1911 Revolution—i.e., that it opposed imperialism and feudalism in the most thorough and uncompromising way. The reason why the May Fourth Movement possessed this characteristic is that the capitalist economy

of China had made a new step in its development at that time, and that the then revolutionary intelligentsia of China had personally witnessed the disintegration of three big imperialist countries, Russia, Germany and Austria, the wounding of two of them, Britain and France, the construction of the Socialist State by the Russian proletariat, and Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy in the grip of proletariat revolutions. All these things gave new hope for the liberation of the Chinese nation. Thus the May Fourth Movement broke out at the call of the world revolution, of the Russian Revolution and Lenin, and was a part of the world proletariat revolution of that time. Although we did not have a Chinese Communist Party during the May Fourth Movement, many intellectuals did possess primary Communist thoughts and approved the Russian Revolution. At its beginning the May Fourth Movement was a united front revolutionary movement of three kinds of people, the Communistic intelligentsia, the revolutionary petit-bourgeois intelligentsia, and the bourgeois intelligentsia (which formed the right wing). . . . The cultural revolution of the May Fourth Movement opposed feudal culture in a thorough-going way, and there was never such a great and thorough cultural revolution in the history of China. It achieved success under two banners: opposing the old morality and promoting the new morality, and opposing the old literature and promoting the new literature."

Therefore the May Fourth Movement initiated a great new epoch in the self-consciousness of the Chinese people. Without the May Fourth Movement we could not have had the Great Revolution, the agrarian revolution and the war of resistance of the past six years. This is why the May Fourth Movement is so much hated by all the reactionaries and counter-revolutionaries.

Imperialist aggression against China brought agony and bitterness to our people. It created within China a lot of imperialist lackeys, from Tseng Kuo-fan, Li Hung-chan, to our disciples and grand-disciples of Hitler, Mussolini and Tojo to-day. These lackeys have always served the foreign aggressors and can never avoid the stigma of traitors, no matter how hard they advocate the old culture, old ethics and old moralities of China. On the other hand, this same imperialist aggression forced the Chinese peoples to waken from their dreams and compelled them to study the advanced thought and techniques of the foreign countries—for the sake of opposing the aggressors and their lackeys. Such are the dialectics of history.

The reform of Chinese thought began from the ideas of liberty, equality and fraternity advocated by the Tai-ping Revolution. The "study of benevolence" preached by Tan Szu-tung repre-

sented a brave offensive against the spider-web of old Chinese ethics and morality. At that time lackeys of the Empress Dowager, such as Yeh Teh-huei and Chang Chih-tung, and representatives of reactionary ideologies cursed the reform movement and shouted that "ethics" and "the way of the sages" were unchangeable forever. Their ideas have been inherited by all the subsequent traitors and reactionaries of China, even up to the present moment. The May Fourth Movement was a mass movement in ideology, and many stubborn elements, reactionaries and foreign lackeys trembled like aspen leaves before this irresistible new force. However, a historical movement is never a straight line. Some of the participants of the May Fourth Movement continued going forward, others stopped midway, while still others changed their minds and ran in the opposite direction. To-day only the Communists and revolutionary democrats of China still remain as the pillars and shock fighters of the new culture. They are heading in the only direction that will revive the Chinese nation from its moribund state. These fighters do not change or compromise. They are the greatest source of the national confidence and national self-respect of the people.

The author of *China's Destiny* writes as follows: "Since the May Fourth Movement, the ideas of Liberalism and Communism have prevailed in China . . . with the result that people generally consider that all Western things are right and all that belongs to China is wrong. They worship this or that foreign country, all in a similar manner. Different cliques exist among them only because there is more than one country and one foreign theory in the world. Each clique imitates one particular country and worships one particular theory, forming a group of its own, proud before its countrymen but submissive before the foreigner. Since the theories of the various countries are forever changing, therefore the theory of each of these groups has to change unceasingly in accordance with the foreign changes. As to the struggle between Liberalism and Communism, it is merely a reflection of the opposition of Anglo-American thought to that of Russia. Such theories and politics are not only unfit for the national life and the people's livelihood of China and opposed to her original cultural spirit, but also reveal that their promoters have fundamentally forgotten that they are Chinese and have lost the standpoint of learning for China and applying their learning for China."

No doubt, the advanced ideas of different countries are not the same. There is one kind of advanced thought (e.g., democracy) which reflects a certain advanced stage (the anti-feudal stage)

and is needed by a certain advanced revolutionary class at this stage; there is another kind of more advanced, or the most advanced, thought (e.g., Communism) which reflects a more advanced stage (anti-capitalist stage) and is needed by a more advanced revolutionary class.

Modern China finds herself in a period of great world changes, and the struggles and various relations, internal and external, of the various classes and the various kinds of people in Chinese society are interwoven one with another. Therefore even at the same time, the various schools of advanced thought in the world may be accepted by representatives of our various social classes, and co-operation of a certain type may arise among them. Here is one example. Dr. Sun Yat-sen, a revolutionary bourgeois democrat, accepted the Western democratic ideas of Lincoln (of the people, by the people and for the people) together with the experience of the Russian Revolution (he said: "I take Russia as my teacher), while the Chinese Communists, as the representatives of the proletariat, accepted scientific Communism—Marxism-Leninism. Dr. Sun and the Communists co-operated with each other after 1924. This co-operation was beneficial to the nation, as has been proved by the Great Revolution.

Again, there is another portion of our people, the Liberals and the democrats, whose thoughts reflect the ideology of certain classes or strata, and who, according to their needs, may co-operate with the Communists in a certain period and on certain questions. Such co-operation is also beneficial to the nation, as has been proved by many facts. Whether this is fit for "the national life and the people's livelihood" depends upon one's view of the benefits of the nation and the people. Other than these, all are false issues.

It is rather peculiar that Mr. Chiang should openly oppose the liberal principles of Europe and America and the Communistic principles of Russia. Do not all the Fascist countries as well as their lackeys, like Wang Ching-wi, shout madly that every one must oppose Liberalism and Communism? Can we help being afraid that as soon as they see Mr. Chiang's book, Hitler, Mussolini, Tojo, Wang Ching-wei and others will think that Mr. Chiang is singing in unison with them? And that the book will shock and disappoint Roosevelt, Churchill, Stalin and all anti-Fascist people?

Moreover, the various countries of the world not only have their advanced and revolutionary ideas, but also reactionary and counter-revolutionary ones. Since there are progressives and reactionaries, revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries in China, therefore world reactionary and counter-revolutionary

thoughts naturally find a welcome and worshippers among certain Chinese. There is no need for us to cite examples from afar. Here is a nearby one. Are not the official Kuomintang publications *San in Chu I Semi-Monthly* and *Central Weekly* propagating on a great scale the Fascism of Hitler and Mussolini, and describing Hitler and Mussolini as two of the "six great leaders" of the world? Yet this is only the surface. Besides this, there are certain groups who, fearing that Fascism is too disreputable, too contrary to the national benefit, too unfavourable to the Allies, and too "hand and glove" with the German, Italian and Japanese robbers, dare not openly advocate it; but who try to smuggle it in as contrabands under every kind of camouflage, and to peddle it everywhere. This is done not only by the small men of the Kuomintang, but also by its important figures—as is now universally known.

As regards the remark "proud before one's countrymen but submissive before foreigners", one should sometimes look in the mirror. There is a gentleman in China\* who thought, at the time of the Russian October Revolution and the Chinese Great Revolution, that the Soviet Union might be helpful to him. So he went to the Soviet Union himself, humbly asked for advice, sent his son to study there, and declared that "China's revolution must be led by the Third International". Later on, when he became anti-Communist and anti-Soviet, the same gentleman went to Tokyo to interview Mitsuru Toyama, the Japanese secret service leader, and declared that it was necessary for China and Japan to unite together. After that, he was converted to the "foreign" Christian religion. Later yet, as soon as Hitler came to power in Germany, he sent another son and a great number of his followers to study there—to learn Fascism. For wholly ten years he relied on foreign funds and ammunition to fight against the revolutionary Chinese people in a war that was planned and directed by foreigners, among whom there was the famous General von Seeckt, leader of the Reichswehr, and a German police chief whose special task was to teach secret service methods. Even after the outbreak of the war of resistance, he still relied on foreign Powers and ammunition, and even expects the foreigners to fight the war for him. What shall we call this? Are not such actions and thoughts "proud before one's countrymen but submissive before the foreigners" and "the great hidden trouble of the national spirit"?

Now let us say something about the Communists. As far as the theory of Marxism-Leninism is concerned, the Chinese Communists not only have the ideology of the Russian Com-

\* Chiang Kai-shek.

munists but also of the Communists of the various countries of the world. However, scientific Marxism-Leninism demands that the Communists of every nation work out their political programmes and decide their policies according to their own national conditions, and rely on their own people for self-salvation. The Chinese Communist Party works according to this principle. It has created all kinds of progressive forces, entirely through its own efforts, without dependence on any "foreign country". Not an item of ammunition was given it by foreign countries, nor has it ever relied on foreign funds to carry on its fight. It determines its own strategy, and is "self-resuscitating".

The Eighth Route Army and the New Fourth Army, led by the Chinese Communists, have resisted more than half the Japanese forces stationed in China, and have never dreamed that the foreigners would do all the fighting for our country. In the regions under the influence of the Chinese Communists not a single unequal treaty, or even half of a treaty, has ever been signed with the foreigners—like the Tangku Truce, the Ho-Umetzu Agreement and the Shanghai Truce. The policies and actions of the Chinese Communists are welcomed everywhere by the Chinese people because they are identical with the benefits of the nation and the people. The Chinese Communists have never relied on one country to-day and another country to-morrow, with an attitude as changeable as April showers, and have never been "proud before their countrymen but submissive before the foreigners". These are the results of the thoughts of the Chinese Communist Party, which is a hundred per cent. revolutionary party of the Chinese people, "learning for China and applying their learning for China". It finds no comparison in China.

It is evident that from the beginning there have been two kinds of traditional culture in China. One belongs to the people and is revolutionary and bright. The other is against the people and is counter-revolutionary and dark. At the commencement of contemporary Chinese history the Tai-ping Revolution and Dr. Sun were the representatives of the former, while Tseng Kuo-fan and all the anti-Communist and anti-popular elements of the present time represent the latter. Despite the fact that there was foreign ideology in the Tai-ping Revolution, "liberty, equality and fraternity" truly represented the thoughts of the Chinese people, and the Tai-ping leaders were real Chinese heroes. Despite the fact that Tseng Kuo-fan spoke constantly of "benevolence, righteousness, morality, the five ethical relations", etc., he was still a "twofold" slave to the Manchurians and to the imperialists. The Chinese Communists have succeeded to all



the superior revolutionary traditions of China from ancient times down to Hung Hsiu-chuan and Dr. Sun Yat-sen, while the reactionaries have inherited the traditions of Tseng Kuo-fan and Yeh Teh-hwei. The reactionaries want to abolish the progressive traditions and preserve the backward one, while we do exactly the reverse. This is where the difference lies on the question of Chinese culture and thought.

#### (iv) On the Kuomintang-Communist Relation

Mr. Chiang has disregarded all the main historical facts of the first Kuomintang-Communist co-operation and made false and extremely vicious accusations against the heroic and patriotic Chinese Communist Party. There are tremendously provocative words in this part of the book aiming to inflame the people's enmity against the Chinese Communists. It is therefore necessary to bring to light once more pages of great importance in our history which have very much indeed to do with China's destiny.

In 1924 the Kuomintang was reorganised and the first period of co-operation between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party was initiated under the direction of Dr. Sun Yat-sen. At that time Dr. Sun was maintaining himself in Canton, in a tiny corner of South China. His revolutionary banner was not bright and his power did not extend beyond his own headquarters. All military, political, financial and other authority was in the hands of war-lords who practised counter-revolution under the revolutionary flag. And the Kuomintang did not have a single healthy revolutionary organisation strong enough to help the revolution in any place.

It was at that time and under those conditions that Dr. Sun Yat-sen, with his brilliant far-sightedness, asked for the help of the Chinese and Soviet Communist Parties. The Chinese Communist Party at once came out to give Dr. Sun the aid which, together with help in every respect from the Soviet Union, made possible the re-organisation of the Kuomintang and created a situation completely new in the Chinese Revolution.

First, regarding the revolutionary banner and revolutionary programme. Before the co-operation the Kuomintang had no programme against imperialism and against the feudal social system. The Nationalism of the Three People's Principles was originally meant to oppose the Manchus, and it was deficient in content once the Manchus had been overthrown. This historical fact has been stated in Dr. Sun Yat-sen's *Past Events of Chinese Revolution* and proved by all works of Dr. Sun. The revolution to oppose imperialism is one of the main contents of the Chinese revolution. Without the anti-imperialistic movement, China

would never be able to get rid of her semi-colonial position, but on the contrary would become a colony of Japanese imperialism. The hoisting of the banner of anti-imperialist revolution and the carrying out of the revolutionary movement to oppose imperialism and to abolish the unequal treaties were important events which enabled the Chinese revolution to step forward to a completely new stage, from the old democratic revolution to the new democratic revolution.

The Kuomintang's principle of democracy in the San Min Chü I, before the re-organisation in 1924 was an expression of the old democracy which did not have the contents of thorough struggle against the feudalistic system and the liberating of the broad masses of the working people. The principles of democracy and of people's livelihood had to be imbued with new content by setting out clearly the anti-feudalistic slogans. Only in this way could the revolutionary Chinese people again secure a revolutionary direction and be mobilised, and the Kuomintang go along a proper revolutionary way and acquire new vitality through unity with the revolutionary people.

The questions should be asked: Who were the first ones to bring such a clear revolutionary policy to the Chinese people? Who helped Dr. Sun Yat-sen to turn this revolutionary programme into the programme of the Kuomintang? Who other than the Chinese Communist Party? Since the revolution of 1911, the Kuomintang had been isolated, ignored by the people and the youth. After its reorganisation the situation changed. The Kuomintang began to connect with the people and once more draw the youth. Was this not because of the new programme against imperialism and feudalism? Besides, thanks to the brilliant far-sightedness of Dr. Sun Yat-sen and his real supporters in the Kuomintang, should not the Kuomintang feel any gratitude to the Chinese Communist Party for this new programme? Should it not ascribe any merit to the Chinese Communist Party?

The author of *China's Destiny* himself experienced these events. Please reflect. Why doesn't he write down the page of history? Is it "justice" to disregard it? Is it "honesty"?

Furthermore, were there any troops under Generalissimo Sun Yat-sen which could be counted on as a revolutionary army before the reorganisation of the Kuomintang? Were there any troops which could stand a battle? Dr. Sun had attempted many North Expeditions, but was there a single expedition that was successful? Things changed after the reorganisation. The Whampoa Academy was established to train revolutionary cadets. The men who initiated the foundation and organisation of the academy were Dr. Sun Yat-sen, Mr. Liao Chung-kai and

the Russian advisors. The author of *China's Destiny* did not then recognise the importance of this academy, and even did not want to be the president.

This was how the first revolutionary troops came into being. They defeated Chen Chun-ming twice; they beat down Yang Shi-min and Liu Tseng-huan and were at last able to carry out the Northern Expedition. The foundation and achievements of the revolutionary army at that time were historically unprecedented. For several decades Dr. Sun had failed in his searching for the right direction. But in co-operation with the Chinese Communist Party and the Soviet Union, great military successes were achieved within a few short years. Whose merit was it that the Kuomintang was capable of extending its power to Wuhan and Nanking and holds its present position to-day? Please reflect! Why don't they write down this page of history? Is it "justice" to disregard these facts? Is this called "honesty"?

Mr. Chiang says: "The Kuomintang arose from the original, national moralities, with affection, faith, responsibility and duty as the basic principles of organising the party. Unlike other parties and groups, it does not use dexterous tricks and cruel intrigues at all, nor does it resort to self-interest and selfishness as its instinct of combination."

Well, please look into history! History is the witness. The help which the Chinese Communist Party rendered to the Kuomintang was so big and so decisive that since 1924 all the revolutionary achievements of the Kuomintang have been inseparable from the name of the Chinese Communist Party. In the military sphere, for instance, how many Chinese Communists and members of the Communist Youth League sacrificed their lives in the two Eastern campaigns and on several fronts of the Northern Expedition while at the head of their fellow soldiers? Mr. Chiang himself acknowledged that the blood sacrificed by the Communists and the Kuomintang members is inseparable when he wrote a preface to the Alumni Souvenir Album of the Whampoa Academy.

But what did the representatives of the big bourgeoisie offer the Communists as a "reward"? After having unified Kwantung Province and gained a certain position, the representatives of the big capitalists double-crossed the Communists upon whom they had formerly depended. The so-called "Incident of the Gunboat *Chung-san*" was fabricated on March 20, 1926. This incident, according to the author, was plotted by the Communist Party. But historical examples are plentiful. Did Hitler not talk of a plot by the German Communist Party after he burnt the Reichstag? The reason why the representatives of the Chinese

big bourgeoisie carried out such a criminal plot on March 20 was because their aim was to create a pretext for driving out the Chinese Communists from the Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang, the Whampoa Academy and from the main posts of the National Revolutionary Army, and to restrict the activities of the Communists within the Kuomintang. They created this plot because they knew well that the Chinese Communist Party did not want to break the united front and they expected that the Communists were honest enough to be easily cheated.

Was that called "reason"? Was that not playing "dexterous tricks or cruel intrigues"? Was that not "self-interest and selfishness"? Was that "justice"? Was that "honesty"?

Nevertheless, the man who plotted the March 20 incident had not yet prepared at that time to annihilate all the Communists, because he had not yet arrived at Nanking, because the Communists still had certain usefulness for him. We shall not discuss here the many important faults within the Communist Party that had already come into being under the opportunist leadership of Chen Tu-hsiu. But it was definitely correct for the Chinese Communists at that time to insist upon co-operation with the Kuomintang and to support the Northern Expedition. While holding this correct line, the Chinese Communists heroically participated in military operations. Of the great number of party representatives and political workers in all the main forces of the National Revolutionary Army whose victories amazed the world, were the majority members of the Chinese Communist Party and the Communist Youth League? The Chinese Communists had also organised the people, organised plain-cloth squadrons throughout the country, organised three workers' uprisings in Shanghai to co-ordinate with the action of the military forces and created a Great Revolution unprecedented in China.

On one hand, the representatives of the big capitalist perceived the necessity of using the Communists and revolutionary workers and peasants to serve their own purpose of arriving at Nanking and securing the controlling position in the country. On the other hand, they prepared for the massacre under the name of the "purge" once they succeeded in these objects.

The fault of the Communists then was that they were too innocent. They paid no attention to the cruel counter-revolutionary intrigues of the big bourgeoisie while they were helping the Northern Expedition and launching the Great Revolution. And the guilt of the opportunist leadership of Chen Tu-hsiu lies in the fact that it actually helped the successful realisation of this counter-revolutionary scheme of the big capitalists.

There is no precedent in Chinese history, even in world history, for the horrors of the "purge" which began on April 12, 1927. Innumerable heroic and patriotic Communists, revolutionary workers and peasants, as well as members of the Kuomintang who were really faithful to revolutionary principles and the Three Policies of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, fell suddenly and unexpectedly under the executioners' swords of the big bourgeoisie.

This was the "faith" of an ally of yesterday! This was the "justice" and "honesty" of the big capitalist! These were not "dexterous tricks and cruel intrigues"! This was not "self-interest and selfishness"! Only those who were killed innocently were accused of "dexterous tricks or cruel intrigues" and of resorting to "self-interest and selfishness"! Who is it intended to deceive? The heavens?

We have long ceased to talk about the above-mentioned events. We have been tolerant indeed during the war of resistance for the cause of the country. But now Mr. Chiang has mentioned these events and made all kinds of vicious and slanderous accusations against the Communist Party. Indeed, we Communists and all the Chinese people with justice and enthusiasm would let those things be forgotten if they were not mentioned. But once they are mentioned our hearts cannot help being filled with anger, because the Chinese Communists have shed their blood! It is the blood of innumerable revolutionaries and able young men and toiling workers and peasants! It is the blood of the elite of this nation! Since the beginning of the "purge", too many people have died under the sword of the Kuomintang! Too many!

Mr. Chiang says: "I cannot make clear even today the inside story of the Wang-Communist collaboration—whether the Communist Party was utilised by Wang Ching-wei, or Wang Ching-wei was utilised by the Communist Party, or whether they mutually-utilised." This question Mr. Chiang advances is a strange one indeed. But it involves a big plot. It is hinted that the Chinese Communists conspired with the traitor Wang Ching-wei. Well, let us come to history. Everybody knows that in the course of the Great Revolution of 1925-27 there was not only a "Wang-Communist collaboration" when Wang Ching-wei was still revolutionary, but also a "Chiang-Communist collaboration" when Mr. Chiang was still a revolutionary. There was also a "Chiang-Wang collaboration" when Wang Ching-wei was still revolutionary. At the time when Wang Ching-wei was still revolutionary, why should we not have collaborated with him? Just as at the time when you, Mr. Chiang, were still revolutionary, why should we not have collaborated with you?

As for "utilising", who intended to utilise others is too clear a

historical fact. The Communists have no need to utilise anyone, but they are of the opinion that there is necessity to co-operate with certain people under the condition that such co-operation is favourable to the revolution. But there were some persons who really intended to make use of the Communists. They made use of the situation when it was favourable to them, but if anything occurred to impede their own aims, they murdered their friends. Wang Ching-wei did so and so did Chiang Kai-shek.

Let us put these questions to Mr. Chiang. After the Mukden Incident on September 18, 1931, Wang Ching-wei collaborated for a long time with Mr. Chiang. Wang Ching-wei had not signed treacherous agreements and become a traitor at the time of the "Wang-Communist collaboration". But things were completely different at the time of the "Wang-Chiang collaboration". As the president of the Executive Yuan and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Wang Ching-wei put forth the treacherous policy of "negotiation while preparing for defence", signed the Shanghai Truce, the Tangku Truce and Ho-Umetzu Agreement, proclaimed a "good-neighbour policy" and negotiated with Japan. After the outbreak of the war of resistance, when Mr. Chiang became the Director-General of the Kuomintang, Wang Ching-wei became the Vice-Director and was appointed by the C.E.C. of the Kuomintang to the chairmanship of the People's Political Council and other posts. But he escaped from Chungking to Nanking and became the No. 1 traitor. We cannot even today make clear the inside story of all these collaborations, whether Wang Ching-wei was utilised by Chiang Kai-shek or Chiang Kai-shek was utilised by Wang Ching-wei, or whether they mutually utilised each other.

Writing of the failure of the national revolution midway in its course and the split between the Kuomintang and the Communist Party in 1927, which aroused a civil war lasting for ten years, Mr. Chiang blames the whole crime on the greedy hands of the traitor Wang Ching-wei by saying that "it happened because of the tragedy of the split between Nanking and Wuhan". Here it seems that the author depreciates himself and honours the traitor Wang Ching-wei too much. Please have an eye to history and see how the split between Nanking and Wuhan really took place. Was it not due to the "party purge" that began on April 12, 1927? Whose greedy hands were responsible for the "purge" of April 12? Is it not you, Mr. Chiang, who should have the credit?

It was after the split between Nanking and Wuhan, not before the split, that Wang Ching-wei went to Wuhan and speculated in revolution. When Wuhan was menaced by the imperialists and the reactionary Nanking Government, Wang Ching-wei

turned from wavering to reaction. Did not the "purging movement" of Wang Ching-wei follow your "purging movement" against the Communists, Mr. Chiang?

The profound idea of the author in this paragraph seems to be that the Communist Party would have been annihilated once for all, and that the "Communist Problem" would exist no longer, had it not been for the Wuhan Government. The author is wrong. In any circumstance, the Communists can never be wiped out by slaughtering. The Communists never die. The Chinese Communist Party is like "the wild grass which can never be burnt away and which will grow again under the spring breeze". History has proved this.

Mr. Chiang Kai-shek further enumerates a lot of the so-called "crimes" allegedly committed by the Communist Party. But "crimes" can be manufactured so easily. Mr. Chiang has slaughtered without pity more than a million people who were the nation's elite and the momentum behind the Eastern Campaign and the Northern Expedition. So why should it be difficult for him to fabricate "crimes"? Is there any necessity to talk of "conscience"? The Chinese Communists know that when slaughtering it is necessary to change all the merits of the victims into crimes. This is, of course, the proper "logic" of "cruel intrigues". Chinese Communists have experienced innumerable and terrible misfortunes and know the lord high executioners are these self-appointed representatives of "benevolence, righteousness, superior conducts and original morality".

It is true that "the experiences of this period of revolution were too painful, the losses of the country were too heavy and the people's sacrifices were too terrible". But where is the repentance of the executioners?

Who launched the ten years' civil war? The Communists and the revolutionary workers and peasants were compelled to fight in self-defence. Should not they have done this? Is it really true that the governor has the right to burn houses while the people have no right to light a lamp? Is it necessary that Communists and revolutionaries should not take up arms in self-defence, but should instead, like lambs, be willingly cheated, arrested, tortured and killed?

To help the peasants to obtain the land and develop their own production was what we Communists did during the Agrarian Revolution. This constituted our "unpardonable crime of rebellion". But was it a crime? Were we criminal when we sought prosperity for the peasantry which constitutes more than 80% of the whole population?

Who were responsible for flooding Chinese territory with blood,

while the army marched forward to destroy our peaceful villages? Please refer to the figures given in your official reports during the ten years' civil war. You killed hundreds and thousands of "bandits" here in one day, and hundreds and thousands of "bandits" there another day. The so-called "bandits" were none other than peaceful peasants in our peaceful villages. Towns and villages were burnt by the so-called "Bandit-suppression Army". Cannons, aeroplanes and machine-guns supplied by foreign countries were concentrated to bomb our peaceful villages. They were glad to burn down even the rice and wheat in the fields of our peaceful peasants. This is "honesty"! This is "benevolence, righteousness and morality"!

With fortitude and pain the Chinese Communists have fought together with the people, led the Red Army, broke through "punitive encirclements" and succeeded in preserving the elite of the Chinese people. They have forged an army with experience of thousands of engagements, able to resist more than half the Japanese troops in China and defend half of China's territories. If there were no Eighth Route and New Fourth Armies, which were forged by the Communist Party and which are fighting against the enemy troops in such great numbers, could the Kuomintang withstand the enemy attack independently with the Kuomintang troops alone? If the troops of the Kuomintang could not stand independently, then is it not possible that the enemy could already have driven straight into Chungking, Kunming, Sian and Lanchow? Then how could China have survived up to now? How could China be counted as one of the four big Powers? And how could the authoritative gentlemen of the Kuomintang still sit safely and snugly in Chungking?

Mr. Chiang says, "If there were no Three People's Principles, there would also be no resistance; if there were no Chinese Kuomintang, there would also be no revolution". But in fact the contrary is the truth. If there had been no Chinese Communist Party, the Three People's Principles would have no new content (first of all, the content of anti-imperialism, and of the abolition of unequal treaties in the Principle of Nationalism); if there had been no Chinese Communist Party, the Great Revolution would not have arrived. This is also true for the Kuomintang of today. If there had been no Chinese Communist Party, not only would the situation of the Great Revolution be unimaginable, but also the mighty war of resistance of the last six years. The Chinese Communist Party was born to fight for the well-being of the nation and the people, and to help everyone to do what is good for the people. We do not intend constantly to praise ourselves, but the wolf-hearted reactionaries in the Kuomintang not only

try to tread on the Communists after having used them, but also try to spread scandalous rumours against them. So long as a Communist still has a mouth to speak with, it is necessary for him to denounce these counter-revolutionary scandals.

That the Chinese Communists are loyal to their country is plain to all the world. Before the Sian Incident they repeatedly urged the Kuomintang to stop the internecine fighting, and to initiate a resistance through unity, but judging the Communists from their own selfish viewpoint, the Kuomintang thought the Communists were compelled to do this because they had come to a dead end. Nevertheless, when the Sian Incident broke out, the Chinese Communist Party not only did not take the opportunity to "loot during a fire", but instead, for the consolidation of the nation, it forgot the bitter enmity of the purging movement and the ten years' civil war and resolutely insisted on the release of Mr. Chiang. This was the reason for his release, yet he still tries to destroy the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies. To return evil for good has always been the philosophy of the big capitalists of China.

The Marco Polo Bridge Incident occurred, the war of resistance broke out, and the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies went immediately to the front and penetrated deeply into the occupied territories behind the enemy's lines with results known to the whole world. But what was the attitude of the Kuomintang towards them? Not only did it suppress the war news of the two Armies, but it also arrested the Communists on a large scale, killed them, rebuked them and attacked them. Large numbers of secret service men conspire to penetrate into the Communist Party, aspiring to attack it from the inside and outside so as completely to "destroy" it. Even in the occupied areas behind the enemy's lines, the troops under the leadership of the Kuomintang members have not attacked the Japanese troops but instead attacked the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies, who really attacked the Japanese troops, thus subjecting the two armies to blows by both the enemy and the Kuomintang troops. However, these are not called "dexterous tricks" or "cruel intrigues", "self-interest and selfishness", but rather "utmost justice", "utmost honesty" and "utmost unselfishness".

All the things mentioned above we have "endured for the nation". We have mentioned them neither in speeches nor in written words. However, the author of *China's Destiny* centres his attacks upon the Chinese Communist Party, and recently the Kuomintang published the news of the demand for "disbandment of the Chinese Communist Party" and "abolishing the Border Regions" through the official Central News Agency, and

meanwhile, has been preparing forces to invade the Border Regions. If, after all this, we still kept silence, we would feel sorry for all the Communists who have sacrificed themselves, but also for all our fellow-countrymen, for the Chinese nation and for our twenty-two years' Party history.

Chapter VII of *China's Destiny*, "The Artery of Chinese Revolutionary Reconstruction and the Pivot where China's Destiny is Determined", is the nucleus of the whole book. The central idea of this book is actually "one party, one principle, one leader", or that the Kuomintang is China and vice versa. The thought of "I am the State" of the French tyrant Louis XIV is completely revived here. To the citizens and youths of the whole country this chapter is full of words of threat and enticement, compelling them to join the Kuomintang and the San Min Chi I Youth Corps. In relation to all Communists, however, it is a pretext for slaughter. Those accusing words, "the new feudalism and the camouflaged warlords", are clearly meant for the Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies and all the anti-Japanese democratic bases. The author says: "If this behaviour of the feudal warlords is not corrected thoroughly and the determination of military partition is not given up fundamentally, any leniency towards them would be fruitless and I can't see any reasonable measures can be devised".

First, let us make a study of the "leniency" of Mr. Chiang and the Kuomintang authorities. We wonder if it can be called leniency to arrest the Communists, to kill them, to rebuke them, to attack them and to dispatch large numbers of secret agents to penetrate into the Communist Party.

Well, you may say the Communists deserve to be killed a thousand times. But how about other parties, the various social groups, the cultural and economic organisations, non-party people with a sense of justice, the youth, and even the genuinely patriotic Kuomintang members who are entirely non-Communist and not connected with the two armies and the anti-Japanese democratic bases? What kind of "leniency" have they ever got? Have they any freedom to publish their own views? Any freedom of assembly or association? Any freedom to refuse to act as secret agents? Have such Kuomintang members as Madame Sun Yat-sen (Soong Chin-ling), Madame Liao Chung-K'ai (Ho Hsiang-ning) and thousands or tens of thousands of others any freedom of speech or action?

In economic life, besides the fact that the people in the rear have no freedom to demand reduction of interest or rent, that the workers have no freedom to earn a living wage, can we say the medium and the small capitalists or the small producers have any

freedom to increase their output? Are not all the enterprises exclusively monopolised? Monopolised to such an extent as not to permit the small producers to get back their capital, resulting in the gradual decline of production? Can all this be called "leniency"?

However, Mr. Chiang and the authorities of the Kuomintang are certainly lenient with some. That is to say they are lenient with the local bullies and the oppressive gentry, with those dirty and avaricious officials, lenient with the several hundreds of anti-revolutionary secret service organisations—the rascals and outlaws of the whole country, lenient with the Fifth Columnists of the Japanese, lenient with the traitor clique under Wang Ching-wei, lenient with Tao Hsi-sheng, Wu Kai-hsian and so on, the spies of the Japanese and Wang Ching-wei, lenient with the thirty-three generals who capitulated to the enemy. There is really too much leniency, but pray, is it beneficial to the nation, to the country? What are its results—besides the destruction of the enthusiasm, self-confidence, self-respect and resourcefulness of our anti-Japanese people, and leading the country astray?

Next, let us examine the "camouflaged warlords". The Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies are holding over half of the enemy troops on the battlefields behind their own lines. Without any replenishments of guns, bullets or funds from the National Government, they fight with unprecedented valour as the most courageous volunteers of the nation. Can they be called "camouflaged warlords"? The Eighth Route and the New Fourth Armies came from the people, and are beloved by the people, because of their policies of unanimity between soldiers and officials and between soldiers and the civilians, of supporting the Government, of loving the people, and of production for self-sufficiency. If somebody has to call them "camouflaged warlords", what harm do these "warlords" do to the country and the nation? And what losses do the people suffer from them? On the contrary, would it not be better to have more of them? The more we have of them, the better, the more powerful will be our resistance, and the better-protected will be the people. We must inquire, who is a real warlord? Are not all the anti-Communist and anti-popular elements the real warlords? The real warlords flaunt their violence and lawlessness throughout the whole country, yet they are so shameless as to dare to rebuke the Communists as "camouflaged warlords".

Further, let us examine the new feudalism. Shall we take the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region as an example? We have democratic politics there. The people live in peace and enjoy

their work; the soldiers and civilians are unanimously and enthusiastically developing production; many labour heroes are appearing; the people and the Government, the functionaries and the masses, soldier and civilian are warmly united as members in one family; the savagery and poverty resulting from control by militarists, the rascally party members of the Kuomintang and secret agents, have been done away with during these several years; and now the people are gradually treading on the road towards plenty in food and clothing. Can this be called the "new feudalism"? If somebody has to call it "new feudalism", what harm is there in it to the country and the nation? What losses will the people suffer from it? On the contrary, it is better to have more of it. The more we have of it, the more broadly will the Three People's Principles be realised and the more quickly and completely will the last will of Dr. Sun Yat-sen be carried into effect.

But let us now look at the old feudalism in the rear of the main Chinese lines. The cruel and heartless oppression and exploitation, the oligarchic despotic policy, a hundred times worse than those of Emperor Chin the First, several hundreds of bandit-like anti-Communist secret service corps throughout the whole country, are not all these the familiar signs of compradore-feudal-Fascism of the Chinese style?

We are wondering what Mr. Chiang means by the statement "I cannot see that any reasonable measure can be devised". Does it mean that a civil war is the only solution of this problem? If this is true, for the sake of the nation and the people, we call for a stop to it. Were the experiences and lessons of the last ten-year civil war not sufficiently cruel?

Mr. Chiang says: "Formerly China's destiny relied on the foreign policy. . . . Hereafter it will depend on the internal policy. . . ." The spirit of Mr. Chiang's book may be summarised in two words, "internal problems".

Nevertheless, everyone knows well that up to the present a great part of our beautiful country is still in the hands of the enemy, and though Great Britain and the United States have abolished their unequal treaties with China, most of those rights were in the occupied areas, and we can reap no benefit from their surrender without a final victory over the Japanese robbers.

There are still many handicaps to overcome. The fundamental problem of today is one of opposing the invaders—to vanquish the enemy with unity, and not to attack one's fellow-fighters and prepare for a civil war. Mr. Chiang has suggested that the choice is between "consolidating sincerely, to serve the public and to obey the law" and "practising deception and falsehood, disobey-

ing regulations and misbehaving". This he considers the "watershed of China's destiny which will be decided in the period of the resistance and within two years". But there are still many questions to be asked. Are the preparation of friction, the instigation of civil war, and the attitude of "yours is mine and mine is also mine" methods of "sincere consolidation"? Those who capitulated against the country are free from chastisement; those who effectively resist the enemy's invasion are not rewarded; avaricious elements and wolf-hearted scoundrels are in authority; feudalism, absolutism and selfishness prevail. Is all this "to serve the public and to obey the law"? To force and entice the youths to spy for the secret services, to compel them to penetrate into the Communist Party, into all other "alien" parties and groups, and into mass organisations and intellectual and educational circles; to bring them up not as upright people, but as men of twofold character—is not this "deception and falsehood"? To refuse to realise the Three People's Principles and the Programme of Resistance and Reconstruction; to do what is exactly contrary to them—is not that "to disobey regulations and to misbehave"? Does the sentence "China's destiny will be decided in the period of resistance and within two years" mean that an internal front line will be organised within two years in order to destroy all "alien" parties?

We hope that these questions will be answered by Mr. Chiang. Because we know very well, since Fascism appeared openly or secretly in Chinese territory, it has been served up under various names. If this *China's Destiny* eventually becomes a tool of civil war, how will Mr. Chiang express himself before all our countrymen? It is no wonder that after the publication of the book in March 1943 the rumour began to spread that it was a war proclamation to the Chinese people, that it represents a preparation of ideology and general opinion for a civil war. "To decide the fate of China in two years" is clearly written down in this book.

Yes, there is certainly a group of gentry who intrigue to disband the Eighth Route Army, to dissolve the Shensi-Kansu-Ninghsia Border Region, and are preparing a large-scale civil war. They have even ordered one of their secret service organisations, composed of the vilest Trotskyists, to bark in Sian about the disbandment of the Communist Party—and the news was spread by the official Central News Agency.

But the Chinese Communists and the Chinese people have their own clear brains and hot blood. They will continually develop their daring spirit, struggling for the maintenance of the resistance against civil war, struggling for national consolidation against national split, struggling for the maintenance of the anti-

Japanese united front, for the resolute realisation of the Three People's Principles, for the ultimate victory over Japanese imperialism, and finally for the liberation of the Chinese people. It is precisely for these objects that, should the reactionaries dare to challenge them, they will stand up in self-defence. We would like to tell all these intriguers that the Chinese Communist Party can never be annihilated, that all the anti-Japanese democratic bases can never be annihilated, because the life, happiness and heroism of the Chinese nation can never be annihilated. The twenty-two years' history of the Chinese Communist Party is clear evidence of this. The Chinese people will surely advance along the road of progress and light, not retreat along the road of backwardness and darkness. Whoever dares to stand in their way will certainly have his pitiable little head broken.

Are the Communists "selfish"? The Chinese Communists give up their families and their homes for the nation and the people, and they are ready to give up their lives for the benefit of the people. There is not one among them who has sought his private gain out of the blood and sweat of the people. There is not a Communist who has grown rich as a result of his becoming a Communist. They endeavour to work for the people, but not to become officials, especially officials of high rank. Who "takes his individual lust as the premise"? Who "takes his individual benefits as the centre"? Please make a study of internal conditions in Kuomintang China. Outside the genuinely patriotic Kuomintang members, are there not many who accumulate private properties by squeezing the people? Are there not many who were penniless before, but became millionaires as soon as they got official position, and who are dissipated and shameless though rich and of high rank. Are these not known to all?

Alas! All these crimes are committed in the name of "justice", "honesty" and "unselfishness". There are certainly gentry who are planning the disbandment of the Communist Party and the abolition of the Border Regions, and are preparing for a large-scale civil war under the same flag of "justice", "honesty" and "unselfishness". What is all this, if it is not "to take one's individual lust as the premise" and "to take one's individual benefit as the centre"?

#### (v) An Appeal for the Future of China, and for the People, Youth and Children of China

What kind of country China should be after the war has been pointed out in the *New Democracy* of Comrade Mao Tse-tung and in the Manifesto of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the war

of resistance. But after reading *China's Destiny* we find there is room for suspicion that things are going differently and that it is necessary to make an appeal for justice in time. There is such an appeal in the Communist Party's Manifesto of July this year, opposing splitting and the civil war and insisting on unification and the war of resistance.

Politically, *China's Destiny* has taken the old despotism as its pattern. The author eulogises the Ching dynasty, saying: "In the Ching dynasty the scale of the national reconstruction was so magnificent and far-sighted and the political structures and codes were so well and precisely planned, that it could actually compare with the traditions of the Han and Tang dynasties and surpassed those of the Sung and the Ming dynasties, not to say the Yuan". Again he says: "So far as the politics of the various dynasties of China are concerned, a policy of 'leniency' was generally adopted towards the people. The people retained almost no connection with the Government except to pay their taxes. The Chinese people have enjoyed 'full freedom' from the earliest days. It is unnecessary for them to fight for freedom."

According to the author: "Since the unequal treaties were concluded the cultural circles of China lost their self-confidence. They followed blindly the theories of the foreigners, and some introduced the European thoughts of the eighteenth century to destroy the spirit of the 'rule by law' among Chinese citizens."

We, on the contrary, know that since democratic thought was introduced into China, it has opened the eyes of our people and caused them to rise up to fight for the overthrow of despotism. Dr. Sun Yat-sen was one such fighter. Yet according to the author all their efforts were wasted, because China was already well organised under the "rule of law" of early days. Does this not imply that if there were no unequal treaties every point of the old politics of China could be entirely good and right? Such an opinion is not only opposed to the democratic thought of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, but is also contrary to the hope of the Chinese people at the present hour and the aim of the Allies in the anti-Fascist war.

The author says again: "It ought to be realised that the democratic system of China should not take the democratic system of individualism and the class theory of Europe and America of the nineteenth century as its pattern." That is to say, the author not only wants no new democracy but he also wants no old democracy. He would not permit the people to enjoy any freedom. What is this if it is not the combination of Fascism and old absolutism—or new absolutism? What is this if not the compradore-feudalist-Fascism of the Chinese pattern? The so-called "democratic system" which the author proposes is nothing but another

name for this kind of Fascism or new absolutism. Is not "Fascist Germany" still called the "Republic Germany"?

Furthermore, the author has distorted the essence of the "Sun Yat-sen Theory", the theory that "understanding is difficult, action is easy" propounded by Dr. Sun, and given an opposite explanation for it. He eulogises the old saying of Confucius, "to enable the people to follow but not to understand". He eulogises the execution of Shao Tsen-mao by Confucius. The people-fooling philosophy of Confucius has been taken up openly. Confucius' cruel intrigue in executing Sheo Tsen-mao has been exposed clearly by Chang Tai-jen. Is it not clear that Mr. Chiang is actually insisting on the execution of all holders of opposite thought at the present hour, when most of the Allies are advocating freedom of thought in the anti-Fascist war? Mr. Chiang has given a warning to those who do not believe in the compradore-feudalist-Fascist or new absolutism. He would take all these people as Sheo Tsai-mao—and execute them.

The fundamental content of the so-called "Fundamental Problems of Revolution and Reconstruction" mentioned in the sixth chapter of *China's Destiny* is firstly opposition to democracy, and secondly opposition to freedom of thought. This is the real crisis destroying the spirit and thought of the Chinese people.

Everybody knows that the central thought of Dr. Sun Yat-sen, derived from his experiences of forty years, was to raise the masses of the people. This viewpoint is the exact opposite of the central thought of *China's Destiny*. Either to support the people or to oppress them is the fundamental problem of the Chinese revolution, the fundamental distinction between the revolutionary and counter-revolutionary political lines, the fundamental distinction between the national and anti-national political lines. The central problem of raising the masses is the problem of democracy and of freedom of thought, by which the forces of the people can be developed. The counter-revolutionary line is definitely opposed to this, and demands that the forces of the nation be killed. This is also the problem of national polity "in its real meaning but not in name", the problem of governmental polity, and the problem of the destiny of the nation and the future of the country.

That we are weak and have been insulted by the enemy is the result of the oppression of our people by despotic policies. If, after the war, our people are still oppressed by despotism, China will never be liberated. All reconstructions will be fruitless. This is not an exaggerated statement. The history of the past several decades has proved it to the hilt.

The secret-service-controlled education which the reactionary representatives of the big capitalists and the big landlords have



imposed in the Chinese rear is a tremendous injustice to youth. The masses of youth, with their unadulterated minds, enjoy no freedom to choose their line of thought based upon their own reason. Moreover, some of the reactionary elements have taken "left thought" as a bait to lure the youths, especially the more vital and capable. As soon as they are tempted to swallow this bait, they are compelled even to give their families or relations as hostages for their own lives. This policy has been imposed on the children of thirteen or fourteen years. These intrigues are not only no different from those of Hitler, Mussolini and Tojo, but they even surpass them. This is the policy of "protecting the youth" and "not utilising the youth". This is the policy of benevolence and sincerity! We dare to cry loudly to all the people of the whole country: This is the slaughter of youths and children! This is a tremendous spiritual calamity for Chinese youth, which has never suffered so before! This is a tremendous spiritual calamity for our Chinese nation!

*China's Destiny* has been described as a "Bible" to be read by all the youths and children in the rear. How brutal it is to compulsorily burden the brains of youths and children with such fabrications and distortions of history!

We appeal for the future of the Chinese nation, for the future of the Chinese people—the youths and children, the younger generation. We demand of Mr. Chiang Kai-shek, of all the patriotic members of the Kuomintang, of all anti-Japanese political parties and all our patriotic countrymen that they be united, that they insist on the war of resistance, that they oppose the civil war, that they insist on consolidation and oppose all splitting, that they insist on the theory of the Three People's Principles, that they oppose compradore-feudalist Fascism—the new absolutism. Let the Chinese people breathe freely! Give the youth and children of China the opportunity to choose their line of thought by the light of their own reason! Save the young generation of the nation. China must not go along the old road of despotism, civil war, darkness, slaughter and secret services! Let the new democracy, in which the people are their own masters, be born! Long live China!

